

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CASTLEREAGH

1815-1822

By the same Author

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*Viscount Castlereagh
from the portrait by Sir Thomas Lawrence, P.R.A.
in the National Portrait Gallery*

THE FOREIGN POLICY OF CASTLEREAGH

1815-1822

BRITAIN AND THE EUROPEAN ALLIANCE

BY

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TO MY FATHER, DANIEL WEBSTER,
FOR WHOSE AFFECTION AND FRIENDSHIP
I CAN NEVER BE SUFFICIENTLY
GRATEFUL

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PREFACE

THE researches on which this book is based were begun about fifteen years ago. I was induced to make them by a desire to ascertain more exactly the history of the European Alliance, which seemed to me specially important to the understanding both of British Foreign Policy in the nineteenth century and of the part Britain might play in instituting some new system of international diplomacy for the world as then constituted.

It was originally my intention to confine these researches to the period covered by this book, but when I began to investigate the nature of the European Alliance, I found that it was necessary to make a detailed study of the reconstruction of Europe in 1812-1815, as well as of the events of later years. I had nearly completed the collection of the material when the war interrupted my work. Towards its close, I wrote for the Foreign Office a monograph, *The Congress of Vienna*, 1814-15, which has since been supplemented by an account of the British policy during the years 1813-15 in volume i. of the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, and the publication of a collection of documents entitled *British Diplomacy 1813-15*.

In this book, therefore, I have been able to confine myself to the period 1815-1822. Perhaps three or four hundred thousand letters, dispatches and memoranda have been consulted, and it is obviously somewhat difficult to bring the results together into one volume. I have, however, attempted by numerous quotations from the original sources to enable readers to form their own conclusions. Appendices have also been added, which give some of the documents at greater length, necessarily only a tiny fragment of the whole, but

conveying, I hope, impressions such as no second-hand account can produce. Their spelling and punctuation has been modernised.

The chief temptation of the historian is not to take sides on behalf of a nation or a party, but to leave out inconvenient evidence, which complicates or blurs his presentation of the facts. But history, and particularly diplomatic history, is intricate and must necessarily often be obscure. It is not difficult to present an attractive case on this side or that, illustrated by appropriate selections from the large mass of evidence available. Castlereagh has, perhaps, suffered as much as any character in history from such treatment, and the European Alliance has been often used in similar fashion by publicists, who have obviously little knowledge of its problems. If I have been able to add something to the basis of historical fact on which such deductions must be founded, if they are to have any real value, the main object of this book will have been achieved.

The book is concerned with British policy, and that of other countries is only described and explained in so far as is necessary to make British policy clear. In particular I have tried to trace the relations between Britain and the European Alliance, and to describe in more detail than has hitherto been attempted the methods which Castlereagh employed in his efforts to institute a new system of diplomacy. I have also necessarily had to write a good deal about the policy of others who played a great part in that age, such as Alexander I. of Russia, Metternich, Richelieu and John Quincy Adams. But the point of view has always been that of Britain, and it is the reaction of European events on British policy which it has been my special object to reveal. One chapter only has been devoted to the New World, but here also the special object of the book has been taken into account, and the relations between Britain and the United States reduced into a smaller compass than their own importance would justify.

The most important evidence on which this book is based is that in the Foreign Office Papers in the Public Record Office. I have tried to make myself acquainted with all of it, though some parts of it have necessarily been more hastily

dealt with than I could have desired. The Foreign Office Papers are one whole. An Ambassador is instructed not only by the dispatches which he receives addressed to himself but by the copies of those addressed to and received from his colleagues in the Diplomatic Service, to which he is constantly referred. British policy towards Austria, for example, cannot be ascertained merely from a perusal of the correspondence with Vienna. The dispatches to and from Russia, Spain, Sicily, almost every other country in fact, are necessary to understand it.

Castlereagh's private papers in the Londonderry Archives I was not allowed to see, when I applied for permission in 1912, but so much of these have already been published that it appears improbable that what remains would materially affect my conclusions, much as it is to be desired that they may be given to the world.

The essential evidence for the study of British foreign policy is, however, not only found in Britain. The records of the conversations of the British Foreign Minister with the representatives of foreign States in London are sometimes of equal or even greater importance than his correspondence with his own subordinates. This is true of nearly all periods of modern history, but especially so of these years, when Britain was more closely connected with the common problems of Europe than at any other time in the nineteenth century.

It was not possible for me to visit all foreign Archives, but the most important were obviously those of the other members of the European Alliance, and, at Vienna, Paris, Petersburg ¹ and Berlin, I was able to obtain much information, the total effect of which is, in my opinion, to modify considerably conclusions based solely on the evidence of the Foreign Office Papers at the Record Office. The Vienna Archives were naturally the most important. The relations between Austria and Britain were so close and so delicate during these years that the records of Castlereagh's conversations with Prince Esterhazy are essential to the understanding of his policy.

¹ The modern capital of Russia has twice changed its name while this book was in course of construction. I have returned, therefore, to the name in common use during the period under review, omitting, however, the word Saint, which so often accompanied it.

Only a few extracts of the dispatches had been published by Stern in his *Geschichte Europas* and by other writers, and the private letters in which Esterhazy communicated his most intimate thoughts to his chief were entirely unused. Some extracts from these letters have been printed in Appendix E. There were also some hitherto unpublished private letters exchanged between Castlereagh and Metternich, of which those of the year 1822 are given in Appendix D.

The correspondence of Count Lieven at Petersburg had been surveyed by F. Martens in volume xi. of the *Recueil des Traités et Conventions entre la Russie et les Puissances étrangères*. His accounts are, however, very inadequate and even misleading summaries and omit much valuable information. Some extracts from Lieven's correspondence are given in Appendix F.

Part of the correspondence of the French Ambassadors was published by the Comte d'Antioche in his *Chateaubriand Ambassadeur à Londres* shortly after I had completed my own researches at Paris, but there was other information in them, interesting from the point of view of British policy, and I was also able to consult in the French records valuable accounts of the diplomatic Conferences of the period.

The Archives at Berlin did not contain material of the same value, while in the Hanover Archives, which I also visited, there was practically nothing of importance for this period.

The extracts in the text have been translated except for one or two phrases, whose meaning is obvious, but the dispatches in the Appendices have been left in their original French.

References to secondary authorities have only been occasionally made, and generally when some difference of opinion seemed to make them necessary, or where some material, otherwise unavailable, has been given in them. To have recorded in the footnotes all my obligations to other writers would have made them so unwieldy as to defeat their purpose. I must acknowledge here, however, my special obligations to the works of Professor Alison Philipps, who was the first historian to interpret Castlereagh's policy during this period in the light of some of the papers at the Record Office, and whose results have been published in volume x. of

the *Cambridge Modern History*, his *Confederation of Europe*, and volume ii. of the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*.

I have to acknowledge much friendly assistance and counsel, which has been most generously placed at my disposal. When I began my researches at the Record Office Dr. Hubert Hall was in charge of the documents, which were then only available under supervision, and to him as well as Mr. Headlam I owe a deep debt of gratitude. I must also express my sense of the great consideration and courtesy of the authorities in charge of the Foreign Office Archives at Vienna, Berlin, Petersburg, Hanover and Paris. To obtain quickly and accurately the evidence of foreign papers is no easy task, and such results as I have obtained were only made possible by the ever-ready assistance of those under whose charge they lay.

I am also indebted to two grants from the Research Fund of King's College, Cambridge, and in particular to an anonymous donor to that fund who enabled me to take advantage of it when of insufficient standing as a Fellow.

I owe much also to conversations with the late Professor Schiemann of the University of Berlin, who gave me some of Bernhardi's notes on this period, which he used for his *Geschichte Russlands*, with the late Professor Fournier of the University of Vienna, and with my most learned and kindly friend, Commandant M. H. Weil.

Professor A. F. Pribram, of the University of Vienna, was kind enough to read much of the book in typescript and to make many valuable suggestions. Professor H. W. C. Davis also read the proofs and gave me the great assistance of his scholarship and judgment. I have also to thank my colleague, Mr. Sydney Herbert, for many useful hints as well as for the great kindness of compiling the Index. M. Hauck assisted me with the preparation of the Appendices.

Above all I have to thank Mr. H. W. V. Temperley. Without his encouragement this book would probably never have been attempted, and he has given me much advice at every stage of it. From him I received the extracts of the *Howard de Walden MSS.*, which are quoted in the book, and much other valuable

information. I have also seen in typescript most of the first draft of his own *Foreign Policy of Canning* 1822-27, which will shortly be published, and to which I have been permitted to make one or two references. While, therefore, I must be considered as solely responsible for what appears in this book, where the point of view is, on one or two problems, somewhat different from his, yet my results would have been very different if I had not had the privilege of availing myself unreservedly of his unrivalled knowledge of diplomatic transactions and his acute and penetrating criticism.

I must be permitted also to record my thanks to the publishers of this book, whose patience and sympathy have never failed me.

Lastly, without the help of my wife this book could not have been written.

C. K. W.

ABERYSTWYTH,

July 1924.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	PAGE
PREFACE - - - - -	v
NOTE ON THE SYSTEM OF REFERENCES - - - -	xiv
 CHAPTER	
I. THE FACTORS OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ALLIANCE - - - - -	1
1. The Crown, the Cabinet, Parliament and Public Opinion - - - - -	3
2. The Foreign Minister and the Diplomatic Machine	29
3. The Principles of Policy: the Quadruple Alliance	47
 II. FROM VIENNA TO AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: THE ALLIANCE IN ACTION, 1815-1818 - - - - -	 61
1. Castlereagh and the New Diplomacy. Great Powers and Small, 1815-1818 - - - -	63
2. France in Tutelage, 1815-1818 - - - -	74
3. Russian Activities and Austrian Fears, 1815-1818	88
 III. THE CONFERENCE OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE: THE ALLIANCE RE-STATED, 1818 - - - - -	 119
1. The Preliminaries and Form of the Conference -	121
2. The Personnel and the British Instructions -	131
3. The Scope and Nature of the Alliance - -	142
4. Other Questions - - - - -	167
 IV. FROM PRECAUTION TO ALARM: THE ALLIANCE SUS- PENDED, 1819-1820 - - - - -	 173
1. Metternich and the Russian Bogey in Italy, 1819	175
2. Unrest and Reaction in Germany, 1819-1820 -	186
3. Reviving France and the Alliance, 1819-1820 -	199

CHAPTER	PAGE
V. REVOLUTION AND NON-INTERVENTION: THE ALLIANCE	
CHECKED, 1820 - - - - -	215
1. The King, the Queen, and the Cabinet, 1820-1821 - - - - -	217
2. The Revolution in Spain and the State Paper of May 5, 1820 - - - - -	226
<i>Note.</i> The Authorship of the State Paper of May 5, 1820 - - - - -	245
3. The Portuguese Revolution, 1820-1822 - - - - -	247
VI. TROPPAU AND LAIBACH: THE ALLIANCE DISRUPTED, 1820-1821 - - - - -	257
1. The Neapolitan Revolution, 1820 - - - - -	259
2. The Conference of Troppau, 1820 - - - - -	285
3. The Conference of Laibach, 1821 - - - - -	312
VII. THE EASTERN QUESTION: BACK TO THE ALLIANCE, 1821-1822 - - - - -	347
1. The Greek Revolution, 1821 - - - - -	349
2. The Hanover Interview, 1821 - - - - -	367
3. The Struggle for Peace, 1821-1822 - - - - -	383
<i>Note.</i> The Repayment of the Austrian Loan - - - - -	401
VIII. BRITAIN AND THE NEW WORLD: THE ALLIANCE IN THE BACKGROUND, 1815-1822 - - - - -	403
1. The Emancipation of the Spanish Colonies - - - - -	405
2. Britain and the United States - - - - -	437
3. The Abolition of the Slave Trade - - - - -	454
IX. THE DEATH OF CASTLEREAGH: THE END OF THE ALLIANCE, 1822 - - - - -	467
1. The Spanish Problem: Preparations for Last Conference - - - - -	469
2. The Death of Castlereagh and its Consequences - - - - -	482
3. Castlereagh and the Alliance - - - - -	490

TABLE OF CONTENTS

xiii

APPENDICES

	PAGE
A. Castlereagh's Circular Dispatch, January 1, 1816	509
B. Observations of the Duke of Wellington upon the Memorandum by Lord Castlereagh, April 1820 -	513
C. Separate Dispatches and Letters from Lord Stewart to Castlereagh, 1820-1821 - - -	515
D. Private Correspondence between Castlereagh and Metternich, 1822 - - - - -	537
E. Private Letters from Esterhazy to Metternich, 1819-1822 - - - - -	550
F. Dispatches from Lieven to Nesselrode, 1818-1822	562
G. Private Correspondence between Joseph Planta and Stratford-Canning, 1821-1822 - - -	581
INDEX - - - - -	585

NOTE ON THE SYSTEM OF REFERENCES.

I. UNPUBLISHED SOURCES.

- (i) The Foreign Office papers in the Record Office are referred to by the name of the country and the number of the volume (e.g. *F.O. Russia* 102). The numbers allotted to each series in the *List of Foreign Office Records* have not been inserted. Nor is the number of the dispatch given, except in the *F.O. Continent* series, where there are a great many of the same date.
- (ii) The quotations from the Vienna *Staats-Archiv* are nearly all from the series *England*. This word has therefore been omitted. Where any other series has been used (e.g. *Frankreich*), the title is inserted. References have also been given to the *Weisungen* (Instructions), *Berichte* (Reports), and *Varia*, and to the numbers of the series and the cartons in which the papers are contained (e.g. *Vienna St. A. Weisungen* 210, vii.).
- (iii) Similarly the quotations from the papers in the *Archives des affaires étrangères* at Paris are mainly from the series *Angleterre*. This word has therefore been omitted. Where any other series (e.g. *France*) has been used the title is inserted. References have been made to the number of the volume and folio (e.g. *Paris A.A.E.* 612, f. 72).
- (iv) For the papers at the *Staats-Archiv* at Berlin and at the Foreign Office Archives at Petersburg merely the date and the abbreviation *Berlin St. A.* and *Pet. Arch.* have been used, since the classification of the papers is hardly sufficiently detailed to make it worth while to add a more specific reference.
All dates of Russian documents have been given in new style.

II. PUBLISHED SOURCES.

Abbreviations have been used to refer to five collections to which many references have been made.

- (i) *C.C.* =Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh. Edited by his brother the third Marquess of Londonderry. 12 vols. London 1848-53.
- (ii) *W.S.D.* =Supplementary Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of the Duke of Wellington. Edited by his son. 12 vols. London 1858-72.
- (iii) *W.N.D.* =Despatches, Correspondence and Memoranda of the Duke of Wellington. Edited by his son. Vol. I. London 1867.
- (iv) *B.F.S.P.* =British and Foreign State Papers. Edited by the Librarian of the Foreign Office [Sir E. Hertslet]. Vols. 1 to 10. London 1825-41.
- (v) *I.R.H.S.* =The Collections of the Imperial Russian Historical Society. Vols. 54, 112, 119, 127. Petersburg 1886-1910.

Other works have been referred to by Author and Short Title. Nearly all will be found in the Bibliographies of the *Cambridge Modern History* and the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*. The title of those not to be found there has, it is hoped, been made sufficiently detailed to facilitate reference, if desired. In no case has use been made of the abbreviations *op. cit.* and *loc. cit.*, which have often tried the author's temper.

CHAPTER I

THE FACTORS OF FOREIGN POLICY: THE FOUNDATIONS OF THE ALLIANCE

1. THE CROWN, THE CABINET, PARLIAMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION.
2. THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DIPLOMATIC MACHINE.
3. THE PRINCIPLES OF POLICY: THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE.

“ Les traités sont l’expression des rapports qui existent, au moment où ils sont conclus, entre les forces matérielles et les forces morales des États qui les concluent.”—ALBERT SOREL.

CHAPTER I

I. THE CROWN, THE CABINET, PARLIAMENT AND PUBLIC OPINION

DURING the seven years which followed the Second Peace of Paris, British foreign policy, both in principle and method, followed a course entirely different from any that had previously existed. Though it was broken off sharply in 1822 and never again resumed during the nineteenth century, this experiment left a permanent impress on European diplomacy. It was, of course, a result of the long struggle against the French Revolution and Napoleon. But the special shape which this influence assumed was due mainly to the work of the British Foreign Minister, Viscount Castlereagh. To him, more than any one else, was due the Treaty of Alliance which originated in the necessity of guarding against the return of French aggression. Even more particularly his invention was the new system of Conferences which was associated with it. The problems raised by this experiment were too difficult to be solved in that age. The original intention of the Alliance was distorted by the continental Autocracies, and Britain failed to support an institution which eventually lost entirely its original character and became in other hands a mere instrument of repression.

During Castlereagh's life-time it was, however, kept in something like its original form by his personal influence in the councils of his own country and Europe; when he died there was nothing to check the disruptive forces. In this book an attempt is made to trace in some detail the history of this singular experiment in the foreign policy of Britain.

The institution of monarchy triumphantly survived the attacks of the French Revolution and Napoleon. In the final settlement the legitimacy of thrones was better recognised than that of republics. Habsburg and Hohenzollern, Romanoff and Bourbon ruled over territories as extensive and more compact than those of 1792. Bernadotte and Orange had grafted new dynasties on old lines in Scandinavia and the Netherlands. In Naples, Spain, Portugal, Piedmont, the feeblest representatives of ancient houses were reinstated in full sovereignty. If Germany had lost many of her petty princelings, four old families had acquired the royal title. Meanwhile the ancient Republics of Holland, Genoa and Venice had disappeared as completely as Napoleon's mushroom creations. The Divine Right of Kings had been vindicated.

The House of Hanover shared to the fullest extent in this good fortune. Republican principles had never obtained many adherents in Britain and few survived Napoleon. The dynasty became a symbol of resistance to foreign aggression and domestic revolution. This is one reason why the monarchy, apparently so unpopular after the Peace, was regarded as an indispensable institution by all classes of the population. George III., indeed, had never been so popular. His reason had completely gone, and, blind and deaf, he was by far the most pitiable representative of royalty in an age when most monarchs were defective in intellect. But his subjects, who had disliked him intensely at some moments of his reign, now professed an affection and respect which were certainly sincere. He could, at any rate, do them no harm.

His place was already filled by the Regent, his eldest son, who became George IV. on his father's death in 1820. The Regent's vices and unpopularity have been the theme of many writers and some historians, but few have investigated the exact extent of his power and influence. That he was dissolute, profligate and treacherous has been universally admitted. The pamphleteer and the caricaturist, never so savage as in his day, have depicted a soul and body so monstrously debauched as to appear almost incredible. Yet George handed on a great inheritance to his successor, and almost the last

act of Canning, the most brilliant minister of his age, and not himself unmindful of popular favour, was to assert the royal prerogative against the attacks of the aristocracy and to win the victory. Either the monarch or the monarchy must have had somewhere big reserves of power.

This strength lay, perhaps, mainly in its secret and intangible nature. The royal power had not yet been entirely appropriated by the Ministers but they had always to assume the responsibility for George's crimes and errors. It was, indeed, sometimes difficult to decide whether George brought more unpopularity on his Ministers than they on him. But the Ministers could be called to account: George could only be abused. Nor must the unpopularity of the Regent be exaggerated. Most monarchs are twitted by the wits and hangers-on who leave behind them diaries and table talk; most monarchs are criticised by their Ministers; and most monarchs would have been hooted and stoned by such a mob as then could be so easily raised in London, if protected by such slender means as defended George. Few monarchs have received more magnificent demonstrations of loyalty than George when, after eleven years' reign as Regent, he went first as a crowned king to Dublin and Edinburgh. Those who, like the Tsar or Queen Caroline, took the abuse of the London mob as an index of George's popularity with his subjects were ultimately bound to suffer disappointment.

It is true that amongst all classes there were few illusions on some points of the character of their monarch. But some of his vices—his drunkenness, his gambling, his extravagance—were by no means calculated to decrease his popularity with many of his subjects. More serious were the charges of deceitfulness and treachery which were brought against him. Yet, if George had betrayed the Whigs and his best friend, he had acted more as a monarch rather than as a man. The nation, as a whole, so far as it had opinions, was undoubtedly on his side. Few, except his intimate advisers, knew the extraordinary difficulties which George's character caused his Ministers. He was indeed the most selfish and rapacious of men, who put his own pleasure and his own lusts above the necessities of the State. But some Ministers used these

traits to their advantage, others simply put up with them. It was only the dramatic episode of the Divorce that revealed them to the public, and even then party and mob violence and the doubtful merits of his accusers soon produced a reaction in favour of one who was, after all, a King and must therefore be judged by special rules.¹

Nor did George ever lose completely the charm and brilliance which distinguished him as a young man. When he was not thwarted in his passions or desires he could be as winning as any of his subjects. Few could resist his *bonhomie* and tact when he cared to exercise them. He had a strong will and an intelligent mind. He had also acquired a great experience of men and affairs. Above all, he was the most human and approachable of Princes. The free and easy life of the Pavilion at Brighton or the Cottage in Windsor Park, might lack dignity, but it was also entirely without that aloofness and stiffness which cut off Louis XVIII. from all ordinary intercourse with his subjects. At his private table, presided over by a mistress to whom he was affectionate and gallant, George was the best of hosts and entertainers. Good fare, good music, a regard for the arts and a bawdy humour, much appreciated, were always in evidence. This broad humanity, which identified him with his subjects, penetrated far beyond the inner circle which enjoyed it. Not that George was insensible to or incapable of the spectacular side of his office. If his person had by this time become corpulent and undignified, he did his best to make it presentable, and he who had rivalled Beau Brummel in his youth owned more changes of costume than any other King of England ever possessed. Even the curses of the mob were turned to plaudits by the splendour of his coronation.

In any case George was indispensable. The whole fabric of the State depended on his existence. By none, but a few fanatics or dreamers, was his overthrow ever imagined except

¹ Mr. Fortescue, who has seen papers not accessible to other historians, is convinced "that he inherited a taint of his father's madness" (*History of the British Army*, xi. 59, note). The charge was indeed sometimes made during his life-time by those who wished specially to insult and hurt him. But until 1822, unless a habit of lying in bed till 3 p.m. be considered sufficient evidence, his words and actions are those of a sane, if extraordinary, person.

as a symbol of the destruction of all order and authority. The best had to be made of him even by those who hated and detested him most.

This fact is of importance to the foreign policy of Britain during his reign. For George, though a constitutional ruler, exercised an influence on the acts of his Government which, intangible, elusive and uncertain, was perhaps more apparent in foreign affairs than in any other business of state. He had, in the first place, considerable knowledge. The Foreign Minister indeed, as will be seen, did not allow either the Court or his own colleagues to interfere much in the details of his office. But the most important dispatches were submitted to the Regent, and he always took an especial interest in foreign policy. The visit of the Tsar, the King of Prussia and their principal Ministers in 1814, had given him a personal acquaintance which he endeavoured in vain to renew. That project, so long harboured, his Ministers were able to thwart, but George had at least access to the representatives of foreign Courts in London. With these, and above all, with Prince Esterhazy, the Austrian Ambassador, he had constant and intimate intercourse and discussed with great freedom the policy of his Ministers. So much so, indeed, that on more than one occasion the latter had to protest and remind, if not their own master, at least foreign Courts, of the impropriety of such conduct. To the end, however, George criticised his Cabinet freely to those who enjoyed his confidence, and the correspondence of the foreign Ambassadors is full of his indiscretions. In return, he obtained much secret history from them and, though perhaps he loved best the lighter gossip of their Courts, yet he was always fully acquainted with the details of policy. Above all, he knew all about the personages of Europe. Chateaubriand was astonished to find that he had all the details of French Society at his finger tips.

Moreover, he was ruler of Hanover as well as of Britain. There he, in theory at any rate, exercised despotic power, and a duplicate set of machinery was at his command. Count Münster, who directed the foreign policy of Hanover, was shrewd and well-informed and, though he took good care

not to offend the King's Ministers, yet reported directly to his Sovereign and kept him in touch with many matters in which the British Government had only a minor interest.

Amongst his brother monarchs George had decided and unconcealed preferences. Louis XVIII. had shocked his subjects on his return in 1814 by openly expressing his gratitude to the British crown, and George had undoubtedly assisted him back to his throne. Louis' gratitude did not go very deep at any time, but George always regarded himself as the special protector of the Bourbons. It was, however, the Emperor of Austria, whom he had never seen, who pleased him most. Inspired by Metternich, the Austrian Court encouraged the King's vanity and love of display, and personal messages were sent from one capital to the other through the intermediary of Esterhazy. This friendship was also partly due to George's intense dislike of Alexander, the Tsar of Russia, who was never forgiven for his conduct during the visit to London in 1814, when both the Tsar and his curious sister, Catharine, had treated the Regent with cold contempt and even threatened to recognise the Princess of Wales. George was offended and humiliated; and the fact had considerable effect on the policy of Britain during the Congress of Vienna. The influence of this incident persisted throughout the whole of this period.¹

George's attitude towards foreign affairs was based on good Trade Union principles. He was, as he often told Esterhazy, '*royaliste de métier*.' Throughout this period of revolution and reaction he was, therefore, naturally always on the side of royalty and against its attackers. There

¹ A full account of these events is given in the *Extrait des Mémoires de la Princesse Lieven*, printed by the Grand Duke Mikhailowitch in the *Correspondence de l'Empereur Alexandre I. avec sa sœur la Grande-Duchesse Catharine*. The rôle which the Grand Duchess herself played in this curious and dramatic episode is also seen in her letters. The mischief had been largely done before Alexander himself arrived in London. How deep it went may be seen by the fact that the Regent was deliberately rude to the Grand Duke Nicholas, Alexander's brother and later Tsar, when he paid a visit to Britain in 1816-7 (Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands unter Nikolaus I.*, i. 210). The Austrian Arch-Dukes, John and Lewis, were on the other hand received with extravagant warmth, which did not, however, prevent the young men from summing up the Regent and his Court pretty accurately (E. von Wertheimer, *Aufenthalt der Erzherzoge Johann und Ludwig in England, 1815-16*. *Archiv. für Oest. Geschichte*, lxxviii, 1892).

was thus at the centre of power a constant and pervading influence on the side of repression. But it was more important that George was interested in Europe and regarded himself as part of the continental fraternity of monarchs. Popular opinion was drifting in the other direction and eventually carried the Government with it. But the King's knowledge and interest were certainly of some assistance to Castlereagh in the effort which he made to institute a new system of policy for Britain and Europe.

This was perhaps the King's most important contribution to foreign policy during Castlereagh's life-time. He had little or no direct influence on the rest of that minister's actions. There was no such controversy as to ways and means which affected Canning's policy and forced him to become alternately democrat and courtier. Castlereagh had, by 1816, established an ascendancy over the Regent's mind which enabled the Minister ultimately to control his master's policy on all questions of foreign affairs. He could not, indeed, always check the royal extravagances and indiscretions, but he could always prevent them from exercising a malign influence. George had ideas and predilections of his own, but, in the long run, he was always prepared to subordinate them to the advice of his Foreign Minister whom he trusted above all his colleagues. Yet indirectly the King profoundly affected Castlereagh's career. For, as will be seen, the Divorce question estranged the King and his Ministers at a most critical moment in foreign affairs. The Government were immobilised by the private passions of their master, and Castlereagh, who bore the burden of the consequences, both domestic and foreign, lost his reason and life as a result of the double strain to which he was subjected.

George, like most rulers, had his 'camarilla' of intimates and associates, round whom much gossip centred and who were suspected of interfering in affairs of State. There is little evidence, however, that their influence extended very far. In appointments and minor matters in which George could get his own way by a display of obstinacy they had a certain amount of control. But this did not affect foreign policy. With the Marchioness of Hertford, a dignified lady

well over fifty, who looked her age and was received by the old Queen, George had most decorous and conventional relations. Her husband, the father of a more notorious son, controlled, as Lord Chamberlain, the apparatus of the Court. He had much influence in Parliament and was a strong supporter of the Tory Government. The Hertfords were connected with Castlereagh by marriage and Lady Castlereagh was an intimate of the Marchioness. Sir Benjamin Bloomfield, who acted as the King's Private Secretary until 1822, was also reputed to have much influence over his master. But there was no conflict between these individuals and the Government with whom they were in full sympathy. It was not until George changed his mistress and attempted to divorce his wife (1820-21) that his private life was to affect the policy of the Government.

The death of the old Queen Charlotte in 1818 made no difference to foreign politics, though her stiff and formal Court had been appreciated by the Diplomatic Circle. But in 1815 only George's daughter, the Princess Charlotte, stood between his six brothers and the throne. Any of the royal dukes might therefore become important to foreign Courts. For the moment they had no influence on foreign affairs, nor, indeed, much in domestic politics, except to bring the family into contempt by their amazing habits.

The Duke of York was an excellent Commander-in-chief, but his private life was so disorganised as to make his sanity or at least that of his Duchess very suspect. The principal occupation of the rest of the family was to pile up debts and illegitimate children. They all took, however, a good deal of interest in public affairs, even the hated Duke of Cumberland, whose wife, the sister-in-law of the King of Prussia, was of too bad a reputation to be received by Queen Charlotte. The Duke of York, the Duke of Clarence, and the Duke of Cambridge were all sound Tories. But the Dukes of Kent and Gloucester had more liberal views, while the Duke of Sussex was much in request at Whig meetings. None had a legitimate heir and the future of the monarchy as an institution appeared to depend on the Princess Charlotte. She had suffered much from both her father and mother and was

a gawky, garrulous girl with no great attractions. Her refusal in 1814 to marry the Prince of Orange had infuriated her father and helped to turn him against the Tsar and Countess Lieven, the wife of the Russian Ambassador, to whose influence it was unjustly ascribed. This marriage had been designed by Castlereagh as an important item in his continental policy, and it was he who arranged a substitute. In 1816 the Princess was married to Prince Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, the Regent allowing the match only at the urgent request of his Minister.¹

The death of the Princess Charlotte in 1817 made the succession again problematical and induced two of the royal brothers to marry in the hope of producing legitimate offspring—the Duke of Clarence, who, like the Duke of Sussex, had been refused by the Tsar's sister in 1814, and the Duke of Kent, who had for some time been giving his serious attention to such a step. As early, indeed, as 1816 the Duke of Kent had suggested to the Russian Ambassador that a Baden princess was a suitable match for him, and solicited and obtained the loan of a thousand guineas from the Tsar to pay the expenses of a journey of inspection. This was unfortunately of no avail, but the Duke was in 1817 more successful elsewhere. His gratitude to the Tsar for his previous help was, however, shewn in the fact that his infant daughter bore only the name of Alexandrina in addition to that of her mother Victoria.²

Though the Dukes did not profit as much financially as they considered the merits of their actions deserved, the settlement of the succession was an important incident in foreign as well as domestic politics. Not only did it remove the possibility of the sinister and unpopular Duke of Cumberland succeeding his brothers, but it took away much opportunity for intrigue both from courtiers and foreign Powers. Even as it was, after the death of Caroline, projects for the King's marriage were seriously discussed in various quarters, fortunately without result.

¹ Dr. E. G. Corti, *Leopold I. of Belgium*, 37.

² Lieven to Nesselrode, Feb. 6, March 12, Aug. 11, 1816: *Pet. Arch., Stanhope Conversations*, 295. The Duke had no sooner received his loan than he pleaded for the addition of a bearskin. The reason adduced for the name of Alexandrina in Mr. Lytton Strachey's *Queen Victoria*, 18-19, depends, like much else in that delightful book, only on gossip. Alexandrina was the last name that George would have inflicted on his niece, though it may well be that he refused to have his own associated with it.

The responsibility for foreign affairs rested not with the Regent but with the Cabinet of Lord Liverpool, which had come into being in 1812 after the assassination of Perceval. It had a continuous life until dissolved by the illness of the Prime Minister in 1827—a record which no other Ministry has ever approached. The reasons for this remarkable longevity were various, partly the wish of George IV., partly the weakness of the Whigs, partly the prestige and glory won by the glorious ending of the long struggle against France. Nearly all its members had spent the whole of their political life in waging war against the French Revolution and Napoleon. They possessed, therefore, a fixed set of ideas about popular and democratic movements which they associated with the overthrow of all established institutions and aggressive warfare against weaker States. Naturally such men were unfitted to cope with the difficult economic and social problems which inevitably arose when peace at last came. These would, in any case, have been severe enough, but they were made much more formidable by the extraordinary changes which the Industrial Revolution was producing in Britain.

In foreign affairs their outlook was insular and limited. They had viewed the Continental struggle almost entirely from the angle of Britain. They never succeeded in obtaining the European point of view which Castlereagh and Wellington, who had shared personally in the final stages of the War and the peace, were easily able to adopt. They had hated France and distrusted their Allies. That these emotions, which they shared with most of their countrymen, were not given more expression in the final settlement, was due almost entirely to the fact that they left the decisions to their Foreign Minister, who had a very different standpoint, based on a much more extensive knowledge of the necessities of Europe.

They were, on the whole, a very united Cabinet. They had passed triumphantly through a great crisis and had learnt to trust one another. They were divided, of course, on the question of Catholic Emancipation, but that division had now become one accepted as a normal feature of political life. On other matters they were, for the most part, prepared to accept the opinions of the members of the Cabinet immedi-

ately responsible—and this applied perhaps even more to foreign policy than to domestic affairs. Until Canning took his place in the Cabinet at the end of 1816, only three colleagues supported Castlereagh in the Commons, and none of these could speak well. The debating power of the Ministry was therefore very weak, though in Palmerston, Huskisson and Peel (until 1818) it had, in subordinate office, men of great power and intelligence. It made little effort to enlist other younger men of distinction, a reproach which Wellington at a later date admitted as just. The Government was certainly a complacent one, and opponents like Brougham or Hume, who saw all their most violent attacks fall harmlessly on the thick hide of its supporters, could find no words sufficient to describe its stupidity and ignorance. In domestic affairs there was some truth in these charges, at any rate for the first few years after 1815. In foreign affairs, however, Castlereagh alone was more than a match for all his critics, and until 1820 he had Canning at his side.

Some share of the credit for the long life of his Ministry must be given to the character of the Prime Minister, which united just those qualities which tend to keep a Government in office. Had Liverpool been a more tenacious or a more brilliant man, his Cabinet would probably never have survived some of its difficulties; had he been less experienced, less tactful and less judicious, it is certain that it would not have done so. At any rate, when in 1821 he lost for a time his usual good humour, his Cabinet nearly collapsed. Not least amongst his stronger points was a tendency to 'Methodistic principles,' which made him popular with an important and increasing section of the population. Destined for public life from his early youth, he was given minor office at the age of twenty-five in 1795. When he became Prime Minister in 1812 he had, except for one brief interval, remained in office since 1795, and had already held all three Secretaryships of State. He was thus especially fitted to exercise that supervision over the foreign policy of the Government which is always one of the chief functions of its head. Liverpool, however, interfered as rarely as possible in the departments of his Ministers. Even in the great events

of 1814-15, when Castlereagh had played the principal part in the pacification of Europe, he had limited himself almost entirely to conveying in a tentative and tactful manner the views of the Cabinet, who were often alarmed at the courage and even audacity of some of Castlereagh's plans. Liverpool would have undoubtedly preferred Canning to Castlereagh as Foreign Minister in 1812; but when Canning threw his chance away by a foolish display of impatience and jealousy, Liverpool supported Castlereagh wholeheartedly, and by the end of 1815 had come to trust him completely. Thus, though his general outlook on foreign affairs was by no means that of Castlereagh, he interfered as rarely as possible in his colleague's work. He hardly ever gave interviews to the foreign Ambassadors and Ministers and, if he did, was as non-committal as possible. Sometimes when the occasion was very important and a formal Cabinet decision had to be taken, Castlereagh would suggest that Liverpool should be seen personally. But this, as Esterhazy noted, was only for form's sake. In the debates in the Lords, however, the Prime Minister often chose a line of defence very different to that of Castlereagh, often, too, more effective. He was a singularly precise and accurate debater. The Duke of Wellington once remarked that Liverpool and Pitt were the only speakers he remembered "who were quite sure of themselves—who knew exactly what they were going to say."

The Prime Minister naturally saw the most important dispatches, and the drafts of the important Memoranda which defined British policy were always submitted to him and generally to the whole Cabinet. Some of these, as will be seen, revealed how much difference there was between Castlereagh and his colleagues and occasioned considerable discussion. On the whole, the Prime Minister was on the side of caution and restraint, but where the Foreign Minister, as he often did, took his own line, Liverpool never seems to have resented it. Throughout the whole period, indeed, and not only in foreign policy, Castlereagh was a far more powerful member of the Cabinet than the Prime Minister, for as leader of the House of Commons, as Foreign Minister and as the special confidant of the Prince Regent, he had, in a sense, more responsibility and more influence than his chief. There was talk indeed as

early as 1816 of a change of Prime Ministers but, though this was actually contemplated at a later date, nothing ever impaired in the slightest degree the friendship of the two men or their mutual confidence and trust. Some bitter critics said that Liverpool was content with the title and emoluments of his position and cared little for real power. His friends said more truly that his modesty and self-abnegation were due to a sincere appreciation of the merits of others and a singular disregard of popular renown.

None of the rest of the Cabinet, except Wellington who had a special position both in Britain and Europe, played much part in foreign affairs. The Earl of Bathurst, Secretary of State for War and Colonies, who had had experience of the office of Foreign Minister, acted as deputy once or twice, but he was considered to exercise his office on such occasions '*avec beaucoup de nonchalance*.' He shared with Wellington and Liverpool the privilege of seeing the bulk of the papers, and with them and Castlereagh he formed the Inner Cabinet for foreign affairs which always exists in some shape or other in all British Administrations. But he does not seem to have had much influence in it or indeed many ideas outside the routine of his own office. He was, indeed, a man whose ambition and energy lagged behind his general ability and capacity for administration. Lord Melville at the Admiralty was even more absorbed in the duties of his own office, and gave no trouble.

Viscount Sidmouth, Home Secretary, was also too occupied with the plots and agitations which troubled his department to take much interest in the problems of his colleagues. The Old Guard in the Lords, Eldon, the Lord Chancellor, Harrowby, Lord President, Westmoreland, Lord Privy Seal, Mulgrave, Master General of the Ordnance, and Earl Camden, occasionally spoke in the upper chamber on foreign affairs, but their main function was to act as ballast. They were all men of great experience and reputation. Eldon, of course, was a powerful personality of the most reactionary principles, and in judicial matters he still exercised a commanding influence. But he did not interfere in foreign affairs. Harrowby, Pitt's Foreign Minister, whose public duties had

sharpened the edge of a keen sense of humour, had too great a regard for Castlereagh ever to challenge him ; while the honest and straightforward Camden was connected with Castlereagh by marriage and in the Cabinet without office as a sort of concession to him. Westmoreland, the *Sot Privé* of Canning's gibes, was quiet enough in these years, while Mulgrave's most important contribution to general policy was to resign his office in favour of Wellington in 1818.

Where such stalwarts were satisfied it was not likely that Castlereagh's colleagues in the Commons would have much to say. Neither Vansittart, the incredibly bad Chancellor of the Exchequer, nor the easy-going Robinson, later Viscount Goderich and Earl of Ripon, who was fortunately content to allow the policy of the Board of Trade to be determined by abler men like Wallace and Huskisson, still less nonentities like Wellesley Pole and Bragge Bathurst, had any claim to be heard. Castlereagh, indeed, had constantly to cover their deficiencies in the House and they had little or no influence on his foreign policy.

Only two members of the Cabinet, in fact, had the ability and knowledge necessary to enable them to share with the Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary any real responsibility for the conduct of foreign policy—Wellington and Canning. Wellington had replaced Castlereagh at Vienna in 1815 and shared with him the main responsibility of the final settlement with France. His prestige after Waterloo was such as to make him, in a very real sense, the principal military adviser, not only of Britain, but of the whole Alliance, and rarely has a great soldier rendered more useful services to friend and foe alike than Wellington by his unwavering support of Castlereagh in the successful effort which the latter made to protect France from the attempts at spoliation and revenge. It was inevitable that Wellington should be the Commander-in-chief of the Allied Army of Occupation in 1815-1818, and, as will be seen, in this capacity he exercised great influence over international affairs. At the end of October 1818, he was offered a post in the Cabinet as Master-General of the Ordnance. His letter of acceptance to the Prime Minister revealed an attitude towards party politics which characterised

all his later life and often made him the despair of friends and foes alike: "I don't doubt that the party of which the present government are the head, will give me credit for being sincerely attached to them and their interests: but I hope that, in case any circumstances should occur to remove them from power, they will allow me to consider myself to take any line I may at the time think proper. The experience which I have acquired during my long service abroad has convinced me that a factious opposition to the government is highly injurious to the interests of the country; and thinking as I do now, I could not become a party to such an opposition, and I wish that this may be clearly understood by those persons with whom I am now about to engage as a colleague in government." ¹

This frank stipulation was accepted by the Government, who were only too anxious to obtain the advantage and protection of Wellington's prestige and authority. It gave to him a position of independence of which he never scrupled to make use when he thought that he could interfere in any question to advantage. In foreign affairs particularly he constantly communicated his personal opinion on matters of grave interest to foreigners, even when his ideas were in opposition to those of his colleagues. When military problems were mixed, as they so often are, with political, he considered it his duty to supply a technical appreciation of the situation to foreign Powers, if they desired it. It was thus that he supplied advice on the military expeditions against Naples, Spain and Turkey to Austria, France and Russia, though in each case his Government had protested against the action contemplated. Such conduct has naturally puzzled historians, but there was no suggestion of treachery in the Duke's actions. He considered himself to occupy, as indeed he did, a special position in Europe and acted accordingly. Fortunately in foreign policy generally his views were in almost complete accord with those of Castlereagh, beside whom he had taken his place at the European council-table, and for whose judgment and character he had the greatest admiration. His wide circle of European friends and his great knowledge and

¹ Wellington to Liverpool, Nov. 1, 1818: *W.S.D.* xii. 813.

experience of European affairs thus made him an invaluable colleague. He was indeed the only member of the Cabinet who at all understood and sympathised with the line of policy which Castlereagh pursued.

Canning joined the Cabinet in June 1816 and remained in it until the end of 1820. He was far the most brilliant of its members, and was to close his career as Castlereagh's successor with five years of magnificent energy which resulted in the Premiership and his death. But Canning had not at this time a position in the Cabinet to which his intellectual gifts entitled him. In 1812 Castlereagh had offered to give up the Foreign Office to Canning, if he was allowed to retain the lead of the House, a position which he could not relinquish without subjecting himself to an open humiliation. Canning, owing to bad advice and foolish jealousy, rejected this handsome offer. Apparently he thought that Liverpool's Government would soon fall or be reduced to soliciting his aid on any terms. The result was that he was excluded from the Ministry during the triumphant years of the war. He could not join the Opposition, for he had no grounds of quarrel with the Government other than his jealousy of Castlereagh. He disbanded his followers, and in 1814, to the dismay of his friends, accepted a special Embassy to Lisbon, the object of which was never realised, since the House of Braganza preferred to remain in the comparative safety and splendour of Brazil. By accepting such a position he had shewn, however, that his pride was humbled and that he was ready to come back, not on his own terms, but on those of the Government. His friend Liverpool therefore seized the first available opportunity and offered him, in 1816, the Presidency of the Board of Control of India, an important office but not one considered on an equality with a Secretaryship of State. Yet Canning accepted it and served in the House of Commons under Castlereagh's lead with absolute loyalty. The two men never, of course, became cordial or intimate. Castlereagh was not likely to shew any less reserve towards Canning than towards the rest of his colleagues. But there is no hint of friction or jealousy between them. They were apparently agreed on all public measures. Both were as strongly in favour of Catholic

Emancipation as they were opposed to Parliamentary Reform. In the debates in the House of Commons Canning's oratory was always available to assist the cumbrous but no less convincing arguments of the leader of the House.

Canning's influence might have been expected to have been powerfully exerted in foreign affairs, his own special sphere of action. But this was not so. He shared in the Cabinet proceedings, when the official Memoranda were submitted for their approval, and doubtless talked more than some of the others. But the world had changed a good deal since he was last in office in 1809, and his knowledge and experience could not compare with that of Castlereagh. Only during Castlereagh's absence at Aix-la-Chapelle does he seem to have taken up a critical position, and ultimately he seems to have been quite satisfied with the result. Having had no share in the transactions out of which the European Alliance arose, he appears, however, from the first to have viewed the obligations which it imposed with great distrust, and his influence was always thrown in the direction of reducing them to the lowest possible terms. His European connections, which were mainly with Paris, to which he paid more than one visit, perhaps helped him to this point of view. More probably he saw how unpopular such obligations were likely to become with his countrymen. He certainly shewed no more sympathy with revolutionary or democratic movements than his colleagues during these years, though perhaps he was not sorry to see the problems which they produced gradually weaken the ties which bound Britain to the Continent. At any rate, even as late as the middle of 1821 he was able to defend his late colleagues in the debate on Laibach, and during Castlereagh's life-time he never once embarrassed him by a single public gesture of disapproval.

In the Cabinet, then, Castlereagh had a very commanding position, but there was also Parliament to reckon with. This was no slight check on the conduct of affairs. It is true that the unreformed House of Commons was largely under the control of a Cabinet which possessed the confidence of the Crown. But there were limitations to the authority of the Government. The organised Opposition was, indeed, weak

enough at this time. Grenville's supporters had already begun that movement back to the Tory Party which brought them into the Government at the end of 1821. The Whigs were also rent by factions. But there was a floating body of independent members whose votes were often cast against the Government. Thus the Liverpool Ministry in the first year of the peace suffered heavy defeats which would have meant resignation or dissolution in a later age. Above all, its financial policy met with constant and hostile criticism. The main object of the propertied classes was to reduce the burden of taxation which they had borne reasonably enough during the war. The first action of the House of Commons when peace was fully assured was to abolish the Property (Income) Tax entirely, in spite of the protests of the Ministers. All expenditure was scrutinised with great severity. The Army, the Navy, and the Civil Services were reduced to the lowest possible establishments and their pay cut down. Even the sinecures which were distributed amongst the Government supporters were challenged on both sides of the House. In other matters the House was more amenable. It shared the feelings of the Government towards democratic reform and popular agitation. The reformers, whether of Parliamentary corruption, economic insanity or judicial savagery, were yet only a handful and their real strength was rather outside than inside the House.

In foreign affairs the House was more insular and more prejudiced than the Cabinet. It had accepted, almost without challenge, the settlement of 1814. Its criticisms of the proceedings of the Congress of Vienna had been spasmodic and ill-informed. The Tories accepted the overwhelming and un-anticipated triumphs as a testimony to their own foresight and efficiency. The Whigs were deprived of all authority, for their gloomy prophecies had all been proved false. Their leaders, too, were pitifully weak. In fact, during most of the period the Party was split into groups and without a recognised leader in the Commons. Whitbread, the boldest and best critic in 1814-15, Ponsonby, Horner and Romilly were all dead by 1818, two of them by their own hand. Tierney, who became leader in 1817, knew little of foreign politics and was

laughed at by many of his followers. Sir James Mackintosh was the most powerful critic of the Government, amongst men of repute, but he was terribly doctrinaire. Brougham, the greatest orator of the Opposition, had but a small following and knew little of his subject. Lord John Russell had only just begun to understudy Lord Holland. It was the little group of freelances, known as the 'Mountain,' who did most to damage the Government, but their criticism was too obviously factious to carry the more solid portion of the House. Sir Robert Wilson and Lord William Bentinck had knowledge and experience gained in semi-diplomatic service during the war, but neither was an expert Parliamentarian. In the Lords, Grey shewed little interest in foreign affairs, and in any case could rarely be enticed from Howick. It was Lord Holland and Lord Lansdowne who contributed most to the discussions. Their connections with continental Liberals served them well, and on the whole the debates in the Upper House were better informed and more useful than those in the Commons.

Nevertheless, the influence which Parliament exerted on the policy of the Government was profound. It had deep instincts and traditions which could not be ignored. In spite of its hatred of 'Jacobinism' and 'Revolution,' it had no love for autocrats. It might consider that other countries were scarcely fitted to enjoy the blessings of constitutional liberty so long enjoyed by the British aristocracy, but it viewed with no favour the tyranny and incompetence of such rulers as Ferdinand of Spain. As the dread of France wore off, Parliament evinced an intense dislike of continental entanglements, and though many of its members still responded to the appeal of the balance of power, they were by no means inclined to undertake the obligation to maintain it unless British interests were obviously and directly involved.

Moreover, new elements were growing up which were by no means confined to one party. 'Imperialism' in the modern sense did not exist. But the commercial classes were acquiring more and more direct representation in the House by purchase and election, and their interests in colonial and maritime questions far outweighed European considerations.

Before Castlereagh's death the repeal of the Navigation Acts had been begun, announcing the beginning of a new era in international trade, largely brought about by the startling developments in the New World.

Even greater influence was exerted by the rapidly growing religious section, the core of which was known as 'The Saints.' Its leader in the House was Wilberforce, whose activities were in the first place concentrated on the Abolition of the Slave Trade. His followers, who, to his embarrassment, had at one time been mainly Nonconformists or Republicans, now began to be more numerous in the most respectable portions of Church and State. The aristocracy and the clergy were still largely imbued with the cynical and philosophic outlook of the eighteenth century. But the change had already begun. Public affairs had begun to be tested by a standard derived from the teaching of Wesley and his school. The 'Nonconformist Conscience' was already shared by Tories and Churchmen, and was exercising an influence on the Government. The 'Saints' were still laughed at and lampooned, but they had begun perhaps the most powerful movement in domestic and foreign policy in the nineteenth century.

From a different standpoint the doctrinaire reformers often came to similar conclusions. They had as yet little influence in Parliament, but their attempts to find academic solutions of the evils which afflicted the world had already begun to influence public opinion, mainly in domestic matters, but, if more slowly, yet inevitably in foreign affairs also. The combination of these three forces gradually altered the outlook of Parliament. The emotions and interests evoked by the War were almost insensibly replaced by more humane and tolerant feelings, to which the ideas of nationality and self-government, hitherto associated with the excesses of the French Revolution, began to make a special appeal. This change was not, of course, consummated in this period, but its influence was already felt in no slight measure before its close. Metternich was warned of it as early as 1820 by Esterhazy. "It is not the real Radicalism which presents to the Government its greatest difficulties," the Ambassador wrote,

"but rather the disguised Liberalism. . . . This peril . . . the Government encounters not only in the ranks of its enemies, but also of its friends. The Liberalism which, in the question of the Slave Trade, expressed itself in the sentiments of a laudable philanthropy, has taken a more dangerous direction, and if ever there was a Liberalism of good faith, it is found in this country." ¹

Castlereagh had, moreover, to keep Parliament informed, to a certain extent, of his activities. It never abandoned its rights of information and criticism even at the most serious moments of the war. "So long as there is an English Parliament there will be a place of debate for all Europe," threatened Sir Sydney Smith at Vienna, and his words were repeated in his book on the Congress by De Pradt, one of the most astute publicists of Europe. The words were true, and throughout these years the actions of the Alliance were subjected to the jealous and increasingly hostile criticism of the British Parliament.

Criticism, however, depends for its efficacy on good information, and this the House never obtained. For this Castlereagh was more responsible than any one else, since he undoubtedly wished to avoid giving to the House full information as to all his activities. No Foreign Minister can avow all he does. This is particularly the case with one who is trying to co-operate with other Powers who approach continental problems from a very different point of view. He must necessarily make some compromise between their demands and those of his own countrymen. But Castlereagh went further than either common-sense, or sometimes perhaps than even common honesty allowed. He cut down the information to a minimum. The Treaties were, of course, laid before Parliament and obtained their sanction. But the process by which the Treaties had been made was often entirely obscured. Castlereagh had, for example, attempted to conceal entirely that at one period of the Congress of Vienna he had not only agreed but violently urged that Prussia should have the whole of Saxony. Similarly he had refused to reveal the

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, Sept. 16, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, viii.

policy which he had pursued towards Murat, and the documents which he laid before the House on this point were so mutilated as to prevent the truth from being known. These were undoubtedly delicate questions which had been solved in an unexpected manner, and the custom of his day, as of our own, allowed much latitude to a Foreign Minister so situated. There was to be less excuse for his actions in 1816-17, when he deliberately deceived Parliament in the question of the Sicilian Constitution. He had, in fact, no trust in public opinion. He preferred to keep Parliament in ignorance rather than to appeal to it boldly. It is the great defect in his career, and in one sense it made the rest of his policy of no avail, since he could not obtain for his plans the support of an enlightened body of opinion amongst his countrymen.

Castlereagh was, however, an excellent leader of the House. He was, indeed, no orator. His sentences were often ungrammatical and his speeches sometimes contained expressions so clumsy and uncouth as to expose him to the derision of his opponents. Yet he was effective in debate; for he could produce a strong impression on his listeners. His sincerity, his common-sense, his patriotism and his courage were always convincing, even if he could not find appropriate language to clothe his thoughts. On many occasions he saved the Government in a hard fought battle by sheer debating skill, having that instinct for choosing the right kind of argument which is more effective in the House of Commons than mere oratory. His worst efforts were made on financial questions which, it must be admitted, he never understood. But the financial situation, already terribly complicated by the War, was made even more so by Vansittart's blunders, and few other members of the House were equal to the emergency.

Almost as important as Parliament was the Press, which, since the outbreak of the War, had played an increasing part in determining public opinion. Its influence now extended to all classes of the population. "The lowest labourer reads his newspaper," announced the alarmed Lieven.¹ London had sixteen daily newspapers, besides its nineteen Sunday and many other weekly ones. Newspapers multiplied in the pro-

¹ Lieven to Nesselrode, April 26, 1818: *Pet. Arch.*

vinces. Their circulation increased continually. As their revenue increased they began to create elaborate organisation for the collection and dissemination of news. During the Napoleonic wars *The Times* with its special Packets often anticipated the official reports. In 1816 it began to print by steam.

All governments recognised the immense possibilities of this new force, and wherever they were strong enough they controlled the Press. In hardly any country were newspapers free to express their opinions without reserve. The autocratic monarchies could not, of course, tolerate outspoken criticism. In France the extent of the liberty of the Press was a continual subject of debate, and the rigour of control fluctuated with the strife of parties. In Germany the newspapers were subjected to increasing attacks from the reactionary forces. Only in one or two small countries, such as the Netherlands, were they able to defy the government with impunity. In these it must be admitted that liberty often meant license.

In Britain the Newspaper Press had already escaped completely from control. It had, indeed, to pay a tax which, in 1815, amounted to 4d. and was, in 1819, extended to all classes of publications, however cheap, which were concerned with political questions. This checked its circulation but otherwise it was free.¹ This freedom was indeed one of the reasons for its rapidly extending power. It was some time before the Ambassadors could convince their Governments of so important a fact, though they never ceased to point it out in the many reports on the Press which they sent home.

There were, of course, 'Government' and 'Opposition' papers, but they were nearly all entirely independent. During the negotiations at Paris in 1815, Castlereagh, at Talleyrand's request, protested to Liverpool against the tone of the British Press "in the hope that some means may be adopted of keeping some, at least, of the English papers a little more correctly informed and of moderating a system of defamation which can be productive of nothing in France . . . but confusion and civil war." Liverpool agreed with his charges but

¹ In 1821 the circulation of all the morning papers in London hardly amounted to more than 20,000. *Annual Register*, 1821, 721.

pointed out that there was no remedy: "No paper that has any character, and consequently an established sale, will accept money from the Government; and, indeed, their profits are so enormous in all critical times, when their support is most necessary, that no pecuniary assistance that Government could offer would really be worth their acceptance."¹

Against this independence all Governments had to contend. The game of Press propaganda, which was to play so large a part in the diplomatic transactions of the nineteenth century, had already begun. Only second-rate newspapers could be bought. But, if the Press could not be controlled, it could be wooed and flattered and personal influence could be exerted on proprietors or editors. Very clumsy and amateurish these efforts appear when compared with those of Bismarck and his age or our own times, but they were already making themselves felt. For the Tory Government they were managed principally by Croker, the Secretary of the Admiralty, whose diaries are more reliable, if not so amusing, as Creevey's, and Arbuthnot, Secretary of the Treasury, a friend of the Duke of Wellington. Both moved in the best society and had secrets worth knowing. They seemed to have shared in a loose informal manner the duties of a Government Press Bureau. Arbuthnot did the more direct and obvious propaganda, but Croker's relations with *The Times* and the superior quality of his mind made him perhaps the more important of the two.²

The newspapers which paid the greatest attention to foreign affairs were *The Times*, the *Courier*, the *New Times* and the *Morning Chronicle*. Of these, the *Courier* had the closest connection with the Government and was, indeed, looked upon throughout Europe as its official organ. It certainly inserted news or opinions to which the Government desired to give publicity. These were attributed mainly to Arbuthnot, but its support could not be reckoned upon with certainty, and while news could be put in, it could not be kept out. *The Times* was independent, but it had already begun to

¹ *British Diplomacy*, 378.

² Decazes to Dessolles, March 31, 1819: *Paris A.A.E.*, 612, f. 87. J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, iii. 471: "Croker is one of the scavengers of the Ministry, a Quarterly Reviewer, a Courier scribbler." *Bathurst MSS. (Hist. MSS. Commission, 1923)*, 489.

have those consultations with members of the Government which persisted throughout the century and helped to make it the most authoritative of British newspapers. The negotiations were even then conducted between Croker and the proprietor or editor, as between equal Powers. The *New Times*, on the other hand, had a regular subsidy and its editor saw Arbuthnot frequently. Possibly for this reason its influence soon disappeared. The *Morning Chronicle* was the principal critic of the Government and exercised at this period greater power than *The Times*. No newspaper was more feared by foreign governments, whom it attacked with the greatest ruthlessness. Its famous editor, Perry, was, as was noted at Paris, 'incorrigible' and 'incorruptible.' The *Morning Post* was even then renowned for its literary excellence; it attracted less attention for its political opinions. Of the weekly Press Cobbett's formidable *Political Register* was more concerned with domestic than foreign tyrants, but it sometimes turned the full blast of its invective in their direction. The inspired articles in the *Quarterly* and the *Edinburgh* sometimes did great execution, but more often these heavy guns came rather late into action.

Foreign governments were even more anxious than the British to get support in the London Press, which they studied closely. During the Congress of Vienna many attempts were made to influence British opinion in this way. After 1815 French parties were especially active to obtain in London the expression of opinions which were forbidden at Paris or would produce more effect there if proceeding from a supposedly impartial source. They supplied foreign correspondence free. At one time *The Times* was thus given much ultra-Royalist propaganda, while, during his Ministry, Decazes inspired a series of articles in that paper. During the first Richelieu ministry it was suggested to the French Government that it would be worth while to establish a newspaper under their control. The Ambassadors found the greater papers incorruptible, but some of the gutter Press of the time instituted attacks on foreign Powers with the express intention of being bought off. Metternich, who had a profound sense of Press control, saw the possibility of more subtle methods.

On one occasion he sent an article, which his Ambassador was ordered to get by hook or by crook inserted in the *Morning Chronicle*, Austria's most hostile critic, so that it could be reproduced in the continental Press as the view of the Opposition.¹

The total result of all this underhand work was not great. Its significance lies in the fact that it was thought worth while to attempt it. It shews that the Press had already begun to play an important part in the creation of public opinion and particularly in the sphere of foreign affairs. Its knowledge was as yet limited, and much of its news was the ignorant reproduction of articles in foreign newspapers. Its opinions were often violent and prejudiced. Its circulation seems insignificant when compared with modern figures. But it had already established itself as a factor in foreign policy. Its judgments were read with interest and concern over the whole of Europe. During the diplomatic Conferences of the period no information was more anxiously expected or more diligently studied than that of the London Newspapers.²

¹ Rapport confidentiel à son Excel^{le} M. le Marquis d'Osmond, Sept. 30, 1817: *Paris A.A.E.*, Supplement 21, f. 289. Lieven to Nesselrode, Jan. 17, 1819. *Pet. Arch.* Esterhazy to Metternich, Feb. 5, 1819. *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 209, ii. Metternich to Esterhazy, Jan. 31, 1822. *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 217, i.

² The correspondence of the foreign Ambassadors is full of information on the Press and its influence. They tend, of course, to repeat much unfounded gossip, which I have tried to reduce to due proportions in the above account. It is difficult to believe, for example, that the Paris correspondence of *The Times* was written for any length of time by two Abbés of pronounced reactionary views living in London. See also my *Congress of Vienna*, 94-95; Walpole, *History of England*, i. 379-384; Halévy, *Histoire du Peuple Anglais*, i. 156-161, Duvergier de Hauranne, *Histoire du Gouvernement Parlementaire en France*, iii. 505; and especially H. W. V. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-27*.

2. THE FOREIGN MINISTER AND THE DIPLOMATIC MACHINE

THE Crown, the Cabinet, Parliament and Press thus all had a share in determining British foreign policy. But by far the most important influence was the personal control exercised by the Foreign Minister himself, perhaps the most complete and effective ever established in the Parliamentary age. He had, by the end of the European settlement, established an ascendancy over his colleagues and Parliament which was partly due to their deficiencies, but partly also to the strength and energy of his own character. He maintained it throughout these years by an unwearied attention to business which eventually cost him his reason and his life.

Robert Stewart, later Viscount Castlereagh, had been born at Mount Stewart in County Down on June 18, 1769, the same year as Napoleon and Wellington. He came from the most tough and obstinate stock in the British Isles. He inherited a wonderful courage and persistence from his father as well as his striking grace and beauty. His gifted mother, the daughter of the Marquess of Hertford, died when he was seven years old. Like Liverpool and Canning, he was from his early youth destined by his father for office. Yet he was educated, not in an English public school, but in Ireland at Armagh. He went, however, to Cambridge University, and was there a diligent and successful student until, according to the custom of his age, he was taken away from St. John's College to make the grand tour in the two years immediately preceding the French Revolution. His seat in the Irish House of Commons was obtained in 1790 by profligate expenditure, which crippled his father financially for the rest of his life. The Revolutionary War diverted Castlereagh's attention from politics to

the duties of a colonel of militia, but he was given office in 1797, and in 1798⁸ became Chief Secretary of Ireland and carried through the Union of the Parliaments, on Pitt's behalf, by a ruthless expenditure of energy and money. In 1796 he had been made Viscount Castlereagh, a courtesy title, his father having been made Baron Stewart in 1789, Viscount Castlereagh in 1795, and Earl of Londonderry in 1796. In 1816 the son's merits created his father an Irish Marquess, and Castlereagh succeeded to the title in April 1821. Throughout this book he is given the name of Castlereagh, under which he has come down in history.

After the Union he was one of the most devoted and perhaps the most trusted of Pitt's lieutenants. He held the Board of Control while Lord Wellesley was organising and Sir Arthur conquering a new Empire in India. "He was thus brought into contact with Eastern problems at a time of unexampled difficulty and with the Wellesleys at the beginning of their wonderful career. Both experiences served him in good stead when he took over the War and Colonial Office in 1805, and resumed it after Pitt's death in 1807. The historian of the British Army has done justice to the administrative talents which he shewed in this office and his belief in and support of the work of Wellington. But no less remarkable was his general grasp of affairs. He assisted Pitt to draw up new schemes for the reconstruction of Europe and the guarding of its peace in 1805. These schemes he put into practice in the closing stages of the War, and throughout his career he never ceased to regard himself as Pitt's pupil and to ascribe to him the credit for his own success. In 1816 he received from the Pope the present of some sculpture as an acknowledgment of his help in restoring to Rome the works of art carried off by the French. "The four figures of Fame," he wrote in his letter of thanks, "are destined by me to ornament the four corners of an altar on which I shall place the bust of Mr. Pitt. I cannot render His Holiness' present a more respectful homage than by thus employing them to do honour to the memory of the individual to whom the world is most indebted, both for its peace and for its triumphs." ¹ But he

¹ To Cardinal Consalvi, Jan. 22, 1817: *F.O. Italian States*, 10.

learnt from Pitt's failures and those of succeeding Ministers the interdependence of politics and strategy. Thus, gradually, for he was laborious and cautious, he became a statesman whose principles were founded on a prolonged experience of men and events. The failure at Walcheren, which resulted in the duel with Canning, and kept both out of the Ministry from 1809-1812, provided him with not the least useful of his lessons.

He came back to the Foreign Office in 1812 at the blackest moment of the War. Napoleon was supreme from Portugal to Warsaw, and hostilities were about to break out with the United States. Few thought the new Minister likely to be a success, and Castlereagh himself was ready to hand over his office to Canning if allowed to retain the lead of the House to which Perceval's death had made him the obvious successor. When that offer was rejected, he took up the double responsibility with the same laborious zeal which had characterised every action of his life, and made an astounding success of both. A clumsy and uninspiring speaker, he became the best 'manager' of the unreformed House of Commons since Walpole. In 1815 he was not only the most important person in the Tory Cabinet but one of the principal figures of Europe. Both the overthrow of Napoleon and the reconstruction of Europe were due to him more than to any other single man. He had shewn not only courage and persistence, but resource and invention such as none of his friends had imagined him to possess. The experience which he had won and the prestige which he had acquired had thus set him apart from his colleagues, and only Wellington could move with the same assurance in the new Europe of Alexander and Metternich.

No man ever stood more alone. Except to his wife and brother, who were incapable of understanding him, his reserve was never broken until a few weeks before his death. As popular with his supporters and with the House generally as he was hated by the Radicals and the mob, he treated friends and foes alike with the same smiling unconcern. A display of impatience or anger on his part was treated as an event. His intellectual qualities were admittedly not brilliant, though

he had done well at College. The facility which he had acquired in impromptu debate in the House or round the council-table was the result of long-continued, unrelenting hard work. But the strength of his character, shewn in his inscrutability and indifference under the heaviest burdens of responsibility or the hottest attacks of the Whigs, was admitted even by those who were infuriated by his apparent calm.

Castlereagh, however, who had braved the criticism of the Peninsular campaign and the passion directed against his moderation in 1815, had now to face a more prolonged and more justifiable hostility. He had a foreign policy to direct which was at once new, intricate, and opposed to the prejudice of his countrymen. But he had also to bear the brunt of a domestic policy unwise, unpopular, and indeed impossible. He was not specially responsible for it, for his main energies were directed to his own department. But he had to defend Vansittart's blunders in finance and Sidmouth's panic policy of repression. In the House the task was not so difficult, since most of the aristocracy shared the Cabinet's fears and ignorance. But public opinion moved further and further away from the House of Commons, and the growing discontent was shewn, not only in the gusts of popular passion which assailed the Regent, Castlereagh and Wellington alike, but in more solid and bitter manifestations of hatred. After the Thistlewood plot in 1820, indeed, Castlereagh always carried pistols to guard himself against assassination. His Irish experiences, he said, had made him used to the precaution. Under the cold and calm exterior there was, however, a deep sensitiveness, which is shewn in his devotion to flowers and his love of mountain scenery. To such a nature the endurance of such implacable and deep-seated unpopularity must have been a heavy addition to his other burdens.

As Foreign Minister he was in a much happier position. He was popular and friendly, if not intimate, with all those with whom he had to deal. In spite of his reserve and inscrutability, he cultivated a singular directness of approach which went at once to the heart of the business to be transacted. His written notes and dispatches were often prolix and involved, though he could write an incisive and clear style

on occasion. This was doubtless one reason why he preferred personal intercourse to a written exchange of views. The more informal this was the better he was pleased. "His whole reception of me was very conciliatory," noted Rush. "There was a simplicity in his manner, the best and most attractive characteristic of a first interview. . . . He remarked that it had been his habit to treat of business in frank conversations ; a course which saved time and was in other ways preferable as a general one to official notes."¹

Since he was always overwhelmed with work, he was accustomed to set aside Sundays for these interviews when Parliament was sitting. More often than not it would take place at his country house at North Cray, in Kent, which was only fourteen miles from London. The house was little more than a cottage, set amid a garden full of flower beds. A simple and modest household was kept, though Lady Castlereagh had set up a small menagerie of beasts and birds. The foreign representatives often spent the night at Cray, and thus there was opportunity for long and intimate conversations, often in French, which Castlereagh spoke by now fairly fluently though with a bad accent.

In London high state was maintained. During the season the Foreign Minister naturally entertained much in his house in St. James' Square. There, in rooms, in one of which a picture of the Regent by Lawrence was hung, and where the porcelain vases and articles of *virtu* presented to Castlereagh by the continental Sovereigns were displayed in all their magnificence, an elaborate, if rather uncomfortable, hospitality was dispensed. Lady Castlereagh gave a reception every Saturday night, a time which was chosen to suit her husband's convenience, and because on that night guests might be expected to arrive by midnight, since the Opera and Covent Garden closed early.

Lady Castlereagh enjoyed these displays more than her husband. They had been married in 1794, and as Lady Emily Hobart was a daughter of the Earl of Buckinghamshire, the connection was of some political importance. She was a woman of some beauty, but her huge bulk was a constant

¹ Rush, *Residence at the Court of London* (1st series), 27, 32.

temptation to the wits, which was increased by a terrible habit of wearing formidable ornaments in her hair, including, on one famous occasion, her husband's Garter. But though she had no social tact or brilliance or a sense of humour, and her parties were reckoned a bore, she had an extraordinary devotion to her husband, whose career was the sole object of her life. "She never left her husband at any time," noted the daughter of the French Ambassador; "while he worked she was beside his desk. She followed him to town and to the country and accompanied him upon every journey. . . . She would spend nights of cold, hunger and weariness in miserable lodgings without complaining or seeming to feel any inconvenience. In short, she did her utmost to be as little in the way as possible throughout this apparent devotion. I say apparent, because their most intimate friends believed that in this respect she was following her own desires rather than those of Lord Castlereagh. He, however, never offered any objection. I have sometimes thought in later years that she may have discovered some signs of that illness, which was revealed to the world by the ultimate and dreadful catastrophe, and therefore desired to watch over him at all times and to relieve his sufferings. . . . Whatever the reason, Lady Castlereagh would never be separated an hour from her husband, yet no one ever accused her of attempting to exert an influence upon politics." There is no doubt, however, that Castlereagh returned to the full the affection of his wife. He could not bear to be away from her. "I don't know what you feel," runs a letter of this later period, "but I am quite determined never to pass from one country to another even *for a day* without you. You know how little I am given to professions, but I really of late felt your deprivation with an acuteness which is only known to those who are separated from those they most love." They had no children.¹

By this time the diplomatic machine had become a large and rather unwieldy concern. Its business had grown immensely after the Peace; the new Europe needed far more attention than the old, and a new world was coming into existence over-

¹ De Boigne *Memoirs* (Eng. Edn.), ii. 165; *Life*, by the Marchioness of Londonderry, 15.

seas. The organisation of the Foreign Office scarcely kept pace with these developments, and Castlereagh, like Pitt, trusted too much to his own powers of work and too little to the assistance of a well-organised department. The old Foreign Office in Downing Street was an inconvenient building, but it was the centre of government. The Cabinet met there until the middle of the century, and the Ministers could thus the more easily inspect the dispatches which were laid for their information in the Cabinet room. Only the Prime Minister, Bathurst, and Wellington were, however, kept constantly informed of diplomatic transactions.

In those days, when the Cabinet often scattered for months and the round of country house visits was customary, a Minister's office was often his carriage or an inn parlour. He was accustomed to do his work with his private secretaries and only left the routine affairs to be dealt with by his permanent officials, who had but little influence on the more important problems. Thus, even when in London, Castlereagh kept all the threads of the correspondence in his own hands. He spent regularly five or six hours a day in his office, but, of course, he could scarcely keep up with his work in the thick of the Parliamentary session. After 1819 he had often to plead pressure of Parliamentary business as an excuse of meagre instructions. When it is remembered that he wrote most of the drafts with his own hand, such excuses are intelligible; the marvel is that he kept up with his work so well, and that he had always the details of his correspondence at his finger tips.¹

In any case the methods of the Foreign Office made then, as now, the personal supervision of the Foreign Minister more necessary than in any other department. The public correspondence with the principal representatives at foreign Courts is always supplemented by private letters which often contain far more important and definite instructions than the more formal communications. The distinction is almost a matter of routine, though, of course, it varies a good deal at different times. Where a negotiation is in its first stages or where

¹ Alison states that he drafted all his dispatches "of the least moment" and was never behind-hand with his work, but Alison knew little about this period of his life: *Lives of Castlereagh and Sir Charles Stewart*, iii. 176.

matters of great delicacy are being discussed, or where reasons have to be adduced which are not easily avowed, both the Foreign Minister and representative generally use the private rather than the public form. Public dispatches were, indeed, used mainly for minor matters and communications meant for the eyes of the Cabinet or the foreign Court. The private letters were formal in tone, and might also be used in exactly the same way as the public ones if the negotiation developed in such a manner as to make that course advisable. Where there was a degree of intimacy between the Foreign Minister and his representative the private letters would be supplemented by other private letters, more personal in character and not intended in any event ever to be made public or even to be communicated to a successor in office. Many of these were kept by the two parties as their own private property, and to this day much of the correspondence by which the great departments of State are regulated is never placed in the archives of the offices.

The distinction between public and private papers was even looser in Castlereagh's day than our own. Few Foreign Ministers have, however, so far as our knowledge extends, left more intimate records in the public correspondence. At the Court of his principal Ally, Austria, Castlereagh was represented by Lord Stewart, his half-brother, with whom he was on the most intimate and affectionate terms. Much of their intimate private correspondence, especially that of the difficult years, 1820-21, remained part of the official records of the office.

The Foreign Office clerks were appointed by favour without reference to merit. They included many Etonians. Most intimately connected with the Foreign Minister were his private secretary and the two Under-Secretaries of State. Castlereagh's three private secretaries were all Etonians. He was fortunate in his first choice of Joseph Planta, who accompanied him on his missions to the Continent in 1814-15. His talents were from the first appreciated by Castlereagh, and his devotion and laborious service were of the utmost importance to his chief as afterwards to Canning, to whom he had been *précis* writer in 1809. He was as popular with the Diplomatic Service as with the foreign representatives, and his

appointment to the Under-Secretaryship in 1817, which broke all the traditions of the office, was greeted with a chorus of approval. He was succeeded by Lord Clanwilliam, who was scarcely so hard working, being fonder of feminine society than his predecessor, though Planta could write a good letter about lighter things than Protocols. Clanwilliam, however, won Castlereagh's approval, and was promoted to be Under-Secretary in his turn in 1822, when Woodbine Parish, who had been trained up for the purpose, succeeded him. All these young men were full of devotion to their chief, and were treated with the greatest kindness, if with the same reserve as all the rest.

The office was still organised in two sections, a Northern and a Southern, and was under two Under-Secretaries of State who, in theory, appear to have been on equality. The two Under-Secretaries in 1815 were two old hands, Edward Cooke and William Hamilton. Edward Cooke, an Etonian and Kingsman, was an official of great experience especially devoted to Castlereagh, with whom he had worked in Ireland and whom he had followed to his various departments and accompanied as principal official to the Congress of Vienna. The hot rooms and gaieties of the Congress ruined a constitution which was already weak and drove him to seek refuge in Rome. His bad health was the reason for his resignation in 1817, but he continued in intimate and affectionate relations with Castlereagh until his death in 1820.¹ The cultured William Hamilton, who had been appointed in 1809, had less intimate relations with Castlereagh, who preferred Planta, and he was left with the more routine duties of the office. But the fact that he was entrusted with so delicate a task as investigating Sir Charles Stuart's conduct at Paris shews that he had Castlereagh's confidence.²

¹ It is to be regretted that the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy* (iii. 554) has repeated a piece of cruel gossip which Stapleton published (*George Canning and his Times*, 356), that Cooke resigned from office at the Congress of Vienna as a protest against Castlereagh's Polish policy. The falsity of Stapleton's statement, which was not published till both Cooke and Planta were dead, can easily be seen by reference to Cooke's own letters from the Congress, printed in *W.S.D.* xi.

² Clanwilliam really acted as Under-Secretary from 1820 onwards, but Hamilton retained his appointment officially, to qualify for his pension, until a Mission was opened for him by A'Court's transfer from Naples to Madrid.

Their subordinates included several who afterwards became well-known, including the Librarian, the elder Hertslet, who re-organised in 1810 the Register of Papers, with such excellent results that they are, perhaps, more easily studied to-day than those of any other diplomatic archives. The messenger service was also brought under the Librarian's charge. It was one of the most efficient in Europe at a time when its duties were arduous in the extreme, and indeed resulted in the death of three messengers during this period. There were two regular routes, one to Germany and Russia via Cuxhaven; the other to France via Calais and thence to Vienna and Constantinople. The Italian and Spanish dispatches were sent by this route. Those for Portugal went by sea. Times varied immensely according to the weather and the diligence of the messengers. The record to Vienna was seven days, but more often it was nearer fourteen. Petersburg might take a month. The Minister at Washington was at one time left for over two months without instructions owing to bad weather in the Atlantic. The economical utilisation of the messengers was one of the first duties of the office and the diplomatic staff, for the Post could not be trusted. All letters were opened and copied by foreign governments, and though ciphers were used, two at least were compromised during these years.¹ ✓

All the permanent officials, up to the Secretary of State himself, received perquisites, which increased their no more than adequate salaries and were hid from the enquiring eyes of the economy group in the Commons. These made up Castlereagh's salary to £7000 a year. His subordinates had a bewildering variety of fees and presents, some of which were paid by the public, others by private individuals. In 1822 a levy of 5-10% was made on all salaries to satisfy the demands of the House of Commons for economy.

The Diplomatic Service was even more than the Foreign Office a field of patronage; it was also a training ground for

¹ Sir E. Hertslet, *Recollections of the Old Foreign Office*, chaps. viii., ix.; *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, iii. 557 ff.; and numerous references in the dispatches. Book ciphers appear to have been read almost as easily in that day as in our own, owing to special practice during the War. See Stanhope, *Conversations*, 77-78.

young men whose fathers had sufficient influence to get them admitted to the family circle of some diplomatist and sufficient money to keep them there while they acted as his clerks. Some of them eventually became permanent members of the profession; the majority returned home after a few years' experience. The higher appointments were, to a large extent, reserved for men who had influence with the Foreign Minister, or other members of the Cabinet.

The British Missions abroad had been re-organised after the War, and in 1816 were divided into seven classes, of which Paris, Petersburg, Vienna, Madrid, the Hague, and Constantinople were filled by Ambassadors. Then came Berlin filled by a Minister Plenipotentiary. Rio de Janeiro, Naples, and Washington were next; then Stockholm, Munich, Copenhagen, Turin; then Stuttgart, Florence, Berne, Dresden; and, lastly, Hamburg.¹ The service had been, of course, much dislocated by the War, and had been re-organised during the peace negotiations to suit the predilections of the Foreign Minister and his friends.

The two most important Embassies were filled with two ex-soldiers who had exercised semi-military, semi-diplomatic positions in the final stages of the War. Of these, Lord Stewart, Castlereagh's half-brother, was at Vienna, where the most important and delicate negotiations were to take place. He had some good qualities—courage, experience, and self-confidence. He was a friend of Wellington and the Prince Regent, who both called him by his personal name. Above all, he loved Castlereagh, who had also for him an affection which survived all Stewart's faults and blunders. These were many. His vanity and love of display made him indeed at times an object of ridicule to all Europe. Nor had he too many brains, though he was not without a certain shrewdness which enabled him to find out the shady side of Metternich's character. Until 1819 he had, at any rate, energy and a complete devotion to his duties. The marriage which he then made, in spite of Whig opposition, with one of the richest

¹ Lane-Poole, *Stratford Canning*, i 278. The Constantinople Embassy, which had only recently been made a definite part of the diplomatic service, stood on a different footing to the others, and thus there are seven classes.

heiresses in Britain, who brought him wealth but no social tact or experience, rendered him, unfortunately, much less serviceable to his chief. Still, he had Castlereagh's whole confidence and played a big rôle in diplomacy until his brother's death, which cut short his public career.

At Petersburg was the Earl of Cathcart, under whom Stewart had served at Copenhagen when Cathcart took the Danish Fleet. He had none of the necessary qualifications for his post, which had resulted from his Mission in 1812. But the Tsar liked him as a soldier and an old comrade in arms. In 1820 he was succeeded by Canning's friend, Charles Bagot, who had some of the real stuff of the diplomat in him. At Madrid, until 1822, was Wellington's younger brother, Sir Henry Wellesley, who had the prestige of the family name and the disillusioning experience of the Peninsular War behind him. He had much authority, but was perhaps a trifle too stiff and self-important for a post which needed much finesse and tact. The Earl of Clancarty, who, in addition to the Embassy at the Hague, represented Britain in the important negotiations at Frankfort arising out of the Vienna Treaty, was one of Castlereagh's greatest friends and admirers. He had done well at the Congress of Vienna and was a hard-working, if opinionated and reactionary, politician. Sir Robert Liston, who filled the Constantinople Embassy, was hardly sufficiently active for such an important post. Fortunately, before the crisis came in 1821, he had been replaced by a much stronger character, Lord Strangford. George Rose, at Berlin, was a dear, middle-aged gentleman, who took his duties very seriously but had not much ability.

All these had Castlereagh's confidence. At Paris, however, perhaps the most important post of all, was Sir Charles Stuart, who was suspected of Whig leanings and was never fully trusted by the Tory Cabinet. He was no fool, and his voluminous dispatches contain some good judgments of men and events. But he was too intriguing and too anxious for that kind of credit which is won at the expense of others. Perhaps it was only the many protests received from foreign Courts which made Castlereagh keep him there, for both he and Wellington, who, as usual, expressed his opinion freely to Stuart's brother

diplomats, were convinced that he was not fitted for the position which he held.

Amongst the juniors, besides Bagot who did some fine work at Washington before he went to Petersburg, there were two others of real merit. The young Stratford-Canning was first in Switzerland, where he had not much to do of importance, and later succeeded Bagot at Washington, a post scarcely suited to his temperament. Sir William A'Court, who was at Naples, had been sent there to get rid of Bentinck's Whig fancies and succeeded admirably. He was a vigorous and ambitious man who obtained long-solicited promotion to Madrid in 1822. At Turin was the Hon. William Hill, a recluse and a hypochondriac; at Florence Lord Burghersh, a Tory much interested in Italian art and music, and thus eventually in sympathy with Italian protests against foreign tyranny. Frederick Lamb at Frankfort, who was called by Gentz clever but lazy, penetrated successfully the intrigues and alarms of the German diet. Edward Thornton did well in Sweden until 1817, when he went to Brazil, a difficult post in which he did all that was possible. He was succeeded at Stockholm by Lord Stangford.

On the whole, they were a hard-working and fairly intelligent set of men. Most of them were of true Tory stock and imbued with all its insular prejudices and pride. Their dispatches betray a subconscious contempt for all that is not English.¹ They thought that foreigners could never be trusted, and perhaps their experience at this time tended to confirm their beliefs. They had no sympathy with the attempts of inexperienced men to work new institutions. The blessings of constitutional liberty they thought reserved for the aristocracy of Britain by the same divine wisdom which had given them their own jobs without the necessity of proving their capacity for them. But they were honest and frank, and when troublous times came, courtiers and revolutionaries alike

¹ They were instructed "to write a dispatch under all ordinary circumstances, at least once a fortnight" (Rush, *Residence* (2nd series), 369). Most of them, of course, wrote a great many more, but J. P. Morier at Dresden found so little else to write about that in 1819 he began to send home in fortnightly parts a historical account of Saxony from 1806 onwards: *F.O. Saxony*, 22.

appealed instinctively, and not in vain, to their hatred of obvious cruelty and oppression.

The Consular service was in urgent need of re-organisation, which it soon afterwards obtained. Some of the Consular appointments, such as that of Algiers, were posts of much importance. The Vice-Consuls were mainly appointed by the Consuls themselves, and were often of no great merit. They were paid by fees. There was already a deep gulf fixed between the Consular and Diplomatic service which has lasted ever since, and is one reason why the British Diplomatic service failed to keep pace with a century of industrial revolution.

In the year 1822 the expense of the whole Diplomatic service abroad was £265,962, which was deemed excessive, since in 1793 it had been only £113,989. But, as Wellington pointed out in an able minute, its duties had increased enormously, and in 1793 it had been paid at far too low a rate. The principal missions were allowed private secretaries, but hardly any other paid clerical assistance. In 1821 there were only seven paid attachés and twenty-one unpaid. A despairing appeal from Lisbon for an interpreter obviously comes from the heart. "There are no cloven tongues now-a-days," explained the diplomatist to Hamilton, "and the only miracle is how I have got on at all. Do pray try and fumble in the blue old shabby breeches pocket of the Foreign Office and see if you can't find as much as will keep me a decent clerk. I shouldn't wonder, however, if the pockets had been cut off long ago as sinecures, I try not to think of Mr. Brougham when I'm in church."¹

¹ Wellington to Castlereagh, May 10, 1822: *W.N.D.* i. 239. Ward to Hamilton, Sept. 29, 1816: *F.O. Portugal*, 197. He got £100 for a special clerk.

Many details as to the expenses of the Diplomatic service are given in *F.O. Great Britain and General*, 10. The salaries attached to the various missions (including house-rent) were as follows: Paris, £11,000; Vienna (Lord Stewart also received £1000 as a Colonel, £750 as a Lord of Bedchamber, £500 as Governor of Fort Charles), Petersburg, Madrid, £12,000; The Hague, £12,300, Constantinople, £8000 (but also considerable sums for special expenses); Berlin, £7500, Rio de Janeiro, Naples, Washington, and Frankfurt, £6000, Stockholm, Munich, Copenhagen, Turin, £4900; Stuttgart, Florence, and Dresden, £3900, Lisbon, £1645, Berne, £1595; Hamburg, £500. There are also estimates made by the Ambassadors of their expenses in all cases more than their salaries. Extraordinary charges for 1821 included: private secretaries, £2100; chaplains, £900, post office, £7854; couriers, £2238; Constantinople, £7217 (including £1220 for public audiences and £625 for janissaries at the same).

There is a great deal of new information from unpublished sources in H. W. V. Temperley. *The Foreign Policy of Canning*, 1822-27.

The Diplomatic Corps in London contained five Ambassadors, of whom Prince Esterhazy and Count (afterwards Prince) Lieven were the most important. Esterhazy belonged to one of the most ancient and splendid families of the Austrian Empire. He was not wanting in intellect, though his manners were such as to make people under-rate him. He had wealth, which was badly needed, for his predecessor was reduced to appropriating part of a subsidy to furnish the Embassy with a set of plate, without which, as he bitterly remarked, he was of less consequence than a second-rate merchant. Esterhazy devoted himself especially to the cultivation of the Prince Regent, and succeeded admirably. He was admitted to his most intimate circle and at times spent weeks at the Cottage or the Pavilion. George liked his flattery and his splendid presence, though the Princess was too insipid to please the royal taste. Metternich gave Esterhazy generally his full confidence, and the private correspondence of the Ambassador, much of which, written in a vile French and even viler handwriting, has remained in the Vienna archives, and goes deep into the secrets of Court and Cabinet during these years. Castlereagh perhaps trusted Esterhazy less because of his intimacy with his Sovereign, which he had to check firmly once or twice, and preferred to deal with Metternich through his brother. There was also a quarrel between Metternich and Esterhazy in 1818, which Lebzeltern, one of Metternich's most trusted lieutenants, came over to compose. Esterhazy's subordinate, Neumann, a skilled and shrewd observer, was used as a check on his chief, and his advice perhaps counted as much with Metternich, who had trained him at Paris and put complete trust in him.¹

Lieven was neither so energetic nor so much in favour as Esterhazy, of whom he was inordinately jealous. The Prince Regent visited on him and his wife the sins of Alexander. It was indeed Countess Lieven who was the real chief of the Embassy. She was one of the grand dames of the century, and numbered Metternich and Grey among her victims. But during this period she had only just begun her long reign, and

¹ He acted as intermediary between Metternich and Countess Lieven in 1819-20.

had scarcely much influence, certainly none with Castlereagh, who was less susceptible to her charms than Canning. Thus Lieven's dispatches are less interesting than might perhaps be expected, though he has often intimate knowledge. The fact that though a Russian he was a Protestant was not altogether without influence. Baron Nicolai, his First Secretary, was no more than a competent official.

France was continually changing her representatives as a result of the party struggles at home. The Marquis d'Osmond, who represented her during the first Richelieu Ministry, bore the scars of long and honourable military service, and had something of the dignity and charm of his chief. He was a great favourite with the Diplomatic Corps, who stayed away from the opening of Waterloo Bridge in 1817 as a mark of deference to him. He was less well received by the Prince Regent and the Government, and his position with the former was completely lost by an unlucky familiarity after too much wine. He resigned with his chief, and was succeeded in 1819 by the capable Latour Maubourg, who, however, only stayed a year when he in turn gave way to Decazes, an ex-Premier and ex-favourite, who wished to control Paris from London, and failed lamentably. Chateaubriand came in 1822, full of arrogance and suspicion but always an alert and intelligent observer. He too, however, only looked on his mission as a temporary exile. Their subordinate, Caraman, was second-rate.

The other Ambassadors represented minor Powers. Of these the Portuguese representative, the Marquess of Palmella, had won the confidence of the Government and was an intimate friend of Wellington. The Court to which he was responsible remained in Brazil, and thus he had often to take the initiative in the very delicate negotiations which ensued between his country and Spain, in which Britain, as the special protector of Portugal, was deeply interested. His diplomatic skill and prestige were equal to all emergencies, though he was temporarily displaced when Portugal followed the example of Spain and became a constitutional State. The Spanish representatives, Count Fernan-Núñez, 1815-1817, and the Duke of San Carlos, 1818-1820, were hardly so successful, but

they had an almost impossible task. The Duc de Frias, 1820-21, who arrived after the Révolution, was not of much account, but Onis, who replaced him in 1821, had negotiated the Floridas Treaty with Adams, and was a man of some force of character. Baron Fagel, the Dutch Ambassador, was concerned mainly with matters of commerce and the Slave Trade. An embarrassing Persian Embassy appeared in 1819.

The distinguished Prussian Minister, Humboldt, replaced Baron Jacobi-Kloest in 1817, but neither he nor his successors, Bülow and Werther, played much part in these years, though their comments on British politics are often shrewd and well-informed. They shared with the Ambassadors the privileges of the royal table, to which few minor diplomats were admitted, but they had a quarrel with the old Queen owing to her refusal to recognise the Duchess of Cumberland, and this kept them until the end of 1818 from many important functions. The two representatives of the United States of America were destined to have a profound influence on Anglo-American relations. The great John Quincy Adams, who left in 1817 to become Secretary of State to Monroe, was as bitter and hostile to Britain as Richard Rush, his successor, was friendly and conciliatory. The other Ministers Plenipotentiary played no very important rôle. Minor diplomats included a *chargé d'affaires* for Turkey, M. Ramadani, who dealt only with commercial matters.

There were, fortunately, no incidents or disputes amongst the members which had so often embarrassed foreign affairs in previous centuries. The new rules of precedence laid down at the Congress of Vienna worked well. "The Diplomatic Corps lived, for the most part, in the seclusion of the new suburb north of Oxford Street, and enjoyed their view into the verdant scenery of the Regent's Park. Most of them found it as difficult as Esterhazy's predecessor to support the dignity of their position in a capital so rich and expensive as London. But Richard Rush, who, as the servant of a Republic, was paid an especially small salary, considered that this affected their official usefulness but little. "Nor with the English," he noted, "do I believe, that the consideration attaching to foreign ministers, is dependent upon the salaries they receive.

However large these may be, and sometimes are, in the persons of the representatives of the Imperial and Royal Governments of Europe, they are still so much below the wealth of the home circles of London as to be no distinction, supposing distinction to be sought on that ground. The surpassing incomes in the home circles and habits of expenditure, with the ample accommodation by which the many who possess them live surrounded, incline their possessors to regard such official strangers as objects rather than agents of hospitality." ¹

¹ Rush, *Residence* (1st series), 57.

3. THE PRINCIPLES OF BRITISH POLICY : THE QUADRUPLE ALLIANCE

THE principles of British foreign policy have rarely been formulated by British men of action. They have, for the most part, been arrived at by experiment and followed instinctively as part of the accumulated experience of the nation. There are, for example, no such series of general instructions for British representatives abroad as exist, from an early date, for those of France. They were, perhaps, scarcely necessary. British policy is, of course, governed by the fundamental fact that Britain is an island. To this was added from the seventeenth century onwards the existence of an Empire. Trade interests, which were always an important part of policy, seemed in the eighteenth century at some periods to have precedence over all the rest. The maintenance of a maritime and colonial ascendancy had thus become apparently the main object of the people of Britain.

Nevertheless, Britain remained part of the Continent of Europe. Religious interests and dynastic connections had kept her in close contact with European diplomacy, while the Western European Powers were alternately her great rivals in trade and Empire. However much, therefore, she tried to remain in isolation, great European struggles had nearly always ultimately involved her in them, often to her great advantage. It was her connection with Europe which had given to her two Empires and lost her one of them. The application of the balance of power to Europe had resulted in the overwhelming preponderance of Britain in the rest of the world.

There was also always in mind the question of the security of her islands. For this the supremacy of the narrow seas seemed necessary, and the exclusion of any great Power, and especi-

ally France, from the mouth of the Scheldt was thus an axiom of her policy. Her maritime and trading position had also given her a connection with Portugal of long date. The overland route to India brought her into the Mediterranean, where bases were necessary for her fleet. Her Eastern possessions also made her take a special interest in the Ottoman Empire, now obviously threatened. There had also been the dynastic link with Hanover which, however disliked, had affected her policy throughout the eighteenth century and not least during the Napoleonic Wars.

For all these reasons British statesmen had always been forced to pay considerable attention to European diplomacy. But they had never ceased to regard Britain as separate from the rest of the Continent, and while attempting by one expedient or another to secure her special interests, they had always tried to reduce their commitments as much as possible, and, after each crisis had been surmounted, to devote themselves once more, without interruption, to maritime and imperial problems. Always they had failed, and the long struggle with the French Revolution and Napoleon had seemed to make Britain more than ever part of a Europe which, in the course of that struggle, had obtained a unity never before experienced.

The final success of Britain against Napoleon appeared to her governing classes to have justified her ancient institutions and the traditional principles of her policy. This was a comforting reflection to a people who were not at ease in any situation unless amply fortified by precedent. Yet Britain and her Empire had changed profoundly during the long War, and her foreign policy had changed with it, though her leaders were, for the most part, ignorant of both events. Britain had conquered a new Empire in the process of destroying the power of France; her internal equilibrium had been entirely altered by the Industrial Revolution. New obligations abroad and new interests at home produced their inevitable effect. Above all, a new attitude had been adopted towards Europe. Yet men clung to the old principles and many of them were still true. It was their relative importance which had altered.

Sea power and maritime rights were still and truly regarded as the bulwark of power. They had preserved Britain, though

not Ireland, from serious invasion. They had also beaten Napoleon through the Blockade, but of this aspect British statesmen were then less conscious than are modern historians. At the peace the strategic necessities of the Empire were fully protected by the accession of Malta, the Cape, and the Mauritius. The 'Maritime Rights' were not even admitted to discussion. 'The Right of Search,' and other principles of International Law, accepted by no other Great Power, were thus preserved in all their vigour.

No British statesman would have dreamed of abandoning these fundamental principles. Yet their very supremacy made them forgotten. The fleet was so very much stronger than its rivals that it was allowed to drift into inefficiency. The 'Maritime Rights' were never again exercised. In 1818 the Admiralty abandoned the old claim of salutes in the Narrow Seas, the symbol of a contested sovereignty which it was not now worth while to assert. Moreover, in the final stages of the Napoleonic Wars Britain had played the part of a great military Power, and was very proud of the fact. The Navy had a lower place than the Army in the public esteem. A special medal was struck for Waterloo but none for Trafalgar.

As for the new Empire, it exercised less influence on politics than the old. The Nabobs and the West Indian interest were still a force in politics, but one which had declined in influence. Fortunes as big as theirs could now be won in Britain itself. The Empire was in most men's eyes nothing more than a huge collection of those 'sugar islands' which Pitt and Dundas had spent the early years of the War in annexing. Canada had to be defended against the United States for decency's sake and from dislike of its attackers, but it was hoped that it could now look after itself. The Cape was taken to protect the long route to India. Few thought of Australia except as a dumping ground for undesirable characters.

The trading interests, moreover, looked now as much to the rest of the world as to the Empire for markets. The South American colonies, the United States since the War, and Europe itself in increasing amounts were customers of the highest importance. The old mercantile age had, in fact, already ceased to exist, though many of its laws and customs remained. The

new trading interests had exercised an important effect in inducing the British Government to make peace with America. They were to exercise still more on the question of the Spanish Colonies. Men like the banker, Alexander Baring, had financial connections all over the world. The Rothschilds had already laid the foundations of their wide-spread organisation. International relations were beginning to be influenced by the question of debtor and creditor. British interests were soon considered by powerful classes of the community to be far more affected by such considerations than those of revolutions or even frontiers, and Governments had to take them into consideration. This was a process which had been going on for a hundred years, but its strength now became very apparent.

For the moment, however, most important of all influences was the new connection with the Continent brought about by the long war and the reconstruction of Europe which followed it. In both Britain had played a far more important part than ever before. The Treaties of Westphalia had been made without her participation. The peace of Utrecht she had anticipated by a special settlement of her own which, however advantageous, marked her isolation and selfishness. But after the downfall of Napoleon she dominated the Continent and was a principal factor in shaping the new Europe. Her own special maritime and colonial interests had been, indeed, relegated to separate treaties between herself and France and the Netherlands. The Continent had no concern with them. But with the continental settlement Britain was intimately concerned. Pitt, indeed, had planned a good deal of it ten years before, and Castlereagh had put his plans into action. Moreover, Castlereagh had designed the special instrument by which these plans were carried out, and which, as he had desired, survived into the age of peace—the Alliance of the Great Powers.

The treaties then which regulated the new Europe had thrust on Britain such obligations as she had never before undertaken. In the first place Britain was a signatory not only of the First and Second Treaties of Paris of 1814 and 1815, which imposed new frontiers on France, but also of the Final

Act of the Congress of Vienna of June 1815, which determined those of nearly every other European State as well as other matters of general interest. She had thus a connection with the Continent such as had never previously existed. No frontier could be altered without touching a Treaty to which Britain was a party. It is true that there were no special obligations to defend them under a special territorial guarantee, such as Castlereagh had at one time contemplated creating at Vienna.¹ But the right to uphold by diplomatic action or to vindicate by arms the terms of the Treaty remained, of course, with every signatory. Moreover, the Final Act of Vienna was regarded as a single instrument; an infraction of any part of it, without the consent of the contracting parties, therefore tended to invalidate all the rest. No State had been allowed to obtain its own special advantages under the Treaty without at the same time recognising those obtained by all the others. Never before had Europe possessed an instrument so comprehensive, uniting the interests of all the Powers.

In this unity Britain inevitably shared to the full. Her interests in peace had thus become identified with those of continental Powers. She no longer contented herself with special arrangements concerning Belgium or Portugal, in which her safety and interests seemed particularly concerned. During the late war France had invaded Portugal and absorbed Belgium, and their freedom had been secured upon the plains of Russia and amid the rivers of Germany and Italy.

This fact sprang from the nature of the case, which the Treaty merely expressed. It was well understood by Castlereagh. His recognition of it, indeed, was the reason why he had himself played so prominent a part in the negotiations at Vienna. In his view, unless he could reconstruct Europe in such a manner as to prevent a great continental war, Britain would inevitably be drawn in whether her interests were immediately affected or not. This was not so clear to his Cabinet and certainly not to his countrymen. They could understand it when Antwerp was in Napoleon's hands and could only be won back by the armies of the Eastern Powers. But once

¹ *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, 491; *British Diplomacy*, 304-6.

France had been overcome they did not wish to concern themselves with such remote problems as those of Saxony or Poland or Central Italy. It was only Castlereagh's influence, indeed, which made Britain the mediator in these disputes, and thus prevented the war which would almost inevitably have occurred if he had refused to accept the responsibility thus forced upon him.

Nevertheless the idea in a vague form was accepted more or less by public opinion. It was, after all, only an application of the old doctrine of the balance of power. By the 'balancing system,' or 'just equilibrium' as Castlereagh often called it, was meant a Europe so constituted that no one Power could attack the rest with prospect of success. Since the main danger had come from France the balance of power was viewed mainly as a means of protecting Europe from French aggression. But Russia was also in Castlereagh's eyes, as in Pitt's, likely to be a danger to Europe, and especially to Britain because of her interests in the East. The strengthening of Central Europe, which he advocated and to a large extent obtained at Vienna, was meant to protect Europe against Russia as well as France. It was this argument which he used to defend his conduct on his return from the Congress at Vienna. On the whole it was accepted, though Britain's interest in most parts of the Treaty was still regarded as a remote one. Her rights in it, however, persisted and were appealed to again and again throughout the century. Not until the Bismarckian era had entirely remodelled Central Europe did the validity of the Treaty of Vienna cease; some of its more general clauses were indeed part of the public law of Europe throughout the century, and have only recently become out of date.

Britain was also a signatory of the Second Treaty of Paris of November 20, 1815. It was, in fact, the common-sense of Castlereagh and Wellington, even more than the magnanimity of Alexander, which prevented the dismemberment and ruin of France by the German Powers. As it was, France had to pay for her support of Napoleon during the Hundred Days by losing some frontier districts, including the Saar Valley and part of Savoy, and by an indemnity of 700 million francs, which was added to the Reparations already agreed to by the

First Peace of Paris in 1814. Moreover, an Allied Army of Occupation was stationed in the North-East of France, commanded by the Duke of Wellington and containing 30,000 British troops. Until this heavy responsibility was liquidated, Britain was almost as much bound to the Continent as during the War.

This situation would not, however, last very long. But Britain was further bound by another Treaty signed at Paris on the same day as the Second Peace of Paris between the four victorious Great Powers. It was this Treaty which was the foundation of the Alliance, and its obligations need special consideration, since on them depend the whole history of these years. It was directed specifically against action by France and dates from the discussions between Pitt and Alexander in 1805. It was revived by Castlereagh in 1813, and first secured by him in the Treaty of Chaumont in March 1814. The dissensions of the Congress of Vienna threatened to abolish this Treaty altogether, but the return of Napoleon at once re-constituted the Alliance, which was renewed at Vienna in March 1815.

When the final settlement came at Paris the Treaty of Alliance was again carefully considered and re-drafted. The Tsar submitted a new draft which would have pledged the four Great Powers "to support with all their efforts" both Louis XVIII. and the liberal constitution, the *Charte*, which, largely owing to Alexander's efforts, Louis had granted to his subjects in 1814. It would thus have been a treaty not merely to protect Europe against French aggression, as had been its original intention, but also to interfere in French internal politics. This was not a position which any British statesman could accept. The declaration of war which Pitt had made in 1793 was not specifically directed against the Revolution as such, but based on the infringements of the Treaties which the Revolutionary Government had countenanced. The doctrine of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries had been an axiom of British politics since the accession of the House of Hanover. It had indeed been partially abandoned under the influence of Burke in the struggle against the Revolution, but never officially. It could not

be abandoned now. The final form of the Treaty of November 20, 1815, therefore, which was mainly based on a draft made by Castlereagh himself, brought the instrument back to its original intention at Chaumont—or, at any rate, nearly so.

Its first and main object was to protect Europe against French attack. It placed the territorial arrangements accepted by France in the First and Second Treaties of Paris under the special protection of its signatories, and it was this side of it that appealed most strongly to the British Cabinet and won their acceptance of the whole. Nevertheless, in one special case the whole people of Britain were ready to accept the doctrine of interference. They would not tolerate the return of Napoleon or any of his family to the throne of France. On that score Castlereagh could be sure of support. The apparent exception was defended on the ground that a Bonaparte on the throne of France meant the certainty of aggressive war, a reasonable deduction, it must be admitted, in view of recent history. There was no difficulty, therefore, in making a second object of the Treaty a specific engagement to maintain the exclusion of the Bonaparte family from the throne of France.

There was also, however, a third object—to define the attitude of the Great Powers in case revolution broke out in France once more. There was no obligation taken to suppress it, but there was an engagement to undertake the defence of Europe against it should it prove to be aggressive. Revolution in France, therefore, was under the special surveillance of the Great Powers. But since the *casus foederis* was not the Revolution itself but only its effect on Europe, the British principle was maintained.

Nevertheless, the wording of this part of the clause was not as explicit as it might have been. It ran: "And as the same Revolutionary principles which upheld the last criminal usurpation, might again, under other forms, convulse France, and thereby endanger the repose of other States; under these circumstances the High Contracting Parties, solemnly admitting it to be their duty to redouble their watchfulness for the tranquillity and interests of their people, engage, in case so

This clause is the origin of the Conferences, or Congresses,¹ of the Great Powers, which was so important a feature of the European Alliance. As originally drawn up by Alexander, the clause would have limited such meetings to a consideration of matters arising out of the Treaty itself. But Castlereagh's additions had made them something quite different. They could now be applied to any problem of European diplomacy if the Great Powers desired. Castlereagh wished, in fact, to make permanent the European Council which had grown up in the course of the final struggle against Napoleon. He had taken the idea with him to the Continent in 1814. "He stated to me," wrote the Earl of Ripon, who accompanied him on his first journey, "that one of the great difficulties which he expected to encounter in the approaching negotiations would arise from the want of an habitual confidential and free intercourse between the Ministers of the Great Powers *as a body*; and that many pretensions might be modified, asperities removed, and causes of irritation anticipated and met, by bringing the respective parties into unrestricted communications common to them all, and embracing in confidential and united discussions all the great points in which they were severally interested."² This hope had been fulfilled beyond his expectations, and his own patient, courageous and intensely practical mind had contributed greatly to the result.

To Castlereagh, indeed, the new system of diplomacy had been essential to the success of the Alliance. "If the Councils of the Sovereigns had not been brought together . . .," he said in the House in 1816, "if they had been forced to look at their special interests through that cloud of prejudice and uncertainty which must always intervene when events are viewed at a distance . . . he was sure that the Councils of

¹ Many attempts have been made to define the distinction between a Conference and a Congress (*e.g.* Sir Ernest Satow, *Diplomatic Practice*, ii. 11), but unsuccessfully; and inevitably so, since the distinction was not clear to the statesmen themselves, who use the two words indiscriminately in this period. On the whole, 'Congress' was applied to such a meeting as that at Vienna in 1814-15, when all European Powers were represented. I have therefore used 'Conference' to describe the reunions of the Great Powers in this period, but the diplomatists and publicists refused as usual to be consistent, and the word 'Congress' will be found in some quotations from their dispatches and writings.

² The Earl of Ripon to the Marquess of Londonderry, July 6, 1839: C.C. 1. 128.

Europe would have been disturbed to such an extent by doubts and misapprehensions that those great exertions whose successful issue was now before the world, would never have been made." ¹

It was only natural, therefore, that he should endeavour to perpetuate so useful an invention. It imposed no new obligations on his country. It merely gave an opportunity to her statesmen to continue the work of reconciliation and compromise which Castlereagh had performed so well during the preceding two years. He desired the whole system to be as informal and unrestricted as possible. Even the words, "at fixed periods," which remain in the final clause, were taken not from his draft but from Alexander's, and were given no further definition.

To Castlereagh this aspect of the Alliance was perhaps its most important part. France had, indeed, to be kept in check, but there were hopes that the sanctions of the Treaty would be sufficient by their mere existence to attain that object and would never need to be put into operation. But the Sixth Clause of the Treaty could be used to found a new system of European diplomacy, by which the differences between the Great Powers could be composed and the greatest benefits thus conferred on humanity. How difficult it was to be to ensure the success of such a system without formal interpretation or the driving power of public opinion, Castlereagh could not as yet be expected to realise.

Of one weakness in it he was from the outset, however, very conscious. The Treaty of Chaumont had been originally intended as one to be signed by the Smaller Powers as well as the Great. At any rate, Sweden, Spain, the Netherlands, and Portugal were to become members of it. It was only the discovery that its obligations could only be assumed by the Great Powers which had limited its scope. The discussions at Vienna had emphasised the distinction between Great and Small Powers, which, Europe was just beginning to realise, had been greatly increased by the progress in military science made during the Napoleonic Wars. The Small Powers had, it is true, become members of the European Alliance against

¹ *Hansard*, Commons, Feb. 9, 1816.

Napoleon by acceding to the Treaty of March 25, 1815, made at Vienna. But no scheme could be devised to give them a permanent position in the Alliance or to define the relation of the Alliance towards them. As will be abundantly apparent in the course of this narrative, this difficulty was to be one of the main causes of the failure of the Alliance.

Moreover, the Alliance was as yet a Quadruple Alliance only. It was directed against the fifth Great Power—France, which had as yet therefore no share in the provisions of the Sixth Article, which was meant for other matters. It had indeed been suggested at one time that Louis XVIII. should sign the Treaty, but the legal and political difficulties were too great. Yet before Europe could be organised for peace instead of war, a way had to be found to admit France as an equal into the concert of Europe.

Castlereagh had lastly a heavy handicap in the mere existence of another Alliance—the ‘Holy Alliance.’ The Tsar had accepted his amendments, but only after much discussion and protest. For he, too, had his schemes for the perpetuation of the peace of Europe, and they were of a very different character to those of Castlereagh. What Castlereagh hoped to secure by common-sense and an appeal to enlightened self-interest the Tsar thought he could obtain by an appeal to the principles of the Christian religion professed by every European Power except the Turks. He was at this time under the influence of the most powerful religious emotions. With Madame de Krudener and others he spent all his spare time in the mystical interpretation of Holy Writ and long and fervent prayer. He had therefore already submitted to his Allies another treaty—the Treaty of the ‘Holy Alliance,’ which bound all the sovereigns of Europe to behave as Christians, not only in relation to one another but also towards their subjects. The Tsar’s religion was an intensely personal one. The abstraction of the State could find no place in his scheme. It was to the Sovereigns therefore that he appealed, not as autocrats but as beneficent fathers of their subjects who, with them, would follow the divine truths of the Christian religion. In such a world more definite obligations would be out of place, and the Treaty laid no specific duty upon any party to it.

The Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, though their Ministers thought the Tsar mad, could easily sign such a Treaty. The ruler of Britain was not allowed to undertake any personal responsibility in his own name, not even that of upholding the principles of the Christian religion. George could do no more than send a personal letter to the Tsar expressing his sympathy with the object of the Treaty, and he shared with the Pope and the Sultan exclusion from the Christian fraternity of monarchs. No one, except perhaps the King of Prussia, took the Treaty seriously. But every ruler, except the three above mentioned, could sign it, and all great and small did so. The Tsar was even able at a later date to associate the Republic of Switzerland with its aspirations, and he attempted, though without success, to obtain the support of the United States. But when, in 1816, it was published, its extraordinary character aroused the suspicions of Liberals over all Europe and especially in Britain. What sort of an Alliance would that be which only monarchs could sign? Obviously one directed against the liberties of their peoples. No charge could have been more false so far as the original conception of the Holy Alliance was concerned. But when the real Treaty of Alliance of November 20, 1815, was diverted from its original objects, the gibe appeared to be fulfilled, and the 'Holy Alliance' became the name applied not to the original instrument but to the whole system of Diplomacy by Conference. Nothing is more difficult to overcome in politics than an unfair charge crystallised into a phrase which appeals to the popular imagination. In execrating the 'Holy Alliance' men forgot what the Alliance itself really connoted.

CHAPTER II

FROM VIENNA TO AIX-LA-CHAPELLE : THE ALLIANCE IN ACTION, 1815-1818

1. CASTLEREAGH AND THE NEW DIPLOMACY. GREAT POWERS AND SMALL. 1815-1818.
2. FRANCE IN TUTELAGE. 1815-1818.
3. RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND AUSTRIAN FEARS. 1815-1818.

“ It is from bad international tempers that outbreaks arise. It is upon fitful, intermittent but repeated manifestations of such temper that predictions of inevitable conflicts are based. It is the everlasting duty of the wise to correct and prevent the temper thus threatening mischief.”—LORD COURTNEY OF PENWITH.

CHAPTER II

I. CASTLEREAGH AND THE NEW DIPLOMACY. GREAT POWERS AND SMALL

AFTER twenty years of war Europe had once more to learn the arts of peace of which the Sovereigns and statesmen, it must be confessed, knew little. Nor was it possible for them even now to turn their whole attention to internal problems, however urgent they had become during the inevitable neglect and waste of the war years. In a sense the peace was not yet obtained. An Allied Army was still in occupation of the northern provinces of France : a revolution increasing in force was in progress in South America ; many urgent problems had been passed over in the reconstruction of Europe. Foreign affairs therefore still commanded universal attention. It was only gradually that men could recover that sense of security and progress which long years of peace alone can give.

Much would obviously depend on how the critical problems of these years were treated by those in power. The new institutions, which had been given to Europe as a result of the long struggle with Napoleon, would be of no avail unless they were accompanied by a new spirit in those who had to put them into force. Were the old features of international rivalry to continue, or were they to be replaced by new diplomatic methods corresponding to the professions of unity and common interest of which the victors had been so free at Paris ?

There was, at any rate, some hope that a new outlook had been attained by those most responsible for the conduct of affairs. The Sovereigns and statesmen of the different countries had lived a common life for almost two years.

They had shared trials and triumphs and even board and lodgings for long periods together. Those who had experienced the emotions produced by the final overthrow of Napoleon never completely lost a peculiar intimacy such as the statesmen of Europe have possessed at no other time. With all their jealousies and intrigues they had been, as it were, comrades for a considerable period. Since 1813 Alexander, Metternich, Hardenberg, Humboldt and numbers of lesser men had lived a common life for long months together at camp fire and council board, and there undoubtedly existed between them something of that spirit of connection and obligation which bind together men who have rowed together in the same boat or lived at the same college.

Castlereagh and Wellington had shared in these labours and triumphs and experienced these emotions. In a sense this is the most important influence in the foreign policy of Britain during these years, just as the fact that from 1812 to 1815 Canning was out of office affected profoundly his policy in the period that followed. Castlereagh had thus come to possess an outlook which was not shared by the Cabinet and which only Wellington understood. For the moment, however, this inevitable divergence was not apparent. The preservation of the peace of Europe, in company with the men who had succeeded after many weary years in at last obtaining it, was the natural policy for all to follow. The history of the next three years is the interaction between this obvious course of policy and the new jealousies and rivalries that inevitably came into being once the danger from France was removed. On the whole, the unifying forces were triumphant, a result which was largely brought about by the policy of Castlereagh, who continued his efforts as mediator and reconciler, combined, of course, with proper regard for the interests of his own country.

At any rate, Castlereagh made a special attempt to abolish from European diplomacy the spirit of intrigue and suspicion which revived immediately amongst the representatives of the Alliance. During the month which followed the signing of the Treaty of Paris he accumulated only too many melancholy proofs of this fact. Now that the danger from France was

less, the old game was everywhere beginning again, and Ambassadors and Ministers obviously felt themselves to be rivals for influence rather than colleagues engaged in preserving the peace of Europe. It was especially disquieting that at many of the minor Courts the Russian representatives appeared to be most zealous in this direction. Castlereagh's subordinates certainly were everywhere inspired with a profound distrust of them, and were encouraged in this point of view by their Austrian colleagues.

Castlereagh received their reports with something like dismay, and with characteristic directness he tried to put an end to these manifestations before they had poisoned the atmosphere of every European Court. Instructions were immediately dispatched that so far as Britain was concerned they must cease and be replaced by new methods based on a spirit of trust and good-will. The outcry was loudest at Madrid and Naples, and it was accordingly to Vaughan, Wellesley's Secretary of Embassy, temporarily in charge, and to A'Court that Castlereagh addressed himself first and most strongly. To Vaughan he wrote :

" It is unfortunately too much the diplomatic practice in such governments as that of Spain to work and to intrigue for influence upon the parties that from day to day distract the public councils. In return, a feeble Government uneasy at being excluded from what it holds to be its due share of influence in the greater politics of Europe, is not unlikely to endeavour to ferment disunion amongst the Powers whose existing connection diminishes its influence. You will hold these observations in view, and although it is always the duty of a Foreign Minister to be vigilant and to keep his Court informed, you will be cautious in giving any ostensible credit to jealousies, which, although resting on private channels of information, have yet received no countenance, either from the public acts of the Powers whom they affect, or from the correspondence of your own Government. . . . If, in the lapse of time, any Court shall diverge from this wise policy, it will then be necessary for Great Britain to adopt corresponding measures of precaution, but, in the meantime, it will be the province of the Ministers of this Court abroad to inculcate in all quarters the importance of union, to the preservation of that peace for which the Powers have so long and so gloriously contended, and to keep down as far as possible the spirit of

local intrigue which has so often proved no less fatal to the repose of States than the personal ambition of their Sovereigns."

To A'Court, whose information had been more specific but no less suspect, he wrote in a similar strain, admitting local difficulties but urging him to see them in the right perspective.

"My wish then," he concluded, "is that while you watch with all due attention whatever the Russian agents may be about, that you do not suffer yourself to be drawn either by the Court of Naples or yet by the Court of Vienna into a premature attitude of suspicion much less of hostility of the Russian agents in Italy.

"It is of the utmost importance to keep down, as far and as long as possible, these local cabals, which may shake the main Alliance, yet indispensable to the safety of Europe, in order to conduct France to a stable order of things. That such a settlement is the object of Russia, as well as of the other Allied Courts, we have no reason to doubt. Whatever alliances may hereafter arise, this should be the grand basis in wisdom of all our present politics. If the Emperor is with us in this, and I have the satisfaction to assure you that with none of the Allied Courts have we drawn better at Paris than with Russia, we ought not to be too susceptible in our minor relations to the hazard of the great machine of European safety, which, if it does not consist of the four Powers, is shaken to its foundation."¹

He hoped, by this appeal, to damp down the hotheads at the two chief centres of disturbance, but he felt that something more was necessary if European diplomacy was to move on the right lines. He accordingly took advantage of the opportunity which these incidents afforded to address a special warning to all his subordinates and through them to the Courts to which they were accredited. He began the new year therefore with a circular dispatch to all his representatives abroad. He explained the objects and provisions of the Quadruple Alliance and pointed out that it was directed neither against the Government of Louis XVIII. nor against the interests of the Smaller Powers. It was, on the contrary, especially designed to meet the necessities of these latter, whose situation offered great temptations to ambitious and designing

¹ To Vaughan, Dec. 20, 1815: *F.O. Spain*, 177. To A'Court, Jan. 1, 1816: *F.O. Sicily*, 74.

diplomats. If they had not been asked to sign the Treaty it was only a matter of convenience. Meanwhile, the Prince Regent, he declared, desired nothing but "to preserve the Peace." All secondary interests must be subordinated to this great end. "To effectuate this, it ought to be the study of every public servant abroad, more especially of the Greater States, whose example must have the most extensive influence, to discourage that spirit of petty intrigue and perpetual propagation of alarm, upon slight evidence and ancient jealousies, which too frequently disgrace the diplomatic profession, and often render the residence of foreign Ministers the means of disturbing rather than preserving harmony between their respective Sovereigns." They were, of course, to be vigilant and not to become the "dupe of designing men," but they were to make it clear that the policy of Britain was "to inspire, as far as possible, a temper of morality and confidence amongst those who are accredited to the same Court," and thus by their example produce the same spirit in other governments.¹

This remarkable manifesto was accompanied, in each case, by other dispatches which emphasised the particular aspect most suitable to the situation of the person to whom they were addressed. Thus, to Rose, to whom it was first sent, a long private letter was also addressed dealing with the special position of Prussia. In this Castlereagh pointed out the danger of special combinations within the Alliance. It was for Britain, above all, to eschew them, since "our insular situation places us sufficiently out of the reach of danger to admit of our pursuing a more generous and confiding policy." The dangerous internal condition of Prussia added new reasons why the harmony of the Alliance should be preserved at all costs. Rose was, therefore, "to *keep quiet*; to cultivate the good will of your colleagues; to inspire them, as far as possible, with confidence in your Court by making them feel that it is equally the ally of all; and in order to do so with effect you

¹ Circular dispatch, Jan. 1, 1816: *F.O. France (Archives)*, 12. The whole dispatch is given in the *Appendix*, p. 509. Neither Professor Alison Phillips nor I were able to trace this dispatch in the Record Office (see *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, II, 8), but I have since obtained it by Mr. Temperley's kindness from the Embassy Archives now accessible at Cambridge.

will avoid evincing distrust to theirs." Similar instructions were sent to Vienna. To Cathcart at Petersburg not only were full details given of the special complaints made of the Russian Ministers at Naples and Madrid, but also of the instructions issued in reply from London. The Russian Government was also urged to send a similar circular instruction to its own representatives in order to destroy the false notion "that the Russian and British interests are to be opposed to each other as that of rivals contending for authority instead of allied and friendly nations co-operating in the common cause of order and peace." Castlereagh took the opportunity to avow frankly to Lieven the Secret Treaty which he had signed at the Congress of Vienna.¹

The idea was certainly a new one and seems almost a little naive. It produced at first but little immediate effect for, as will be seen, the Russian activities appeared to increase rather than diminish as time went on. Nevertheless, the policy which it laid down was, to a large extent, successful, and the ambitions and manoeuvres of the Russian agents were far more easily countered by this frank and open policy than by the opposite method which Metternich urged in vain. The result was to preserve that unity of the Great Powers which Castlereagh deemed so necessary for the good of Europe.

Meanwhile the continuity of action of the Alliance was seen in the various Ambassadorial Conferences which were dealing with the problems left over from the Peace. At Paris, London and Frankfort special committees of the Great Powers were sitting to whom many matters had been referred. This also was a new device; but, on the whole, these new machines produced few results except that at Paris, which was, of course, different from all others. The London Conference set up to devise methods to secure the Abolition of the Slave Trade did not get very far. Nor were the problems of the Barbary Pirates and the refusal of Sweden to carry out the Treaty of Kiel, which were also assigned to it, solved by its action. Deadlocks arose in all the matters which could not

¹ To Rose, Dec 28, 1815: *C.C.* xi. 104. To Cathcart, Jan. 1, Feb. 11, 1816: *F.O. Russia*, 102. Lieven to Nesselrode, Feb. 13, 1816: *Pet. Arch.* To Stewart, Jan. 5, 1816: *F.O. Austria*, 125.

be overcome and resulted in much reference to the Courts concerned. At Frankfort the disputes between Bavaria and Baden and Austria, to whose resumption of Salzburg and other Bavarian territory in 1814 they were in the first place due, made but little headway, though a good deal of valuable work was done on minor problems. Only at Paris, where the Conference had special duties to perform in connection with the Army of Occupation, was much accomplished, and it was here that the danger of the overlordship of the Great Powers to the liberties of the Small was first clearly seen.

This danger had been in Castlereagh's mind from the first. The Alliance was one of Great Powers, and in it the Smaller Powers had no rights. The situation was an unavoidable one, since only Great Powers could undertake the onerous obligations of the Quadruple Alliance. It was, however, precisely the difficulties raised by the Smaller Powers which were so difficult to overcome. "The secondary Courts, if I may thus express it," wrote Pozzo di Borgo to Wellington in 1817, "rarely help those of the first rank in great difficulties; but they are very active and dexterous in tiring them out and raising small difficulties for them." There was, therefore, a great temptation for the representatives of the Great Powers, when acting in concert, to treat the Small States summarily, and this was particularly so when they appeared to be centres of intrigue and disaffection.¹

This was exactly the attitude which Castlereagh wished to avoid. Even at the Congress of Vienna he had, alone of the members of the Alliance, protested at the original proposal of dragooning the rest of the Congress to accept the decisions of the Great Powers. His circular dispatch urged the same recognition of their susceptibilities. Nor would he admit, of course, any right on the part of other Powers to interfere with their internal affairs. At Paris, however, the Russian Ambassador, Pozzo di Borgo, had done everything to exalt the importance of the Ambassadorial Conference. This Corsican and life-long enemy of Napoleon considered himself in a special sense the protector of the Bourbon Monarchy and the French Constitution, both of which he considered essential to

¹ Pozzo di Borgo to Wellington, Aug. 11, 1817: *W.S.D.*, xii. 30.

his plans. But he had also far-reaching schemes which involved the whole of Western Europe. He was full of ambition and energy, and the Ambassadorial Conference seemed made to provide him with a machine through which he could impress his personality on European diplomacy. Such a design naturally drew on him the hostility of the other members of the Conference, especially, as will be seen, that of Sir Charles Stuart. Baron Vincent, the Austrian Ambassador, was also his foe, but neither he nor his Prussian colleague, Count Goltz, possessed the same energy or ability as Pozzo di Borgo, who was, indeed, one of the most successful and brilliant figures of this period.

The main work of the Paris Conference, which will be considered in the next section, was connected with the Army of Occupation. But the convenience of such a body for the settlement of vexed problems was obviously great. Thus not only was the delicate question of the succession to the Duchies of Parma and Guastalla handed over to it, but also the dangerous dispute between Spain and Portugal over their differences in Europe and South America. In this matter Castlereagh supported the Conference, and Portugal's acceptance of its authority was obtained by his threat to abandon her if she refused her consent. When, however, Pozzo di Borgo, flushed with success, proposed that the critical question of the Spanish Colonies, on which the British point of view had been already unequivocally announced, should be referred to Paris, Castlereagh vetoed the proposition immediately. It had obviously been made to embarrass Britain, and Castlereagh recalled the Ambassadors very promptly to a proper sense of their limitations.¹

He was just as suspicious of the attempts made by the Conference, at Metternich's suggestion, to act as a kind of supervisory committee over the Small Powers. Proposals were made which would have given to it machinery of a most dangerous kind. This new suggestion was no less than to erect at Paris a European police centre—a kind of clearing house for authority in its efforts to put down those who challenged it. It began with the problem of the Napoleonic

¹ See below, Chapter VIII, section 1., p. 412.

exiles at Brussels. Wellington himself had long complained in vain of the violence of the Brussels Press, and the French Ambassador, La Tour du Pin, had been withdrawn because an insult to him had gone unpunished. When, therefore, at a meeting on April 11, 1817, at which both Richelieu and Wellington were present, the Ambassadors decided to urge the King of the Netherlands to banish these dangerous exiles from Brussels, Wellington agreed to use his influence with the King to get him to consent—and in fact succeeded.

In this measure Castlereagh seems to have acquiesced willingly enough, but it was followed by a far more dangerous one, the inspiration for which came not from Pozzo di Borgo but from Metternich himself. Vincent was ordered to suggest to the Conference that it should become the organ of the Great Powers in putting down the intrigues of the revolutionaries all over Europe. This idea was received by the Conference with much favour, and a circular dispatch was drawn up and sent in its name to the Small Powers of Germany and Italy and to Switzerland. Stuart appears to have protested, but the mischief was done. The wider schemes of Metternich could not, however, be adopted without the express consent of the Cabinets, and Castlereagh was not slow in sending an uncompromising refusal. "The Allied Ministers at Paris," he wrote at once to Stuart, "must be kept within the bounds of their original institution and not be suffered to present themselves as an European Council for the management of the affairs of the world."¹

To Esterhazy he used less definite language, urging the susceptibilities of the Smaller Powers as his principal objection to Metternich's plan. These objections Metternich endeavoured to overcome in an interview with A'Court at Florence on July 20, 1817. "In proposing that the Conference at Paris," reported the latter, "should be the centre to which all the reports should be directed, it was by no means the Prince's intention that any executive power should be lodged in the hands of the members of the Conference. His wish was that the police reports from all countries, the residence

¹ From Stuart, July 7, 10, 1817: Protocol of July 10, 1817: *F.O. France*, 160. To Stuart, July 22, 1817: *F.O. France*, 151.

of suspected persons, should be directed to the Conference where, by comparing one with another, the truth would undoubtedly be elicited, and a general knowledge given to each Power of the proceedings of a party, whose manoeuvres would thus be rendered infinitely less formidable." It would be for the Conference merely to point out the danger to a secondary Power. The nearest big neighbour might be trusted to give the necessary pressure.¹

Castlereagh was, however, left unmoved by these arguments. He had already spoken to Lieven on the subject with some heat, and suggested that the French Government wished the Ambassadors' Conference to be occupied with anything but its proper business of looking after France. Finally, after consultation with the Cabinet, he sent a dispatch to Stuart which laid down the principles on which he was to act. It was not the purpose of the circular but the use of the Ambassadorial Committee to which he specially objected, because such a method appeared to arrogate to the Great Powers a directing authority in Europe, even in the internal affairs of the other States. "It may be too much to assert," he wrote, "that no case could occur in Europe to render an authoritative remonstrance on the part of the Great Powers conjointly to any particular Court expedient, but such a mode of acting ought not to be of habitual occurrence, and especially ought not to proceed from the ministers in conference at Paris, as if it were done in the execution of their acknowledged functions." These latter must confine themselves, therefore, to such measures as they could recommend in normal times, when there was no Army of Occupation and consequently no Ambassadors' Conference. By all means let the Allied Ministers at Paris consider any danger which may threaten France—and report to their Governments without taking action themselves, if other States were involved. The actual circular issued could be defended as within the duties assigned to the Ambassadors, but it must not be extended. In this view of the matter Metternich was compelled to acquiesce, though he re-asserted his conviction of the necessity of a

¹ From A'Court, July 20, 1817: *F.O. Sicily*, 80. Esterhazy to Metternich, July 8, 1817: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 206, vii.

common centre of information, and he sent a dispatch to Vincent disapproving of the circular letter.¹

This action of Castlereagh is of great importance, because it marks thus early a fundamental divergence of principles between Castlereagh and his Continental Allies. To Metternich no less than to Alexander the exercise of a supervision over the Small Powers, extending even to measures which could hardly be considered as 'external,' seemed a natural and obvious one. They were already prepared to make the overlordship of the Great Powers a reality in Europe. Castlereagh, on the contrary, however necessary he regarded the Alliance of the Great Powers and the organs which it had set up, from the first considered them to be strictly limited to the duties imposed on them by the Treaties. He objected to Metternich's proposal not so much because of its object but because it infringed the rights of the Small States. He protested truly that public opinion in Britain would not tolerate such an extension of power. He thus began a controversy which was gradually to develop into a great issue between Britain and her Allies.

There was, in fact, great need to re-state the terms of the Alliance. Fortunately, an opportunity was soon to occur. For a Conference between the members of the Alliance was inevitable in order to settle the problem of the Army of Occupation in France. It would also provide an occasion to discuss the other vexed questions of European diplomacy, which, as will be seen, also needed such ventilation as only a meeting of the principal Sovereigns and statesmen could provide. The course of these discussions inevitably forced the Great Powers to reconsider the nature of the Treaties that bound them together, and their relations, not only to France, but also to the smaller Powers of Europe.

¹ Lieven to Nesselrode, July 30, 1817: *Pet. Arch.* To Stuart, Aug. 22, 1817: *F.O. France*, 151. From Gordon, Oct. 2, 1817: *F.O. Austria*, 137.

2. FRANCE IN TUTELAGE, 1815-1818¹

THE attitude of conquerors towards the conquered is the greatest of all tests of national character and capacity. After the battle of Waterloo France was helpless before a united Europe which could remember long years of selfish domination. The settlement of 1815 had left her in tutelage, her territories occupied by 150,000 Allied soldiers and her policy to a certain extent controlled by the Great Powers. Her financial Reparations had been only partially defined, and the measures by which she was to pay them to her conquerors were still to seek. There were undoubtedly in all countries important sections of public opinion which desired to keep France helpless as long as possible and to get as much as possible out of her during the period of Occupation. No credit was to be allowed for the fact that she had abandoned Napoleon and presumably his ambitions. France was always France—restless and desirous of dominating the Continent. She must be humiliated, punished, kept under by the same methods she had applied to Germany and Italy in the days of her greatness.

But France had been saved from dismemberment in 1815 by the wise action of Britain and Russia, and it was by the continuance of these salutary efforts that the period of Occupation was reduced to a minimum and France enabled to pay off, without too much financial dislocation, the comparatively lenient indemnities and Reparations which she had undertaken to provide by the Treaties and Conventions of November 1815. The motives of this unusually wise and humane

¹ There is no detailed account in existence of the Army of Occupation in France, whose problems are best studied in vols. xi and xii. of the *W.S.D.* The interesting study of M. Rain, *L'Europe et la Restauration des Bourbons, 1814-1818*, is founded on researches in the British and French archives, but, like many works of Sorel's pupils, it scarcely does justice to British policy.

attitude were not altogether or even mainly altruistic. To both Britain and Russia, France was, if not an Ally, at least a counterweight. Nevertheless, such a policy implies a restraint and a breadth of outlook that is unfortunately rare in international politics.

The policy of Britain was summed up in the vigorous and unique personality of Wellington. He represented, indeed, more than his own country, for it was an Inter-Allied army that he commanded, and in the last resort Alexander and Metternich looked to him as much as to their own Ambassadors. Nevertheless, his outlook and methods were peculiarly his own, and it was the interests of Britain that in the long run dictated his policy, however wisely and humanely sought, though the Duke was always conscious of the great position which he held in the councils of Europe and was anxious to fulfil his task, a congenial one, in the best possible manner. He had on occasion extraordinary lapses of tact, and the importance which he attached to his personal dignity, while ignoring all considerations of personal safety, was sometimes a little repellent. But his judgment and temper never failed him, and while the humanity of Alexander and the resource of Pozzo di Borgo were of the utmost importance to France, it was Wellington's cool and courageous wisdom that enabled her so soon to resume her place as an equal amongst the Great Powers—and he was superbly indifferent to the inevitable resentment that so magnanimous a policy incurred from those whom it most benefited.

It was to Wellington and not to Sir Charles Stuart, the British Ambassador, that Castlereagh looked to carry out his policy. Stuart was absurdly jealous of Pozzo di Borgo and transferred his dislike to the Richelieu ministry, which he regarded as set up by Russian influence. He would have been ready with the slightest encouragement to intrigue with any French element that promised to be able to upset Richelieu merely in order to triumph over his rival. But, as has been seen, this was just the kind of policy that Castlereagh disliked most, and he soon let Stuart know his view.

"I know that there are persons," he wrote, "that look upon the Duke of Richelieu's administration with jealousy

from his Russian connection, but in the present state of Europe it is perhaps more true to consider this connection as an important pledge on the part of Russia to support the King in France, which is *our great object*, and I am confident that Great Britain will have more real influence on the affairs of France, whilst the Emperor has this motive for accommodating, than if we were made the instruments, however innocently, of setting up our influence to the exclusion of his. . . . Upon this, as upon all other points, the Duke and I felt alike when we were together. We both opposed the change and we both felt that, being made, whether with any view to influence on the part of Russia or not was a secondary question, we had nothing to do but support honestly, cordially and fairly, whilst the Duke de Richelieu pursued a moderate course. Whatever errors of management on his part there may have been, there appears to have been none in intention. He acts with honour and good faith. He is above tricks, and in the present demoralized state of France if he falls I don't know how the King can replace him." ¹

This attitude was faithfully maintained during these three years, by Stuart reluctantly and with some subterranean revolts, by Wellington openly and wholeheartedly and with a rare success. Alexander, as will be seen, met him more than half way, and though Pozzo di Borgo, like Stuart, and with far more energy and guile, pursued a consistent campaign of intrigue, the two Courts continued to combine in a policy towards France that was at once intimidating and conciliatory.

Wellington was supreme in control of the Army, whose contingents were supplied in equal proportions of 30,000 men by the four Great Powers, while the remaining 30,000 was provided by smaller countries. He was responsible to his own Government, however, merely for the British contingent. As Commander-in-chief he was responsible to the Alliance as a whole. The co-ordinating instrument of this Alliance was the Ambassadorial Committee of the four Great Powers, which had been established for this purpose on the day on which the Peace was signed. It performed a double function. It was on the one hand to be the organ through which the commands of the Allied Sovereigns were transmitted to the Duke, and on the other it was to be the channel between the Duke and the French Government. The object was, as the

¹ To Stuart, Jan. 6, 1816: *F.O. France*, 128.

Ministers of the four Courts pointed out to the Commander-in-chief in their first communication to him, "that the most perfect union should subsist in the measures of the respective Cabinets, particularly in all affecting the political system to be observed towards France." ¹

Nothing could have been more punctilious than the regard which the Duke paid to the Ambassadors' Conference—when it suited his purpose to do so. It was for him an admirable body when he wished to delay decision or to play for safety. It must be admitted, however, that he never scrupled to disregard it and to approach either the King of France, his own Government or the Allied Sovereigns and Ministers directly when he had something of importance to say to them. He was, in fact, far too big a personage to be controlled by a Conference of Ambassadors, who were in any case generally divided in policy. On the contrary, it was the Duke who kept the Ambassadors in order. When Pozzo di Borgo was in despair at the conduct of Sir Charles Stuart, or when Sir Charles could put up with the intrigues of Pozzo di Borgo no longer, they both repaired to the Duke for advice and assistance, which was always forthcoming, if not always congenial. "It must not be supposed," wrote Wellington in 1818, with his usual frankness, "that the Allied Ministers here are very cordially united either in their objects or councils because they don't break out. The truth is that I keep them together; but if I were to withdraw from Paris altogether . . . you would no longer see that union of councils and objects which has prevailed here since the Peace." ² The Duke did not, as usual, under-estimate his own importance. Nevertheless, his words have a considerable amount of truth in them, and while the Ambassadorial Council had duties to perform, which at times were very important, it could easily have been dispensed with. By common consent, however, Wellington was *l'homme nécessaire*—indispensable not only by virtue of his command but by reason of the moral authority which he exerted over the French Government and their critics, external and internal.

¹ The Ministers of the four Courts to the Duke of Wellington, Nov. 20, 1815: *W.S.D.* xi. 240.

² Wellington to Bathurst, Feb. 25, 1818: *W.S.D.* xii. 335.

In the long run all the important decisions with regard to France during these three years were made by him, however he might try to avoid or disguise the responsibility.

The Commander-in-chief had, necessarily, first of all to think of the security and comfort of his troops. Wellington remained throughout the just and careful administrator who had raised the British army to so high a pitch of efficiency. But the Convention under which the Occupation was regulated was drawn up with a scrupulous regard for French interests. Wellington was given the minimum of power necessary for his office. The civil authorities were not superseded. Many towns were forbidden to the Allied soldiers. The tariff of provisions had been fixed so low by Wellington that it had to be supplemented by a grant from the British Exchequer.

Nevertheless, a military Occupation is always a grievous burden to the inhabitants however wisely administered. Wellington was constantly faced with problems which tried his temper and patience. The French contractors often behaved badly, and Wellington had to threaten to remedy their deficiencies by requisitions from the inhabitants. The peasants had to supply transport at absurdly low prices to the contractors; on occasion they had to consume supplies which had been rejected as unfit for the troops. The blame for these burdens was naturally placed on the foreigner. Their complaints of the damage done to their crops by the hunting proclivities of the British soldiers were more justifiable, and Wellington took steps to ensure that a practice, which he considered legitimate, should not fall too hardly on those who suffered from it, and he forbade it altogether when it was shewn to be abused.¹ His decisions almost always shew a decided bias in favour of the inhabitants. In 1814-15 he had led the only Army into France which could be prevented

¹ Bathurst to Wellington, Dec. 1, 1817: *W.S.D.* xii. 151. "The French complain much, I understand, of the damage done by our officers in their hunting parties. In this country the matter is better understood, besides which, people will bear contentedly from each other what they will ill bear from foreigners, especially when those foreigners belong to an army of Occupation; and though you attend to their complaints in your parties, and send them away satisfied, this may probably not be the case in other places from whence I have heard that the complaints are made."

from plundering and ill-treating the inhabitants. He was not going to allow this standard to be depreciated, and he was always ready to investigate and, if necessary, to punish and compensate when complaints were made.

His influence in France was, however, paramount in many other questions besides those which concerned his professional capacity. From the first he assumed an attitude which was almost paternal. It would have been difficult, indeed, for him to have avoided all connection with French politics, for the problems of the Army of Occupation were closely bound up with the internal security of France and this in turn depended on the strength of the various parties. The Chamber which had been elected in 1815 was like the Cavalier Parliament of Charles II., *une chambre introuvable*, and was far more Royalist than the placid and sensible Louis XVIII. For a time something like a White Terror reigned in France, and the Ultra-Royalists, under the leadership of the heir to the throne, who was surrounded by obstinate and intransigent *émigrés*, threatened to drive the mass of the people into revolution.

The Allied Ambassadors were soon alive to the dangers of this state of affairs. Pozzo di Borgo supplied his Court with long accounts, and Alexander sent Louis a warning letter, whose tone of patronage caused Stuart, though not his Government, much resentment. Nor could Wellington keep silent. His Army was there to keep the King of France on his throne and thus to preserve the peace of Europe.

On February 29, 1816, therefore, after discussions with Pozzo di Borgo and Richelieu, he wrote Louis a letter of protest and warning, severely criticising the conduct of the Chamber and of the Court.¹ It was undoubtedly his influence, together with that of the Tsar, to which Pozzo di Borgo constantly appealed, that carried the Government through the dangerous crisis of the early part of this year. Louis was given sufficient moral support to enable him to support his Ministry successfully against a hostile majority and the intrigues of his own family. In these difficulties Wellington learnt to appreciate the character of Richelieu even more

¹ Wellington to Louis XVIII., Feb. 29, 1816: *W.S.D.* xi. 310.

warmly than in 1815, and the latter henceforth found in the Commander-in-chief real sympathy and understanding.

The first big political decision which Wellington had to make was the question of a reduction of the numbers of the Army of Occupation. In a confidential note, dated November 20, 1815, the Allies had confirmed a promise made in conference on the Treaty, though not mentioned in it, that if circumstances allowed they would reduce year by year the numbers of the Army of Occupation. It was only natural therefore that this should be one of the first means by which Richelieu should try and reduce the burden laid on his country by the expenses of the Army of Occupation. In the early days of June 1816 he approached Wellington with a view to obtaining a reduction of 20,000 men in the second and third years of the Occupation. This reduction was to be the reward of the moderate party for their efforts to follow Wellington's advice, and their position in France was thus to be strengthened. Wellington shewed some disposition at first to accept this point of view, but he was apparently frightened at the threats of the Ultras during the recess, and he made his consent dependable on the behaviour of the Deputies during the next session. He discussed the project, however, amicably enough with Pozzo di Borgo who was also informed with a view to obtaining Alexander's consent. For the moment Prussia and Austria and even Stuart were kept in ignorance.¹

Wellington went home to drink the waters and consult his Government. Castlereagh brought the matter before the Cabinet, who agreed that reduction must depend upon the behaviour of the Chambers. Richelieu, in despair of the *Chambre Introuvable* behaving otherwise than foolishly, saw that his only chance was to dissolve. The Duke graciously approved, though Pozzo di Borgo declared that he was annoyed at so important a matter being settled without him. At any rate, he still refused to advise the reduction. Richelieu in vain tried to get the decision from the Allied Sovereigns through the Ambassadors. But all that Alexander and the Emperor

¹ Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, June 15, July 5, 1816: *I.R.H.S.* cxii. 532, 548. Castlereagh to Wellington, July 10, 1816: Wellington to Castlereagh, Aug. 30, 1816: *W.S.D.* xi. 442, 470. The relative papers on the promise made at Paris in 1815 are given in *W.S.D.* xi. 537-543.

of Austria would do was to agree that Wellington should decide, while Prussia made no reply. The Duke refused throughout the autumn to accede to Richelieu's repeated and urgent requests. Public opinion in France, he said, made such a measure dangerous. He might have to requisition food and would need all his forces to keep order. He suggested a compromise, and it was not until January 9, 1817, that he consented to recommend a reduction of 30,000 men to his Cabinet which, of course, at once agreed, provided France paid the instalment of the indemnity now due. French credit was naturally not very high when her territory was occupied by foreign armies, and large and as yet indeterminate sums were to be paid by her. But fortunately help could be obtained from British and Dutch bankers, and particularly Alexander Baring, a man of singularly large and enlightened views, who later as Lord Ashburton was to render other and even greater services to his country and the peace of the world. The necessary funds were thus obtained, and the much needed relief, which strengthened Richelieu's hands considerably, at last given. The whole transaction is a good illustration of Wellington's obstinacy and sense of dignity. It is difficult to believe that he considered the reduction dangerous, but he seems to have suspected that he was being forced into premature decisions about the Occupation, and he refused to be hustled. That his hesitations and postponements took away some of the advantages of the measure and made it appear in some sense a triumph of Pozzo di Borgo, does not appear to have occurred to him, and would not have troubled him if it had.¹

But Pozzo di Borgo was encouraged by the use which he had made of the Ambassadorial Council, and in the year 1817 he tried more than ever to use it in all his schemes. He failed, however, to make it an effective instrument to influence Allied policy towards France. The main points were decided by Wellington without more reference to the Council than he desired. "It is very difficult just at present," he wrote in March 1818, "to do anything here through the means of the

¹ Wellington to Stuart, Nov. 23, 1816, Jan. 9, 1817; Castlereagh to Wellington, Jan. 17, 1817: *W.S.D.* xi. 556, 589, 600.

Foreign Ministers, as Pozzo di Borgo is, in fact, a Frenchman, and there can be no concerted plan of action upon any subject, however common our interests may be."¹

When Wellington had agreed to the reduction he had insisted that it must be the last concession he was to be asked to make before the first three years envisaged in the Treaty were completed, when the whole situation of the Allies in France could be reviewed. He was forced, however, shortly to take up another question of supreme importance upon which, indirectly, the whole question of the Occupation turned. Wellington always insisted that his army remained in France to protect the King and the peace of Europe. He denied that it was there to collect the Allied debts. The reduction of 1817 was not made as a result of payments, nor was the duration of the Occupation made by treaty to depend on them. Nevertheless, all knew that the principal means of inducing France to pay the obligations which she had incurred under the Treaty of November 20, 1815, was by offering her freedom in exchange for settlement. Richelieu, indeed, was ready to do all that he could to satisfy the Allies, but his means were uncertain for they depended on the credit of France. The credit of France depended in its turn on the extent of her obligations, which were not yet known. The indemnity had been fixed in 1815 at 700 million francs, but besides the indemnity France had promised in 1814 to pay compensation for certain kinds of damages inflicted on individuals and public bodies by her armies, and the assessment of these damages had yet to be made.²

The nature of these damages had thus been specified but

¹ Wellington to Liverpool, March 1, 1818. *W.S.D.* xii 354.

² These were redefined in 1815, in two Conventions, as supplies for the French Army, arrears of pay, the maintenance of French troops in civil hospitals, funds entrusted to French post-offices, orders for payment to authorities no longer in French territory, loans to French civil and military authorities, indemnities granted for non-enjoyment of national domains and expenses connected therewith, advances from Communes, indemnities for land taken for fortifications, the stolen funds of the Bank of Hamburg and illegal payments of customs dues. The British claims were for goods illegally seized and the restoration, with accumulated interest, of French debt held by British subjects in 1793. In Wellington's opinion all these "were in general just demands in France, which France was bound in honour to pay, even if there had been no promise by treaty." Wellington to Bathurst, Nov. 25, 1817: *W.S.D.* xii. 139. The Conventions of Nov. 20, 1815, are given in *B.F.S.P.* iii. 315, 342.

their total amount was uncertain, and, as is always the case in such circumstances, many of the claims sent in were monstrosously swollen. The British claims were more easily definable and were rigorously scrutinised by the British Government. The claims of the continental Powers, however, amounted to 1200 million francs, nearly double the indemnity. It became obvious, therefore, to the French Government that everything depended on discovering some means of reducing these debts to a more moderate sum. By the Treaty their sum was to be assessed finally by Commissions on which France could have an equal voice, but in view of the number of claims and their amounts, this procedure would be very protracted, and in the end the total sum to be paid might be more than France's credit could support. The result would be, therefore, bankruptcy—and consequently the Army of Occupation for another two years. Richelieu was conscious, therefore, that everything depended on arranging a new financial settlement, and from the middle of 1817 all his efforts were directed towards this great end.

He began by suggesting a revision of the terms of the Treaty to the Ambassadors' Conference in unmistakable language. "M. de Richelieu distinctly stated," reported Stuart, "that at the time he signed the Treaty of 1815, whatever might be the calculations of the Allies, the Court of France did not contemplate the extensive demands which are now before the Commissioners; that he cannot therefore be prepared to propose to the legislative bodies the creation of 40 or 50 millions of Rentes to face the charge, and, feeling it would not be entertained for a moment, he was quite determined rather to abandon the office he held in the King's Councils than to expose the country to the mischief which must result from the refusal of such a proposition. He added that the truth can no longer be concealed, and that he must not disguise from us that the conditions of the Convention are in the present circumstances inexecutable; that we shall therefore do well to concert modifications by which France shall be enabled to fulfil her engagements." The German Powers, whose claims were naturally by far the greatest, refused at first even to consider his claims for relief. But

Richelieu knew that he could rely in the long run on the support of Britain and Russia. As early as May 1817, indeed, Baring, who had done well out of the first French loan, was anxious to go on with his work if the Government approved, and Castlereagh and Wellington gave him every encouragement. When, therefore, he pointed out that he could only raise the necessary sums if they were determinate and moderate, the support of the British Government for reduction was already secured. Wellington suggested that a fixed sum, say 500 million francs, should be accepted from France in lieu of all claims, and that the Allies should divide it amongst themselves, setting up a special commission for the purpose at Frankfort. Castlereagh was prepared to accept a fixed sum, but he insisted on the necessity of some "principle" of division being found, lest the controversy should be simply transferred to the Allies themselves and "blow up the confederacy."¹

The Allied ministers therefore began to discuss the nature of the claims, and it was soon obvious that the amounts could be materially reduced. Richelieu went so far as to admit that a sum of 300 millions was justified, and Wellington thought that 400 millions would suffice. But Prussia was claiming 200 millions and Austria 150 millions, and while all were agreed that these sums were ridiculous, the 'principle' which Castlereagh demanded could not be found, and the Ambassadors merely quarrelled with one another. It was in vain that Richelieu sent Caraman to meet Hardenberg and Capo d'Istria at Carlsbad. Metternich, who had also been expected, kept away, and no concession could be obtained from Prussia. Richelieu, losing patience, sent almost an ultimatum to the Conference and offered 200 millions only as a settlement. This provoked a brutal reply from Prussia, which did Richelieu's cause great good, and threw Austria on the British-Russian side. Eventually it was the Tsar, who, in response to an urgent appeal from Richelieu, found the 'principle,' which, as so often, was found in a personality. In a Memorandum of November 13, Alexander suggested that

¹ From Stuart, July 7, 1817: *F.O. France*, 160. Liverpool to Wellington, May 15, July 25, 1817; Castlereagh to Wellington, Aug. 8, 1817: *W.S.D.* xi, 684; xii, 13, 23.

Wellington should be made the final court of decision on all the Allied claims. This idea was eagerly accepted by the British Government and consequently by Wellington himself.¹

It was a weary and thankless task, but the Duke's sense of justice, powers of work, resource and prestige, triumphed over all obstacles, at some cost of temper. Neither Richelieu nor Pozzo di Borgo found him as lenient as they had anticipated; for in this matter Pozzo di Borgo, as the Duke found in practice, really represented France, not Russia. But the Duke had always behind him the financial skill of Baring when it came to assessing the extreme amount which France could pay. The eager rivalry of the Allies played into the hands of their debtor when it was seen that a reduction must be made, and Richelieu was able to get them to accept a settlement which was an equivalent of only 240,800,000 francs, far less than they were entitled to even on Richelieu's own admission. The British claims were settled by an annual payment of 3 million francs. "The French Government have behaved most shamefully in this question," wrote Wellington, "and have taken advantage of the general eagerness to come to a settlement to make a better bargain. . . . However," he added, "I believe the sacrifice was necessary and that we should have got nothing if we had not made it."²

All that remained was now to find the capital. Baring would have been only too glad to make himself responsible for the whole amount due from France—the indemnity as well as the sums due for Reparations. But the French Ministry decided to offer this latter as a national loan, and it was subscribed five times over. It was even suggested that no foreign loans would be necessary. But the magnitude of the transaction was very great for those days. The French bankers easily lost their heads. British and Dutch credit was indispensable. There were indeed some anxious moments

¹ The Emperor of Russia to Wellington, Oct. 30, 1817, Pozzo di Borgo to Wellington, Dec. 3, 1817, with Russian Memorandum: *W.S.D.* xii. 119, 156 ff. Rain, *L'Europe et la Restauration des Bourbons*, 371-376. Duvergier de Hauranne, *Histoire du Gouvernement Parlementaire*, iv. 360-365. E. Molden, *Zur Geschichte des oesterreichisch-russischen Gegensatzes*, 59-64.

² Wellington to Clancarty, April 23, 1818: *W.S.D.* xii. 492.

before the final stages of the transaction were arranged at Aix-la-Chapelle.

Before the question of the financial claims was settled, the parallel problem of the reduction of the term of Occupation to three years was being hotly discussed amongst the Powers. To obtain this boon was the principal reason why Richelieu pressed on the financial schemes so eagerly and consented to give such good terms to Baring and the Dutch firm of Hope. The financial settlement made, indeed, the evacuation practically inevitable. Nevertheless, the decision was not come to without a good deal of hesitation on the part of the British Government. In December 1817 Bathurst wrote to Wellington, after a hostile demonstration against the British troops, expressing the gravest doubts as to the wisdom of abandoning the Occupation, and the Duke himself remained pessimistic as to the future of France. The conduct of Monsieur, with whom the Duke had remonstrated in the strongest possible manner, caused him the gravest misgivings. "The descendants of Louis XV. will not reign in France," he wrote at the beginning of 1818, "and I must say, and always will say, that it is the fault of Monsieur and his adherents."¹

Nevertheless, he told Baring at the beginning of February that the Powers would probably withdraw the troops in the autumn, and after that France would have to look after herself. On February 10, 1818, however, a half-hearted attempt was made to assassinate him in Paris, where he was attending conferences on the financial question. The Ministry were much alarmed and drew upon themselves the severe displeasure of the Duke by advising him to leave Paris, an opinion which offended him as much as the suggestion of the French Government that there had been no serious attempt on his life. Bathurst wrote seriously about the possibility of a revolution breaking out in France. But Liverpool assumed that, if France paid her debts, the evacuation would take place, and Wellington, while he grew more and more pessimistic as to the future of France, yet thought that the Occupation grew more dangerous as the public opinion of France grew more and

¹ Bathurst to Wellington, Dec. 1, 1817; Wellington to Villiers, Jan. 1, 1818; Wellington to Liverpool, Feb. 9, 1818: *W.S.D.* xii. 151, 212, 61.

more hostile towards it. It could only continue, he said in March, if the troops were concentrated, and consequently made a greater burden to the inhabitants. He was obviously anxious to be rid of his responsibilities, and nothing could be more unjust than Gentz's innuendo made at this time, that the Occupation would continue because Wellington liked the commanding position which it gave him in the Councils of Europe.¹

The Cabinet had long discussions on the subject, and the Memorandum, which was issued on March 27, 1818, to their Allies, while leaving the matter open for decision of the Conference, took a gloomy view of the internal condition of France, and suggested that some substitute might be found for the Army of Occupation in the creation of a special force on the Netherlands frontier. This idea, however, did not find favour with either Russia or Austria, though Prussia, as usual, would have welcomed anything which was intended to check the power of France, and in the course of the discussions as to the form of the future Conference it was gradually dropped. In the course of these discussions also it was gradually assumed that the Occupation would cease, and the Powers began to consider the new situation which would thus arise. Hitherto the Alliance had been kept together by their common responsibilities in France. It must assume a new character when the Army of Occupation ceased to exist and France regained her position as a Great Power.²

¹ Bathurst to Wellington, March 3, 1818; Liverpool to Wellington, March 6, 1818; Wellington to Bathurst, March 8, 1818: *W.S.D.* xii. 363, 375, 380. Gentz, *Depêches inédites*, i. 339.

² Castlereagh to Cathcart, March 27, 1818. *W.S.D.* xii. 445. Russian and Austrian Answers in *I.R.H.S.* cxix. 645, 661; Rose to Castlereagh, May 20, 1818: *F.O. Prussia*, 113.

3. RUSSIAN ACTIVITIES AND AUSTRIAN FEARS, 1815-1818

IN France, though their Ambassadors were rivals, yet Russia and Britain had the same end in view—the consolidation of the restored monarchy. But almost everywhere else in Europe during these three years their policies apparently conflicted. The Tsar, or at least some of his servants, engaged in multifarious activities which were in almost all cases hostile to Britain. There was a kind of diplomatic duel between the two countries which extended over a large area. At Paris they appeared to be rivals for the favour of Louis XVIII., at Madrid there was a fierce contest on which large issues hung, in Italy and Germany Britain supported Austrian influence against Russian, at Constantinople there was almost openly confessed divergencies of view; the contest extended into Asia and the struggle over Persia had already begun. It must be remembered that this was an entirely new part for Russia to play. Before the French Revolution she had appeared as a half-barbarous Power who had no relations with Western Europe. Pitt had suspected her, but merely as a rival in the East. Now her influence was supreme and apparently increasing at half the Courts of Europe, and her agents were engaged in stirring up strife all over the West.

No wonder, therefore, that many men accused the Tsar¹

¹ For Alexander the best account is by Schiemann in the first volume of his *Geschichte Russlands unter Nicolaus I*, but there is but little about his foreign policy. The Grand Duke Nicholas Mikhailowitch has published a large mass of evidence about him in his *Alexandre I*, his *Correspondance avec sa soeur la Grand Duchesse Catharine* and his *Rapports diplomatiques de Lebzelttern*, which add an immense amount to Shilder's account, part of which is largely based on the memoirs of Danilewski, which are not very trustworthy. Those who have tried to paint a Machiavellian Alexander have relied mainly on their imagination. Bernhardt's *Geschichte Russlands* is still worth reading. *Le règne de Alexandre I^{er}*, by K. Waliskewski, is founded on most of the recently published evidence, but the second volume (1924) only covers the period 1812-1816.

himself of hypocrisy and trickery. His professions of Christian principles were thought to be merely designed to cover his far-reaching schemes of European domination. He was aiming at Constantinople, at the succession to Napoleon, at the overthrow of the British Empire. His agents were carrying out only too well orders that came from Petersburg.

It is true that neither then nor now was the character of Alexander easy to understand. He remains as one of the great enigmas of history. The Holy Alliance had revealed how strong were his religious emotions in 1815. These continued and, indeed, increased. He became a mystic and a zealot. His correspondence is full of allusions to the more incomprehensible parts of Holy Writ. He loved the society of those who held, or professed to hold, similar beliefs. His knees bore the marks of the constant prayers for which he knelt night and morning. He founded Bible Societies and corresponded with Quakers, and he introduced their phraseology into his conversations and public papers.

Whether from religious motives or not, he brought forward into the European arena policies which were far ahead of the public opinion of the day. The design of the Holy Alliance was a new Christendom where Kings were brothers and their subjects their children. He instituted, as is shewn below, the first discussions for international disarmament ever seriously made amongst European statesmen. He gave to Poland a constitution far in advance of the age. He discussed, and even put into practice, emancipation of the serfs.

Yet at the same time he was also under the influence of sinister and reactionary statesmen. In particular he gave Arakscheiev a confidence such as he gave to no other man. And Arakscheiev, while a diligent and trustworthy servant, was also a cruel and barbarous Russian of pronounced abnormal tendencies, who was the avowed foe of all that 'Liberalism' which Alexander professed at this moment. The Military Colonies, founded in these years to increase the efficiency and striking power of the Russian Army, may be defended even from a humanitarian point of view, but not the methods by which they were carried out. But they were the main delight

of the Tsar, and Arakscheiev was given complete authority over them. Gradually, as will be seen, this tendency of Alexander triumphed over all his other emotions. He became a suspicious and bigoted tyrant. All his other friends were banished from his presence, and he surrendered entirely to the sinister influence of Arakscheiev and the Patriarch Photinus.

The explanations given of this curious career are not very satisfactory. It may be that the influence of Arakscheiev was due to the Tsar's remorse for his conduct towards his father and the consciousness that while he had been a treacherous son the other had remained a faithful servant.¹ It would appear, however, that this fixed complex of ideas could not have become completely dominant if the character of the Tsar had not been altogether abnormal. It is probable that his irregular life and the sudden change caused by his strange conversion had exerted a demoralising effect on his will and intelligence. Perhaps from 1815, as Castlereagh suspected, certainly after 1820, we must regard him as half mad, at any rate mad on some subjects. He had all the persistence and cunning of a madman, but men like Arakscheiev and Metternich, who knew how to play on his character, were able to bend him to their will. Yet it is possible to discern in his foreign policy at least something like a consistent plan, and it is possible to regard it as successful in the long run, for it undoubtedly paved the way for the successes of Nicholas I.

At any rate the problem cannot be solved by supposing that during these years Alexander did not try to direct his own foreign policy. On the contrary all the evidence goes to shew that he endeavoured to exercise a personal and special control over it. "The Emperor has reserved to himself," wrote Cathcart, "in a peculiar manner the superintendence of the department of foreign affairs. He considers that, having had opportunities of knowing the policy, of seeing the practice and of becoming personally acquainted with the Ministers of the principal Courts, he possesses more information than can fall to the share of most Ministers." Castlereagh more than once

¹ Mikhailowitch, *Alexandre I.* i. 260.

commented on the fact that the Emperor's subordinates were only given very limited discretion. The Tsar himself, indeed, took the same view. "What signifies that which appears to M. de Pozzo di Borgo or M. de Tatishchev, looking each as he does to the mere point immediately before his eyes," he said in 1818, "to him who has to determine upon a general view which he has to take from a commanding height." The influence of Arakscheiev did not extend to foreign affairs. They were directed by the Emperor's own unbalanced and emotional, but acute and sensitive intellect, which a long and eventful reign had strained and twisted but also sharpened and refined.¹

As if to make the more obvious the two conflicting sides of his nature he had chosen two men as different as possible to convey his views to his subordinates. Both Nesselrode and Capo d'Istria acted as secretaries for foreign affairs. The first was a matter-of-fact German with a soul steeped in routine, who had no ideas of his own except a distaste for anything new or liberal in conception. To him was entrusted the ordinary business of the department, but, except as a channel for Metternich or Castlereagh to convey their ideas to Alexander, he had during these early years but little influence.² Capo d'Istria, a Corfiote, who had entered the Russian service in 1813, was, however, a man of ideas, who was later to have a stage to himself for a short time. He professed a Liberalism which, though mainly inspired by a wish to help his own Greek countrymen, yet was undoubtedly sincere and intelligent enough. Until 1822 he played a big part in Russian diplomacy, and it was to him that the Tsar turned for advice in the most important problems. Metternich detested him and the dislike was mutual. It is not surprising, therefore, that Capo d'Istria was the centre of all the intrigues directed against the Austro-British connection. His influence with the Tsar

¹ From Cathcart, July 12, 1816: *F.O. Russia*, 104. Castlereagh to Bathurst, Oct. 3, 1818. *F.O. Continent*, 35. From Rose, Sept. 30, 1818: *F.O. Russia*, 114. Schemmann, *Geschichte Russlands*, i. 77.

² Noailles to Richelieu, May 30, 1817: *I.R.H.S.* cxix 208—"Il [Capo d'Istria] était chargé de toute la partie délicate de la diplomatie; le comte de Nesselrode, de la partie matérielle." The private correspondence in the *Lettres et papiers du Chancelier Comte de Nesselrode* unfortunately throw little light on his public career.

stopped short, however, far below control or even intimacy, and, while allowed some freedom, he was soon checked if he went too far. Of this weakness in his position both Castlereagh and Metternich gradually became fully aware and took advantage.¹

The relations of the Tsar himself to Castlereagh and Wellington were friendly and even cordial. The former had opposed his plans at the Congress of Vienna in a bitter controversy, but at the Second Peace of Paris Alexander and Castlereagh had worked together to save France from dismemberment. But, as has been noted, Alexander and the Prince Regent disliked one another intensely. Moreover, by shewing especial favour in 1814 to the Whigs, Alexander had also aroused the distrust of the Tory Cabinet, which had no other opportunities for meeting the Tsar as Castlereagh and Wellington had. All this had an undoubted influence, as Countess Lieven sadly insisted, on the pro-Austrian attitude of the British Cabinet. But of course it was not the deciding nor even the main factor in producing this policy which was based, not on sentiment, but on interest. The result of these incidents, however, was to make more difficult the task of Castlereagh when he attempted to allay the suspicions of the Cabinet and Court which Metternich and his Ambassador fomented in every possible way.

The Russian activities were indeed sufficiently alarming in themselves. They emanated mainly from Pozzo di Borgo and Tatishchev, but they had subsidiary and related effects all over Central Europe. The energetic and resourceful Pozzo di Borgo was profoundly grieved at the impotency to which Russian policy was reduced by the Austrian-British combination against it. He found himself, for example, in the Ambassadors' Council at Paris almost always out-voted, for it was soon apparent that Prussia preferred to follow Austria rather than Russia. Unless Russia, therefore, was prepared always to find herself in the minority, either the Austro-British *entente* must be broken or some counterweight be found.

¹ There is no adequate biography of this interesting and mysterious figure, whose assassination in 1831 when he was acting as President of liberated Greece cut short a wonderful career.

been signed by which Russia had obtained Minorca in return for the sale of her fleet to Spain. The existence of this treaty was reported from almost every Court in Europe. When however, enquiries were made at Petersburg, the report was categorically denied, and the Emperor told Cathcart that whatever honours Tatishchev might have obtained from Spain he had obtained none from his own Court. Complaints were made against Tatishchev by Metternich as well as Castlereagh, and even Pozzo di Borgo urged moderation and recounted the indignant alarm of Wellington. Castlereagh himself was at first seriously disturbed by these reports. The Austrian Ambassador reported that he had never seen him so moved. Lieven, who, with some logic but no great tact, compared the position which Tatishchev had established in Ferdinand's private circle to that of Esterhazy in the entourage of the Prince Regent, was treated for some time with marked coldness.¹

The total result of all this intrigue was the sale of some old Russian vessels to Spain. Lieven returned hastily from the Continent to explain the transaction to Castlereagh when it was at last revealed. Castlereagh received the news coldly but he accepted the explanations, and Lieven reported that he seemed relieved that no secret bargains were to be avowed. The ships were received in Spain with great pomp and hailed as a new Armada. They turned out to be utterly unseaworthy, and a touch of comedy was thus given to Alexander's attempts to challenge British sea-power. Nevertheless, Tatishchev kept his commanding position in the King's counsels until Aix-la-Chapelle. The exact inwardness of these transactions was not known to Castlereagh, whose opinion was that Tatishchev had secured the concession but that it had been discovered by his Court. Its ultimate effect on the question of the Spanish Colonies is discussed in a later chapter, but its immediate effect was greatly to increase the power of

¹ From Vaughan, July 27, Nov. 28, 1816, from Wellesley, Jan. 15, Feb. 6, April 10, 1817: *F.O. Spain*, 187-198. From Cathcart, March 1, 22, 1817. *F.O. Russia*, 108. Lieven to Nesselrode, May 13, 1817: *Pet. Arch. Lebzelter* to Metternich, Feb. 23, 1817, from Stewart, March 15, 1817: *F.O. Austria*, 135.

those who believed or wished to assume the bad faith of the Tsar.¹

No other incident of these years produced quite the same effect as this one, but there were many other disquieting rumours. A'Court reported an intrigue from Naples, of which it was difficult to complain openly, seeing that the evidence involved two of his colleagues in discreditable conduct. Castle-reagh refused to place much faith in this revelation, but the dispatches of Stewart and A'Court continued to be full of accounts of the presence of Russian agents in the Peninsula and their attempts to stir up disaffection against Austria. A'Court admitted that they were probably acting without the direct authority of their Government, but that the Italians did not know this, and were constantly assured by the Carbonari and other secret societies that Alexander himself was in sympathy with their work. But though these alarming reports continued down to the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, it was obvious that they had but little to justify them. Mocenigo was recalled from Naples in 1817, and, except at the Court of Sardinia, Russia's influence was not great, the Emperor's position at Naples being weakened by his sincere attempt to make that Court pay the compensation granted, at Alexander's own special desire, to Eugène de Beauharnais in 1814.²

From Germany came also a similar tale of Russian influence. The skeleton of the German Confederation erected at Vienna still lacked shape and substance. It was important, therefore, that Austrian influence should predominate at the small Courts in order that her plans might be accepted. She had also violent negotiations with Bavaria over territorial cessions which involved Baden. Now Alexander was related through his wife to the Court of Baden, and through his sister Catharine to the Court of Württemberg, the centre of Liberal and anti-Austrian influence in South Germany. Here again then it was

¹ Nesselrode to Lieven, Sept. 16; Lieven to Nesselrode, Nov. 7, 1817: *Pel. Arch.* From Cathcart, Sept. 24, 1817: *F.O. Russia*, 109. I have examined the dispatches to Tatishchev in the Petrograd archives and it appears that he never tried to obtain the concession as suspected. See below, Chapter VIII. section 1, page 412, also the careful examination of the printed evidence by Mr. Dexter Perrins, *American Historical Review*, July 1923, 657.

² From A'Court, Feb. 5, 18, 1816; July 20, 1817; March 16, June 24, 1818: *F.O. Sicily*, 74, 80, 84.

possible to imagine the existence of a Russian plot to establish a Russian hegemony over Germany or, at least, to prevent Austria from exercising one.

At Constantinople itself Russia had, of course, immense and legitimate interests. The Sultan in 1815 had foolishly rejected the guarantee which had been suggested by Castlereagh at Vienna, and there were many questions left outstanding between the Porte and Russia. The publication of the Holy Alliance Treaty, to which, of course, only Sovereigns professing the Christian faith could adhere, caused much alarm at Constantinople. Alexander found it necessary to issue a special explanation of the document in order to disavow the interpretation placed upon it by the Porte, but at the same time the Russian Ambassador, Stroganov, intimated that Russia would brook no interference by the other Powers in her relations with Turkey. He began to prepare for a sustained and determined period of pressure such as was always necessary to secure concessions from the Porte. His instructions had been drawn up in an uncompromising manner by Capo d'Istria and were considered at the Russian Court as a masterpiece, though Metternich called them verbose and confused. Thus, while affairs at Constantinople were not critical during these years, yet they might at any moment have become so.¹

But these many disputes, important, constant, and acrimonious as they were, were only part of the Russian policy. It has been seen how at Paris, though Stuart and Pozzo di Borgo quarrelled, in the long run Russian policy supported the policy of the Alliance and deferred to the authority of Wellington. But Alexander was also constantly reiterating his desire for peace and his devotion to the Treaties. If he spoke most often of the Holy Alliance, his own particular project, yet he was also prepared to support all the more tangible obligations undertaken by the Treaties of November 20, 1815; he even desired, as was soon to be seen, to extend these obligations into something like a European Confederacy or Super-State. What puzzled contemporaries was how to reconcile

¹ From Frere, Feb. 24, May 10, 1816; *F.O. Turkey*, 86; *Rescrit de l'Empereur Alexandre*, of March 30, 1816: *I.R.H.S.*, cxii. 455. Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands*, i. 290. See also below, Chapter VII., section 1, p. 351.

Russian actions in Italy, Spain and Germany with these professions of a desire for the closest co-operation with the other Great Powers. These professions were, it is true, mixed up with assertions and claims which betrayed all the symptoms of a disordered intellect, or at least that kind of inspiration which is closely akin to madness. But it was difficult to believe, either then or now, that they were merely the cloak of insidious and far-reaching designs.

It was his desire to ensure the peace of the world presumably that induced him to propose a mutual reduction of armaments in 1816, and it is significant that it is to Britain that the proposal was first made. The excuse for broaching the matter was Castlereagh's speech in the House of Commons defending the motives of Alexander as revealed in the Holy Alliance, which the Opposition had begun to attack with great bitterness as soon as its existence was known. The Tsar was perhaps genuinely moved. At any rate he wrote Castlereagh a private letter thanking him for his defence and protesting his benevolence. At the same time he urged the necessity for "a simultaneous reduction of the armed forces of all kinds which the Powers have brought into being to preserve the safety and independence of their peoples," and hoped that the united efforts of Russia and Great Britain would "be able to bring about in common, and by methods best adapted to the present situation and the relations of the various Powers, the reduction of armed forces of all kinds whose maintenance on a war footing weakens the credit of existing treaties and must lay a heavy burden on every people."¹

It must be remembered that these proposals came from a monarch who boasted that he could put one million men on a war footing, and while Arakscheiev was organising the system of Military Colonies in Western Russia, so that the huge forces which Russia had raised during the war could be retained within striking distance of her frontiers. Nevertheless, Castlereagh was anxious to shew as much confidence in the Tsar as possible. His reply, therefore, sent on May 28, 1816, in the form of a Cabinet Memorandum signed by the Prince

¹ Alexander to Castlereagh, April 2, 1816: *F.O. Russia*, 105. See an article by the present writer in the *Contemporary Review*, Nov. 1922: "Disarmament Proposals in 1816," where more details are given.

Regent with covering letters from both the Regent and from Castlereagh himself, attempted to reduce these rather vague proposals to a workable form. The Memorandum is indeed a good example of the practical nature of Castlereagh's aspirations after peace. It was a ruthless exposure of the difficulties of the Tsar's proposal which had been entirely ignored in his own letter, while at the same time it endeavoured to make some practical use of the friendly disposition which the letter announced.

"The Prince Regent," it intimated, "will weigh with the utmost attention any suggestion which comes from the Emperor of Russia. Although a complete and perfect understanding on this subject among all the leading Powers, regulating the amount of their respective forces, would certainly be the most perfect basis on which a general disarmament could rest, yet it is impossible not to perceive that the settlement of a scale of force for so many Powers, under such different circumstances as to their relative means, frontiers, positions and faculties for re-arming, presents a very complicated question for negotiation; that the means of preserving a system, if once created, are not without their difficulties, liable as all States are to partial necessities for an increase of force; and it is further to be considered that on this, as on many subjects of a jealous character, in attempting to do too much, difficulties are rather brought into view than made to disappear."

It suggested, therefore, "whether the best course might not be for each State to carry its disarmament as far as it could possibly reconcile to its own view of local expediency, explaining to Allied and neighbouring States the extent and nature of its arrangements as a means of dispelling alarm and of rendering moderate establishments mutually convenient."

It invited Alexander himself to set the example, or rather follow the example which had already been set by Austria and Prussia and, as documents were enclosed to prove, of Britain herself. Nothing was, of course, said about naval as contrasted to military forces in which Britain held an overwhelming superiority. The rest of the document dwelt on the

various topics of discussion between the Great Powers and urged the necessity of their settlement.¹

This virtually put an end to serious discussion of the question. Castlereagh did, indeed, also report the suggestion to Metternich, who regarded the whole thing as a ruse on Russia's part. Alexander's conduct supported this view, in as much as he told Cathcart that he could not move unless Prussia and Austria made much greater reductions than had as yet taken place. Castlereagh's comments on this result were a model of moderation and common sense. "There is much weight in the Russian remark," he wrote, "that their army does not admit of such management, and that the military machine, once let down, can only be restored in Russia after long time, labour and expense. This argument would be decisive of the necessity of preserving an unusually large army in Russia if the magnitude of the Empire and its invulnerability were not such as in themselves to dispel all alarm of attack; but as the Emperor likes an army, as he likes an influence in Europe, and is under an impression of some alarm with respect to the political effervescence of the times, I do not expect him very rapidly to part with the troops he has formed; nor should we, from this circumstance alone, call in question his pacific dispositions; but as the reduction of this army involves that of other States, and in this view essentially bears upon the relief the finances of Europe so generally require, everything that can form an inducement to the Emperor to let it down should be attended to. For this purpose I place in the first rank of importance the closing, as early as possible, the several questions that are yet open in Europe, and the opening as few as possible for discussion whilst the public mind of all States is yet agitated by the fear of the French Revolution, and the military temper to which it has given birth. This, with a frank and conciliatory system of diplomacy, holding fast to the principle of the Alliance which now happily exists, is likely to bring the motives of internal economy to bear with the most effect upon the military expenditure of Russia."²

¹ Castlereagh to the Tsar, May 28, 1816, enclosing a Confidential Memorandum of the same date: *F.O. Russia*, 105.

² From Cathcart, July 12, 1816: *F.O. Russia*, 104. To Clancarty, Aug. 6, 1816: *F.O. Germany*, 3.

This incident well illustrates the attitude which Castlereagh was determined to take up towards the Tsar, and which was very different to that pressed on him by Metternich and by many of his own subordinates. For though by no means blind to the dangers which might loom behind all these different manifestations of Russian activity, Castlereagh was determined to avoid being driven into a position of covert hostility or premature precaution. Such a policy he thought would only increase the very danger which it was intended to avoid. He joined issue with Metternich on this point at the very outset, and rejected all the attempts which the Austrian Minister made to turn the close ties of sympathy and mutual interest which united the two Courts into some more definite understanding or even a positive alliance against Russia.

The relations between Austria and Britain were very close during these early years, and to the day of his death, in spite of the differences that arose at Troppau and Laibach, Castlereagh was on more intimate terms with Metternich than with any other European statesman.¹ During the final struggle with Napoleon Castlereagh had found Metternich more easy to work with than any other great personage of the Alliance. The Austrian Minister had a keen appreciation of facts, he shewed moderation, he had the faculty of compromise. These were Castlereagh's own special qualities, and thus the two statesmen had got on well together from the first moment when they met in the early days of 1814. At Vienna they had established a close alliance against the Tsar and the militant Prussians, and though at the Second Peace of Paris

¹ There is as yet no adequate life of Metternich. The eight volumes of his *Mémoires* contain no more than mere fragments of his papers, and their editing is suspect. His policy during Napoleon's life may now, however, be considered as fairly well known, and the researches already made and now proceeding at Vienna will, it may be hoped, soon make clear much that has been obscure.

It was not until the Conference of Troppau that Gentz, the Austrian publicist, became the close confidant of Metternich. His pen had been more than once in British pay during the Napoleonic wars, and both Castlereagh and Wellington knew him well, since he had been "Secretary" of the Congress of Vienna. His *Dépêches inédites aux Hospodars*, long a principal source for this period, are written with a purpose and are biased and inaccurate. But they, as well as his other letters, not the least those to Pilat, the editor of the official *Austrian Observer*, reveal a good deal of Austrian policy in these years.

Metternich had to oppose Castlereagh, he had yielded as soon as he could and had not shewn the obstinacy of his other German colleagues. When Castlereagh left the Continent, therefore, he could look to Metternich with more confidence than any other statesman.

Moreover, Metternich had taken every advantage of his opportunities in 1814 to win a strong position for himself in the British Court and Cabinet. While Alexander was engaging the Prince Regent and coquetting with the Whigs, Metternich was ingratiating himself with the former by judicious flattery and gaining the confidence of the Tories by refusing all intercourse with the Opposition. Esterhazy received instructions to follow the same line of conduct, and he succeeded in winning the favour of the Prince Regent and his mistress, to the great jealousy of Lieven.

These personal connections were not, however, the deciding factor in British-Austrian relations. Austria had been the traditional Ally of Britain because their interests appeared to be coincident or at least mutually complementary. She had been, like Britain, the consistent foe of France, and now that Russia had emerged as a European Power, she was her rival also as Britain was. She had no maritime interests, and she desired the *status quo* in the East. British statesmen, therefore, saw in her an obvious Ally, and were prepared to try and make her as strong as possible in Europe in return for her support in their maritime and colonial plans. During the period of reconstruction in Europe they had supported almost invariably her claims in Italy and in Germany. They continued the same policy during these years. In return, they looked to her to keep the centre of the Mediterranean free from both French and Russian influence and to receive her support at the extremities of Europe where their own special interests lay.

For long this policy, which Castlereagh actively pursued to the day of his death, was attributed to the malign influence which the cunning Metternich knew how to exercise over a character weaker than his own. The praises which Metternich gave to Castlereagh, and in particular the contrast which he drew between him and Canning, have done more to injure his

reputation than all the abuse of Byron or Cobbett. But nothing could be further from the truth than to regard Castlereagh as the dupe of Metternich. He knew the latter's character only too well—his cunning, his duplicity, and above all his timidity, for which Castlereagh had a great contempt. So far from being the dupe of Metternich, he was considered by more than one observer as the stronger of the two. Certainly until the Neapolitan Revolution drove the frightened Metternich into the arms of Alexander, it was always Castlereagh who determined the general character of Austrian diplomacy. Metternich might be given a free hand in Italian or German problems in which Austria had an overwhelming and Britain only a subordinate interest. But in the major problems of diplomacy, in the shape and character of the Alliance, in the attitude towards France, in the Eastern Question, and, of course, in the problem of the Spanish Colonies, it was Castlereagh who led and Metternich who followed, at any rate until Troppau and Laibach, and even later in 1821 and 1822.¹

Metternich, of course, tried to foment in every way the suspicions which Alexander's conduct was likely to raise in the breasts of British statesmen. He hoped to use them to make an open breach between Britain and Russia, and thus to establish himself as the arbiter of the Continent. His own language at Petersburg was indeed very different from that which he urged Castlereagh to use there. He had no intention of bearding Alexander himself, much as he was incommoded at Russian opposition to his plans in Italy and Germany. He wished to leave this uncongenial task to Castlereagh. At the same time he hoped that he was indispensable to Britain, and could thus obtain the definite alliance which he thought necessary to enable him to complete in safety his aim of dominating the Continent. But Castlereagh was never in any danger of being hoodwinked by these schemes. He knew exactly how far he was prepared to go, and as we have seen he had his own receipt for Alexander, which was the very opposite to that of Metternich.

¹ See "Some aspects of Castlereagh's Foreign Policy," by the present writer: *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, Third series, vi. 75.

When therefore Metternich through Stewart and Esterhazy pressed on Castlereagh's attention the dangers from Russia, stressing always those aspects of Alexander's activities which appeared to be most hurtful to British interests, he found in Castlereagh a disposition to explain and excuse these actions and to deprecate all attempts at counter movements.

Thus Alexander's communication on disarmament presented to Vienna with the British reply as an indication of the success of the methods which Castlereagh had suggested in his circular letter. Stewart was instructed "to call the Austrian Minister's particular attention to the success which appeared hitherto to have attended the course of policy adopted by the British Cabinet towards Russia," and to urge him to pursue a similar line. "The circular instructions sent from hence in January," wrote Castlereagh, "and the language subsequently held appear to have both operated very favourably in the Emperor's mind. The true interests of Russia dictate to him a pacific policy. His ambition, well understood, points to the same way. The solemn pledge he has taken in the face of the world is an additional obstacle to a different course, but to secure our object we must be careful, while we encourage the Emperor to act up to his past declarations, to avoid unnecessarily stirring those points of secondary policy amongst ourselves, which might afford either a motive or a justification to the Emperor to adopt a different system."¹

He was always impressing on Esterhazy the same point of view in the many conversations which he had with him. The latter, however, left no stone unturned to increase the hostility of the Regent and his Ministers towards Russia. With the Regent Esterhazy had a good deal of success for personal reasons, but he complained that Castlereagh evaded all attempts to establish a 'concert' with Austria, and always replied that if the occasion ever arose Austria would be able to rely on the support of Britain. Metternich and his Ambassador, irritated at this attitude, went so far as to suggest that Castlereagh was subservient to Russia. This provoked a sharp rejoinder:

"Prince Metternich mistakes the sentiments of this Court,"

¹ To Stewart, June 4, 1816: *F.O. Austria*, 125.

wrote Castlereagh, "if he supposes that we urge him to adopt either a submissive or conceding policy to Russia. It is not in the maintenance of her just pretensions that we would discourage Austria; we only wish to moderate that 'Cri de Bureau' against Russia which must to a degree exist in all Governments against a State so powerful as Russia has latterly become, but which prevails (perhaps not unnaturally) amongst the Austrian agents at home and abroad in a much greater degree than elsewhere. We conscientiously believe that if this temper is not repressed, and that with some vigour, by those at the head of affairs, it has a direct and rapid tendency to create the very danger which it would attempt to avoid, and I think I could quote recent instances of the exaggerated disquietudes in which this system has kept the Court of Austria, and through that Court the rest of Europe, since we separated at Paris.

"The evil I allude to would, I am confident, have existed at this day amongst our own agents, perhaps not less extensively, if their attention had not been pointedly called to the larger views of our political relations. All we desire under this head from Prince Metternich is that he would assuage, and not excite, the jealousy of his subordinate agents, which, in the intrigue of diplomacy, when countenanced at Court, alternatively operates as cause and effect to disturb political relations, and to engender a thousand embarrassments that never would otherwise find their way to the seat of Government." ¹

The same attitude was seen in the discussions on the disarmament question. "It was useless," said Castlereagh, "to speculate as to what might be the outcome in the future. Prophecy in politics is a very idle occupation." But whatever doubts might be in their minds concerning Alexander's intentions, there need be none as to the proper policy to pursue towards him, one of frankness and conciliation, firmness, and (though Castlereagh scarcely dare use the word) flattery. Let the Emperor think, he said in effect, that he is the guardian of the peace of Europe and he will continue to be so.

¹ To Stewart, July 9, 1816: *F.O. Austria*, 125. Esterhazy to Metternich, Feb. 22, May 1, June 13, 1816: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 204, i. v. vi.

For a time this attitude gave Metternich pause, and both Stewart's dispatches and the Austrian instructions to Esterhazy grew less insistent in tone. But at the beginning of 1817 Metternich made a determined effort to get something more definite out of Castlereagh. The Duchies question, in which it was found that Austria and Russia had joined in secret against the policy of Britain, kept him for some time from pressing his claims too far. But the rumours that came from Madrid of the reported secret treaty between Russia and Spain caused him to return to the idea of a separate alliance with Britain. Esterhazy reported the great effect which the report had on Castlereagh, who went so far as to suggest that Austria and Britain, if it were true, should make a joint protest at Petersburg. This dispatch undoubtedly produced a great effect on Metternich, and suggested to him that the moment had come to define more explicitly the relations between the two Courts.¹

On March 26, 1817, therefore a big budget was sent to Esterhazy. In a verbose Memorandum, which was meant to be communicated to Castlereagh, the policy of Russia was set forth in a most hostile light. It was obvious that she was aiming at an alliance with the Bourbon Powers in order to establish a permanent influence over Europe. Only the closest union also between Austria and Britain therefore could keep her in check. They must try to get France and Prussia to join them in a common policy of precaution. At the same time Metternich pressed with great earnestness on Stewart these views, suggesting that the time had come to consider what action must be taken at Constantinople. "I felt," confessed Stewart, "it was with a view of drawing forth opinions or extorting ideas in which I was in no way instructed. It gave me the impression of some sort of treaty, or a wish to understand, if on any bearing of the Turkish question England would go to war; although there was nothing direct which was absolutely stated by the Prince." To Esterhazy himself, in a reserved and secret dispatch, Metternich expressed the conviction that the British Cabinet was at last beginning

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, Feb. 9, 1817: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 206, ii. See above, p. 94.

to free itself from the kind of enchantment which Alexander had been able to exercise over it. He thought that it might at last refrain from those accusations against Austrian goodwill, which had been so frequent in recent years, confess its errors and explain itself more clearly.

This overture had, however, no effect on Castlereagh.¹ On the contrary, it drew from him so definite a re-assertion of his views that Metternich could not possibly mistake his meaning. In conversation with Esterhazy, while he admitted certain elements of danger in the possibilities of a Russian-French alliance, he insisted that any premature step by Austria and Britain would merely drive the other two Powers closer to one another. While the elements of an alliance might be prepared, he said, it was only real danger that could weld them together. He advised Metternich to exert himself to detach Prussia from Russian influence, and he seized the opportunity to urge a conciliatory attitude towards France in the matter of her financial payments. More he would not say, preferring to send his more definite answer in a dispatch to Stewart which he could shew to the Cabinet.¹

This dispatch reiterated in clear and unmistakable language the policy which he had been urging on Metternich ever since 1815, and put an end to the latter's hopes and schemes. "The principles laid down by Prince Metternich," it asserted, "when taken in the abstract and with due caution in their application, are perfectly wise and sound, and no difference of opinion can arise upon them, but while we all agree in considering the Quadruple Alliance, combined with a system of conciliation and support to the existing order of things established in France, as the basis of all our policy, we must proceed with circumspection in adopting any measures of precautionary policy upon speculative grounds which might prove fatal to the system itself." In our practical views of this subject I am persuaded we must mean the same thing, viz.: to preserve the system which exists as long as possible—that if it is shaken, the fault shall not be with either Court; and to secure this object that nothing should be done, either

¹ Metternich to Esterhazy, March 26, 1817: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 208, iii. Esterhazy to Metternich, May 9, 1817: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 206, iv. From Stewart, March 24, 1817: *F.O. Austria*, 135.

upon chance or upon suspicion inconsistent with our declared relations; and that, whilst the *Elements of Security* in the goodwill of other Powers are cultivated, it should be left to the hand of actual necessity to combine them, if it should ever be unfortunately requisite, as the development of an ascertained danger shall point out . . .

"Judging from the sources of information to which this Government has access, we do not see the danger which threatens the peace of Europe from the power of Russia in so strong a point of view as the Austrian Minister does, either in degree or in proximity, and we further conceive that he under-rates his available means at the present moment of providing against it. Should the alarms to which the Austrian dispatch points unfortunately be realised, it is reasonable to suppose that both Prussia and France might be disposed, in concert with Austria and Great Britain, to take an active part in opposing a barrier to such a danger; but there is reason to believe that neither Power regard the danger at the present moment to be imminent, and neither Government, I am confident, would adopt, by anticipation, an attitude which could tend either to vary or embarrass their existing relations with Russia. . . . In this state of things I have requested Prince Esterhazy to submit to Prince Metternich, whether it may not be prudent to moderate the language of alarm, and not to adopt too exacting a policy either at Berlin or Paris which might tend rather to check than ripen the disposition of those Powers to unite in case of *real and obvious danger*; . . ."

Metternich's plan of special engagements against Russia had, of course, to be immediately abandoned, and, according to Stewart, Castlereagh's plain speaking had removed some of his fears. The reality of these at any time may perhaps be questioned. He had obviously endeavoured to make use of Castlereagh's natural indignation at the Russian intrigues in Madrid. Stewart was convinced that "the Austrian Minister's first desire was to secure by some understanding, without loss of time, the Courts of London, Paris, and Berlin in some engagement that would bind them to act together, in the possible contingency of Russia's overstepping the bounds in which she is now held." Nevertheless, his rebuff did not pre-

vent him from continuing to shew the greatest possible confidence in British policy and following Castlereagh's lead in the critical negotiations which were soon to commence on the exact form of the next re-union of the Great Powers.¹

Metternich had, indeed, reaped great advantages from his 'entente' with Britain. In both Germany and in Italy, and particularly in the latter country where Austrian influence was by no means consolidated, he had received valuable support. To substitute Austrian influence for French in Italy had been one of Pitt's schemes, and it had been faithfully followed by Castlereagh in the settlement of 1814-15. The British Government was not unaware, indeed, of the weaknesses of Austrian rule, and they detested the incapacity and cruelty of the restored Governments. "They desire to see," A'Court was told, "the Austrian influence predominate in Italy, liberalised, however, in some of its views and better adapted to the prejudices of the country, because they wish to see Italy tranquil and strong and not divided against itself."² But the Tory Government had no wish to protect in the slightest degree the movement for Liberal institutions which Bentinck and Wilson had encouraged in the final struggle against Napoleon. These soldiers had been replaced by A'Court in Sicily, a Tory far more Austrian and reactionary than his Government, but a shrewd and capable man for all that, and Lord Burghersh at Florence, also a high Tory, but a man of taste and culture, whose sense of justice was unable to stomach all the transactions of these years. Stewart remained, however, the main channel for the conveyance of Castlereagh's most intimate thoughts in the delicate problems which arose out of Italian politics.

The British Government had sacrificed gladly the Republics of Genoa and Venice to the necessities of Piedmont and Austria, and in this they were wiser than their Whig critics, for, as Lord Salisbury insisted in 1862, these amalgamations marked a necessary stage in the progress of Italian unity. They had been accessories to the intrigue by which Murat's overthrow was

¹ To Stewart, May 5, 1817: *F.O. Austria*, 133. From Stewart, June 13, 1817: *F.O. Austria*, 136.

² To A'Court, Jan 1, 1816: *F.O. Sicily*, 74.

settled, even before his last desperate resistance, and, after Ferdinand's restoration, A'Court strongly approved and Castlereagh acquiesced in the secret Treaty by which that monarch bound himself not to introduce any constitutional reforms into Naples without Austrian consent.

But Metternich was not content to prevent the spread of Liberal ideas to the mainland. He was seriously alarmed at the existence of constitutional government in the island of Sicily. That Constitution had, indeed, been set up in 1813 by Bentinck as a model for the benighted races of the Mediterranean; its success had been marred by intrigue, violence, and gross incompetence. After Bentinck's departure it had scarcely functioned. Still the task of getting rid of it was a delicate one, and Metternich looked to Castlereagh to help him, or at least to shew a benevolent neutrality. . .

Nor was he disappointed. When in February 1816 Metternich, having secured the active co-operation of Prince Ruffo, the Neapolitan Minister at Vienna, opened the question, he professed himself ready to be guided entirely by his British friends. "That Austria trembles at the very name of a constitution founded on a national representation in Italy is clear . . ." wrote Stewart. "To guard against this *in limine* Prince Metternich has been eager to open this intricate question, as relating to the actual state of Naples and Sicily under one Crown, dreading the contagion of revolutionary spirit and constitutional doctrines. But I am persuaded . . . that His Highness would in no way be disposed to go further in the remedies that are to be now applied than the cool judgment and wisdom of the British Cabinet may point out." These assurances were also given to Esterhazy, who was, however, told in addition that what Metternich wanted was for Britain to remain quiet, or, if she must protest for the sake of public opinion, to do so only in such a manner as not to prevent the attainment of the object aimed at.¹

Castlereagh was, however, cautious. He agreed that the Sicilian Constitution was a bad one, but submitted that he must at least consult his colleagues before he agreed to the

¹ From Stewart, Feb. 17, 1816: *F.O. Austria*, 126. Metternich to Esterhazy, Feb. 6, 1816: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 205, ii,

overthrow of a constitution, which a British agent had certainly re-organised, if not established. At later interviews he insisted on the difficulties which the Ministry felt might arise in Parliament, if they agreed to Metternich's proposals, and deprecated the use of violence to achieve an end desirable in itself. Metternich pressed for a decision, and A'Court's dispatches reinforced his argument. "It is indeed evident," wrote the British Minister, "that the immediate neighbourhood of a representative body (however absurd its conduct may be) will tend to keep alive that dangerous and revolutionary spirit." But A'Court refused to admit that no opposition would be aroused in Sicily, as Metternich asserted, and he added the ingenious suggestion of giving to the projected change the denomination of 'modifications of the constitution,' leaving it rather to its opponents the task of finding out that such modifications amounted in practice to complete abolition.¹

Eventually the advice of this astute diplomatist, who conveniently came over to London on leave, was accepted by both Metternich and Castlereagh. The latter could only offer the tacit consent of the British Government, and insisted that the King of Naples must appear to initiate the change himself and that the framework of the old Constitution of Sicily must be allowed to remain. He said that after the discussions which Genoa had caused in the House of Commons the British Government would not relish having to defend a much worse case. They could merely wish it all success without accepting any responsibility for it. He warned Esterhazy that he would have to interfere if there was any harsh dealing with individuals, or if an innocuous constitution was not left as a sham, and, in order to avoid discussions in Parliament, he said that he must be considered as not officially cognisant of the Secret Treaty between Austria and Naples.

The instructions, therefore, which A'Court received, which were written with a view to satisfying the British Parliament, were able to bear the appearance almost of benevolence, and disclaim all intention of interference. No mention was made of the interest which Austria had taken in the transaction.

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, Feb. 22, March 12, May 1, 1816; Metternich to Esterhazy, July 29, 1816: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 204, i, iii, v.; *Weisungen*, 205, vii. From A'Court, Feb. 9, 1816: *F.O. Sicily*, 74.

"You will explain to Prince Metternich," ran the private letter to Stewart, "that, in framing my dispatches on the Sicilian question my object has been not to bring into view the Austrian policy in any of those documents which we might possibly deem it necessary to bring before Parliament, in case we should be obliged to produce papers."¹

In spite of the anxious desire of Metternich and the King of Naples to obtain the assent of the British Government, A'Court did not get his amendments accepted without a struggle. The Austrian Minister, indeed, told Stewart that "he perfectly understood and justly appreciated the Prince Regent's motives for abstaining from any interference in those concerns further than His Royal Highness is in honour bound." But he was playing a double part and, through Prince Ruffo, urging Ferdinand to insist on the complete abolition of the Constitution. "I am obliged to hold a strong language to convince the Neapolitan Ministers we are in earnest," reported A'Court to Castlereagh. "Ruffo tells them that we are acting only for form's sake." "We stand in need of your assistance," A'Court informed Stewart, "in order to induce the Austrian Cabinet to stomach a word [*i.e.* Parliament] of the highest importance to us. In fact, if ever the Sicilian question should come before Parliament, it is upon this very word that the strength of our battle will rest. With this our conduct from the first period of our interference in Sicilian affairs will offer a plain, honourable, and consistent tale; without it, a disjointed, unconnected story assailable at every point. It must not be forgotten that Sicily has ever had a Parliament always manageable till we increased its powers. Reduced within its ancient limits why should it be considered as so formidable now? Besides, by the new arrangements, the calling together of this Parliament depends entirely upon the King. He may assemble it, in its old form or in its new, or even not assemble it at all; the expression binds him to nothing. It affords every latitude he can desire." Even the Austrian Court was persuaded to tolerate the

¹ To Stewart, Sept. 6, 1816: *F.O. Austria*, 125; *C.C.* iii. 288. Esterhazy to Metternich, Aug. 31, 1816: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 204, viii. The official dispatches to and from A'Court which were laid before Parliament are given in *B.F.S.P.* iv. 553.

existence of a Parliament of so accommodating character. Stewart was able to announce: "I had little difficulty in convincing him [Metternich] . . . that the Austrian Government never could be the least compromised by admitting the phrase relative to the Parliament." A'Court could thus report to Castlereagh for the edification of the House of Commons that the privileges of the Sicilian Parliament with regard to taxation had been preserved. In a more secret account he was able a little later to rejoice that all was going well, and add "it is only a matter of surprise how such a people could ever have been deemed capable of enjoying or fitted to receive the blessings of constitutional liberty."¹

Thus closed for the time being an incident which is one of the most equivocal in which Castlereagh took part. His reluctance to try and preserve so ludicrous an institution as the Sicilian Constitution may be understood, and A'Court was not far wrong in his estimate of the political capacity of the inhabitants of that island. It is true also that much of the good administration of the Napoleonic period was preserved and that Austria's influence at Naples was often used in a liberal direction. But the manner in which Castlereagh intrigued with Metternich and so disreputable a character as Ruffo, in order to throw dust in the eyes of the British Parliament, shews the least admirable of his qualities as a Foreign Minister. It had, too, lamentable consequences in 1820, when it was hard to convince Metternich that the British Government was in earnest in its indignant protests against the Troppau Protocol. It was a heavy price to pay for the undoubted advantages of the Austrian co-operation in other parts of the world.

There were other difficult Italian problems, though none so embarrassing as that of Sicily. With the Papal See Castlereagh always endeavoured to maintain the most cordial relations. His zealous advocacy of Catholic Emancipation and his personal friendship with that practical statesman, Cardinal Consalvi, had won him much influence and attention at Rome.

¹ From Stewart, Nov. 19, 1816; A'Court to Stewart, Nov. 6, 1816; *F.O. Austria*, 129. From A'Court, Jan. 13, 1817: *F.O. Sicily*, 80. *Déclaration Verbale du prince de Metternich sur l'organisation des Deux Siciles*, Nov. 21, 1816. Bianchi, *Storia Documentata della Diplomazia Europea in Italia*, i. 435.

Edward Cooke, during his residence there in 1815, had even arranged with Cardinal Pacca that the Papal See should enter into communication with the British Government "by regular agents residing at each Court acting under secret or public appointments." Lord Burghersh had hoped to increase the importance of his Mission at Florence by taking charge of some such duty, which he claimed was an urgent necessity. "It is of the utmost importance," he wrote, "that a legal channel of communication with the Pope's Government should be provided. From the want of it every Jacobin, every knave or fool speaks for the name of England and is attended to."¹

Communication had, indeed, been proceeding between Irish representatives and the Papal See on the question of appointments in the Irish Church. Castlereagh was aware of these negotiations, but he was apparently not anxious to have anything to do with them. They failed completely. In any case public opinion in England would not have tolerated even the slightest approach towards a recognition of the Temporal Power. Consalvi broached the question again in 1816, but Castlereagh explained in the friendliest way its impossibility. "Be assured," he answered, "of the sincere desire felt, not only by myself but by my colleagues in the Government, to evince their respect for His Holiness the Pope and to cultivate the most friendly and intimate good understandings with the See of Rome. Your Eminence is aware that in the present state of our laws there are difficulties and delicacies to be observed, but I trust that nothing will impede the mutual desire between the two States to render to each other genuine and reciprocal acts of kindness."²

¹ From Cooke, March 18, 1815: *F.O. Italian States*, 8. Burghersh to Hamilton, July 30, 1815: *F.O. Tuscany*, 24. This was sent from Paris after a conversation with Castlereagh, who apparently did not disapprove.

² To Consalvi, Jan. 22, 1817: *F.O. Italian States*, 10. From Burghersh, Jan. 12, 1816: *F.O. Tuscany*, 26—"The Irish delegates at Rome, after repeated audiences obtained from the Pope and Cardinal Consalvi, are returning much dissatisfied with the result of their negotiations to England. Their object having been to obtain a reversal of the Pope's consent to the concession of a Veto, and having failed, they attempted to appeal to the Cardinals in Council. The journey of Cardinal Litta to Milan is stated to have been unfavourable to them; their objects were not obtained. They intend on their return to Ireland to hold a language of resistance to the Holy See, upon the plea of opposing an evident inclination on the Head of their Church to sacrifice rights, which for so many years the people of Ireland with their lives and properties have defended."

In Piedmont, once the point of Genoa had been thrashed out with the Opposition, Castlereagh had no constitutional problems to face. Turin was, however, the only Court in Italy, except Rome itself, where Austrian influence was not supreme, and its contiguity to France made it of great importance. Metternich wished to obtain control over the Simplon and to force Piedmont to a defensive treaty. Castlereagh, however, refused to help him much in this design. He approved of the defensive treaty, but he objected to the methods by which Metternich tried to obtain it, which, in his opinion, merely opened the path to Russian and French influence at Turin. Metternich was forced to disavow the methods of Prince Stahrenburg, his Minister there, and to abandon his plan, though he relied on British help to frustrate the "ambitious designs" of the Turin Government.¹

If Castlereagh refused to give much help to Metternich against Piedmont, in another Italian question he found himself entirely opposed to Metternich and Alexander in combination. This was no less a problem than the future of the young Napoleon. In the Treaty of Vienna, owing to the vehement opposition of Lord Clancarty, who had been warmly supported from home, the succession to the Duchy of Parma had been left open, and it was desired by the British Government that a Spanish Bourbon should succeed Napoleon's Austrian wife, Marie Louise.² Spain had taken the affair so much to heart that she had refused to sign the Treaty of Vienna until given satisfaction on this point. The chivalry of Alexander, who had been approached by Marie Louise herself, and the natural desire of the Emperor to secure on a throne a grandson, whom he might hope to bring up a good Austrian, had resulted in the signature of a secret Protocol between Austria and Russia guaranteeing the succession to the young Napoleon, which was not revealed to Clancarty or to Castlereagh.

In 1816 the Ambassadors' Conference at Paris was entrusted

¹ From Stewart, Dec. 21, 1815: *FO. Austria*. Metternich only voiced what many Austrians already felt when he told Stewart that "he looked upon them [the Piedmontese] as the Prussians of the South, and he was thoroughly convinced that their desire of erecting themselves into a much greater Power, than they had any right to assume, would end in some convulsion."

with the settlement of this thorny question. The Spanish Government, however, got wind of the secret Protocol, and eventually Castlereagh's suspicions were aroused. He therefore began to press both the Austrian and Russian Governments with questions as to their reluctance to allow the matter to be settled. Both were much embarrassed. Metternich pretended to Stewart that his difficulties were entirely due to "the romantic gallantry and intrigues of the Emperor of Russia supporting the Empress Marie Louise against Austria." He assured him, however, that the Emperor of Austria merely looked on the young Napoleon as his grandson and had no desire that he should ever reign at Parma, asserting that Castlereagh was fully informed of "all that had passed about Marie Louise and the Emperor of Russia at the Congress."¹

The Tzar, on the other hand, explained to Cathcart that "though bound by no Treaty or specific engagement later than the Treaty of Fontainebleau, yet that in this delicate question he could not give his vote otherwise than in conformity to that of his August Ally the Emperor of Austria." But each Court was afraid of the treachery of the other, and, before any new plan could be made, Metternich gave the game away, and Esterhazy, who had been cautioned to simulate the blindest ignorance on the subject, was at last allowed to tell Castlereagh the truth. The Ambassador, who, as soon as Castlereagh's suspicions had been aroused, had been treated very coldly, found him now absolutely glacial. He was received, however, more in sorrow than in anger. Both Castlereagh and the Prince Regent reserved the full measure of their indignation for Russia, and Castlereagh told Cathcart in a remarkable letter that the incident might be considered as "a proof either that the Emperor's memory is not always accurate, or that His Imperial Majesty allows himself considerable latitude in explanation." The fact that Russia was posing as the special protector of Spanish interests made the situation all the more piquant, and Castlereagh allowed himself the rare luxury of scoring a point at Madrid. In the result the young Napoleon was excluded from his throne, his mother

¹ From Stewart, Sept. 21, 1816; Jan. 4, 29, 1817: *F.O. Austria*, 129, 134. H. Welschinger, *Le Roi de Rome*, 224-25. E. von Wertheimer, *Herzog von Reichstadt* (2nd edn., 1913), chap. vii. The titles indicate the point of view.

cheerfully acquiescing, the reversion was given to the Spanish claimant and Spain at last acceded to the Treaty of Vienna.¹

In Germany also Castlereagh generally gave support to the policy of Metternich in opposition to the Tsar. Only the outline of the German Confederation had been settled by the Vienna Final Act. Its details had yet to be defined, and much depended on them. How far would the Confederation allow its members to pursue their own way in foreign and domestic policy? Would the smaller States be compelled to submit to the Austro-Prussian hegemony, especially the more Liberal Powers of the South? Neither Russia nor France desired to see a strong and united Central Europe. Castlereagh, on the other hand, regarded it as essential to the stability of the Continent, and, to achieve this object, it had always been his endeavour to bring Prussia and Austria together. British influence was therefore nearly always thrown on the Austrian side, and in particular both Clancarty and Lamb kept a vigilant eye on Anstett, the Russian Minister at Frankfort.²

Castlereagh was, however, most anxious to allow Germany to work out its own salvation without interference from outside. He knew that the smaller German States must still have an independent existence, but he hoped that the new Constitution would prevent that foreign influence which had been so detrimental to their national life. This he avowed frankly to the Tsar in his Memorandum on disarmament:

"Considering the Germanick Confederation, when constituted, as a Body politick in Europe with which all other, and especially the leading States of Europe, must have important interests to regulate, H.R.H. deems it of indispensable necessity that these States should have the means respectively of conducting their concerns, through acknowledged diplomatick

¹ From Cathcart, Feb. 9, March 22, 1817: *F.O. Russia*, 108. To Cathcart, May 16, 1817: *F.O. Russia*, 107. Metternich to Esterhazy, Jan. 12, Feb. 18, 1817; Esterhazy to Metternich, March 20, 21, 1817: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 208, i. ii; *Berichte*, 206, iii. To Wellesley, April 12, 1817: *F.O. Spain*, 196—"It is not the less illustrative of the fact that Great Britain has been the only Power that has supported the interests of Spain honestly throughout, and that is perhaps the true reason why we have so little influence at Madrid, where fear has more sway than either gratitude or liberal policy."

² From Cathcart, July 30, 1816: *F.O. Russia*, 104. From Stewart, Aug. 29, 1816: *F.O. Austria*, 128; *I.R.H.S.* cxii. 498-9, 585.

agents, to be accredited to the Body ; and H.R.H. is persuaded that, as the intercourse must exist in some mode or other, it is better it should exist in an avowed and responsible than in an irresponsible and overt shape ; but while H.R.H. feels, that Foreign Powers must of necessity have established relations with the Diet of the Empire, H.R.H. is of opinion, that great care should be taken, that this intercourse should not degenerate into such a species of intermeddling in the internal affairs of the Germanic Body, as would tend necessarily to dissolve the administrative powers of the Confederacy, and render it a scene of intrigue more likely to convulse than pacify the Continent."¹

This same attitude of benevolent neutrality was adopted in the difficult and tedious dispute between Austria, Bavaria, and Baden on the exchanges of territory necessary to complete the bargain made by the first two at the Congress of Vienna. Alexander naturally supported the Grand Duke of Baden, his brother-in-law, in his refusal to supply to Bavaria the necessary compensations. Castlereagh on the other hand supported Bavaria, but he endeavoured to get a compromise by pressing the claim to monetary compensation of Eugène de Beauharnais, who was not only a brother-in-law of the Grand Duke but also a great favourite with the Tsar. Moreover, when Metternich tried to get the necessary funds by raiding those set apart to complete the new German fortifications on the Rhine, Castlereagh promptly disavowed Stewart, who had acquiesced, and confirmed the more resolute Clancarty in his stand for the common interest. The final result was a complete deadlock in the Bavarian-Baden negotiations, which was not to be solved until after the Conference at Aix-la-Chapelle had made another attempt to persuade these small Powers to mutual concessions. It remained a disturbing feature in German politics, and in these circumstances it was not likely that the plan for a German Confederate Army, which Castlereagh had always warmly supported, would make much headway.²

¹ Confidential Memorandum, May 28, 1816: *F.O. Russia*, 102

² To Clancarty, March 2, April 8, June 3, Aug. 27, 1816: *F.O. Germany*, 3. To Lamb, April 3, 1817: *F.O. Germany*, 9. To Stewart, April 16, 1816: *F.O. Austria*, 125. From Stewart, July 24, 1816: *F.O. Austria*, 128.

On the whole, however, both Metternich and Castlereagh had some cause for congratulation. The former might well consider that he had held his own against the Tsar both in Italy and Germany. Prussia also had drawn sensibly nearer Austria and further from Russia. British support had proved of great value, and, if there was no chance of a special alliance in that quarter, Austria and Britain had found it comparatively easy to work together in nearly all the problems of the post-war settlement. Castlereagh, on the other hand, could be glad that some progress had been made towards a more peaceful Europe and that his own influence had largely contributed to the result. On the whole the Tsar had responded to the new diplomatic methods. It might be hoped that their master would succeed in checking the activities of men like Tatishchev and Mocenigo when he became fully aware of what they were doing.

Yet how difficult it was to make the Tsar realise the situation! How much scope was given to lying, treachery, and intrigue when it took months before explanations of actions misreported and misunderstood could be offered and accepted! It was only natural that Castlereagh should look forward to meeting the Tsar again face to face, confident that in a few hours' conversation he could do more for the peace of Europe than by any quantity of notes and memoranda. As the time drew near when the whole question of the Army of Occupation and the future of the Alliance must be reconsidered, most other problems were postponed for settlement until the statesmen could meet once more round the Council Table. It was obvious that much would depend upon who were to be summoned to it and what subjects were to be discussed there.

CHAPTER III

THE CONFERENCE OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE, THE ALLIANCE RE-STATED, 1818

1. THE PRELIMINARIES AND FORM OF THE CONFERENCE.
2. THE PERSONNEL AND THE BRITISH INSTRUCTIONS.
3. THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE.
4. OTHER QUESTIONS.

*, "The value of any International Council depends firstly on the intelligence which it is likely to possess, and secondly on the degree in which it is really representative."—C. A. FYFFE.

CHAPTER III

I. THE PRELIMINARIES AND FORM OF THE CONFERENCE

THE Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle was the first ever held by the Great Powers of Europe to regulate international affairs in time of peace. It had, indeed, its origin in a Treaty of Peace, and its main object was to consider the question of the Army of Occupation, a direct result of the War. But such a meeting was something entirely strange to European diplomacy, and, being new, was therefore suspect. Gradually the discussions as to its form and object overshadowed all other negotiations, these being deferred until the Sovereigns and statesmen had resumed their personal intercourse and perhaps settled in a few days, or even hours, disputes which had been occupying their attention for long months.

The exact character of such a meeting, which might well determine the future of European politics for a long period, was, therefore, the result of much discussion and planning which, at times, perhaps, deserves a harsher word. For it soon became obvious to the Russian firebrands, Capo d'Istria and Pozzo di Borgo, that the whole of their plan to make a counterweight to the Austro-British combination depended on the form of the new Conference. If it was to be merely a meeting of the Great Powers, Russia would find herself nearly isolated and, at any rate, out-voted. But if some wider Assembly could be summoned, on the analogy of the Congress of Vienna, they might use the Powers of second rank, particularly Spain, to whom they had so much to offer and over whom they had acquired so much influence, as a means to obtain decisions to their own liking, or, at least, to defeat the designs of their

opponents. Such plans inevitably opened the whole question of the continuation of the Quadruple Alliance and the status which France, free and in control of her own policy, as well as the secondary Powers were in future to have in relation to it. How far was the Alliance of the four Powers to persist when their immediate responsibility towards France ceased, and she had discharged all the obligations laid on her by the Treaty? Was France to be admitted to a combination of Great Powers organised to govern the new Europe which had been created by their efforts? Were the Smaller Powers to be given no voice in this international council? Was it to assume new duties now that those laid on it by the Treaties of Peace were in a sense discharged? If the implications of these questions were soon perceived by Pozzo di Borgo and Capo d'Istria, they were realised no less fully by Castlereagh and Metternich, especially perhaps by Castlereagh, since of all those present at Paris in November 1815, he had most completely envisaged a series of reunions of the principal statesmen of Europe.

The Tsar himself took a deep interest in the coming meeting from a very early date. Even in the early days of 1817 observers had noted his eagerness to meet his Allies once more, and not unnaturally attributed it to a desire for a wider scope of action and more pleasing companions than he could obtain in Russia. There was at any rate no doubt but that the Tsar would come in person, and this meant that the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia must both appear, if only to shew their affection and regard for their brother monarch, and demonstrate the fact that in name, at least, they too were autocrats. Even the Prince Regent saw in the Conference a chance for continental travel, after which he was always hankering, and a possible means of enhancing his own importance by personal relations with Sovereigns subjected to less restraint than himself; and more than one of the Sovereigns of the Smaller Powers saw the possibility not only of social recreation but of political advantage.

The place of the meeting was not fixed until the month of April 1818, but Aix-la-Chapelle had been mentioned at a very early date. Alexander talked of "taking the waters,"

and it was under this designation that his journey was generally alluded to in Russia. Since a meeting in France was considered to be humiliating to her while the foreign troops still remained in her territory, and the Netherlands involved another Government, Aix-la-Chapelle was the most convenient place for the Sovereigns and statesmen to meet the Commander-in-chief of the Army of Occupation. Other considerations were doubtless that it was already a well-known and popular spa, where a reunion could take place amidst congenial surroundings and with adequate accommodation, while Metternich was perhaps not averse to the old capital of the Holy Roman Empire, whose title, though abandoned by his master, still shed a faint and nebulous glory on the Habsburg house. Capo d'Istria seems to have hoped for Switzerland, but Metternich, at an early stage, preferred Prussian territory to a place where "all the Jacobins of France and Germany would flock," while the practical Castlereagh wanted a quiet spot "with a view to the course of business being as little as may be broken in upon by other objects."¹

No sooner had the financial claims on France appeared to be in a fair way towards complete settlement than the question of the removal of the Army of Occupation became acute. As has been seen, the British Government at first put forward a scheme for an Army of Observation in the Netherlands which was not well received by its principal Allies. But this discussion inevitably turned the attention of the statesmen to the coming Conference where this problem must be solved. Whether they committed themselves or not to a complete withdrawal of their troops, they had to settle the terms of their meeting and thus to consider in detail the scope and nature of the Alliance which bound them together.

British policy was the earliest to be explicitly stated. Castlereagh had already been alarmed at the extensions of the European system which Pozzo di Borgo, and to some extent Metternich, had endeavoured to bring about by means of the Ambassadors' Conference. In Britain he found the attention

¹ Metternich to Esterhazy, April 5, 1818: *Vienna St. A. Wersungen*, 208, iv. Gentz says Düsseldorf was considered, but the King of Prussia insisted on Aix-la-Chapelle. Mannheim had also been suggested. See also E. Molden, *Zur Geschichte des oesterreichisch-russischen Gegensatzes*, 67 ff., for other proposals.

of the public, and consequently of the Cabinet, more and more absorbed by domestic matters and less inclined than ever for connection with Europe. His own belief that the peace of Europe and thus of Britain could only be preserved by sharing the responsibility for the peace of the Continent was as strong as ever. He looked forward to a personal meeting to dissolve the clouds of suspicion and intrigue which had begun to accumulate. But he was aware that he could undertake no greater responsibilities than had already been assumed under the Treaties of 1815. Indeed, these must be interpreted in the strictest fashion if he was to preserve for them sufficient public support. But outside written obligations he had a wide choice. There was nothing in the Constitution or the tradition of Parliament to prevent him from continuing the new methods of diplomacy, which experience had made him believe infinitely superior to the old. If only his continental colleagues would not press him too closely, he could by his personal influence continue to connect his policy with that of the Continent and continue to watch over the peace of Europe.

These ideas are seen clearly in the dispatch which was sent to his Allies on March 27, 1818. The character of the next meeting, he said, must be defined as soon as possible, and it was the wish of the British Government that it should be limited in scope. Its model should not be the Congress of Vienna—a general Congress. On the contrary, it should originate in the Treaty of Alliance between the four Powers, and its competence should extend only to their own special obligations. "The real question," he insisted, "is whether a general Congress is desirable or not. As there does not appear to be new matter for deliberation sufficient to call for so extraordinary a measure; as the movement of such a body is necessarily slow; as it might be productive of more embarrassment than utility and give rise to ideas of change which it cannot be desirable to encourage, I cannot hesitate to acquaint your Excellency that the opinion of the Prince Regent's Government, as at present informed, leans strongly in favour of the most simple and expeditious course of proceeding." ¹

¹ To Cathcart, March 27, 1818: *W.S.D.* xii. 445.

The legal and avowed object of the meeting therefore was to be confined to the relations of the Great Powers to France, but Castlereagh's views on the advantages of applying Round-Table diplomacy to difficult questions, due regard as always being paid to the susceptibility of the Smaller Powers, were also clearly indicated. "Such a determination," he thought, "need not preclude the Allied Sovereigns from travelling so far out of this latter object as to avail themselves of this occasion of examining the state of the several other political questions which are in progress of discussion at the several central European points of negotiation, in order to give to their progress that useful impulse which has never failed to result from the immediate superintendence of the Sovereigns when assembled together. Neither need it impede the necessary intercourse with any other Power whose interests may present an object of negotiation. The Allied Sovereigns may pursue the course, which they have hitherto adopted, of placing themselves in relation with the particular State upon whatever may constitute the object of common interest to be treated of." The design was clear. The superintendence of the Great Powers over European affairs was to continue, since this was the most convenient method for them to come to agreement about them. But they were not to assume any legal or open right of deciding in Conference, and if any considerable secondary Power, such as Spain, should be affected, it should be treated with consideration and not too openly relegated to a position of inferiority.

Meanwhile Metternich had been in communication with the Russian Emperor and his Ministers. Lebzeltern had been reinforced by Hessen-Homburg, who had been sent to Warsaw to congratulate the new King of Poland. According to their reports the Russian Government wished to extend the Conference to the secondary Powers and to multiply the subjects of discussion. Metternich had accordingly issued a Memorandum asserting that only the four Great Powers of the Alliance had a right to be called to the Conference, and had taken steps to ensure that Prussia took the same view. Alexander was apparently won over by these measures and the official instruction to Vincent, which Metternich sent in reply to

Castlereagh's note, was therefore able to assume a unanimity amongst the Cabinets which scarcely existed in fact. It was accompanied by a Memorandum which analysed in brilliant fashion the two articles of the Treaties of November 20, 1815, under which the Conference could be summoned, and shewed that the decisions to be taken under either head belonged exclusively to the four Great Powers.¹

It was, indeed, quite true that Alexander had refused to follow the line which Pozzo and Capo d'Istria had chalked out for him. They had envisaged the Conference as an opportunity to construct the Bourbon counter-weight and to break up the Quadruple Alliance, or at least, to relegate it to a subordinate place. But the Russian Memorandum of April 20, sent in reply to Castlereagh, gave no hint of such a policy. On the contrary, it accepted the limitations which Castlereagh and Metternich suggested. At the same time it implied that no other decision should be made except that concerning the evacuation. If Russia was to stand alone, she would exclude all other questions from discussion. It was in vain that Pozzo di Borgo protested against this policy and urged that France and Spain should be associated in a new alliance. By the Emperor's orders Capo d'Istria administered a severe, if kindly worded, rebuke, which told the Ambassador that Alexander had not yet enough confidence in France to give up the old Alliance. For the moment, therefore, the Ambassador had to change his tune. He still played with the idea, however, that Spain might be invited in order that the difficulties between Spain and Portugal and Spain and her Colonies might be adjusted. The Emperor himself subsequently gave to Cathcart his own reasons why "the introduction of other questions" would be "extremely inexpedient." "First," he said, "because it would expose the Allies to the invidious charge of constituting themselves to be a sort of tribunal (Aréopage) to control the affairs of other nations; secondly, because it would be unjust to investigate questions of importance to other parties, whether invited to do so or

¹ Metternich to Esterhazy, April 5, 1818: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 208, iv. Memorandum, April 5, 1818: *I.R.H.S.* cxix. 645. Metternich to Vincent, April 27, 1818; Memorandum, April 16, 1818: *F.O. Austria*, 140.

not, without calling upon them to send ministers duly accredited and instructed to attend to their respective interests." The implication was that the Tsar could not trust the Alliance to accept his views on these questions, but when pressed he admitted that discussions might take place informally.¹

The decision of the Powers was announced to the Smaller Courts by a circular of the Allied Ambassadors at Paris, which based the Conference on the Fifth Article of the Treaty with France of November 20, 1815. Castlereagh would have preferred it to have been grounded on the Sixth Article of the Treaty of Alliance of the same date, with which the Smaller Powers had also clearly no concern, but his instructions to Stuart to that effect arrived too late. His insistence on that point shewed how much he wished the Conference to be free to act as the diplomatic centre of Europe, and he expounded these views in some detail to Lieven, expatiating on the advantages of personal contact over "the malign influence of purely diplomatic relations." At the same time, he did not want the Great Powers to make known too ostensibly their intention of discussing the diplomatic difficulties of Europe. In both respects the form of the circular, which he attributed entirely to Pozzo di Borgo, seemed to him to be wanting in common-sense and tact. It was, in fact, he told Humboldt, the worst document ever issued by the Allied Cabinets.²

Meanwhile, Metternich was jubilant at what he considered a notable victory over the Russian diplomatists. In order to complete his triumph over Pozzo di Borgo he was anxious to insist that the Ambassadorial Conference at Paris should be kept in being during the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle so that the Ambassador might be kept away from Alexander. He displayed the greatest eagerness "not only to open himself in the first instance in the most reserved and completely con-

¹ Russian Memorandum, April 20, 1818; from Pozzo di Borgo, April 8, 1818: Capo d'Istria to Pozzo di Borgo, July 22, 1818: *I.R.H.S.* cxix. 661, 674, 772. From Cathcart, June 3, Aug. 6, 1818: *F.O. Russia*, 113, 114.

² To Stuart, April 24, June 1, 1818: *F.O. France*, 176. From Stuart, June 8, 1818: *F.O. France*, 182. Circular Letter, May 25, 1818: *I.R.H.S.* cxix. 717. From Lieven, May 18, 1818: *Pet. Arch.*, *Appendix* p. 562. Humboldt to Bernstorff, June 2, 1818: *Berlin St. A.*

fidential manner to the British Government, but also to shew that he will enounce no opinion as proved or matured on his part without their complete concurrence and approbation." Unfortunately, Esterhazy, who was much concerned at this critical moment about his private affairs, failed to furnish his Court with any information and was peremptorily summoned to Carlsbad in June to meet his chief. Nor was Pozzo di Borgo yet entirely beaten. The Conference was postponed a fortnight, and he made the most of his opportunity. He stirred up Richelieu to support his views. In a letter to Capo d'Istria, Richelieu pressed on the Tsar France's claim to an equal place in the European Alliance. D'Osmond was also ordered to protest to Castlereagh against any Army of Observation, which would provoke measures in reply. The intrigues of Tatishchev and Pozzo di Borgo to get the King of Spain to the Conference continued feverishly. Though their master had refused to support them, they still tried to keep the matter open, and Richelieu was persuaded to back them. D'Osmond assailed Castlereagh while Richelieu tackled Wellington. The Austrian and Prussian Ambassadors, however, supported Stuart in the Conference and a peremptory refusal was sent back from London.¹

Metternich did not fail to underline the significance of these manoeuvres. The postponement was deliberately designed, he told Neumann, to give an opportunity to engage in them. Russia, he said, was playing a double game. He had an interview on August 16 with Capo d'Istria at Carlsbad, which Gordon also attended. The opinions of the two ministers were opposed on every point, reported Gordon, except that they both agreed that the Army of Occupation must be withdrawn. Capo d'Istria, indeed, now affected to believe that the Conference with so limited an object was entirely unnecessary and would merely provoke jealousy of those excluded from it. No good could be done by interfering with any of the questions then before them. "His favourite theme

¹ Richelieu to Capo d'Istria, July 17, 1818: *I.R.H.S.* liv. 517. Richelieu to D'Osmond, July 27, 1818: *Paris A.A.E.* 611. f. 166. From Stuart, Aug. 27, 31, 1818: *F.O. France*, 185. Castlereagh to Wellington, Aug. 21, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 33. Wellington to Castlereagh, Aug. 24, 28, 1818: *W.S.D.* xii. 656, 665. Metternich to Esterhazy, June 27, 1818: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 208, vi.

seems to be," added Gordon, "that every nation should exclusively confine its efforts and observations to itself, that the progress of time must work its changes, and no attempt can be made to repulse that effect without imminent and general danger." Metternich, at a later date, ascribed this surprising change of attitude to a fear that the Quadruple Alliance would thwart the freeing of Greece, which was even then the main object of Capo d'Istria. The latter admitted that his views were not shared by his master; they amounted also to an abandonment of his friend Pozzo di Borgo. It is more probable, however, that Capo d'Istria was anxious to lull the suspicions of the Austrians by pretending to small interest in the discussions at Aix-la-Chapelle, and thus to prevent premature disclosure of the far-reaching schemes which he was there to advocate. For a document was already prepared in the Russian archives with the object of transforming the whole character of the Alliance, and of this document Capo d'Istria cannot have been ignorant, if it was not, indeed, he who had inspired it.

At any rate Metternich's suspicions were by no means allayed, and he clung more than ever to Castlereagh. He opened his heart to Stewart, who had just returned to his post primed with his brother's most intimate confidences. He accepted entirely Castlereagh's views on the character of the Conference, though he deprecated the idea of the Army of Observation. Such a view, however, only made more necessary the Quadruple Alliance, from which France must be excluded. Indeed, he hoped that though the evacuation must take place, special precautions would still exist during the two years originally contemplated in the Treaty, including the maintenance of the Ambassadorial Conferences at Paris. Even Stewart suggested that Metternich's "brilliant and inventive imagination" had carried him rather too far. The Austrian minister, had, moreover, another scheme by which he hoped to link Castlereagh even more closely to him. He projected a visit to Paris to give Monsieur, who had been in communication with him, a little lesson in politics, and reconcile him to the King. He entreated Castlereagh to meet him there before the Conference. Stewart told him that it was Castle-

reagh's view that any such meeting would only arouse jealousy, but he persisted in urging it both through him and Neumann. Castlereagh was, however, wise enough to take no notice of this invitation, much to the satisfaction of Liverpool, whose suspicions of Metternich were never asleep, and it is significant that Metternich's visit was not made.¹

Nevertheless, Castlereagh went to Aix-la-Chapelle with the feeling that Metternich would act with him and full of distrust towards Alexander. He foresaw controversy which would involve the whole scheme of the Alliance. Nor could he be unaware that he must convince a Cabinet of the wisdom of a policy which they were neither by training nor experience fitted to appreciate. Accordingly, though his instructions were drawn up in great detail and discussed with his colleagues before he went, they contained little on one main point which was, perhaps, best expressed by Edward Cooke, who sent him, from his retirement at Tunbridge Wells, a letter of encouragement. "I shall conceive," he wrote, "all will have succeeded for the best at Aix-la-Chapelle, if the great Powers agree for another meeting of the Sovereigns within a reasonable period. Whilst such reunions continue, peace will be secure."²

¹ From Stewart, Aug. 24, with Gordon's report, 1818: *FO. Austria*, 139. Metternich, *Mémoires*, iii. 145. Metternich to Neumann, Aug. 15, 1818: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 208, viii. Liverpool to Castlereagh, Sept. 4, 1818: *C.C.* iv. 2.

² Cooke to Castlereagh, Aug. 28, 1818: *C.C.* iii. 473.

wards presented to Castlereagh and claimed were amongst the most important documents of the Conference. They were, however, never even considered. Louis Way was concerned with the emancipation of the Jews. All the principal London newspapers sent special correspondents; the famous Perry was there in person, and *The Times* made successful efforts to shew itself the best-informed journal in Europe. Even Gentz admitted their articles were less bad than those in the other newspapers. Sir Thomas Lawrence also made the journey in order to paint for the Prince Regent the likenesses of brother Sovereigns and statesmen whom his Government would not allow him to meet in the flesh. Lady Castlereagh, as usual, accompanied her husband, but her salon, according to Metternich, was no more attractive than at Vienna. It was, however, the diplomatic, if not the social, centre of the Conference.

At the council table and in the audience chamber Castlereagh found many of his old companions, for by one method or another a good many of the most important Ambassadors in Europe managed to get summoned to the Conference. The Emperor of Austria had made a triumphal procession through the Catholic population of the Rhineland, rather to the embarrassment of their Protestant King, who was not, however, a man to shew jealousy. With his Emperor came Metternich, having abandoned his Paris visit, braced for a diplomatic contest with his Russian rival and eager to resume his intimate connection with Castlereagh. His henchman, Gentz, was to be the Protocollist of the Conference, as he had been of the Vienna Congress, and he was thoroughly delighted with his importance—and the substantial rewards which it entailed. Lebzelter, Metternich's most capable Ambassador, also came with him, and Zichy from Berlin and other Austrians. His trusted councillor, Hudelist, died at Vienna during the Conference.

Alexander came via Berlin multiplying, as he progressed, his protestations of devotion to his Allies and the peace of Europe, which fell a little flat on German ears. ✓ Capo d'Istria and Nesselrode again represented the two different aspects of the Tsar's character, and it was soon to be seen how great the influence of the former was, in spite of his diplomatic

defeat before the Conference. Pozzo di Borgo joined his friend from Paris, despite or because of, the transparent intrigue of Metternich to keep him away. Lieven was also called to his master's side, to his great surprise and delight, and of course his wife went with him to direct his policy—and, incidentally, to establish very intimate relations with Metternich.¹

The King of Prussia was accompanied by his son Karl, while Hardenberg, his authority in Prussia decreasing as his infirmities increased, brought, besides Wittgenstein, his new helper Bernstorff, who did not, however, play a great part. Wilhelm Humboldt, whose exclusion had made him ill, was allowed to come towards the end of the Conference, but had no influence. The expert Jordan, who had been at Vienna, was the principal Prussian civil servant. The Prussian Generals were much in evidence.

Richelieu, of course, represented France, whose fate was to be determined, and she could not have had a better advocate. He more than any one else had won the victory before the Conference met. If he did not get all he wanted, he got far more than any other Frenchman could have obtained. Caraman, the French Ambassador at Vienna, came to assist him, but his real helpers were two civil servants, men of proved ability—Rayneval, of the Foreign Office, and Mounier, a financial expert, whom Pasquier claims the credit of finding.

The Sovereigns and statesmen of the Smaller Powers were prevented from enjoying again the transient importance which they had obtained at Vienna. Their politics were indeed canvassed and some of their problems discussed and even solved. But the meeting, owing to Castlereagh and Metternich, remained a Conference of the Great Powers. It never "degenerated into a Congress," and the very fact set the seal on the primacy of the Great Powers which had only just been revealed to Europe. But it was only with a good deal of grumbling and protests that this situation was accepted. The Press had made a great deal of the coming meeting, and plans were made on all sides to get there by hook or by crook.

¹ Poletica and Alopeus also appeared, but rather to receive instruction than to give advice.

134 THE CONFERENCE OF AIX-LA-CHAPELLE

At one time Gentz anticipated 5,000 visitors, and rooms went to unheard-of prices. Though numbers were actually far less, the pleasure city of Aix-la-Chapelle soon drew to itself a good crowd of strangers who came to amuse or be amused by the great ones of the earth, and its concerts, fêtes, and dinners repeated, though on a very much smaller scale, some of the delights of the Congress of Vienna. Planta thought, however, that the Sovereigns, or at least their suites, were bored—and hoped for a speedy settlement.

The instructions of the British Mission had been prepared with great care. They were in the form of two Memoranda prepared by Castlereagh for the Cabinet, and the drafts in the archives shew that their language was most carefully considered. They were, however, most explicit on those points on which not much difference of opinion was likely to take place; on more delicate questions Castlereagh, as usual, reserved for himself a large measure of discretion, so that he could develop his ideas in accordance with the situation existing on the Continent. He already knew, of course, a good deal of the direction of Metternich's mind by the dispatches of August. But the evidence as to Alexander's intentions was conflicting and disquieting, and even when he left England Castlereagh was uncertain whether the King of Spain would not try to take the Conference by storm.

The first Memorandum¹ dealt with the policy to be pursued towards France, and incidentally therefore with the future of the Alliance—and it is significant only incidentally. It was based on an analysis of the obligations and advantages of the Treaties which had been signed in 1815, and substantially its conclusion was that these engagements had gone far enough and must be reduced rather than increased. Four main subjects were considered.

(i) *Whether the circumstances contemplated in Art. v. of the Treaty of Peace are considered so far to exist as to determine the Allied Sovereigns to withdraw the Army of Occupation at the expiration of the third year?* This question was considered as already practically decided by the Duke of Wellington, who had repeated to the Cabinet in August his opinion that a con-

¹ *F.O. Continent*, 34.

tinuation of the Occupation against the declared wish of the King and every political party in France would increase rather than diminish the danger. Public opinion in France had been allowed, he said, to expect the withdrawal by the King's speech in the Chamber and by the financial obligations which had already been undertaken by the latter. If it was disappointed, France would be exasperated and he could only make his army safe by concentrating it. The question was therefore, morally speaking, decided, and, provided that security was given for the pecuniary claims, Britain must agree with its Allies to evacuate France in November.

(ii) *What arrangements on the part of France ought to be accepted by the Allies in satisfaction of their pecuniary demands?* The Memorandum sketched the process by which the French Chamber had voted an interest to cover the money due to the Allies, and concluded that Richelieu, by means of contracts with Baring and other financiers, would be able to raise sufficient funds to cover all obligations. The money being already voted, the arrangement rested on the joint credit of the French Government and the Contractors; and as the former could not avoid their obligations without an act of violent bankruptcy, and the latter were liable in their personal credit, it did not seem that better security could be devised. Something must be risked if the troops were to withdraw in November, as it would not be possible to capitalise the whole of the interest by that time. Against this risk was, however, to be set "the strong interest of all parties in France not to destroy the public credit of the State," and "the dread which France must still feel of provoking the European Alliance by so flagrant an act of violence and bad faith." The Cabinet were, therefore, of the opinion that the risk could be safely run without adding to the sanctions already existing.

(iii) *Whether after the evacuation any intermediate system of military precaution could be temporarily set up?* It was admitted that discussion had shewn a very general repugnance, shared by the Netherlands itself, to stationing there an Army of Observation composed of foreign troops, even if all its charges were defrayed by the Alliance. The great expense alone, since France could not be expected to support it, was

sufficient to make the scheme impossible. Moreover, it would be represented to France as a menace and so give her pretexts to increase the French army, which it was now expected would be reduced. As a substitute the British Cabinet looked to the Army of the German Confederation, which, according to Münster, had now been agreed to in principle by the several States of Germany. The objections of the King of the Netherlands, of the Confederation itself, probably of France, and possibly of Russia, also prevented the adoption of the idea which had been considered of incorporating the Netherlands in the German Confederation. A special Treaty to protect the Netherlands frontier would arouse the jealousy of other frontier States. Moreover, the Four Powers were already pledged to defend it by "stipulated succours and, if necessary, with their whole forces." To invite other Powers to accede to this Treaty, as they had done at Vienna against Napoleon, would "embarrass the Councils of the Quadruple Alliance," and it was considered therefore more prudent to leave it alone.

The Prussian position on the flank of the Netherlands was also held to increase its security, but it was thought better not to make any special Treaty with Prussia and Russia, as had been suggested, but rather to rely on the Quadruple Alliance, especially in view of the objections to separate alliances, which the Emperor of Russia had brought forward on more than one occasion.

On these three points the Memorandum had merely stated in terms specially applicable to British interests what had now become the common view of Europe. The fourth question, however, traversed very debatable ground, on which the views of the other Allies and especially Russia were imperfectly known.

(iv) *Whether any and what changes should now be made in the diplomatic relations of the four Allied Powers either with regard to each other or collectively towards France?* This point led to an analysis of the Treaty of Alliance of November 20, 1815. Its military provisions (60,000 men from each of the Four Powers with more if necessary) and its duration (20 years) were considered entirely adequate. Its objects were, however, more debatable. The two first were, as has been seen, quite definite,

and automatically called the sanctions of the Treaty into force. They were the inviolable maintenance of the terms of the peace with France just concluded, and the exclusion of Napoleon Bonaparte and his family from the throne of France. But the third object, of guarding Europe from the consequences of another revolution in France, was more vaguely stated, and, moreover, was to be judged by the Powers when it occurred and the appropriate action was then to be determined. It was agreed that this case, though approved by Parliament in 1816, might now give rise to serious difference of opinion, and that it was therefore important that no engagement should be made by which it would have to be again submitted for approval. Indeed, as it might be represented that it "menaced France with a systematic interference in her internal affairs, which threatened her independence and compromised her dignity," it was held possible that France might desire to see it altered. But while the Cabinet admitted the difficulties of interpreting such a clause, they were not prepared to give it up at the very moment that the Allied troops were, "not without some hazard to the general tranquillity, about to be withdrawn from France." They therefore refused to make a decision until they knew on what grounds the demand might be made and how it was viewed by the other Allies, and Castlereagh was ordered, if the case arose, to write home for further instructions.

Another supposition was that France might request to be admitted to the Treaty of Quadruple Alliance. Louis XVIII. had indeed made the request in 1815, and had only reluctantly agreed to withdraw it when he was told that it would make him odious in the eyes of his people. The removal of the Army of Occupation certainly took away some of that odium. Nevertheless, as the Treaty was aimed exclusively at France, he could not become a party to it "without placing himself altogether in a false position towards his own people." Europe, in fact, could not be expected to give up her precautions, and the King could not become a member of "a league avowedly pointed at France."

The Cabinet were, however, sensible of the advantage of establishing any method which could be devised "to recognise

a common interest and reciprocal confidence and ostensibly combine the councils of France with those of the Allies in watching over the interests and peace of Europe." It had already been recognised that the King of France should be consulted before measures were taken to combat revolution. The Cabinet now suggested that France should be specially invited to take part in the general deliberations which had been envisaged under Article VI. of the Treaty. There was no need to invite any other Powers "as the Alliance is essentially founded on a French basis" (a rather weak argument, but the only one available if the necessary distinction between Great and Small Powers could not be avowed). "Upon the whole," the Memorandum concluded, "there is less hazard in doing so than in having so great a Power as France in a state of separation to create for herself some counterpoise to this Alliance. From the experience we had of conducting business with France, there seems rather a convenience in her being brought into these deliberations, and perhaps such an arrangement might satisfy her pretensions and enable us to preserve our treaties untouched as approved by Parliament."

There is little information as to the method by which this Memorandum was prepared except its own statements. It appears to have been almost entirely Castlereagh's own composition, and there is no evidence that it was altered by the Cabinet discussions. Nevertheless it betrays a certain divergence of views between the Cabinet and the Foreign Minister. The reluctance to approve the third object of the Treaty of November 20, 1815, lest it should lay the Cabinet open to the charge of interference in the internal affairs of France, is significant, and the phrases which defer the final decision appear to be a compromise. As will be seen, this point was to call forth an explicit declaration from the British Plenipotentiaries during the Conference. The most important part of the document was, however, the final paragraph, which discussed the means by which France was to be allowed to enter the councils of the Alliance. The suggestion to utilise the Round-Table conferences on the general affairs of Europe for this purpose was undoubtedly Castlereagh's own. It had

not been hinted at in any of the Austrian or Russian papers. Article VI. was, as we have seen, his own invention, and this attempt to perpetuate it and enable France to become a member of the Committee of the Great Powers marks once again the importance which he attached to it. Alexander's projects and Cabinet suspicions were nearly to wreck it during the Conference, but, if he did not define its scope or make it permanent, it was to remain intact after the searching debates of Aix-la-Chapelle were over.

The second Cabinet Memorandum dealt with various problems in debate at London, Paris and Frankfort. They might be discussed at the Conference "though it may not be thought expedient to negotiate." The exact procedure by which this was to be done was obviously uncertain, and the Memorandum betrays the difficulty of Castlereagh in finding phrases to indicate his meaning.¹ What he intended, however, is clear. He hoped by verbal discussion to find some solution for these various questions which had been dragging on since 1815, and, after virtually coming to a decision upon them, to refer them to the various Ambassadorial Conferences to be drafted and signed. By this means the Great Powers would avoid the appearance of deciding in conclave questions in which several of the Smaller Powers were concerned, without summoning them to be heard. At the same time questions which gravely disturbed the harmony of the Alliance would be got out of the way. The questions discussed were six in number, of which three were actually under discussion at London, one at Paris and one at Frankfort. The sixth was the very important question of the Spanish Colonies, which had not as yet been referred to any centre for discussion.² At London were the chronic problems of the Slave Trade and the Barbary Pirates, and one that threatened to become eternal unless vigorous action was taken—the refusal of

¹ *F.O. Continent*, 34. A phrase in the draft which is crossed out ran: "It may nevertheless be deemed proper so far to deliberate as to come to some understanding between the several Courts." This was apparently deemed too explicit, and the Memorandum merely said: "It is probable that much conversation will arise as to the most advisable course to be hereafter pursued for bringing these several questions to an early and satisfactory conclusion."

² See below, Chapter VIII., Section 1, p. 418.

Sweden to carry out the terms of the Treaty of Kiel. On the Slave Trade the great point was to obtain the right of Visit and Search, which Britain desired and France and other maritime Powers opposed; on the other hand, the Cabinet was very suspicious of the proposal to establish a common Mediterranean fleet to act against the Barbary Powers.¹ As to the Treaty of Kiel, the Plenipotentiaries were ordered to support strong action by the Great Powers, but the actual method to be adopted was left entirely to their discretion. On the question of the Spanish Colonies wide latitude was again given to the Plenipotentiaries. On the Spanish-Portuguese dispute, which had been under discussion at Paris since the middle of 1817, little more was attempted than to state precisely the actual state of the negotiations. At Frankfort only the territorial exchanges between Austria, Bavaria and Baden remained to be completed, and the Cabinet recorded its opinion that Austria ought to give way.

In all these matters, therefore, Castlereagh had given himself large discretion. The instructions do little more than explain the matters under discussion to the Cabinet. The Foreign Minister obviously wished to keep a free hand to deal with them as the circumstances of the moment and the development of the confidential discussions indicated. In some of them British interests were vitally concerned, in others Britain had only a slight interest. In such a combination a diplomatist likes to have some small change which he can use to adjust his accounts. In this kind of juggling Castlereagh had already shewn himself at Vienna to be an expert, and he had been accustomed to take the most serious responsibility on himself, when, as was inevitable, situations developed which could not be foreseen when the instructions were drawn up.

This course he was also to follow at Aix-la-Chapelle, where Castlereagh and Wellington made the gravest decisions without reference to their Cabinet. The latter body was to prove more restless than during the Congress of Vienna, partly owing to Canning's influence. Moreover, it was much nearer than during the Vienna Congress, and could not be treated with the same disregard. But the final result was

¹ See below, Chapter VIII., Section 3, p. 463.

the same, except, as will be seen, on one vital point, in which Castlereagh was possibly influenced to some extent by the criticisms of his colleagues.

The Cabinet only sent him nine dispatches during the course of the Conference, two of which were of grave importance, though Castlereagh had already anticipated the instructions contained in them. The rest were only formal, but Liverpool continued the practice, which he had followed in 1814-15, of sending frequent private letters conveying his own and his colleagues' impressions of the negotiations. The dispatches from Aix-la-Chapelle were, as those from Paris in 1815, signed only by Castlereagh, for though Wellington promised to become a member of the Cabinet in the course of the Conference, yet he had his own special position and could not be regarded as a Plenipotentiary in the same sense as the Foreign Minister. "The reasoning," wrote Castlereagh, "which must always more or less mix itself with these reports can hardly be adopted by the person who does not draw the dispatch without either exposing him to unfair responsibility or essentially delaying the business." "I feel," he added, "that I should abuse the confidence with which the Duke of Wellington has always acted towards me, if I asked him, by his signature to make himself answerable, possibly in the eyes of Parliament, for observations, many perhaps of a speculative nature, which I may feel it my duty to submit to the Prince Regent's Government."¹ These dispatches were indeed to be necessarily full of some very speculative matter, and to display once more the practical capacity of one who, no less than Alexander and with more truth, regarded himself as the founder of the Alliance.

¹ From Castlereagh (No. 5), Oct. 3, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 35.

3. THE SCOPE AND NATURE OF THE ALLIANCE

ON his way to Aix-la-Chapelle Castlereagh met Wellington at Cambrai. At Spa he had two conversations with Richelieu who had gone there expressly to engage in them. Richelieu's instructions were to get rid of the Quadruple Alliance altogether and place France on an absolute equality with the other Powers. But both ministers were reserved. Castlereagh naturally wished to see his Allies before he committed himself, while Richelieu put forward no very definite plan. Both were as conciliatory as possible. Richelieu judiciously refrained from all attempts to champion Spain, while Castlereagh merely attempted to create an impression of trust.¹

At Aix-la-Chapelle Castlereagh arrived a day or so before the Emperors and their ministers; but all had assembled by September 27, and preliminary conversations began immediately. The King of Prussia and the Emperor of Austria, who seemed to be on very good terms with one another, contented themselves with compliments, but Alexander began immediately to 'open himself' with the greatest frankness. He protested his attachment to the Quadruple Alliance and his love of peace. He spoke openly of the rumours that credited him with the desire of war, and repudiated them with violent indignation. With whom could he go to war, he said; not with his Allies and friends. "Is it with the Turks? The world may think so—but I do not respect them enough to sacrifice my reputation for any object I could attain by turning my arms against them: I have as much territory as I desire and more than I can well manage; my ambition will be to improve it and make my people happy. I consider

¹ Castlereagh to Liverpool, Sept. 27, 1818: *C.C.* xii. 42. Richelieu's instructions are given in *I.R.H.S.* cxix. 820.

my Army as the Army of Europe and as such alone shall it be employed. I will not admit that it can otherwise be employed than *with Europe*, to repress any attempt to shape the system of which my Empire forms only a part."

More pleasing to Castlereagh even than these protestations were the Tsar's views on France. He spoke with the greatest distrust of her condition, considering that it was such as to make the Quadruple Alliance more than ever necessary. This was very reassuring, since all the rumours of the Franco-Russian Alliance were destroyed at a blow, which Austria had been spreading. Nor did Castlereagh fail to report to his Cabinet a significant passage whose casual entry into the conversation reveals something of the mind of both speakers. "In referring to the next reunion three years hence, the Emperor said—He could be ill-spared from the interior of his dominions, and that he might not then enjoy the good health he now happily did, but that he had it so much at heart to meet his Allies, that no inconvenience should prevent his attending them, whenever the meeting might be fixed, and His Imperial Majesty added that he would 'rather come in a litter than fail them.'" There is no comment on this by Castlereagh, but it shews how instinctive was the common view, which he shared, that the reunions, of which Aix-la-Chapelle was the first, should be a permanent feature of European politics.¹

All this was very satisfactory, and the same sentiments were reiterated by the Emperor in interviews with Wellington and Metternich, accounts of which Castlereagh forwarded to his Cabinet. But, as he reported in a private letter, Castlereagh was struck by the 'exaltation of mind' which these conversations displayed, and which was carrying the Tsar further than Castlereagh wanted to go. He contented himself for the moment with some general acquiescence. But as Alexander's views were directly at issue with Richelieu's, the British Plenipotentiaries thought it best to bring forward their scheme at the earliest possible moment. They therefore, without loss of time, communicated confidentially to the ministers of the three Courts the whole contents of the First

¹ From Castlereagh (No. 2), Oct 3, 1818: *F.O. Documents*, 35.

Cabinet Memorandum summarised in the last section, merely making a few changes of language necessary to fit it for perusal by foreign eyes. Metternich immediately adopted it *in toto*, and the Prussians also viewed it favourably. The Russian Ministers could not, of course, commit themselves without the direct orders of the Tsar, and Castlereagh found some difficulty in ascertaining their views. "It was plain," he reported, "they had been at work on the problem of the future colour to be given to the Alliance, and I think it was as plain that they had not been able to solve it in a manner satisfactory to their own minds; indeed, they avowed to me that the materials had been for a considerable time before the Emperor, but that His Imperial Majesty had formed no decision as yet upon them. They seemed to go along very much with the reasoning of the paper, and yet they hinted that they considered the Emperor's views as not altogether coinciding with it." The guarded nature of their criticisms made it impossible for Castlereagh to do more than guess what the difference was, but he thought that he saw some traces of a recurrence to that view of the subject which the Russian Plenipotentiaries put forward in 1815 at Paris, "the making any subversion by violence of the order of things then established in France as a distinct *casus foederis*."

It was certain, however, that Richelieu's overtures to have the Quadruple Alliance abolished altogether had been peremptorily rejected, and Castlereagh reported that fact with great satisfaction. Nor did he believe Metternich, when that Minister tried to defend his past insinuations by reporting Alexander's confession that overtures of Alliance had actually been made to him from Paris. Even the Austrian minister could find no fault with Alexander's present attitude, and transferred all his suspicions to his servants. The two Emperors had undoubtedly shewn much confidence in one another. "I am quite convinced," wrote Castlereagh, "that past habits, common glory and these occasional meetings, displays and repledges are among the best securities Europe now has for a durable peace."¹

¹ From Castlereagh (No. 9, Private and most secret), Oct. 3, 4, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 35; *C.C.* xii. 48. Castlereagh's dispatches are addressed to Bathurst, who took charge of the Foreign Office in his absence.

In these circumstances the question of evacuation, on which all were agreed, went very easily. The only point to settle was the monetary payments. These amounted, in all, to 265 million francs, of which 165 millions were guaranteed by Baring and Hope, while 100 millions were allowed to be given in French funds at the price of the day. France saved 15 millions by this transaction. Prussia, indeed, raised awkward questions and wanted more guarantees than the other Powers. But Baring paid them cash on the spot, and with the help of the Duke overcame all difficulties. For the moment, therefore, everything seemed straightforward, and on October 9 a Convention was signed between France and the four Allied Powers agreeing to withdraw the Army of Occupation and accepting the guarantees offered by the bankers.¹

Business was thus proceeding excellently, and there was a general feeling that by the end of the month everything would be arranged. By October 12 the four Allied Powers had agreed by Protocol to adhere to the Quadruple Alliance and not to allow France to become a member of it. This decision was to remain secret, but the four Powers were also to invite her publicly to take her place in the reunions of Article VI., exactly as the British instructions had suggested. The precise form of the invitation was to be arranged with Richelieu. A declaration was to be made by the Allies in order to dispel as far as possible the alarm which other Powers might feel as to reunions of this description in time of peace, whether consisting of four or five Powers, by assuring them that it was not intended by the Powers so assembling "to arrogate to themselves any supremacy or to interfere in the politics of other States in any manner not strictly warranted by the Law of Nations."

Castlereagh could congratulate his Cabinet, therefore, that everything was being arranged in accordance with their desires, and to him it marked once more the advantages of diplomacy by Conference.

"The discussions to which this extended and delicate

¹ *B.F.S.P.* vi. 6. Owing to the fluctuations in the French Rentes there was still to be much anxiety, however, before the financial transactions were finally settled, and the contract with Baring and Hope had to be modified. *W.N.D.* i. 18. D'Angeberg, *Congrès de Vienne*, 1767.

subject has already given rise," he advised them, "have furnished the most decisive proof of the advantage of bringing from time to time the principal Cabinets into direct contact with each other. The review that has been taken of our existing engagements, and their application to the state of things which will grow out of the measure of evacuation, could not have been taken by the ordinary course of diplomatic intercourse, not only without delay but without the hazard of the most serious misconception and complication of views; placed as the Cabinets now are by the side of each other, these misconceptions have been immediately obviated and a divergence of opinion is likely to be avoided which might have been prejudicial in the highest degree to the general interests." ¹

This was true enough. So far, the Conference had triumphantly justified itself and adopted all Castlereagh's views. He had kept the Quadruple Alliance, and at the same time had apparently secured the permanence of the new system of diplomacy which he had invented at Paris. But this happy position was not to last long. It was assailed immediately from two sides—by the Russians who wanted quite a different scheme, and by the British Cabinet itself.

For the Cabinet had already taken alarm at some of Castlereagh's expressions, and the idea that the continuance of a system of Conferences was to be publicly announced had aroused the violent opposition of Canning. In Castlereagh's absence he was a far greater influence in the Cabinet, and he had won over, to a certain extent, the six members who met to consider the dispatches of Castlereagh, just quoted, which, as has been seen, more than once announced the continuance of the system of reunions of the Great Powers as a matter settled almost without discussion. The older members of the Cabinet merely objected, indeed, to announcing the decision, but Canning objected to the system itself. He had not been a member of the Cabinet when the Treaty of Paris was made in which the system originated, and the idea appears to have come to him as something fresh. At any rate he considered

¹ From Castlereagh (No. 10), Oct. 14, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 35. He had not yet received the Russian Memorandum dated Oct. 8.

the Sixth Article of the Treaty as applying only to France, and "that system of periodical meetings of the four Great Powers, with a view to the general concerns of Europe, new and of very questionable policy; that it will necessarily involve us deeply in all the politics of the Continent, whereas our true policy has always been not to interfere except in great emergencies and then with commanding force." He said that other States would protest and the meeting might become a scene of cabal and intrigue; that public opinion in Britain would be against meetings with despotic monarchs deliberating about revolutions. The Cabinet, Bathurst protested, in elaborate and embarrassed apology, did not agree with him, but they thought others might take the same view. They therefore pleaded with Castlereagh not to make a public declaration, and indeed sent him official instructions to that effect. These allowed him to announce one further meeting, to which even Canning did not object, but not a 'permanent system' of such meetings.

"We are persuaded that the action of such meetings would create a great degree of jealousy amongst the other Powers of Europe which no declaration that could be issued would adequately remove. The prominent necessity for them will cease to exist whenever the French Government, left to itself, shall have proved that it can maintain tranquillity at home and the relations of peace with other countries, and though the mind might anticipate other circumstances under which such meetings might be productive of many advantages, one may likewise contemplate those under which they might be likely to lead to great embarrassment." The Sixth Article in the Treaty of Alliance, as well as some other stipulations in that Treaty, could hardly have been adopted for the first time under such circumstances as the present. We are by no means desirous of seeing it abrogated, but we do not think it would be politic to reinforce it by a new declaration of a general nature." ¹

Here, baldly stated, is the real issue between Castlereagh and his Cabinet which persisted throughout these years.

¹ Bathurst to Castlereagh, Oct. 20, 1818: *F.O. Continent Archives*, 48; *C.C.* xii 56 In this letter the 6th Article is twice misprinted "ninth," and this has perhaps obscured some of the sense of the letter.

Castlereagh wished for a permanent system of reunions of the Great Powers, the Cabinet and Canning did not. But Castlereagh was the Foreign Minister who had signed the secret Treaty at Vienna in direct defiance of his Cabinet's instructions. He could not, perhaps, act with the same disregard now, since he was only three or four days away from the Cabinet instead of twelve or fourteen, and Parliament was likely to be far more critical than in days when the war fever still persisted. Nevertheless, as will be seen, Castlereagh kept his system intact, though perhaps less explicitly stated than it would have been if it had been left to himself entirely. But he had first to defend it from an attack by the Tsar which would have transformed the system of reunions for the transaction of diplomatic business into a grandiose and impossible machine for governing the whole of Europe.

For, before the letter of Bathurst just quoted had reached him, the real crisis of the Conference had arisen and had been solved. The secret of the Russian hesitations was at last disclosed after much manoeuvring. After the Emperor had digested the British Memorandum he received Castlereagh and again hinted that he wanted something more. "He should be happy to lend himself to any plan," he said, "which might relieve the Prince Regent's Ministers from a Parliamentary difficulty." He meant that he would not propose a new Treaty which would need the sanction of Parliament; but he wanted something far bigger than Castlereagh's modest proposals. Castlereagh was alarmed to find that the Emperor and Capo d'Istria were, in conversation, "disposed to push their ideas very far indeed in the sense of *all the Powers of Europe being bound together in a common league guaranteeing to each other the existing order of things in thrones as well as in territories*, all being bound to march, if requisite, against the first Power that offended either by her ambitions or by her revolutionary transgressions." "I thought the best chance of preserving the Emperor's mind within the principles which we could maintain in Parliament," he reported, "was by trying to present something that might at once keep within our own line, and at the same time present the subject somewhat in the zone of his own ideas." Indeed, the whole question of

maintaining the Alliance and, at the same time, framing an invitation to France which she could accept, while avoiding offence to the secondary Powers, was so delicate that Castlereagh was anxious to invent a form of words as soon as possible, lest others should take the initiative and bring in undesirable ideas and expressions. Accordingly, he got Gentz to translate the British suggestions into his best French, and sent the result to Alexander. This document announced that the Treaties, including that of the Quadruple Alliance, still existed in all their force, but invited France to take part in the reunions of Article VI., disclaiming in express terms, however, all intention of interfering in the affairs of any other State. Gentz took care to put into the document the sort of language which appealed to Alexander's sensibilities, and talked much of duty towards God as well as towards Man, but the essence of the document was exactly what Castlereagh's instructions had laid down. In taking it to the Emperor, Castlereagh was careful to explain that it was intended merely to explain his intentions and not necessarily as the final draft to be adopted by the Allies.¹

Metternich's Memorandum in reply to this overture merely affirmed the necessity of maintaining the Quadruple Alliance, on which all were agreed, and avoided the real issue. But the Russian answer, much of which "had been brought in a prepared state from St. Petersburg," at last revealed what had been behind all the hesitations and hints of Alexander and his Ministers, and explains a good deal of the diffident conduct of Capo d'Istria at Carlsbad. For though Russia wished to maintain the Quadruple Alliance, the Tsar proposed nothing less than the creation of an entirely new system which would have bound each State to guarantee not only the territories but the government of all others. Not France alone was to join, but all other States, and the object was to repress revolutions that might arise anywhere against the legitimate authority of the Sovereign.²

¹ From Castlereagh (No 13), Oct 19, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 35. The document drawn up by Gentz is annexed.

² The Russian Memorandum dated Oct. 8, is printed in *I.R.H.S.* cxlix. 832, and *W.S.D.* xii. 743. It does not appear to have been handed in, however, before Oct. 14. The Austrian Memorandum is in *F.O. Continent*, 35.

It was obvious that British Ministers could not accept proposals of this kind. Castlereagh had already dealt with a situation somewhat similar at Paris in 1815. It was one which could only be met by frank and uncompromising speech. He did not attempt, therefore, to answer it at once by a Memorandum, but invited the Ministers of all the Powers to a "free discussion of all that had been written." In this discussion the British Ministers reaffirmed in the most peremptory fashion the limited nature of their engagements. The boundaries of Europe, as determined by the Treaties of Vienna and Paris, they were concerned to maintain; they had also the special engagements against France contained in the Treaty of the Quadruple Alliance. But they were bound to nothing else except to meet in reunion as laid down by Article VI. of that Treaty. The sweeping suggestions of the Russian paper were subjected to a ruthless analysis which exposed their absurdity. Castlereagh threw these verbal criticisms into the shape of a Memorandum ¹ for the information of the Cabinet, though doubtless his words were scarcely so sharp and sarcastic in conversation. He ridiculed the idea of some States judging how far any internal changes in another State are legal or salutary, and he shewed that the Treaties did not bind the Allies to interfere even in France unless their own safety was threatened. How much less could they do so in other countries! He brought the Conference back to a sense of reality with words which have become well known.

"The problem of an universal Alliance for the peace and happiness of the world," he said, "has always been one of speculation and of hope, but it has never yet been reduced to practice, and if an opinion may be hazarded from its difficulty, it never can; but you may in practice approach towards it, and perhaps the design has never been so far realised as in the last four years. During that eventful period the Quadruple Alliance, formed upon principles altogether limited, has had, from the presence of the Sovereigns and the unparalleled unity of design with which their Cabinets have acted,

¹ This is printed *in extenso* in my *Congress of Vienna, Appendix viii*. It should be noted that this paper was not given immediately to the other Ministers. It was written to give the British Cabinet an account of the line taken by Castlereagh in the discussions.

the power of travelling so far out of the sphere of their immediate and primitive obligations, without, at the same time, transgressing any of the principles of the law of nations or failing in the delicacy which they owe to the rights of other States, as to form more extended alliances, such as that of March 25, 1815, at Vienna, to interpose their good offices for the settlement of differences subsisting between other States, to take the initiative in watching over the peace of Europe, and finally in securing the execution of its treaties in the mode most consonant to the convenience of all the parties.

"The idea of an 'Alliance Solidaire,' by which each State shall be bound to support the state of succession, government, and possession within all other States from violence and attack, upon condition of receiving for itself a similar guarantee, must be understood as morally implying the previous establishment of such a system of general government as may secure and enforce upon all kings and nations an internal system of peace and justice. Till the mode of constructing such a system shall be devised the consequence is inadmissible, as nothing would be more immoral or more prejudicial to the character of government generally than the idea that their force was collectively to be prostituted to the support of established power without any consideration of the extent to which it was abused. Till, then, a system of administering Europe by a general Alliance of all its States can be reduced to some practical form, all notions of general and unqualified guarantee must be abandoned, and States must be left to rely for their security upon the justice and wisdom of their respective systems, aided by such support as other States may feel prepared to afford them, and as circumstances may point out and justify without out-stepping those principles which are to be found in the law of nations as long recognised and practised.

"The beneficial effects which may be expected to be produced by the four Allied Powers consulting together, and interposing from time to time their good offices, as they have hitherto done, for the preservation of peace and order, is considered as equally true with respect to five Powers, the introduction of France into such a system not rendering it too

numerous for convenient concert, whilst it must add immensely to the moral weight and influence of such a mediating Power."

The Russian Ministers were unable to resist an onslaught from adversaries so experienced and determined as Castlereagh and Wellington. The result was "to compel Count Capo d'Istria to descend from his abstractions in a considerable degree and to prepare the Conference for some practical conclusion." It began, in fact, to put into formal shape Castlereagh's own ideas, and at the conclusion of the meetings of these two days, he was able to report to his Cabinet that in substance he had gained his points, though the exact language to be used was still to be settled. Protocols had been agreed upon reaffirming and regulating the Quadruple Alliance and inviting France to take part in the reunions under Article VI. The former had necessarily to be kept secret in order to avoid hurting French sensibilities. The latter was to be public and to be declared to France and Europe. Castlereagh admitted that its exact language would still need discussion and would involve great care. He hoped, he said, to submit it to the Cabinet before he signed it, but he could not promise.

In a private letter to Bathurst he recounted some of the difficulties of these discussions and again emphasised his opinion that only "direct and daily intercourse" had prevented the Alliance from getting "into much confusion." France's object had been, he was now certain, to substitute a Quintuple for the Quadruple Alliance, or, if that was not allowed, to get the latter abolished altogether, but the Allies had refused to agree to either course. "The expedient is then to give France her concert but to keep our security." So long as she behaved herself she was to have equal rights with the other four Powers, but if not, "our Treaties impose on us the obligation of being again as four to one." At the same time Castlereagh pointed out that he much preferred this solution to leaving France out of the concert altogether, a course which he believed Alexander would have readily adopted. Such a decision would have eventually driven France into that alliance with Russia "which may be described as the only one that can prove really formidable to the liberties of Europe." He was thus anxious to go as far as

possible so as not to drive France into that dangerous connection. If Russia insisted he was even prepared to make a new Treaty, inconvenient as the procedure was, rather than lose her altogether, but he hoped that this would be unnecessary.

He was, in fact, already confident, as he told Liverpool, that the worst was over and a satisfactory result assured, and he took the opportunity to point the true moral of his success. "At all events, it is satisfactory," he wrote, "to observe how little embarrassment and how much solid good grow out of these reunions, which sound so terrible at a distance. It really appears to me to be a new discovery in the European Government, at once extinguishing the cobwebs with which diplomacy obscures the horizon, bringing the whole bearing of the system into its true light, and giving to the counsels of the Great Powers the efficiency and almost the simplicity of a single State." Perhaps he would not have been so ready with his praise of the Conference had it shewn more readiness to adopt Alexander's ideas instead of his own!¹

From the 14th to the 21st October these discussions had gone on with increasing energy. The Ministers met every morning at ten or eleven, and the discussions dragged on often till nearly three. The Leipzig anniversary, tactfully and quietly celebrated, owing to the presence of a French Plenipotentiary, was not allowed to interrupt them. Then Alexander and the King of Prussia went to inspect the Allied troops and to pay a visit to Paris. Alexander's tact in seeing only Louis and then hurrying away was much applauded, and contrasted with the King of Prussia's visits to the Parisian theatres which he loved. Meanwhile, the Ministers were working out the details of the agreements. During this period Castlereagh received the account of Canning's protests in the Cabinet, but he makes only casual allusion to it. Circumstances had led to its being rather out of date. Bathurst and Liverpool, on their part, were much reassured by the accounts of his defeat of Alexander which reached them on October 23, while they were staying at Walmer. The paper Gentz had drawn up would do, they said, though they had a few criticisms

¹ From Castlereagh (Nos. 15, 16, Private and Secret), Oct. 20, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 36. Castlereagh to Liverpool, Oct. 20, 1818: *C.C.* xii. 54. See also Cisternes, *Le Duc de Richelieu*, 94-5.

as to its wording. They were still very nervous, however, about the series of reunions, which they wished to make as little prominent as possible. Liverpool was anxious that no *secret* stipulations or Protocols should be signed, as it would be awkward to have to equivocate. He was nervous about Parliament and protested vigorously against any idea of a new Treaty. "We must recollect ourselves in the whole of this business, and ought to make our Allies feel (who are indirectly, if not directly, interested in it) that the general and European discussions of these questions will be in the British Parliament; that we have a new Parliament to meet, which has not been tried, of a doubtful character, and certainly not accustomed to look at foreign questions as Parliaments were some years ago, when under the pressure or immediate recollection of great foreign danger."¹

These warnings came to Castlereagh while he was immersed in his discussions with the Ministers. Gentz was engaged in substituting sober Protocols for Capo d'Istria's high-flown language, and they were gradually getting back to earth. One proposal, of which Castlereagh wittily remarked "the *Greek text* remains in its original impurity," he hoped to get rid of altogether. He expected, he said, to avoid any declaration which would make a sensation; the whole could be announced by dispatches to the Ministers at the minor Courts. As to the reunions, he was reassuring; and this is the only reference to be found to the Cabinet instruction and Canning's outburst. "Your Lordship will observe," he clumsily explained, "that there is no reference in these papers to any specified periods of meeting, nor is there any intention, as far as I am informed, of *now* naming any particular time for re-assembling. In proportion as the subject has been canvassed, the general tendency of opinions has been in the same direction as that of the Cabinet, viz.: to say and to do as little as possible to provoke feeling or comment, and to point the eventual reunions to the maintenance of the late Peace and European settlement, as resting on the particular Treaties, rather than to the more general political interests of Europe *extra* these

¹ Bathurst to Castlereagh, Oct. 23, 1818; Liverpool to Castlereagh, Oct. 23, 1818: C.C. xii. 60-63.

transactions." He reassured Liverpool too on the question of a new treaty, to which he promised not to agree without reference home, but that also he hoped would not be necessary. Meanwhile, he sent them the suggested agreements for their comments, since the Emperor of Russia's absence gave him a little breathing space. But he warned them that they could not expect to have the language of the documents exactly as they wanted. "There are reasons," he said, "why a phraseology *must be tolerated* which would be better avoided. We must take care in substance not to break new ground, and, if this is secured, I should hope in matter of taste the Cabinet will be disposed to make some allowance and not to be too severe in their criticism." ¹

The Conference then began to discuss other matters, especially the thorny problem of the Spanish Colonies, so that Liverpool had time to reflect on these papers. He sent them to Canning, whose comments, which, with Liverpool's, were forwarded as soon as possible, we unfortunately do not possess. But they amounted to little more than objections to such words as *légitime* and *constitutionnelle*, and a desire to avoid expressing any opinion on the internal condition of France. As Castlereagh pointed out, these words had now become part of the "sacramental" language of the Tsar, and must be tolerated to a certain extent, and he pointed out "that they owed it to Richelieu to give his efforts some approval." ²

He had, however, a long battle with the Tsar before he secured documents which he could support and recommend to his Cabinet, and the negotiations of the next ten days, though less dramatic than the earlier struggle with Alexander, were of great importance. If they were mainly concerned with the phrases and formulae in which the agreed intentions of the Powers should be recorded and, in some degree, announced to their own subjects and to the rest of Europe, some of these battles of words raised problems of fundamental principle. On the whole, Castlereagh was victorious. He kept his country unpledged except to the obligations which

¹ From Castlereagh (Private and Confidential), Oct. 29, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 36 (with Enclosures).

² Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 4, 1818, Castlereagh to Liverpool, Nov. 9, 1818: *C.C.* xu, 71, 75.

she had taken at Paris. Where Alexander was permitted to have his way the objectionable phrase imposed no definite obligation. Moreover, the system of reunions, under Article VI., was maintained in its full vigour, and France was admitted to them. But they were not made automatic except in the case of a revolution occurring in France itself.

During the Tsar's absence Castlereagh had tried to reduce, as it were, the importance of the agreements of the Powers on general questions by suggesting that instead of issuing a general Declaration, a Protocol should be signed, which should be transmitted to the Smaller Powers in a circular dispatch. The Russian Ministers objected to this mode of proceeding as not sufficiently grave in character to satisfy the occasion of the admission of France into the European Concert. They wanted an effective advertisement: Castlereagh wished to attract as little notice as possible.

Alexander on his return strongly supported his Ministers. "He was persuaded," he said, "that if they seemed to shrink from an avowal of what they were doing, and gave to their proceedings the air of being only intended for the *Portefeuille*, from which they had transpired, there would be an increased disposition in the world to suppose there was something more than met the eye and that they had something to conceal." To this Castlereagh replied, "that if all the five Courts were agreed, which I trusted was the case, on the substance of their measure, that it was desirable to avoid what might, unnecessarily agitate or irritate the public mind in any direction." Alexander thereupon protested "that he would go to any length which he could reconcile to his own sense of character to relieve the British Government from a Parliamentary inconvenience, but that he could not persuade himself that the general interest would admit of so important a transaction being so lightly slurred over." Tsar and Minister then went over in detail the Protocol which Capo d'Istria had drawn up, and there was a long discussion of words. Castlereagh found that Alexander had many misconceptions as to what the obligations of the Treaty consisted; especially as to how far the Powers were pledged to intervene in France in the third case laid down in the Treaty, viz.: a revolution.

Such an event, the Tsar thought, immediately called the Quadruple Alliance into action to put it down. Castlereagh shewed him that there was no such obligation, and that everything would depend on the nature of the event and the danger caused to other countries, which could only be judged at the time. This led the two into a discussion of Britain's policy towards the Alliance, in which Castlereagh had to explain to him that the only basis of policy on which Britain could act was that of her "security as combined with that of Europe." He pointed out also the great difference that separated the methods which an autocratic monarchy could use and those at the disposal of a Parliamentary Government. It is not easy to speak frankly to Emperors, though Castlereagh had had more practice than any other British statesman. His language, perhaps, assumed at times too much of an air of apology, but, at any rate, he made the position quite clear, and shewed also that he understood his countrymen. Perhaps no better definition of their attitude towards European alliances in the nineteenth century has ever been given than in the lesson which Castlereagh gave to the Tsar.

"The Emperor observed," he reported, "that great dangers often had small beginnings, and that if not taken in the bud they might baffle all our efforts. I admitted this truth, and that it was perhaps a misfortune in our system that we could not act upon precautionary principles so early or so easily as His Imperial Majesty, but that the only chance we had of making the nation feel the wisdom of such a course was to be free, at the moment, to urge the policy of so acting, not because we had no choice, but as having a choice; that this determination would best provide for the public safety, in which decision the advantage of not separating from our Allies would be urged with effect, in proportion as we were known to have a free voice in the course to be pursued."

This profound and subtle analysis of the British character, so often justified in the course of the century that followed, brought into the Tsar's mind, so he frankly said, new ideas to which he was "very little familiar." Castlereagh perhaps weakened its force by the amplifications with which he followed it. "I told the Emperor that it was my duty to give him a

correct picture of the strength and weakness of our system that it would be for His Imperial Majesty's wisdom to draw from it the utmost resource for the common cause of peace and order of which it was susceptible, but to do this the public mind must be managed; the nation must not be alarmed with the apprehension of war when the danger was not at hand. The Allies might always, under these reserves, depend on the Prince Regent and his Government for doing their utmost in the spirit of their engagements." He warned the Tzar also, in Liverpool's words, that "we had a new Parliament and a new nation as intensely bent on peace and economy now as they had been some years since on war and exertion, that it was neither the same nation nor the same Parliament now, that it would become so again, at least, in a great degree if the exigency called it forth, but that to put at issue now any new policy of eventual exertion would be to run the hazard of losing the sanction already obtained from Parliament in favour of our continental engagements." He also explained that he could not expect his Cabinet to give him the same freedom of action as they had done in 1814-15. "My colleagues," he said, "were entitled to see their way and not to be embarked hastily in Parliamentary difficulties upon the result of which it was impossible to calculate."

The Tzar admitted the force of these arguments. He fully understood, he said, the position of the British Government, and that "everything which affected their strength or lowered their character in the eyes of Parliament or the Nation would essentially compromise the present Continental system, of which they were known to be the authors and sincere supporters." He pleaded, however, the need of introducing France with due courtesy into the Concert. Castlereagh promised him that the British Government would go as far as it possibly could.¹

The result of this important conversation was that, though Castlereagh had to accept the form of a Declaration instead of a Protocol, he got the language of the papers in almost all

¹ From Castlereagh (No. 23, Private and Confidential), Nov. 2, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 37.

cases reduced to reasonable terms. The final result was contained in four public documents. These were a Protocol signed by the Five Powers, to which was attached an invitation to France to enter the Concert, and a suitable reply by Richelieu, as well as a Declaration of the Five Courts which announced these facts to Europe. Stripped of unnecessary verbiage, they accomplished exactly what Castlereagh had set out to do at the opening of the Conference. In effect, they announced to the world that France under its restored "*légitime et constitutionnelle*" Monarchy might be considered as a safe member of the European Concert, and was consequently invited to take part in the reunions of the Great Powers.¹

Castlereagh had thus preserved the position of his country in the periodical Conferences. These are alluded to in each of the four documents in unmistakable terms as a permanent feature of European diplomacy. But no attempt is made to specify the occasions on which the reunions are to take place, as Castlereagh took care to point out to his Cabinet. "It has been the Duke of Wellington's object and mine," he wrote on November 5, by which time the final shape was all but completed, "to render the arrangement as little open as possible to the objection alluded to in your Lordship's dispatch of the 20th ult. As the Protocol is now framed, the Concert with France is confined within the limits of the most restricted interpretation which can be given to Article VI. of the Treaty of Alliance of November 20, 1815, viz. : it is confined to the maintenance of the Peace as established and consolidated by the Treaties therein enumerated. The eventual reunions are strictly limited to those interests that grow out of the transactions in question, and, instead of declaring any intention that such reunions shall be held at fixed periods, as the Sixth Article provides shall be the case, it is expressly declared that they shall be special, namely that they shall arise out of the occasion and be agreed upon by the five Courts at the time ; in fact, no Power can be considered as pledged *a priori* to any meeting whatever."

This is true, and the question is of the highest importance in view of the subsequent history of the Alliance. Nevertheless,

¹ All these documents are printed in *B.F.S.P.* vi. 11-19.

Castlereagh had, in fact, not receded from the position he had assumed in 1815 when he drew up with his own pen the original clause. For the intervals at which the reunions were to take place had never been fixed, and it does not appear likely that Castlereagh had any intention of doing so when he went to Aix-la-Chapelle. Such a definition of the Alliance was indeed entirely alien to the spirit in which he had conceived it. All that he wanted was to preserve a piece of diplomatic machinery which had been proved, and might prove to be again, essential to the preservation of the peace of Europe. As he went on to point out to his colleagues, "notwithstanding the very restricted sense in which this part of the arrangement is framed, I persuade myself that it will nevertheless answer the practical end of keeping up a salutary impression of *surveillance*, of evincing to Europe that the Great Powers feel that they have not only a common interest, but a common duty, to attend to ; and that when the occasion shall call for it the Cabinets of these Powers may thus be brought into contact." ¹

This was doubtless further than his own Cabinet really wished to go. It assumed a common responsibility towards European events which they were far from feeling. Yet it really lay in the logic of things unless Britain was to perform the impossible feat of cutting herself off from continental affairs altogether. How far she was from doing this was seen in the secret Protocol renewing the Quadruple Alliance against France, which was heartily accepted by the Cabinet since it was directed to a definite object and that of curbing their old enemy. The only delicate question was that of the duty of the Powers in case a revolution broke out in France, and here Castlereagh secured, as he had previously reported, that there should be no obligation to act without the case being specially examined first by the four Cabinets.

Both Bathurst and Liverpool accepted these documents—even the words '*légitime et constitutionnelle*'—without further grumbling. "You have so neutralised the Protocol and declaration," said the former, "that there cannot be any objection, I imagine, from any quarter against them."

¹ From Castlereagh (No. 25), Nov. 5, 1818 *F.O. Continent*, 37.

Liverpool was a shade more circumspect. They appeared, he wrote, "to be as free from objection as we had any right to expect."¹

Nevertheless, all these explanations and definitions had had an effect upon the continental Powers. They realised more clearly than before the difference between Britain's attitude and their own. The British Memorandum of October 19 had, indeed, been shewn as yet to Metternich alone, and he had readily given Castlereagh a written assurance that he interpreted the obligations of the Treaty of Alliance in the same manner as that document. Russia and Prussia had only had the verbal explanations. These had, however, undoubtedly been clear enough, and naturally Great Britain's guarantee of the *status quo* appeared more limited and eventual than heretofore. The result was inevitably that they began to look to other methods to safeguard themselves. It could not be expected, as Castlereagh very well knew, that Britain could withdraw even a little from the Continent and leave the grouping of the Powers as before. The natural result was to tend to bring new combinations into being.

In this case it was Prussia who took the initiative, a rare thing for her unless there was something to be got from France. However, in this case the motive was the same, the security of her new possessions against possible French attack. Castlereagh's logic had dissipated the idea that there was any general guarantee of existing conditions in Europe as had been assumed in the Tsar's memorandum. Indeed, that had been so crude and extravagant that it had been easily overthrown. But the Prussians, especially their military men (who, as Castlereagh pointed out, were "always on the *qui vive*," "distrustful of France," and "little prone to go home and commence a civil life") were rendered very uneasy. They did not relish the task of defending their new possessions across the Rhine, whose inhabitants had already shewn by their greeting of the Emperor of Austria their distrust of their Protestant ruler at Berlin. They recurred, therefore, to other ideas, and these were the more embarrassing to Castlereagh since they resusci-

¹ Liverpool to Castlereagh, Nov. 10, 1818, Bathurst to Castlereagh, Nov. 10, 1818: C.C. xii. 78-79.

tated in different circumstances proposals of his own, brought forward not very long ago. They approached in the first instance the Tsar, who was only too pleased to see his idea of a general guarantee once more discussed, if in a very restricted form. He had already frequently recurred to the declaration which Castlereagh himself had proposed at the Congress of Vienna, "the idea contained in which he has often wished to realise, namely, to make a general alliance against the Power that should first break the peace."¹ Acting on this suggestion, Hardenberg drew up a project of territorial guarantee, which would have included the whole of continental Europe. Metternich was then approached. He came to Castlereagh in much embarrassment "as to how to refuse assent to so benevolent and self-denying a proposition." Castlereagh, who had not yet seen the document, warned him in the most uncompromising fashion against too readily lending himself to any such scheme. But it had considerable attractions for Metternich, curiously enough, as Castlereagh admitted, not so much as a guarantee against Russian aggression as "an antidote against the spirit of military conquest of the Prussian Army as contradistinguished from the State"—another example of Metternich's intuitive forebodings.

This scheme placed Castlereagh in a difficult position. He pointed out to Metternich at once, however, the devastating effects on the Germanic Confederation, if all the small German Powers were to be invited to accede to it as they had done to the Holy Alliance, while Russia would be given pretexts to march her army to the most distant parts of Europe. Metternich saw the point of these objections and got Hardenberg to reduce the scope of the scheme to the four Great Continental Powers and the Netherlands. The two statesmen admitted, too, that Britain could not be a party to the Treaty, but they hoped that she might give it her moral support. The Tsar agreed to their plans, which Metternich formulated in a short Memorandum, and Castlereagh had therefore to report to his Cabinet that something might be done whatever his own attitude might be. Hardenberg moreover stressed the advantages of a connection between the Netherlands, Prussia and

¹ See Chapter I., Section 3, p. 51.

the German Confederation, which he knew had at one time been seriously considered by the British Government as the best means of defending the new State. Castlereagh was convinced that the King of the Netherlands would not accept such a scheme if France were excluded, as it would make his country too dependent on Prussia, but he thought that France might accept it. He stated the case to the Cabinet very impartially. It might be, he said, useful, not only against French aggression, at which it was primarily directed, but also against Russia: "If the Emperor should court such a system as a pledge to Europe of his pacific intentions, as a sort of guarantee against himself, embracing even the dominions of the Porte in Europe, ought Europe to refuse it, if it is reduced within practicable limits? Confined to the six continental Powers, considering the Germanic Body as one, it may serve to hold such a mass of power in contact, and at the same time in check, as to afford comparatively but little space for contest elsewhere, whilst it will leave the minor European States to their unfettered moral action, with the means nevertheless at hand, of assuaging their dissensions as the time and occasion may point out."¹

Nevertheless, as he took pains to make quite clear in a more private letter, he was himself very much averse from the scheme and wished that it had never been proposed. He despised the Prussian fears. "They reason," he scornfully remarked, "as if Bonaparte was still on the throne of France and as if the French Army was as capable of effectuating a coup de main as formerly. I really think their irritability and taste for demonstration is more likely to excite the military spirit in France and to augment our danger than to add security to the general interests." Both he and Wellington pressed these views at every opportunity on their colleagues, and he was helped, perhaps, by the wish of all to avoid so tremendous a task as the drafting of a new Treaty of this magnitude. They all consented, therefore, to postpone consideration of it to a more suitable moment, and in fact, it was never brought up again in that form.²

¹ From Castlereagh (No. 29), Nov. 9, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 37.

² From Castlereagh (No. 30) (Private and most Secret), Nov. 9, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 37.

The Prussians, indeed, gave up the idea with great unwillingness, and their soldiers endeavoured at the last moment to get the Tsar to accept the scheme of a European Army of which Brussels was to be the headquarters, and the Duke of Wellington the Commander-in-chief. Castlereagh poured scorn also on this proposal, which would merely have roused military feeling in France. "A more ingenious device for keeping us in hot water could not have been invented," he said. "Yet it was very earnestly pressed upon the Emperor of Russia by Generals Knesbeck and Müffling, both men of sense, and it was not without considerable difficulty that the Duke of Wellington succeeded in laying this new ghost."¹

Meanwhile the Cabinet had received the original proposal "with great concern," and urged him to prevent its conclusion, though they did not absolutely refuse to consider the question of participation in it in some form, if the Continental Powers persisted in it. However, before this instruction reached Castlereagh he had got it abandoned.²

It was, indeed, he suspected, not absolutely laid aside, since Metternich was more in favour of it than he would admit, and might possibly discuss it with Capo d'Istria who was to accompany the Tsar to Vienna after the Conference. But no more was to be heard of it at present. The precautions against France therefore consisted only of the Quadruple Alliance, which the secret Protocol had affirmed. This was eminently satisfactory to Castlereagh. He had insisted also that the Ambassadorial Conference at Paris should be terminated and its Protocol closed.³ France was to be left to work out her own salvation without interference from the other Great Powers. "Without disguising from ourselves what danger there is afloat in the world," he wrote in the last of his many reports on this subject, "I trust we have taken upon the whole the wisest course, viz.: to put a good face upon our prospects

¹ From Castlereagh (No. 31), Nov. 12, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 37; *W.S.D.* xii. 807.

² Bathurst to Castlereagh, Nov. 13, 1818: *F.O. Continent Archives*, 48. Clancarty, who saw the papers as they passed through Brussels, while regretting the scheme, was of the opinion that Britain must accept the invitation unless she wished "to exclude herself from the Continent," "as the guarantee would supersede the Quadruple Alliance"—*C.C.* xii. 80.

³ Protocol No. 47, Nov. 24, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 40.

and to speak a language of conciliation and confidence, preserving at the same time our Alliance unbroken for the day of need. Risks must be run and the French Government has yet to try its own strength. But it appears to me that we shall await the result, whatever it may be, of this most anxious experiment with more advantage in the position we have chosen, and shall act with more effect if an adequate necessity shall arise, than if we were to perplex the public mind with an intermediate system which might itself become the cause of fresh difficulties and to which would certainly be attributed much of the blame should sinister events afterwards arise."¹

So closed for the moment, at any rate, Castlereagh's difficulties as to the Alliance. The tone of his last dispatch was not too hopeful, and he must have been conscious that more problems had been raised than had been solved. Nevertheless, he had much to look back upon with satisfaction. The Conference had found solutions for the immediate and pressing problems of European politics. The Army of Occupation had been withdrawn. France had given guarantees for payment and had been admitted publicly to the Concert of the Great Powers, and this had been done on the lines suggested by Castlereagh himself. Moreover, the personal interviews had undoubtedly done even more than had been anticipated. Much of the poisonous atmosphere of suspicion and intrigue had been removed. The bogey of a Franco-Russian Alliance had been laid and the relations between Austria and Russia much improved. Many of the minor problems of the Powers had also, as will be seen in the next section, been thoroughly discussed and rendered less dangerous to the peace of Europe, if they had not been altogether solved. There could be no doubt in Castlereagh's mind that the new system of diplomacy had been thoroughly justified in this, the first European Conference that had ever met, except at the close of a devastating war. He might congratulate himself also that he had kept the system in existence, in spite of the fact that no date had been fixed for another reunion. In 1815 the time had also been left vague. Castlereagh might look forward therefore to renewing his acquaintance with the statesmen of

¹ From Castlereagh (No. 37), Nov. 19, 1818. *F.O. Continent*, 39.

Europe, when circumstances should allow, and continuing the task, which he believed imposed on him by the interests of his own country, of preserving his influence over them and thus ensuring the peace of Europe and Britain. Much, indeed, of the harmonious results of the Conference had obviously been due to his own diplomatic skill and personal influence over the other members. The Cabinet gave him no more than his due when, in a final dispatch, they formally recorded their opinion that "by your frank and ingenuous conduct, by your temper and discretion, by your spirit of accommodation where principle was not implicated, and by your firmness where it might be committed, Great Britain has maintained at the Congress that weight and consideration which the valour of her arms and her unexampled exertions had acquired, and which the anxious wish she has uniformly shewn to preserve the peace and liberty of Europe makes it for the common interest she should continue to enjoy."¹ It was for the last time that this could be said, and for the last time also Castlereagh had represented his country at an international Conference.

¹ Bathurst to Castlereagh, Dec. 4, 1818 *F O. Continent Archives*, 48.

4. OTHER QUESTIONS

CASTLEREAGH's defence of Conferences rested on the contention that they simplified diplomacy and made its problems more easy of solution. That had been abundantly proved at Aix-la-Chapelle in the discussions on the Evacuation and the Alliance. But the Conference was also used to discuss and help towards solution all the outstanding difficulties of European diplomacy. It had, indeed, been determined originally to avoid all other questions lest the Smaller Powers should protest. Nevertheless, it had been agreed that they should be discussed if not finally decided, and as a matter of fact all the principal problems were thoroughly explored, many days being allotted to this purpose. More than half the forty-seven Protocols of the Conference record opinions, which in some cases were decisions, of the Powers on these points. How much simpler and easier were such discussions when all were on one spot and Tsar or Emperor could be appealed to personally, if the negotiations became too difficult! Many of them indeed could not be settled, because investigation revealed some conflict of opinion which could not be solved, but in all cases the tension was eased by the frank and unrestrained communications which took place.

Chief of all these problems was, of course, that of the Spanish Colonies, which is dealt with in another chapter.¹ But it should be noted here the immense effect that the discussions had upon the differences between Russia and Britain with regard to Spain. For three years Castlereagh had received a continuous stream of reports of Russian intrigue at Madrid, and when he set out for Aix-la-Chapelle he half believed that, under Russian protection, Spain was about to try to force the

¹ See below, Chapter VIII, Section I, pp. 418-421.

doors of the Conference. The Tsar, for his part, had been kept supplied with most unreliable reports upon Spanish problems. The extraordinarily frank speaking in which Castlereagh and Wellington were able to indulge, cleared up this situation in a moment and relieved the British statesmen of all their fears of Russian intrigue. In the same way the negotiations on the serious difference between Spain and Portugal were put on a much sounder footing than before.

The Slave Trade negotiations and those connected with the Barbary Pirates were also discussed at length, as is narrated elsewhere,¹ but little was done to make them more effective. The international action that was proposed in each case demanded too great a subordination of national interests and prejudices to a common control for it to be accepted. These discussions, in fact, revealed how far Europe yet was from a common outlook on such matters. To ask Frenchmen to allow ships flying their flag to be searched by British vessels, or to suggest to the British Admiralty the maintenance of an international fleet in the Mediterranean, which might affect their own monopoly of power, was to awake national prejudices of overwhelming strength, while in each case the material advantages were apparently slight, however much a common duty to humanity demanded action. As a Tuscan diplomatist reported to his Minister from Aix-la-Chapelle, "I see clearly that we have not yet begun the age of gold."²

More successful were the efforts made on behalf of the Jews. At the Congress of Vienna their representatives had been able to get inserted in the Articles of the German Confederation one which confirmed such privileges as they had won, and in a general and rather vague fashion advocated their extension. But at Frankfort and in other small States these rights were still denied, and persistent efforts were made by the Jews to get them enforced. Both Hardenberg and Metternich were favourable, the latter's financial obligations to the Rothschilds rendering his support compulsory. Gentz also was a fervent supporter, one suspects not without some reward. British influence was naturally less valuable in a matter which largely

¹ See below, Chapter VIII, Section 3, pp. 463-64.

² Stern, *Geschichte Europas*, i. 474.

should be sent to St. Helena to share the responsibilities of the detention.¹ These, unfortunately, had not been a great success, especially the Austrian Stürmer. The Governments, indeed, cared little about the comfort and dignity of their prisoner. They were far more concerned with the plots to rescue him which were being constantly reported to them from all over the world. The activities of the Bonaparte family were also the subject of constant discussion and precaution. When, therefore, the letters of Louis Bonaparte to Metternich and the mother of Napoleon to the Tsar were laid before the Conference, they received no support. Alexander had been chosen because of the chivalry which he had always shewn to the House of Bonaparte, and because the Russian Commissary had been most critical of Sir Hudson Lowe at St. Helena. But the Tsar had no grounds on which to base any protest, and there is no sign that he wished to do so. The British reports were accepted and their treatment of Napoleon was approved. More drastic measures than before were taken to prevent communication between St. Helena and the outside world. Pozzo di Borgo had been entrusted with the task of reporting on the subject, and as Castlereagh wrote to Bathurst: "When it is *Corse contre Corse* you will not be surprised to find a little cayenne," and he had to tone down some of the expressions. All this he hoped would make an irreparable breach between Alexander and the 'Jacobins.' Moreover, Eugène de Beauharnais, whom Alexander had specially befriended and whose financial settlement had caused great trouble, was also deemed suspect, and he was included in the general surveillance which was to be exercised over the Bonaparte family.¹

Another question most irksome to Castlereagh was also at last settled to his satisfaction. The British Government had incurred great odium in compelling Denmark in 1814 to give up Norway to Sweden. This accomplished, it was found that Bernadotte absolutely refused to fulfil the financial obligations laid on Sweden in the Treaty of Kiel which regulated the cession. This question the Ambassadorial Conference in London had

¹ From Castlereagh (No. 36), Nov. 19, 1818 (with Enclosures): *F.O. Continent*, 39; *W.S.D.* xii. 844. All the archives of this period contain many dispatches on schemes to rescue Napoleon.

in vain endeavoured to solve, and Castlereagh had been specially instructed to bring the matter before the Aix-la-Chapelle Conference. The main object was to get the Tsar to use his influence at Stockholm. This he now consented to do; and the four Great Powers also drew up identical notes so as to make a united protest. Through this demonstration, Bernadotte at last consented to render tardy justice to the Crown of Denmark, and this painful and protracted negotiation ceased to trouble Castlereagh. Here again he might claim the utility of a Conference.¹

Of German affairs only one interested Castlereagh to any degree—the old contest between Bavaria and Baden. He was instructed to support Baden in the protest which she had made against Bavarian pretensions to the succession. The Russian patronage of Baden made it specially dangerous, and Castlereagh was now anxious for Austria to give way. This appeared to be accomplished and the matter referred back to Frankfort. But though it was expressly declared that the negotiation was still to be concluded, it is not surprising that Bavaria felt that it had been already decided without consulting her, and it was soon seen that no real agreement had been reached.²

In other matters which the small princes referred to the Conference, such as the remediatisation of Kniphausen, the appeal of the Elector of Hesse to be given the title of King, which was refused, the petition of the subjects of the Prince of Monaco against their Prince, Castlereagh seems to have taken no special part. He simply signed the Protocols which regulated them. One minor question affecting an old British custom which had become a little *démodé* was adjusted. Several Powers since the Peace had refused the salutes which recognised British sovereignty of the Narrow Seas. The Admiralty had refused to allow the Congress of Vienna to deal with this question, but without employing armed force, which it shrank from using, it found itself powerless to enforce its old rights. The Conference agreed that the question should be settled on the basis of complete reciprocity, leaving

¹ From Castlereagh, Nov. 23, 1818 (No. 41, with Enclosures): *F.O. Continent*, 39.

² From Castlereagh, Nov. 23, 1818 (No. 39): *F.O. Continent*, 39.

the details to be drafted in London and one more source of international friction was relegated to oblivion.¹

All these matters may sound fairly trivial, but they were not a bad record for the first international Conference of its kind. Certainly much paper and ink had been saved as well as temper and energy. Never again in the course of the nineteenth century did the diplomatic machine apparently function so smoothly. At the same time, the Great Powers were conscious that in some of these questions they had no legal basis of action. The Smaller Powers had never agreed to surrender to them any rights of governance in these questions. At times they were allowed to act by consent, at others they could found their interference on some Treaty. But all, and especially Castlereagh, were anxious to avoid the appearance of dictating to the rest of Europe. One of the weak points of the system of reunions was that it offered no solution of this question of the Smaller Powers. The Declaration had indeed promised that if the rights of a Small Power were involved in a future Conference it would be summoned to a place. Yet Spain, Portugal, Bavaria, Baden, Sweden, to say nothing of minor princelings, had seen their affairs discussed and important decisions virtually arrived at, without their having an opportunity of stating their case. This problem, which as has been seen had occupied Castlereagh since 1815, had yet to be solved. It was soon to be raised in a different and very acute form.

¹ From Castlereagh (No. 45), Nov. 24, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 41.

CHAPTER IV

FROM PRECAUTION TO ALARM: THE ALLIANCE SUSPENDED, 1819-1820

1. METTERNICH AND THE RUSSIAN BOGEY IN ITALY, 1819.
2. UNREST AND REACTION IN GERMANY, 1819-20.
3. REVIVING FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCE, 1819-20.

“ Il est des époques dans la vie des États, comme dans celle des hommes où les paroles tournent en action et où le silence lui-même vaut un manifeste.”—METTERNICH, Sept. 18, 1819.

CHAPTER IV

1. THE RUSSIAN BOGEY IN ITALY, 1819

FROM Aix-la-Chapelle the Sovereigns and their Ministers departed full of professions of loyalty and affection. They had renewed their defensive Alliance against France, and if they had differed as to the best method of uniting France to their counsels, yet all were agreed that some kind of Alliance of the Great Powers was necessary for the peace of Europe. Many problems had been discussed and either solved or set on the road to solution so far as that was possible. Castlereagh and Wellington returned home, therefore, via Brussels, well satisfied with the position of affairs, confident that the tension of diplomacy had been eased and that they could look forward to more peaceful times.

The three years that followed Aix-la-Chapelle were, however, to disappoint all these expectations. The unrest in Europe, which had been to some extent held in check while the Powers still occupied France, soon began to appear in every European country. In 1819 and 1820 the rising tide of discontent made itself felt by a succession of plots, assassinations and eventually in Southern Europe by revolutions, which forced extreme democratic institutions on unwilling rulers. The statesmen found themselves faced with the problems which they had discussed in abstract at Aix-la-Chapelle, and it soon appeared that the resolutions of the Conference were very variously interpreted by the men who had made them. The final result was to destroy the Conference System and to change the diplomatic equilibrium of Europe. There was a rapid and disconcerting change in the relations of the Powers. While Castlereagh lived, however, this process was not complete,

and to the end he strove with all his power to avert it. He was not entirely successful, but, in spite of a domestic crisis which weakened the Ministry and paralysed his actions at a critical moment, he never admitted that the machinery which he had devised had ceased to function. It is doubtful, indeed, whether he had not so far adjusted British policy to the new conditions as to have been able to keep it in being for a considerably longer period had he been able to survive the strain which these difficult years inflicted on him.

From Aix-la-Chapelle to the Neapolitan revolution is a transitional period during which the changes in the diplomatic situation were preparing but were not obvious. During that time the connection between the Austrian and British Courts was as close as ever, and, if their policy occasionally diverged or even conflicted, efforts were immediately and successfully made to reconcile their views and interests. For Metternich Russia was still the enemy. Nevertheless, it was admitted that the attitude of the Tsar himself had changed, and it was now Capo d'Istria who was the object of most of Metternich's reproaches. The year 1819-20 was one of the greatest in Metternich's career, in which he laid the foundation of Austrian domination in Germany for forty years. He worked with unremitting industry and, on the whole, with discretion, taking advantage of the glorious opportunities which were presented to him by the actions of a few violent and irresponsible individuals. The final result was to substitute for the splendid hopes, which had sustained the German people in the final stages of the War of Liberation, a system of repression and negation over which Metternich himself exercised a large, though by no means complete, control.

For Britain herself these years were also critical. Foreigners had already noticed with surprise that she was no more immune than other countries from the pervading spirit of unrest. Not since the opening years of the French Revolution had the British aristocracy felt so insecure in their control over the masses of the people. The distress, which had followed the War, resulted in actions which appeared to that generation as the beginnings of violent revolution. The propertied classes were soon seriously alarmed. "A very wide and extensive

plan of insurrection has been formed," wrote, in 1817, the Duke of Northumberland, one of the four richest men in Britain. "... I cannot entertain the least doubt but we are obliged to foreign Propagandists for the mischief intended us."¹ The Manchester meeting of 1819 and the other smaller outbreaks were indeed no more than a natural and spontaneous protest against intolerable economic and political evils. But the aristocracy, which had been brought up in the horror of the excesses of the French Revolution, regarded them as the beginnings of rule by mob violence. The Opposition, which had slightly increased its numbers in the election of 1818, and was particularly successful in the House in the early part of 1819, almost ceased to exist when the situation became more acute. To many in Britain these disorders appeared, as they did to Metternich, as part of a vast movement for overthrowing all established institutions. The result was to increase the sympathy felt by them for the measures which Metternich was devising to put down Liberal institutions in Central Europe. Never did he have more completely the sympathy of Castlereagh and the Tory Government than when he was formulating the Carlsbad Decrees and presiding at the Vienna Conferences of 1819-20.

But such sympathy went no farther than fair words and secret diplomatic support. Castlereagh and his Cabinet were throughout faithful to the principles which they had laid down at Aix-la-Chapelle. They resisted every attempt which was made to use the Alliance to initiate or administer this repressive policy. Each Government must judge its own necessities. There could be no interference by outside Powers in the internal affairs of other countries. In Germany this doctrine suited Metternich well enough, for it kept Russia, who itched to have a finger in the pie, outside the delicate discussions between the German Powers; and, though Metternich was painfully anxious for open approval, he eventually saw the advantages to himself of Castlereagh's doctrine. He was by no means so ready, however, to adopt a similar line towards France, and was more than once tempted to join the Tsar against Britain. Still, on the whole, the Austro-British *entente*

¹ Pellew, *Life of Sidmouth*, III, 177-78.

survived this test, and Metternich followed, though reluctantly, the line chalked out by Castlereagh. Towards the Spanish revolution also he adopted the British point of view, though with many reservations and explanations. Not till revolution came to shake Austrian dominance in Italy did his courage fail him and make him exchange the secret sympathy of Castlereagh for the open support of the Tsar.

For some time, indeed, after the Conference Metternich's suspicions of Russia seemed almost to increase—or was he merely trying to remove the favourable impression which he knew that Alexander's evident desire to preserve the Alliance had made on Castlereagh? At any rate the burden of complaint never ceased, and his dispatches to London and his conversations with Stewart and Gordon were full of Russia and the activities of her agents. The Tsar had, to Metternich's great relief, renounced an idea originally held of making a tour of Italy. He contented himself with a visit to his brother Sovereign at Vienna. On his way home the Emperor Francis visited his brother-in-law at Munich, where he found that the recommendations of the Alliance in the Bavarian-Baden dispute were by no means relished. The influence of the Empress of Austria was exerted on the Bavarian side, and the Bavarian Court was by no means convinced that Austria would support energetically the agreement of Aix-la-Chapelle. Meanwhile Alexander had visited his brother-in-law at Baden and left Capo d'Istria behind him there, but that Court still refused to make the necessary concessions. Soon after Alexander arrived at Vienna the Grand Duke died, and the question of the succession therefore became acute. The Empress of Austria herself attacked Alexander in vehement language which much embarrassed him, and the relations between the two Sovereigns were sadly disturbed by this dispute, though Alexander admitted that Metternich had done his best.

Castlereagh's attitude towards this difficulty was naturally to support the decision of the Conference, and this threw him on the Russian rather than the Austrian side. He was indignant, however, at attempts made by both Powers to throw the onus of the decision upon Great Britain. "I am not conscious," he wrote, "that we have run counter to any of

our assurances either generally to other States not represented there [at Aix-la-Chapelle] or specially to Bavaria . . . the decision was taken upon the distinct understanding that it was not to interfere with the final negotiations at Frankfort but that it was to operate as a preparatory measure." He had no intention, therefore, as he told Clancarty, to act as a catspaw for the two Imperial Powers in order to save them an unpleasant duty. He threw the blame for the *impasse* on the yielding nature of both Austrian and Russian Courts. Metternich protested against these insinuations. Nevertheless, it was apparent that the unity of the Alliance had been impaired by domestic intrigue as soon as its authority was challenged, and Bavaria thus enabled to set it at defiance. Metternich, who had sent the faithful Gentz to Munich, was no less conscious of this fact than Castlereagh and keenly regretted it, confessing to Gordon with a sigh "*que c'est un procès qu'il a perdu*." It certainly did much to keep alive Austrian dislike of Russian influence in Germany, and that in a problem where Metternich could not hope for Castlereagh's sympathy.¹ ~

Alexander's efforts at Vienna to allay all the suspicions against him were almost too eager to be convincing. In a long interview with Stewart he discussed Tatishchev's conduct, and showed dispatches ordering him to support British policy at Madrid. He was lavish with funds for the poor or sick of Vienna, but these personal acts of kindness perhaps annoyed the Emperor Francis more than they impressed the Viennese. When the news came of a change of government in Paris he alarmed that Sovereign a good deal by suggesting that their armies should be put on a war footing, but at any rate, both the Tsar and Capo d'Istria seemed now more insistent on maintaining the Quadruple Alliance than ever Castlereagh and Metternich had been. But Metternich professed himself still unconvinced of the Tsar's sincerity. He suspected the genuineness of these demonstrations, and apart from the Bavarian deadlock he had bitter complaints to make of Russian activities in Italy. No sooner, therefore, had the Tsar

¹ From Stewart, Dec. 21, 27, 1818: *F.O. Austria*, 139. To Gordon, Jan. 22, 1819; from Gordon, Feb. 11, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 141. To Clancarty, Jan. 22, 1819: *C.C.* xii. 101.

left Vienna than the unending succession of reports of Russian intrigue began once more, and evidence of all kinds, much of it trivial enough, was sent to London to prove the Austrian case.

Meanwhile, Castlereagh on his return from Aix-la-Chapelle, had a bad fit of gout, which did not, however, prevent him from staying in town and overworking as usual. So little rest did he get, in fact, that illness forced him at last to seek it at Cray, and he missed the opening of Parliament. Both Lieven and Neumann noted the growing strength of the Opposition and its fighting spirit, and lamented the weakness of the Government. Wellington's entry into their counsels had, however, strengthened the Ministry, and the high hopes of the Opposition were eventually entirely disappointed. The complaints made by the Ambassadors of Castlereagh's "feebleness" and "lack of initiative" were, in fact, mainly due to his refusal to take too openly the part of either Court in their rivalry, and his evident wish to keep clear of any entanglement in French affairs. On the contrary, he insisted that the Conference had cleared up all suspicions, and once more urged on Austria as on Russia a policy of frankness and trust. For such disquieting incidents that had occurred he blamed subordinates like Tatishchev, and he was enthusiastic over the cordiality which the Tsar himself had shewn at Aix-la-Chapelle. Lieven likewise appeared to have had orders to be more open with his Austrian colleague, and shewed Neumann Tatishchev's new instructions.¹

Metternich was alarmed at Castlereagh's attitude. He maintained to Gordon that the Tsar himself was "the chief and sole worker of the system which so essentially merits to be apprehended and opposed," and he justified Austria's attitude of suspicion and hostility. So far from agreeing with Castlereagh's view that Russian falsehood and intrigue should not be openly denounced, he claimed that only by such methods could it be prevented. "Russians are easier led in the right path," he said, "by *coups de baton* than by cajolerie." Only recently, he boasted, his loud complaints of the Russian

¹ Neumann to Metternich, Jan. 1, 19, 1819: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 209, i. Lieven to Nesselrode, Feb. 28, 1819: *Pet. Arch.*

Ministers in Italy had forced the Tsar to issue a circular reprobating their conduct and ordering them to desist on pain of removal from their places. He entreated Gordon, therefore, to explain to Castlereagh that Austria's view remained unchanged. At the same time he sent a long series of dispatches to London. Castlereagh was to be shewn proofs of Russian intrigues in Italy and on the coasts of Greece, and even intercepted dispatches to Golovkin, though these were not as wicked as they might have been, since that Russian Ambassador had not the confidence of his master. In a more private dispatch he lamented that Castlereagh had gone to the last Conference suspicious enough, but had been captivated by the Tsar and now refused to be convinced of his error. Austria had been deserted over the Baden question, and the result was that Russian influence over the minor Courts would be enormously increased. He pleaded, therefore, for a closer union between Britain and Austria. Before he set out, at the beginning of March, for a tour in Italy to reinforce Austrian influence there, he added to these entreaties an intercepted dispatch of the Persian Ambassador, then on his way to London, which betrayed some leanings towards Russia. Esterhazy was bidden to emphasise this point as much as possible in order to increase Castlereagh's fear of the Tsar. Only by such motives could she be induced to abandon her servile attitude. His hopes were not, however, high. "The more I reflect upon them," he wrote, "the more I find that there is no Government more egoistical than that of England."¹

But all this produced very little effect on Castlereagh. He refused to accept Metternich's view of the situation and was above all anxious to avoid all interference at Paris. Neumann, whose duty it was to present these views, wrote bitterly: "Vous retrouverez, Mon Prince, Lord Castlereagh dans son véritable element, celui de la pusillanimité." He attributed this supineness to the unpopularity and weakness of the Ministry which, in spite of its large majority, had had to give way on several occasions in the Commons, and this view was confirmed by

¹ From Gordon, Feb. 11, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 141. Metternich to Esterhazy, March 5, 1819: *Vienna St. A. Wersungen*, 210, iii.

Esterhazy, who found on his return the Government feeble and the Opposition clamant. Even the Prince Regent supported his Ministers in their passive attitude towards Europe.¹

Metternich's tour in Italy with his Emperor, however, redoubled his alarms. The state of that unhappy country was, indeed, not reassuring. Though with Castlereagh's aid all danger from the constitution in Sicily had been removed, yet the Peninsula was full of discontent at the Austrian overlordship. Not only Sardinia but also Modena and Lucca were resisting Metternich's control. Austrian unpopularity had undoubtedly been increased by hopes of Russian support. In the Papal States, too, Austrian influence, never very strong, was thought to have been completely undermined by Blacas, who was ably representing France there, and the Italians were hoping to get more help from the new Liberal ministry at Paris. The provinces administered directly by Austria were subjected to a régime of intolerance of which even Metternich disapproved. Capo d'Istria was, no doubt, prejudiced in the survey which he made, when on his way to Corfu he traversed Italy. Nevertheless, A'Court seemed ready to believe him, when he assured a Neapolitan Minister "that he did not meet one countenance indicative of satisfaction or content till he reached the Neapolitan frontier."²

It is only natural, therefore, that the reports of Gordon, who accompanied the Emperor and Metternich at their special request, are one long tale of woe. Metternich was very dissatisfied with his Emperor's reception at Ferrara and Bologna, and he attributed the attitude of the Italians to Russian influence. The news of the assassination of Kotzebue, which drew his attention to Germany, did not diminish these alarms. Everywhere he endeavoured to collect proofs of Russian intrigue. Amongst them was a letter from Capo d'Istria to Mocenigo from Aix-la-Chapelle, which he thought would convince even Castlereagh since it was as hostile to Britain as to Austria. How could he, he indignantly de-

¹ Neumann to Metternich, March 9, 1819; Esterhazy to Metternich, April 1, 2, 1819: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 210, III. IV.

² From Burghersh, June 30, Nov. 30, Dec. 1, 1818 *F.O. Tuscany*, 31. From A'Court, Feb. 27, 1819: *F.O. Sicily*, 86.

manded, be expected to maintain even the semblance of confidence and union with the author of such a letter? He could not account, indeed, for the different policies advocated by the Russian agents in Germany and Italy "unless perhaps the direct opposite principles of despotism and democracy are inculcated as they may serve to create troubles and confusion in the respective quarters where they are promulgated." Apart from the divergence of Pozzo di Borgo from his master's views at Paris, "in Germany, where the desire for liberty is raging, Kotzebue has been murdered, and Stourdza only escaped a similar fate by professing himself to be the mere organ of the Emperor of Russia, for espousing the cause of unrestrained monarchy and *obscurantism*; whilst in Italy M. de la Harpe travels up and down holding a language of the purest democracy, not to mention that of the Russian Ministers at the different Courts of this country." Metternich claimed, indeed, to possess absolute proof that La Harpe had presided at a meeting of the Carbonari at Bologna, and this fact determined him to take the decisive step of appealing directly to Alexander by means of a personal letter from the Emperor Francis.¹ He reckoned on the effect of Kotzebue's assassination on the Tsar, whom he knew had been also greatly disturbed by events at Paris, and he was confident that such a step would meet with success. As a matter of fact, Alexander had already taken steps to damp down the activities of his agents in Italy. By the time Metternich reached Naples he had proofs that this had been done and his alarm was much decreased. He admitted to A'Court that events in France and Germany had awakened Alexander to the danger of his conduct. He would not admit, however, that his agents had not previously been encouraged by him to act as they had done. A'Court, on the other hand, thought that the Ministers had exceeded their instructions, encouraged "by the Emperor's well-known wish to have his name in everybody's mouth, to be supposed to have a predominant influence everywhere," and he suggested that this was the explanation of the contradictions between Russian policy in Italy and Germany.¹

¹ From Gordon, March 24, April 22, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 141. From A'Court, May 16, 1819: *F.O. Sicily*, 86. Metternich to Esterhazy, April 4, 1819: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 210, iv.

Nor did Gordon, in his final report, think that too gloomy a view of the situation in Italy was justified. He described Metternich as the perfect Paul Pry, who naturally found out more than ever happened. He admitted that secret societies existed, but his conclusion was that their power was weak; both French and Russian influence he thought exaggerated, seeking, like A'Court, an explanation of the reports of Russian activities in the exaggerations by Russian travellers of the magnanimous side of the Tsar's character. The idea of uniting all the States of Italy in one great system, whether under Russian or Austrian influence, though Metternich shewed a leaning towards the latter view, was, in his opinion, entirely chimerical. "If there existed anywhere in Italy a regard for Austria of this nature," he wrote, "it would perhaps be due to the idea that she marches with the British colours: but it is on the contrary to be feared that the strongest discontent may be traced in the very parts of Italy which are subjected to her." It was unfortunate that the urgency of the German crisis had prevented the Emperor and his Minister from visiting Lombardy, where "the errors of the Austrian administration," he said, "may possibly lead to worse consequences than all the machinations of the Carbonari and the Consistoriaux elsewhere." Metternich himself was, indeed, well aware of the state of affairs there, and Gordon could only regret that he shirked his obvious duty and found refuge "in sifting and exposing the refuse and disgusting particles of foreign malversation."¹

Metternich was by now hurrying off to Germany to the Carlsbad Conference, whence similar appeals were to be made to Britain for support against Russian influence. But the change in Russian policy had already gone far under the

¹ From Gordon, July 12, 1819. *F.O. Austria*, 141. His description of Metternich at this time is convincing: "Nothing can surpass Prince Metternich's activities in collecting facts and information upon the inward feelings of the people: with a habit of making these researches he has acquired a taste for them, which gives no repose, until he finds himself ignorant of nothing that was intended to be concealed. But it may be feared that the secrecy with which this taste is necessarily indulged leads him to attach too great importance to his discoveries. Phantoms are conjured up and magnified in the dark, which probably, if exposed to light, would sink into insignificance; and his informers naturally exaggerate their reports, aware that their profit is to be commensurate with the display of their phantasmagoria."

influence of events in France and Germany, and Metternich was well aware of it. He told A'Court "that the Emperor of Russia will be found to err in an opposite sense rather than to lean too favourably to the Liberal side of the question." This was incidentally a far more effective method of dividing Austria from Britain than the advocacy of a sentimental and unreal Liberalism.

2. UNREST AND REACTION IN GERMANY, 1819-20

IN the new situation which had arisen in Germany, Castlereagh was able to shew Metternich more sympathy. Such sympathy was confined, however, to private conversations and letters. When he was asked to go further and openly approve Austrian policy, he drew back. The affairs of Germany were for the German rulers to arrange. Yet even this attitude could be made useful to Metternich; for Castlereagh was quite ready to prevent Russia from interfering with Austrian plans. To apply the doctrine of non-intervention in this sense to Germany meant the triumph, at least in great part, of Metternich's schemes.

At the close of the Napoleonic Wars Germany remained in a state of political ferment. The shadowy unity, which had been expressed in the patchwork constitution drawn up in the closing days of the Vienna Congress, by no means satisfied the hopes which had been raised during the War of Liberation. Though in the Southern States some constitutional liberty had been granted, the Prussian King had evaded the fulfilment of his own special promise, and Hardenberg, though prolific in schemes, was far too weak in body and spirit to force them through. At Aix-la-Chapelle Metternich had warned Frederick William against granting to his subjects a united Parliament for all Prussia, however unrepresentative, and called his attention to the spirit of unrest abroad in Germany, particularly manifested in the Universities and the patriotic Associations which had arisen during the War. Liberal ideas had, indeed, taken a strong hold of the youth of Germany, and, supported by such monarchs as the King of Württemberg, whose connection with the Tsar made him appear especially important, the Liberal movement appeared to be making

much progress. According to Article XIII. of the Confederation, every State was to have an Assembly of Estates, and some Liberals were simple enough to imagine that on this they could found on this clause claims with which to compel their rulers to grant them some real measure of liberty. At the beginning of the year 1819 the struggle was being carried on in one form or another throughout the whole of Germany.

For the Habsburg Empire such doctrines were, of course, most dangerous. Not merely would they destroy the control which Metternich hoped to exercise over the whole of Germany through the Diet of the Confederation, but, if applied to Austria itself, they spelt dissolution and impotence. Fortunately for Metternich, there was as yet little sign that the races of the Habsburg Monarchy had become tainted with the new doctrines. With the exception of the Hungarians, and possibly the Poles, they were as yet unconscious of National and Liberal ideals. Nevertheless, Metternich, with his usual power of diagnosis, saw from the first that the triumph of Liberal ideas in Germany meant revolution in the Habsburg Monarchy. From the first moment, indeed, that Austria entered the War of Liberation in 1813, he had used every diplomatic device to ensure that Central Europe should be a Confederation of Princes, and that the rights of people, whether National or Liberal, should be made as ineffective as possible.

It was an act of violence, such as occurred later in France and England, which enabled him to rally the established Governments against the growing forces of Liberalism, and win what was perhaps the greatest victory of his career. When on March 23, 1819, Karl Sand assassinated A. von Kotzebue, a Russian Agent in Central Germany, he gave Metternich the opportunity for which he had been patiently waiting. The Tsar had already, by means of a pamphlet, written by Stourdza, and issued in November 1818, expressed his condemnation of the excesses of the students. "It was, indeed, partly in protest against this pamphlet that Sand had murdered Kotzebue, who was openly advising repression and doubtless sending hostile reports to his master. The murder was therefore likely to prevent Alexander from using

his influence with the smaller German Courts against Metternich. He might not, and, indeed, did not, wish to see Austrian power in Germany grow stronger. But he could not protect a movement which resulted in such acts of violence. Moreover, the wavering King of Prussia would be confirmed in his policy of repression and the policy of Hanover and Saxony and other Courts of the North strengthened in the right direction. If the Liberals of the South were deprived of all sympathy and protection from outside, Metternich felt that he could deal with them. He determined to act quickly and ruthlessly.

As has been seen, the news of these events reached Metternich on his Italian journey. He could not at once abandon his investigations into Jacobinism in Italy in order to combat it in Germany. But he began immediately preparations for the struggle. Gentz' pen was at once called into action and a plan of campaign devised. A commission was to be immediately set up to enquire into the state of the Universities ; but before action could be taken in the Diet, Metternich wished the ground to be very carefully prepared. "He had no wish to enter into discussions with the Grand Duke of Weimar or other Liberal monarchs, before he had secured the consent of most of the principal States to his demands. Moreover, the Confederation was part of the Final Act of Vienna, and the other Great Powers had therefore at least an excuse to make their views known if they desired. Metternich wished, therefore, to prepare the way for his measures by diplomatic action, and he looked to Castlereagh to support him, if Russia should shew signs of wishing to make her influence felt against Austria. He was still uncertain how far Prussia would go, for Humboldt's influence was directed against him. "He appeals," wrote Gordon, "to the ties of instructive friendship which bind Austria to Great Britain, and declares that, without recourse he had to prompt and well-judged efforts, the whole of Germany will undergo a revolution before the lapse of twelve months. He pictures to himself an aggravation of horrors from such a catastrophe, in contemplating the German character so strongly exemplified in the details of Kotzebue's murder." Through Esterhazy he requested

Castlereagh to urge Berlin to action, and to join him in preventing Russia from meddling too actively in a situation, which had been largely produced by her previous ill-judged policy. Meanwhile, he arranged to meet Hardenberg and the King of Prussia as soon as possible, and this meeting was to be followed by a conference of representatives of the principal German States at Carlsbad, which in its turn was to prepare the way for a meeting of the whole Germanic Body at Vienna, in which the Constitution of the Confederation could be defined and reinforced in order to meet the threatened revolution. All these plans were told to Gordon for Castlereagh's information. "The fate of Germany," Metternich told him, "may be said to depend upon the Conferences at Carlsbad . . . unless counteractive measures are unanimously resolved upon there during this Autumn, there will remain no hope or opportunity to prevent a revolution bursting forth in Germany in the Spring of the ensuing year." The movement, he explained, was not so much a "Liberal" movement directed against the Princes, as a "National" one to exalt the power of Germany through a unified national assembly. It was this design which he was planning to frustrate while the Emperor hastened to Vienna, "prepared and watchful like a parent over the fate and welfare of menaced Germany."¹

Shewing immense energy and more decision than at any other crisis in his career, Metternich successfully accomplished the first part of his programme. He met the King of Prussia at Teplitz and easily got all his schemes approved by him. Thus, when the representatives of the nine German States, specially invited, assembled at Carlsbad in August, they found plans already prepared for their approval. Metternich did not get everything which he wanted, but the substance of victory was his. Decrees against the Universities and the Press were agreed to and passed through the Diet in a single sitting, and, though indignant protests were raised by some individuals, no State dare oppose them openly. Münster represented Hanover, and Metternich found in him one of his most eager collaborators.

¹ From Gordon, May 26, July 12, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 141. Metternich to Esterhazy, May 21, 1819. *Vienna St. A. Weissungen*, 210, v.

This was a good beginning, but of far more vital importance were the constitutional questions involved, and especially the interpretation of Article XIII. The Southern States had evinced a strong determination not to cancel the Constitutions which had already been granted. Their rulers saw in the Austro-Prussian union a menace to their own independence, and their Constitutions were in a sense a guarantee of their own power as much as of the liberty of their peoples. In these circumstances Metternich saw that he would have no easy task. To crush the life out of the new Constitutions was, indeed, probably impossible; but he could at least prevent these dangerous ideas spreading to other States. In order to accomplish even so much, the Southern States must be made to feel themselves isolated. If they were deprived of all support from the Great Powers they might be expected to succumb to Metternich's cajoleries and threats in the coming meeting at Vienna. The Austrian appeals to France, Russia, and England, were, therefore, redoubled at the close of the Carlsbad Conference. Nesselrode was addressed directly by Metternich in order to counteract the influence of Capo d'Istria, which now, as always, was hostile to Austria, while Decazes was urged to prevent the French Liberal Press from continuing to shew marked sympathy towards the German revolutionists.¹

Castlereagh had throughout been kept informed of all these activities, and both he and the Prince Regent declared themselves enchanted with them. Wellington also, while admitting that Prussia must make some concessions to the people, deplored the new mania for constitutions. Only where they were in the hands of an aristocracy, as in England, could they be maintained without danger. After the Carlsbad Conference was over Metternich wrote a special letter of thanks to the Prince Regent and sent Esterhazy a dispatch which drew an analogy between unrest in Britain and Germany. When it was shown him Castlereagh told Neumann that he entirely approved of Metternich's work at Carlsbad, and predicted the happiest results from it. As for the Prince Regent, Neumann said they could be sure of his approval in advance. "No one

¹ Metternich to Nesselrode, Sept. 7, 1819; Metternich to Vincent, Sept. 18, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 147.

is more anti-revolutionist than he." "Recent events," he added, "have not been such as to inspire any liking for such ideas." He alluded of course to the Manchester meeting and the Peterloo massacre. Metternich might have found some warning in Neumann's regret that the ill-considered prosecution of Hunt after that event had transformed him in the eyes of the people from a popular buffoon into an apostle of liberty. At the same time he had to admit that, however much the Government approved, the Carlsbad Decrees had been badly received by the Press. "*The Times* has already begun," he reported, "but that is not astonishing since it has become even more seditious and Jacobin than the *Morning Chronicle*."¹

Metternich was much heartened by Castlereagh's approval of his actions at Carlsbad, where, he told Stewart, "he had completed the great epoch of his political life." He was prepared, he said, for the thunders of the *Morning Chronicle*. But he wanted something more from Castlereagh than secret support. He claimed open approval of the Carlsbad Decrees from Russia and Britain. "The approbation or at least the sentiments of the Allied Powers," reported Stewart, "are called for categorically and Austria insists that these should be openly avowed." Alexander was expected to make a public declaration and thus defeat all the hopes centred on him. "The difficulty of the British Government protecting the suppression of liberty in a foreign country with an open avowal may be removed," Metternich claimed, "when it is considered that this liberty if unrestrained must effect a bloody revolution. Great Britain could not perhaps advise violence offered to a Liberal constitution nor the suppression of the liberty of the Press; but can well support energetic measures, nay despotic ones, during a period which is necessarily required for the establishment of a constitution in those countries where murder stalks abroad, and the dagger is pointed at the breast of every Sovereign, and the seat of every principle of justice." The truth was that Metternich was very doubtful indeed of the exact attitude which Alexander would adopt.

¹ Metternich to the Prince Regent, Sept. 2, 1819; Metternich to Esterhazy, Sept. 3, 1819; Metternich, *Mémoires*, iii 299, 300. Esterhazy to Metternich, Aug. 7, 1819, *Appendix*, p. 550; Neumann to Metternich, Sept. 26, Oct. 5, 1819. *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 209, vu. ix.,

The King of Württemberg was hastening to Warsaw to make a personal appeal for protection of the smaller German Powers against the Austrian tyranny, and, though the Tsar was ready to condemn the license of the revolutionaries, he might easily be persuaded to extend his favour to the constitutional monarchs, with whom he had cultivated specially intimate relations ever since the Congress of Vienna.¹

Castlereagh had, however, already refused to associate himself in these measures. As early as October 19 he warned Metternich that, however anxious he was for the tranquillity of Germany, the matter was one for Germany alone, and that the other Great Powers ought not to intervene. He deprecated Metternich's appeals to France and Russia. In the former country it would tend to revive the battle between the Ultra-Royalists and the Ultra-Liberals, while it would give the Tsar a chance of meddling in German affairs. As for Britain, her attitude must be entirely passive. "I can best explain," he said, "our position as regards Germany by comparing it with that which we took up as regards Sicily four years ago: that is to say, we are always pleased to see evil germs destroyed without the power to give our approbation openly." "What an avowal of feebleness!" commented Neumann. "Would Mr. Pitt, or even Mr. Perceval, have acted in the same fashion?"

From this 'feeble' attitude, however, Castlereagh refused to depart. Even if Russia supported Austria, he told Neumann in his next interview, that would only make matters worse, since it would reveal the impossibility of England and France, both constitutional powers, following suit, and their silence would seem to be that of disapproval. He entreated Metternich, therefore, to be content with knowing that his conduct was approved without asking for more. Doubtless Metternich would have been satisfied were it not for the fact that he was afraid of Russia acting against him. But Castlereagh refused to be cajoled. The London newspapers were redoubling their attacks on Austrian policy, and Lord Milton had openly said in the House of Commons that there had been formed a league of Governments against the liberties of the people.

¹ From Stewart, Oct. 1, Oct. 7, Nov. 1, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 143, 144.

"We can aid you, therefore," Castlereagh told Neumann, "far more by our actions than by our words." Metternich could perhaps find some consolation in the vehement approval of the Prince Regent, who said that the Emperor of Austria ought to take the opportunity of re-assuming the Imperial Crown of Germany.¹

Meanwhile, even if the attitude of the Tsar remained doubtful and Capo d'Istria shewed an almost open hostility, Metternich was forcing his schemes through at the Vienna Conference, which began on November 25, 1819. There was much difference of opinion among the delegates, for invitations had been sent to all the States of the Confederation instead of only to the select nine who met at Carlsbad. But Metternich, who had been unanimously chosen President, told Stewart that he was confident of the result. Only from Württemberg was serious opposition to be feared, and Metternich had suitable menaces ready for her King. Nevertheless, when Castlereagh's views were reported by Neumann, Metternich still insisted on the necessity of obtaining some formal approval from the Tsar, if only because the language of Capo d'Istria was so equivocal. The Tsar's influence on his brother-in-law, the King of Württemberg, would also be decisive. But neither the personal appeals of the Emperor Francis nor the skilful pressure of Lebzeltern, which there is reason to believe Nesselrode supported so far as he could, was sufficient to induce Alexander to give the necessary approval of the Carlsbad Decrees. The Tsar saw that the supremacy of Austria over the whole of Germany was involved, and, influenced by the bitter opposition of Capo d'Istria, he would go no further than to agree that the German Courts ought to take such measures of repression as seemed good to each of them. This view had been communicated to London and other Courts on November 21, 1819, in a document entitled—" *Aperçu des idées de l'Empereur sur les affaires d'Allemagne*," written by Capo d'Istria, which was, in effect, a bitter attack on the Carlsbad Decrees. Moreover, Lieven, in a dispatch of December 4, was ordered to sound Castlereagh as to the possibility of Russia and England acting

¹ Neumann to Metternich, Oct. 17, Oct. 19, Nov. 19, Dec. 3, Dec. 10, 1819: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 209, x. xi. xii.

together in a joint manifestation towards the Vienna Conference. Castlereagh had already told Lieven that the British Government could no more make a pronouncement on German affairs than Germans could judge Britain. He had now to make a more definite reply. The line which he had taken throughout gave him an impregnable position, and he determined to seize the opportunity to reiterate once more the doctrine of non-intervention. He told Neumann that the matter was so important that the Cabinet must be consulted, and pointed the moral that Austria would have done better to leave Russia alone and not try and secure her approval of matters which did not concern her.¹

The British reply, dated January 14, 1820, was not, however, merely negative. It refused, indeed, point blank to make any pronouncement on the Carlsbad Decrees or the measures which had been taken in Germany to repress revolutionary outbreaks, with the general aim of which, however, it admitted its sympathy. To express any such opinion would be to interfere in the internal affairs of the German Confederation. But it admitted that Russia and Britain were interested in the observance of the constitution of the Confederation, which was part of the Treaty of Vienna of which they were signatories. They had a perfect right to intervene if it was not observed. This concession, however, Castlereagh immediately used to arrive at a conclusion which could scarcely be palatable to Capo d'Istria. There was little prospect, he went on, that any such necessity would occur. On the contrary, the German States appeared to be carrying on their discussions with ever-increasing harmony and discretion, and would doubtless work out the details of the constitution of the Confederation in the manner which the Treaty had prescribed. For the present, therefore, the best contribution which the two Powers could make to the discussions was to disavow any wish or intention of interfering in any way at all with them.²

This was sound doctrine and it was also the greatest assistance which Castlereagh could give to Metternich at this

¹ Neumann to Metternich, Jan. 7, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211. i. From Stewart, Nov. 29, 1819: *F O. Austria*, 144. Lieven to Nesselrode, Dec. 12, 1819: *Pet. Arch.* F. Martens, *Recueil*, xi. 274.

² Castlereagh to Lieven, Jan. 14, 1820: *C.C.* xii. 178.

critical time. As he explained to Metternich and Hardenberg in a special dispatch, he thought that this was the best method of countering the designs of Capo d'Istria, which had been assisted by the too pressing invitations of the Austrian Court. He also urged the two Great Powers to act in as conciliatory a manner as possible towards the Southern States. "Some degree of management," he advised them, "on points which are likely to indispose particular States is the more admissible as the real efficacy of any Federative arrangement in Germany must always principally depend on the two Great Powers. When Austria and Prussia draw together, be the Federative control in theory more or less strict, the mass of States will act together for German objects; when these States diverge in their system, the Confederacy will inevitably be paralysed, whatever may be its organic laws, and perhaps the best chance of keeping these two great States together is to make it, as far as possible, the interest of the inferior States to uphold and preserve the Confederacy." ¹

This is the same advice which Castlereagh had given in vain at the Congress of Vienna. He had always regarded a strong Germany as a necessity to the balance of power in Europe. This was exactly the opposite to the view of the Tsar, who had naturally desired a Germany where Russian influence could find its opportunities. Capo d'Istria was the special exponent of this policy at Petersburg, for Nesselrode had been entirely won over to Metternich's views by Lebzeltern. The Tsar halted between his fear of revolution and his desire to continue his rôle as protector of the smaller States. But Castlereagh's reply, safeguarding as it did the ultimate European interests involved in any reconstitution of the German Confederation, made any action at the moment impossible. The British point of view was substantially adopted, and, though efforts were made through Lieven to continue the discussions and further circulars were issued to the Russian representatives in Germany, these were couched in studiously moderate language and exercised but little influence on the negotiations at Vienna.

Metternich was thus left free to pursue his negotiations

¹ To Rose and Stewart, Jan. 20, 1820: *F.O. Prussia*, 122.

without the added complication of foreign intervention. That Castlereagh had thus done him a great service at a critical moment he now readily confessed. Though he continued to vaunt his successes to Stewart, who apparently got a little tired of "his daily *tirade* and daily triumph over M. Capo d'Istria," yet he had found more opposition in the smaller German States than he had anticipated, and it was only the practically complete surrender of Prussia to his views that enabled him to reach finally fairly satisfactory conclusions. Never did he work with such energy and persistence as he did during these critical months. Lord Stewart was amazed at the change. "Metternich is an altered man from what he was at Aix-la-Chapelle," he wrote, "and a far different one from what he was at the Vienna Congress; his labour is incessant now; he has laid aside all trivial pursuits; neither play, women nor conviviality engross him; the two former he has quite abandoned, and he seldom goes into Society. His whole mind and time are devoted to his *Cabinet de Travail* which he scarce ever leaves. . . ."

Metternich now professed himself completely satisfied with Castlereagh's action, and even admitted that he had been over anxious to secure a measure of approval from Alexander. The Russian documents, which he now saw for the first time, opened his eyes to the serious danger which he had incurred, and which Castlereagh's diplomatic reply had removed, and for this he was duly grateful. "I firmly believe," reported Lord Stewart, "your Lordship's answer to Count Lieven has done more permanently and unalterably to seal our friendly relations to Austria than any document which ever passed from the pen of the British Minister."¹

How mistaken was this prophecy was to be revealed in the course of this very year. But for the moment Metternich continued to rely on British support against Russia, though Neumann suggested that, since Russia had ceased to interfere with the Bourbon Powers, suspicions of her had died down at London. Nevertheless, the policy of the Carlsbad Decrees had really put a barrier between the two Powers and made the interests of Russia and Austria approach one another more

¹ From Stewart, Jan. 15, Jan. 24, Feb. 3 (Nos. 4, 5, and Private and Confidential), 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 149; *F.O. Austria*, 160. Metternich to Neumann, Jan. 26, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 213, 1.

than ever before. For the Tsar, if he liked, could openly approve the repression of revolution wherever it appeared. Castlereagh could never do more than adopt a policy of neutrality. He had been entirely faithful to the doctrine of non-intervention both in Germany and, as will be seen, in France also, and he had forced his continental Allies to adopt his point of view. The Tsar had reluctantly abandoned his opposition in both cases. Metternich had more readily acquiesced, but he had obviously desired a more positive policy from the Alliance. If Alexander abandoned completely, as he shewed every sign of doing, his protection of Liberal movements and advocated a policy of repression, was there not here a weapon ready to hand to split the Austrian-British combination which had hitherto successfully opposed his schemes?

The answer to this question was to be given in the course of the year, but it had scarcely occurred as yet to any of the statesmen concerned. The Quadruple Alliance still remained a reality, ready to be called into action if France, as some anticipated, became again a danger to Europe. The system of reunions was still in being, ready to be used if the Great Powers desired. Moreover, the disturbances and unrest in Britain, which included an attempt to assassinate the whole Cabinet, had made Metternich's efforts on the Continent positively welcome to the Tory Government. The British Government might not join Metternich in his policy of repression and his attempts to make the Confederation an instrument to check democratic movements in Germany. But to the end of the Vienna Conference Castlereagh, Wellington and their royal master continued to send, through Neumann and Stewart, their sympathy and congratulations. They were able to give but little attention to continental affairs, for they were themselves in the midst of a first-class crisis. Nevertheless, they felt a common interest with the Austrian Chancellor in the repression of movements which appeared to have a common origin with those that had led the British Parliament to pass the Six Acts. They were critical as to his methods, but they earnestly desired that the final result might be a strong German Confederation in which Austrian influence was

supreme and which was not hampered by Liberal experiments, which they confused with revolutionary excesses.¹

That Metternich was aiming at destroying all freedom of thought and expression in Germany did not give them pause for they were engaged in similar practices in England. In this sense Lord Milton was perfectly correct when he said that there was a conspiracy of Governments against peoples. But Castlereagh was anxious that Metternich should shew moderation and discretion in his dealings with the smaller States. The Austrian Minister had, indeed, to be content with less than he had at one time hoped. No general attack was made on the Constitutions which still existed, and the rights of the Princes were merely re-affirmed in a most general way. When the Final Act was complete, however, Castlereagh was able to congratulate Metternich upon his moderation as well as his persistence. "Your Excellency will offer to Prince Metternich," he wrote to Stewart on May 5, 1820, "my cordial congratulations on a result so honourable to His Highness and so beneficial to Europe at the present critical conjuncture, and I rejoice to observe that His Highness is prepared to improve his advantage by removing in all quarters, without as well as within Germany, those traces of divergences of sentiment, which perhaps not unnaturally clouded the dawn of these great transactions, but which the wisdom and firmness and conciliatory spirit of those who most actively presided over them have had the address to reconcile and have thereby added important additional securities to the European System."² By this time, however, new incidents had arisen to test once more the diplomatic temper of the statesmen and the firmness of their principles. In these, British interests were clearly involved, and the British Cabinet, while engaged in an internal crisis which nearly put an end to its existence, had to define its position in more precise and more vigorous language than it had ever previously used.

¹ It was about this time that Castlereagh sent to Metternich a letter containing the often-quoted phrase: "Your Highness will observe that, although we have made an immense progress against Radicalism, the monster still lives, and shews himself in new shapes; but we do not despair of crushing him with time and patience": *C.C.* xii. 259. There were but few members of either House of Parliament, who would not have subscribed heartily to the sentiment.

² To Stewart, May 5, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 148.

3. REVIVING FRANCE AND THE ALLIANCE, 1819-20

THE Allied troops left France by the end of November 1818; by the end of December Richelieu had ceased to be Premier and his Ministry had been replaced by a more Liberal one, of which Dessolles was the nominal, and Decazes, the King's favourite, the real head. The two events were closely interconnected. Richelieu's moderate policy had been barely tolerated by both 'Left' and 'Right,' simply because it was known that he alone could obtain the evacuation in three years. Once this was obtained the discordant elements in his Cabinet began to quarrel. The victory of the Left expressed public opinion in the new France no less than the King's infatuation for his favourite, whom the Ultras had in vain tried to remove to Petersburg. The Ministry, which included a distinguished and capable Napoleonic Marshal in Gouvion St. Cyr, was a reasonable one, desiring with sincerity to make the *Charte* an effective instrument of constitutional government, to maintain a moderate franchise and to allow such Liberal institutions as a free Press. It was received, however, with a howl of rage from the *émigrés* and the Ultra-Royalist and Catholic Party. This opposition it might survive, for the King himself was on its side. But the Ultras, who had not scrupled during the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle to appeal to the Allied Powers to retain their Armies in France, looked to foreign influence to upset their rivals. More especially they looked to Russia, for Richelieu had been, as it were, the Minister of Alexander almost as much as of Louis, and Pozzo di Borgo had acted as if he were a member of the King's Cabinet.

The effect on Alexander of the change was, indeed, great. At the first rumours of Richelieu's overthrow, which reached

him at Vienna, he urged the Emperor Francis to put his Army on a war footing. He felt a deep responsibility for France towards Europe, since the *Charte* was his own work and he had warmly supported the idea of evacuation. Nor could he be unaware of the loss of influence which Russia would experience by the change of government.

It was this last consideration which impressed many observers most strongly, and the unconcealed chagrin of Pozzo di Borgo made the situation all the more obvious. The Russian Minister did not attempt to disguise his disapproval and his desire to find a remedy before it was too late. The discreet withdrawal of Richelieu into the country prevented him from using that Minister for his plans, and he had never been a favourite of the *Pavillon Marsan*. He had, therefore, to wait on events and, above all, to ascertain how far the Allied Powers were prepared to go in exercising a new surveillance over France.

If Pozzo di Borgo shewed chagrin, his rival, Sir Charles Stuart, made no effort to conceal his exceeding satisfaction at the change. This was less due to a sympathy with Liberalism, of which, however, he possessed a modicum, as to the conviction that the new Ministry would be less under the influence of Pozzo di Borgo than the old. To the anger, therefore, of that Ambassador and of Vincent, he welcomed the change in the French Government "with passionate exaggeration." It was thus only natural that Decazes should approach him at an early date with an elaborate justification of the processes by which Richelieu's resignation had been brought about and complaints of the attitude of the other Ambassadors. Both he and Dessolles declared that they would base their policy on the agreements of Aix-la-Chapelle, and pleaded for special consideration from the only other great Power governed by representative institutions. Though Stuart admitted that the new Cabinet possessed an extreme Left which was dangerous, particularly the Minister of War, who was appointing Bonapartists to all the best posts in the Army, he was also convinced that the effect of the change on public opinion in France had been good, and supported Decazes' complaints against Pozzo di Borgo, whose manifest irritation, he reported with

glee, would effectively prevent him from obtaining any influence in the new Ministry.¹

Castlereagh's official reply to this overture was no more than coldly correct. In a private letter he expressed his fears for the future, but insisted that any symptoms of distrust on the part of foreign Powers would only increase the danger. "We must hope the best," he said, "and act towards the Government with sincerity and, as far as their means will permit us, with cordiality." At the same time he warned Stuart not to impair the harmony of the Alliance by attempting to take in the new Ministry the place which Pozzo di Borgo had held in the old. He enjoined him, on the contrary, to draw closer to his colleagues than before, and above all, to make the French believe that the Allies were cordially united. These dispatches were straightway sent for Metternich's guidance, and while the latter was more alarmed than Castlereagh, he agreed that interference was out of the question. Vincent was, however, painting the picture in the darkest colours, and Lebzeltern, who had paid a visit to Paris, seemed to think a revolution was drawing near. To such a pitch, he insinuated, had Russian influence brought France. Doubtless Metternich was not slow to insist on this unpalatable aspect in his conversations with Golovkin, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, and he apparently made suggestions to him as to the means to be taken to avert it, amongst them the revival of the Conference of Ambassadors at Paris. At the same time Pozzo di Borgo was writing to his Court to suggest that the Ambassadors should receive joint instructions to remonstrate against the measures of the Minister of War and also to take joint action in the event of the death of the King of France. The second of these two objects was much the most serious. For the unpopularity of the Comte d'Artois amongst the masses of the French people was manifest, and many observers, including both Wellington and Metternich, were already of the opinion that he would cause the overthrow of the Monarchy in France. Louis was now obviously weakening, both physically and intellectually. His death could not be long delayed.

¹ From Stuart, Jan. 4, 1819: *F.O. France*, 201. Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, Jan. 24, 1819: *I.R.H.S.* cxxvii, 18.

Were the Allied Powers prepared to grapple with the dangerous situation which might then arise?¹

When the news came of a large new creation of Peers, many of whom had been distinguished supporters of Bonaparte, the four Allied Ministers were invited by Vincent to meet together to discuss the situation. This was almost a revival of the Ambassadors' Conference, though the meeting was informal and secret. Pozzo di Borgo's alarming view was fully concurred in by the Austrian and Prussian Ministers, and even Stuart admitted the danger, though Pozzo di Borgo did not believe him sincere in his desire for unity. Complaints against Stuart's conduct had been made to Castlereagh, both from Vienna and from Petersburg. Castlereagh warned him of these complaints; but at the same time, in a long dispatch which was communicated to the other Powers, he insisted vigorously that the Allied Ministers ought to abstain from all interference in the events passing in France. They should, indeed, not even comment upon them openly, for "their silence will operate much more powerfully to keep parties in France within the sphere of their specific relations with the rest of Europe than any comments they can hazard upon the transactions of the day." Interference, he insisted, might drive either the Ultras or the Jacobins from opposite motives to extremes. "It is quite clear," he said, "that neither party is accessible to calm and dispassionate reasoning, especially from foreign Powers or their Ministers; it is equally clear—such are the difficulties that surround the question of governing France—that the Allied Courts would be incapable of giving them useful counsel, were they even disposed to listen to them. If then they cannot hope by their Ministers usefully to direct or even to guide, why incur useless as well as dangerous responsibility by seeming to take a part? This leads to the question—What course then should the Allied Ministers pursue at Paris in the discharge of their public functions? To which I can give no better answer than by saying: let them do as nearly as possible what their colleagues do in

¹ To Stuart, Jan. 12, 1819: *F.O. France*, 200. To Gordon, Jan. 19, 1819; from Gordon, Feb. 11, 1819. Lebzeltern to Metternich, Jan. 27, 1819; *F.O. Austria*, 141.

London, namely, live in the greatest intimacy and cordiality together, communicate to each other without reserve (in order to check the correctness of information) such facts as come to their knowledge respectively ; let them do this with as little semblance of interference in the local politics as marks the conduct of foreign Ministers in this country." Such a course would not offend France and would preserve the harmony of the Alliance in the eyes of France and of Europe, while any other would, by almost inevitably producing disunion, weaken its moral influence and render it incapable of effective action if an emergency arose.¹

This excellent advice received only a mixed reception at Vienna and Petersburg. Metternich had not, indeed, much time for France at the moment, though he had begun a long and didactic correspondence with Decazes, while the effect of the dispatch on the Tsar was perhaps weakened by a long interview with Lieven, in which Castlereagh apologised to some extent for his circumspection. The Russian Ambassador attributed the growing desire of the Government to keep free from the Continent to their weakness in Parliament and their growing fear of the United States. The alarm of Alexander had, however, increased continually as a result of Pozzo di Borgo's crescendo of hostile reports. The Tsar had hitherto enjoined only a cold neutrality, which had, however, alarmed and irritated the French Government. As a result of these reports and Golovkin's accounts of Metternich's supposed wishes, Alexander now proposed to discuss with his Allies more active measures, and in a circular dispatch of April 12, 1819, he submitted to them formally the possibility of a collective remonstrance against the measures of Gouvion St. Cyr, and the reconstitution of the Allied Ambassadorial Conference at Paris.²

It was some time before the British Cabinet could even consider these propositions. It was in the thick of a hot discussion on the Budget and the Bank, and in the Commons

¹ To Stuart, March 23, 1819: *F.O. France*, 200.

² Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, Feb. 17, 1819; Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, April 12, 1819: *I.R.H.S.* cxxvii. 37, 64. Lieven to Nesselrode, March 31, 1819: *Pet. Arch.*

the Ministry was having a bad time. It was not until a considerable Government victory in Tierney's motion on the 'state of the Nation,' gave Castlereagh a breathing space that he could take up the matter with Lieven. Even then he preferred, he said, to await the results of his last communications to Petersburg before he sent any formal reply. But in a long conversation he pronounced in the most uncompromising terms against the idea of reviving the Ambassadorial Conference. The meetings, he said, could not be kept secret, and might easily provoke a movement in France of which the King might possibly put himself at the head. "What could the Allies do then? The very laws about which Pozzo di Borgo was now vehemently protesting had been passed in 1818 when the Conferences still existed. He warned Lieven, too, that there was a democratic movement in other countries besides France, and that part of Europe would be on her side. Even in England there existed much sympathy for constitutional, though none for revolutionary, France. The conclusion of the Russian Minister was that the British Government would refuse to do anything official or ostensible. It would rely on private and unofficial attempts to keep France on the right path which did not commit it to anything if they failed."¹

This supposition was true enough. Castlereagh, overwhelmed as he was with the business of the House of Commons, was relying on Wellington's influence to help him with the French. The Duke, while he did not scruple to speak of Sir Charles Stuart to Lieven and Esterhazy in the most unflattering terms and even discussed with them the weakness of his colleagues in the Ministry, shared, of course, Castlereagh's views as to the impolicy of interference. Pozzo di Borgo, who tried to convert him to the idea that only the fear of foreign intervention kept the wicked spirits in France quiet, received a cogent letter on the futility of his ideas. The Ambassador, however, claimed credit at Petersburg for having at least provoked a reply. Decazes also wrote to the Duke on the appointment of the new French Ambassador Latour-Maubourg, and received a frank letter of advice on the necessity of keeping the army royalist. Decazes was now trying hard for real friendship

¹ Lieven to Nesselrode, June 1, 1819. *Pet. Arch.*

with England. The general instructions to the new Ambassador were drawn up in a much less hostile tone than those to his predecessor. Decazes also instituted a special 'Paris correspondence' in *The Times* for some time. But he also was aware that the British Government was too occupied to think much about foreign affairs and did not expect more than their sympathy.¹

Meanwhile Metternich also disapproved of the Tsar's suggestions. He hastened to write a long dispatch to Esterhazy entirely disclaiming the responsibility for the proposal of the renewal of the Ambassadorial Conferences at Paris. That idea, he wrote, had been discussed and rejected once for all at Aix-la-Chapelle, where, as he took pains to point out, Pozzo di Borgo had been the most hostile enemy of the Quadruple Alliance. It was impossible to revive it now without France regarding it as a threat. What he had advocated both at Aix-la-Chapelle and afterwards to Golovkin was the establishment of a centre of discussion at some other spot, preferably London, where Ministerial Conferences (on the Slave Trade, etc.) were already taking place. If the four Powers of the Quadruple Alliance wished to take action on any matter, he pointed out, they had to send off twelve couriers before discussion could even be begun. Some "point of moral contact" was very necessary. But if London was considered unsuitable because of British party politics, then perhaps Vienna might be chosen instead. This was undoubtedly Metternich's real objective, and he was to try for a similar scheme more than once later on. He told Gordon that he preferred Vienna to London "from a consideration of the possible disadvantages which might arise out of the known jealousy between England and France and the impediments which hence might be opposed to the prosecution of the Allied labours in London." But he was well aware how much opposition such an idea would arouse, and he did not now

¹ Wellington to Decazes, April 24, 1819; Pozzo di Borgo to Wellington, May 10, 1819; Wellington to Pozzo di Borgo, May 18, 1819: *W.N.D.* i. 56, 62, 66. Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, June 10, 1819: *I.R.H.S.* cxxvii. 120. Decazes to Dessolles, March 31, 1819 (*Marked Cabinet*): *Paris A.A.E.* 612, f. 87. Arbutnot and Croker were France's enemies in the Ministry, said Decazes, neither in very important positions but dangerous because of their influence in the Press.

press it. He was more inclined to accept Pozzo di Borgo's ideas of 'eventual' instructions, in case of the death of Louis XVIII., to recognise the *legitimate* successor at once or not to recognise any other. But he added the sarcasm that the King of France's powers had been so reduced that he could not conceive that the Liberals would now object even to the Comte d'Artois.¹

These ideas were put into more formal shape in a full-dress Memorandum which began by doubting whether any continental State could successfully adopt constitutional government on the model of Great Britain. But it went no further than the dispatch, being drafted to soothe the susceptibilities of the British Government, whose weak situation Metternich deplored. The Russian Government had obtained, in fact, nothing but a vague acceptance of Pozzo di Borgo's ideas of 'eventual' instructions and a proposition to make Vienna the centre of European diplomacy. Nesselrode, therefore, proposed to wait until something more definite could be obtained from Castlereagh, whose reception of the note had not pleased him. Meanwhile Capo d'Istria paid a visit to Paris, and the French Government sent a special emissary to Petersburg to arrange for a new Ambassador and to make propositions with regard to South America, whose results are stated in another chapter.²

The British Government, however, received the Austrian Memorandum with great satisfaction. Castlereagh said he had less difficulty in dealing with Metternich than with his own Cabinet, and even Liverpool, who rarely broke his reserve, told Esterhazy that he was very satisfied. Castlereagh was even, for a moment, ready to accept the idea of the 'eventual' instructions, though he said he must consult his Cabinet. He rejected, however, entirely Metternich's other idea of establishing a "point of moral contact" which would justly offend France. Moreover, he said, he could give no instructions to

¹ Metternich to Esterhazy, May 26, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 147. From Gordon, May 26, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 142.

² Austrian Memorandum on France, June 6, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 147. Metternich to Vincent, June 8, 1819: *Vienna St. A. Frankreich, Weisungen*, 339. Nesselrode to Pozzo di Borgo, June 20, 1819: *I.R.H.S.* cxxvii. 125. See below, Chapter VIII, Section 1, p. 424.

situation. It was divided into six parts. The first stated that there had been no change in French institutions since Aix-la-Chapelle sufficient to call for an extraordinary measure of precaution. The second recalled the fact that a re-establishment of the Conferences was forbidden by the documents there exchanged, which admitted France to full participation in the Concert of the Great Powers so long as she committed no *act* which infringed the Treaties. The third suggested that such Conferences would be rightly viewed by Frenchmen as an unjustifiable interference in their internal concerns, and the King and his party would have to bear the blame or attempt to refute it by some extravagant action. The fourth put forward the view that the Conferences would become a centre of European intrigue, for every Court would want to know what was going on. Instead of the 'clear atmosphere' in which the Alliance had hitherto existed, it would be surrounded by mystery and suspicion and would thus be less able to act if a real emergency arose. So long as they judged France by her external acts there was something definite with which to deal, but to interfere with her 'internal eccentricities' would risk disunion amongst the Great Powers and loss of the confidence of Europe. The fifth insisted that Russia and Austria were not agreed as to the place of the Conference, and had not defined its duties. If it was merely to report, it added little to what was already possible. If it was meant to take action, it would only cause the Allied Powers to disagree. Moreover, it was admitted that the Allies could not have interfered usefully during the last nine months, a fact which suggested that no occasion would be likely to occur in the future. If such an occasion should occur, it should be met by a special Conference called *ad hoc*, and Castlereagh reminded his Allies that "the proceedings taken at Aix-la-Chapelle contemplate the probability of occasional reunions of the Sovereigns, and although no precise period is assigned, such a resource is always within the competence of the Alliance." Lastly, he concluded that the proposition for 'eventual' instructions in case of the death of Louis XVIII., even in the simple form which Austria had advocated it, would do more harm than good. For such a step could not be kept secret, and

it would at once prejudice the Comte d'Artois in the eyes of the nation and at the same time tend to make him rely on foreign aid rather than on concentrating on "that course of policy which can alone consolidate his position in France by incorporating it as speedily as possible with the national sentiment."¹

This Memorandum had been the result of long cogitation, and it expressed the mature and final judgment of the British Cabinet. Castlereagh felt it necessary, indeed, to point out in a covering dispatch, that his language had been strong because he had attempted to look at the proposal from the point of view which the European public would assuredly take "rather than to discuss it simply under the beneficent and liberal form which the real intentions of the Four Powers would seek in fact to give to such a reunion." But, lest too much should be assumed from this concession, he added, "I owe it, however, in truth to my colleagues and to myself to declare that we are not influenced in thus expressing the opinion of the British Government on this occasion by considerations of exclusive convenience, but that, were we entirely relieved from every motive resulting either from the peculiar nature of the Constitution which we are called upon to administer or the explanations specially interchanged at Aix-la-Chapelle by the British Plenipotentiary with the Minister of France, such would still be our deliberate and unanimous opinion."²

So emphatic a repudiation really settled at once the fate of the Austrian and Russian propositions. Nevertheless, the negotiations were still spun out during the closing months of 1819. Metternich had sent another Memorandum, written just before he received that of Castlereagh, which still coquetted with the idea of Ministerial Conferences in one place or another—not at Paris in the middle of the crisis, but in some sheltered spot, if not Vienna, then London. He also discussed the difficulties of framing the instructions for action on the death of Louis XVIII. without, however, rejecting the idea. When Stewart, who had at last returned triumphantly to Vienna with his new bride, warned him that Castlereagh would never

¹ Memorandum on France, Sept. 24, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 142.

² To Cathcart, Sept. 24, 1819: *F.O. Russia*, 117.

agree to these views, he excused himself by stating "that his object was chiefly to interest and amuse the Emperor of Russia by giving His Imperial Majesty some subject for discussion and keeping him interested in the general question of *les bons principes*." "For my own part," reported Stewart, "I really believe that the Austrian Minister is perfectly pliant on all this subject and he holds it up merely to afford ammunition for writing upon; he will be amenable to anything the Prince Regent's Government may deem advisable; but as the Emperor of Russia brought forward the idea of common instructions to the Ministers at Paris for the guidance of their conduct, Prince Metternich is desirous of flattering that Cabinet." But Metternich wanted his 'point of moral contact' for the Quadruple Alliance, where instructions could be sent and a decision quickly obtained, and he told Stewart that, as it was difficult for British Ministers to give such instructions, the capital of the Austrian Empire seemed the best place for the purpose. He would, however, he hinted, now himself take the initiative in these debatable questions, and in his dispatch to Neumann he again emphasised the necessity of the "*point de contact moral*."¹

The truth was that Metternich, who was now in the thick of his German problems, was exceedingly anxious not to offend Alexander. He could not, therefore, at once abandon the position which he had taken up because Castlereagh refused to give it his support. He retired in his usual manner behind a cloud of ink, and discanted at length on minor shades of difference between the Austrian and British Memoranda. He did not press his desire for a new Conference centre, but he now insisted on the necessity of 'eventual' instructions, and, in contrast to Castlereagh, he refused to admit that "the France of 1819" was the same as "the France of Aix-la-Chapelle." Nor could he abandon immediately principles which he had put forward so recently in so official a shape as a Memorandum. The debate therefore continued between Vienna and Peters-

¹ From Stewart, Oct. 7, 1819; Austrian Memorandum, Sept. 20, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 143. Metternich to Neumann, Oct. 10, 1819: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 210, x.

burg, but in very half-hearted fashion, while Pozzo di Borgo wrote bitter criticism of both Metternich and Castlereagh to his Court.¹

To these discussions Castlereagh, knowing that nothing could be done without his consent, gave little heed. He was more anxious lest French statesmen should get some idea of what had been proposed and be driven to more extreme policy in consequence. Stuart, who knew only very vaguely what had been going on, warned him that the probable result of any special surveillance would be an increase of the French army. Castlereagh felt that so many persons had been involved in the discussions that it was more than likely that there would be a leakage. In October, indeed, Decazes did hear from Vienna some vague suspicions and informed Stuart that any representations from the Powers would discredit the Government and increase the strength of the Left. This was the more to be avoided since a reconstruction of the French Cabinet was imminent. In November Decazes assumed nominal as well as real power, and became President of the Council, Latour-Maubourg left the London Embassy to become Minister of War, and the energetic and intelligent Pasquier became Minister of Foreign Affairs.

Metternich, on the other hand, when informed of these fears at first denied the possibility of leakage at Vienna, and then said that it would do no harm if France did find out how concerned the Powers were for her future. The change of Ministry made no difference to his outlook, and he talked of the formidable parties in existence to place the young Napoleon, or Eugène de Beauharnais, or the Prince of Orange on the throne on the death of Louis XVIII. While he was silent, therefore, on any idea of establishing a Ministerial Conference, he still pressed vigorously for the 'eventual' instructions. But Castlereagh had no intention of giving way. He told Neumann that his diplomatic support of Metternich in German affairs surely entitled him to some consideration, and he suggested that Metternich should drop, once for all, his ideas of a 'point of moral contact' or 'eventual in-

¹ From Stewart, Nov. 1, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 144. Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, Sept. 20, Oct. 17, 1819: *I.R.H.S.* cxxvii, 187, 225.

structions,' which might destroy the Quadruple Alliance altogether.¹

Chance or guile, however, provided Metternich with an opportunity to give the discussion a new aspect. Caraman, the French Ambassador at Vienna, had been ordered to make judicious enquiries as to the nature of the Allied discussions concerning France. Metternich hinted that the Cabinets were concerting together on the subject of the course to be taken on the King's death. Both Pasquier and his King were alarmed that any doubt as to the succession should even be mentioned, and the King wrote a letter in his own hand which was included in Pasquier's dispatch emphasising this point. Caraman foolishly gave Metternich an extract from this dispatch, which the latter twisted into a demand on the part of the King of France that instructions should be issued by the Four Powers. Armed with this, Metternich made another attempt to get Castlereagh to agree to the proposal. Castlereagh was, however, horrified at this new turn of events. The rash letter of the King of France, he said, might cost him his throne, and he believed that Pasquier had planned it in order to get the King into his power. In this he was mistaken, but the incident gave him an opportunity to restate the British point of view in unmistakable language. "The cause of the Bourbons would have been lost in this country," he said, "if we had put it in the forefront." Britain could be trusted to act at the right moment, but she could not commit herself to maintain any particular dynasty on the throne.²

Metternich, as a result of this conversation, temporarily abandoned most of his plans. The assassination of the Duc de Berri on February 13, 1820, had, indeed, altered the situation in France. The Right used the violent indignation of the Duchess and the Court as a means to drive Decazes from office. The reluctant King was consoled by Madame du Cayla, and was at last induced to dismiss his favourite to the London Embassy. Richelieu consented to take up the burden

¹ From Stuart, Sept. 9, Oct. 28, 1819: *F.O. France*, 209, 210. From Stewart, Nov. 15, Nov. 29, Dec. 29, 1819: *F.O. Austria*, 160, 144. Neumann to Metternich, Jan. 14, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, 1.

² Metternich to Esterhazy, Feb. 6, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 213, 1. Esterhazy to Metternich, Feb. 24, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, 11.

of office once more, with a reconstituted Cabinet in which, however, Pasquier and others of Decazes' colleagues continued to hold office.* This change reassured the Allies. Nevertheless, the assassination had as far-reaching effects as that of Kotzebue in Germany. It opened the way for the triumph of the Ultra party in France, and it increased the tendency to reaction which was growing at Petersburg, Berlin and even in London. George IV. was convinced that the crime was only part of a general conspiracy against all monarchs, and he told Esterhazy that he had been warned from Paris that his own life was in danger. Like Alexander he, too, turned to Metternich as the great bulwark against revolution and assassination, and encouraged him to hope for a far more active policy of repression from the British Government than either the Cabinet desired or Parliament would permit.¹

The Duc de Berri's death, however, since, though the Duchess was soon known to be *enceinte*, only a male child could succeed, was bound to raise the hopes of the Orleanists. The question of the 'eventual' instructions was, therefore, further discussed amongst the three Eastern Powers, and instructions were actually sent to their three Ambassadors at Paris in the course of 1820. Stuart was shewn part of the instructions by Richelieu himself, who had insisted on knowing their contents. These amounted to nothing more than an order to recognise the legitimate successor as soon as the King of France's death was known, and Richelieu considered that they were beneficial. Stuart who imagined that he had purposely been kept in the dark by Castlereagh shewed some pique, since Richelieu told him that his enquiries had been based on information derived from London. Castlereagh, however, put this right by a dispatch, in which he not only denied Richelieu's implication, but again insisted on the fact that Britain could have no share in any such scheme. He added, however, that the British Government "take no sort of umbrage at any instructions which the other Allied Cabinets may have issued upon this subject. They have been regularly apprised of such instructions having been sent and they feel

¹ Metternich to Esterhazy, April 7, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 213, iv. Esterhazy to Metternich, April 7, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, iv.

entirely satisfied of the friendly spirit in which these were drawn up not only towards France but towards the Alliance." ¹

For the moment, however, Castlereagh had preserved France from any system of special surveillance, and kept the Quadruple Alliance strictly to the terms of the agreement which he had made with Richelieu at Aix-la-Chapelle. France was thus permitted to coquet with Liberalism and to relapse back to a more reactionary ministry without any interference except such futile and subterranean attempts as Pozzo di Borgo and Metternich attempted. There can be no doubt as to the wisdom of his policy from the point of view of both France and Europe. A less loyal or more orthodox diplomatist might, however, have attempted to win some special advantage at Paris. Castlereagh might have claimed some return from the gratitude of the French King and Ministers. Stuart was only too anxious to exploit the position. But any such method of acquiring influence on the Continent was altogether alien to Castlereagh's methods. He remained entirely faithful to his Allies, and was only too anxious to conceal from French Ministers the part which he had played. These had by now some idea of the attempts which had been made to check their independence, but they gave no credit to Britain for her attitude. On the contrary, as the power of France revived her policy began to re-assume its traditional aspect of opposition to British plans, both in the Old and the New World. The instructions to Decazes were drawn by the Quai D'Orsay in a spirit of distrust and covert hostility, and the British Ministry were soon immensely shocked by the revelation that a serious and secret intrigue in South America had been contemplated by the very Ministry whose independence they had been defending. When the Spanish Revolution broke out the policies of the two countries were at once in conflict, and the old hostility of the eighteenth century began to revive. How little influence the possession of Parliamentary institutions had upon the relations of the two countries in comparison with these ancient and national rivalries was to be revealed in most convincing fashion in the course of the next few years!

¹ From Stuart, Oct. 30, 1820: *F.O. France*, 232. To Stuart, Nov. 7, 1820: *F.O. France*, 222.

CHAPTER V

REVOLUTION AND NON-INTERVENTION: THE ALLIANCE CHECKED, 1820

1. THE KING, THE QUEEN, AND THE CABINET, 1820-21.
2. THE REVOLUTION IN SPAIN AND THE STATE PAPER OF
MAY 5, 1820.
3. THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION, 1820-22.

“ Few foreigners understand the constitutional principles by which our political system is regulated.”—CASTLEREAGH, May 12, 1820.

CHAPTER V

I. THE KING, THE QUEEN, AND THE MINISTRY,

1820-21

THE diplomatic history of the next twelve months cannot be understood unless the special difficulties and weaknesses of the British Government be taken into account. For the death of George III. on January 29, 1820, and the acquisition of the royal title by the Regent and his wife caused a crisis so acute that for a considerable period many thought that the Cabinet could not survive it; and even when the worst was over the effect was still plainly visible on the relations between the King and his Ministers. In these trying experiences Castlereagh, as leader of the House of Commons, no less than Foreign Minister, played an especially important part. It was, in fact, more due to him than to any one else that the Government was saved from destruction and the King eventually reconciled to his Prime Minister. Liverpool's Ministry survived, and, though it lost in Canning its most brilliant member, was eventually reconstituted on a broader basis with new recruits of great value. Castlereagh was already in uncertain health when these events occurred, and the additional strain thus thrown upon him at the very moment when five revolutions raised international problems demanding every ounce of his energy and skill, was undoubtedly the main cause of his collapse and suicide in 1822.

The difficulties of 1819 had been triumphantly surmounted by the Tory Ministry. The hopes of the Opposition had been raised by the Government's weak display in the financial discussions of the early part of the year. But when the distress and unrest culminated in the Manchester Meeting and other

overt if less serious conflicts between authority and the people the Upper Classes rallied almost unanimously to the side of the Government. The Six Acts were easily carried after a few concessions in the House of Commons, and it was suspected that such opposition as came from the Whig party was more for form's sake than from any real desire to limit the power of the Government at such a time. Foreign observers noted with admiration that no sooner had reports of serious disturbances reached them than the great lords and the country gentlemen, whatever their politics, hastened to their country seats in order to sustain the power of the law. The Lords Lieutenant gladly obeyed the instructions of the Government to return to their posts. Lord Derby and Lord Fitzwilliam, reported Esterhazy, two of the strongest members of the Opposition, have contributed more than any one else to re-establish order.¹

The Government reaped the benefit of this instinctive and spontaneous loyalty, and their position would doubtless have been further strengthened by the monstrous Cato Street conspiracy, the Thistlewood plot, which threatened the whole Cabinet with assassination at the hands of men as fanatic and determined as Louvel or Sand. Here seemed to be complete proof that the repression of the Government was more than justified. But the death of the old King altered this situation in a few weeks, and soon the Cabinet was fighting for its life, hated and distrusted by its royal master and execrated and even maltreated by the populace. Fortunately for the Tories the crisis so developed that neither the King nor the Whigs could take full advantage of it, but for months almost the whole of their energies, indeed the interest and enthusiasm of the whole nation, was absorbed in the sordid and indecent controversy between George and his legal wife.

Caroline of Brunswick had last played any part in England during the visit of the Allied Sovereigns in 1814. Since then she had lived abroad wandering from one country to another,

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, Aug. 7, 1819; Neumann to Metternich, Oct. 1, 1819: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 209, viii. x, *Appendix*, p. 551. Halévy *Histoire du Peuple Anglaise*, II. 69. Esterhazy's allusion to Fitzwilliam is especially interesting because of his removal from his position as Lord Lieutenant of the West Riding for calling a meeting to discuss the Manchester proceedings.

gradually abandoned by her British companions, and served by Italians of whom one, Bergami, her Chamberlain, occupied a position which was at least equivocal. Scarcely had she left England than the Regent began to plan for a divorce. Caroline had been acquitted by the ministerial investigation of 1806, but George hoped that new temptations would bring more convincing evidence. His Ministers wisely fought shy of his project, but the Regent never relaxed his efforts, and eventually, with the assistance of the Vice-Chancellor, Sir John Leach, sent out a special commission to Italy to collect evidence of the infidelity of his wife. The Ministry were not responsible for this act, which was personal to the Regent, but they were naturally aware of it, and in great secrecy the Austrian Government, and the British Ambassador at Vienna, gave such assistance as was required of them. Caroline's melancholy wanderings were full of indiscretions and humiliations, and much evidence, almost all of course depending on the testimony of foreigners, was soon at the disposal of her husband.¹

The first demand therefore that the new King made was for a divorce. His new status inevitably raised the question of his relations with his wife. The Queen of England could not be treated in the same manner as the Princess of Wales. The King, for example, insisted that she should not be prayed for in the liturgy, and his Ministers felt bound to acquiesce. But they refused point blank to initiate proceedings for a divorce. Some arrangement must be made with the Queen by which, in return for an assured income, she agreed to remain on the Continent.

George's fury was immense. No arguments weighed with him. Castlereagh in vain appealed to the advice of the Emperor of Austria, transmitted by Metternich and reinforced by Esterhazy, that royalty would suffer as an institution if George persisted in his design. The Cabinet sent in its resignation which the King refused to accept. Nevertheless,

¹ There is a good deal of correspondence on the subject both in the British and Austrian archives. When the Emperor of Austria refused to receive Caroline in 1817, George said his gratitude would last to the tomb. Metternich took care to report any specially irritating remark of the Princess, *e.g.* "that the death of the Princess Charlotte was due to men and not to God."

if an alternative could be found there was no doubt but that the King would accept it.¹

The situation of the Tory Cabinet was further complicated by a change in the King's mistress. The discreet Marchioness of Hertford, who had been on excellent terms with the Ministry and Castlereagh, was replaced in the course of 1819 by a new mistress, the Marchioness of Conyngham. She was reputed to favour the Opposition and certainly she quarrelled with Castlereagh, whose wife would not speak to her. More than one shrewd observer thought that she might be the means of reconciling the King to the Whigs. As a matter of fact, she had few political ambitions, but many personal for her family and friends, and she knew how to defend herself. One of the first results of the new reign was the partial disgrace of Sir Benjamin Blomfield, a good friend of the Ministry, whom Sir William Knighton eventually succeeded.²

The period of uncertainty and confusion lasted several months. Foreign Courts were intensely interested, for the whole policy of Britain might be influenced by a change of Government. Metternich and his master were naturally full of alarm. There had long been talk of a visit from the former to England, especially after that of Capo d'Istria. The project was now revived, apparently at Metternich's own wish, with the motive of reconciling the King and his Ministers. Castlereagh had at first encouraged the visit as a means of enlightening Metternich on the state of public opinion in England. But the idea was also warmly welcomed by the King for personal motives. Metternich, was, however, too busy with his Conference to leave Vienna. His ardour for Countess Lieven had also cooled, and though the question was brought up more than once during the year it was eventually shelved.

The Ministry had indeed been saved, as Bülow wisely said,

¹ E. Daudet, *Ambassade du Duc Decazes*, 128. Esterhazy to Metternich, Feb. 24, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, 11.

² Lieven to Nesselrode, March 17, 1820: *Pet. Arch.* Neumann to Metternich, Feb. 10, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, 11—an intimate note in his own handwriting, which contains the following: "Sa nouvelle passion pour la Marquise de Conynghame est la raison du changement dans son régime [of diet], voulant rendre sa taille plus svelte; il était déjà parvenu à réduire son poids de 30 livres: cette nouvelle divinité n'a que seize ans,—c'est à dire de moins que Lady Hertford qui ne mesure que 60—reste par conséquent 44 qui est le bel âge des femmes dans ce pays-ci."

by its unanimity. There had been no weakness, and in face of the united opinion of Eldon and Wellington, as well as Liverpool and Castlereagh, the King had to give way. The new elections, in spite of one or two popular victories, returned the usual majority almost unimpaired. Nevertheless, the situation remained critical and the authority of the Cabinet suffered in consequence. Castlereagh warned Stewart that a change of Ministry was possible, even probable, and Stewart prepared to resign with his brother in spite of his own close personal relations with the King. Metternich, with his usual egoism, discussed his chances of influencing not only the domestic situation but the foreign policy of the Government, if he responded to the King's desire for his visit. But he cautioned Esterhazy to shew prudence and not go too far in supporting the Ministry. He wrote in greater alarm to Münster, who was hastening back to support the Tories by his influence, though Metternich had no trust in the ability of any one but himself to handle so difficult a situation. Lieven also prepared his Government for a change of Ministry.¹

The worst was, however, over. The Queen by her own intransigence reunited the King and his Ministers in a common policy. Even before her final resolve to come to London the King had sullenly acquiesced in the plans of his Ministers. Münster was able to reassure Metternich in a letter of May 30, that even a change of Ministry would make no difference to the foreign policy of the country.² But the Queen refused to accept the terms offered her at Calais by Lord Hutchinson, when her Attorney-General, Brougham, who had accompanied him, refused for reasons still obscure to transmit them. She continued her journey, and when she had been received by cheering crowds from Dover to London, the Ministry had perforce to take action. It was in vain that Brougham and Denman held a formal conference with Wellington and Castlereagh; or that the shocked and perturbed Wilberforce tried to arrange a compromise. The Queen was

¹ Bülow to Bernstorff, Feb. 18, 1820: *Berlin St. A.* To Stewart, Feb. 24, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Varia.* Metternich to Esterhazy, May 16, 1820; Metternich to Münster, May 15, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 213, v. Lieven to Nesselrode, June 9, 1820: *Pet. Arch.*

² Münster to Metternich, May 30, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Varia.*

as deceived by the plaudits of the mob as Alexander had been, and would accept nothing but her full rights. Moreover, Brougham and the left wing of the Opposition had realised how powerful a weapon against the Ministry they now possessed. The Queen became a rallying point for all the democratic forces in the nation. Her courage was admirable; and, though her innocence might be suspect, her private life shone as white as snow when compared with that of her husband. The Grenvilles would have none of her, and Grey held himself coldly and judicially aloof, but the 'Mountain' and others promised themselves a famous time.

The Ministry accepted the challenge with some alacrity. "The die is cast," wrote Castlereagh with relief, to his brother, urging him to send off the Italian witnesses. He had been with the King when the Queen's carriage passed Carlton House, and obviously welcomed the opportunity for a reconciliation. "It is something to have done our best to avoid an evil," he told Metternich, "and to have no other course left but to brave it; I doubt not we shall carry the King through his difficulties. The public mind is still much poisoned, but truth never fails in this country finally to triumph." The Cabinet now made a serious investigation of all the evidence, and most of them undoubtedly believed the charges proved. They imagined that they could carry a Bill of Pains and Penalties through Parliament, and set all their machinery to work to compass its success. Metternich and Stewart did all they could to collect evidence and obtain witnesses for the prosecution and to put obstacles in the way of the defence. The warm reception which the London mob gave the Italian witnesses made their efforts specially necessary.¹

The trial began on August 17, and it was not long before the Ministers were heartily sick of it. The popularity of the Queen and the enthusiasm of the mob increased daily. To Wellington's horror even the Guards could not be trusted. The King refused to shew himself, much to Castlereagh's regret, and surrounded himself in the Cottage with picked

¹ To Stewart, June 6, 1820: Alison, *Lives*, iii. 219. Castlereagh to Metternich, July 15, 1820; Castlereagh to Stewart, July 15, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Varia*. Bülow to Bernstorff, July 14, 1820: *Berlin St. A.*

troops, while Münster ran away to Worthing to take the sea baths. The King retained a sullen resentment against his Ministers, and, according to Esterhazy, still looked to Metternich to come and help him. The spectacle of the House of Lords listening to the sordid and disgusting tales of the Queen's servants, shocked and humiliated all those who did not openly rejoice in the damage which it did to the King and his Ministers. In a moment of candour Castlereagh confessed to Lieven that, if the Government had realised what would happen, they would have done anything to avoid the scandal. The King's hostility increased towards the Cabinet as his humiliation became more evident. Lieven, who was vainly trying to alter the Cabinet's views on foreign policy, suspected that it would not survive the rejection of the Bill.¹

The rumours of the change of Government led to one curious incident which revealed the nervousness of the Great Powers at the state of affairs in Britain. Tierney was one day accosted at a garden party by Decazes, and bored with politics for over an hour. He asked after the Bonapartists in France. "They are so little to be feared," replied Decazes, "that even the return of Bonaparte would have no effect." "In that case," said Tierney, "if ever we come into power the first thing we will do is to release him and save the money it costs us to keep him." The shocked Decazes withdrew, and Tierney's object was accomplished. But the joke had serious consequences. Decazes hastened to report the conversation, and it soon set all the Chanceries humming. It reached the assembled autocrats at Troppau and they sat in secret conclave about it; possibly even the critical discussions on the Alliance which were going on were influenced by it. Solemn instructions were drawn up for the Ambassadors in London. Stewart got wind of them and at last dragged a confession out of Metternich. Both Lieven and Esterhazy laughed at their instructions and hastened to inform their Courts of the truth. But the rumour persisted and went

¹ Lieven to Nesselrode, Sept. 18, Oct. 13, 1820: *Pet Arch.* Esterhazy to Metternich, Aug. 28, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, viii. Bülow to Bernstorff, Aug. 18, 1820: *Berlin St. A.*

the round of the world. Questions were asked in Parliament about it, and it was not finally disposed of until the death of Napoleon himself. So dangerous is a sense of humour in politics !¹

When Liverpool at last withdrew the Bill, his majority having fallen to nine, an explosion came. The Cabinet wished to prorogue Parliament immediately, a step of obvious wisdom since the Opposition in the Commons were thirsting for the fray. The King wished a new charge of corrupting the Princess Charlotte to be brought against the Queen on the evidence of his sister. The Ministry naturally refused to agree to so revolting a step, and the King again threatened their dismissal. Few monarchs have had to endure from their servants such words as Wellington then addressed to him on behalf of the Cabinet. He had to abandon his infamous design.²

Canning now left the Ministry, in which he had only remained so as not to prejudice the case in the Lords. His previous friendship with the Queen had made even the King admit that he could not, honourably, take part in the proceedings against her, and he had set out on a continental tour in July. His resignation made surprisingly little impression, though it was admitted that the Government could ill spare his debating skill in the Commons. Liverpool hoped to get him back when the storm had blown over. Meanwhile, Castlereagh was left almost single-handed to face the Commons. His skilful handling of the liturgy question, when Parliament met in 1821, saved the Government, and a reaction had begun against the violence of the Queen's supporters. The wounded vanity of the monarch was soothed by a coronation which transcended all others in magnificence and cost £263,000. The Queen's ill-judged attempt to force an entry to the Abbey brought her no increase of popularity. The people had begun

¹ Nesselrode to Lieven, Nov. 5, 1820; Lieven to Nesselrode, Dec. 4, 1820: *Pet. Arch.* From Stewart, Oct. 23, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 153. From Stewart, Nov. 20, 1820 (Separate): *F.O. Austria*, 160, *Appendix* p. 531. Stanhope, *Conversations*, 228. Creevey, as usual, gets the story very mixed: *The Creevey Papers*, ii. 4.

² Lieven to Nesselrode, Dec. 4, 1820. *Pet. Arch. Memorandum to the King upon the supposed change of his Government*, Dec. 1820: *W.N.D.* i. 150. Lord Holland, *Further Memoirs of the Whig Party*, 198-9.

to get tired of her. She lost her courage, and to the wrath of Cobbett and other haters of the monarchy, accepted a pension from the Government. Before she could retire to seclusion she fell ill and died, to the immense relief of her husband, the Cabinet and most of the nation.¹

Meanwhile the King had set out to visit his loyal subjects in Ireland. His relations with his Ministers, and especially Liverpool, continued cold. The latter had refused to appoint a nominee of the Marchioness to a vacant Windsor canonry, and the King was furious. Much of this resentment was visited on Castlereagh, who accompanied him to Ireland. There the King had a wonderful reception from the Dublin populace, though, according to some observers, he was drunk during his first entry, which was delayed by the death of the Queen. The mismanagement of her funeral procession, which the London mob forced the authorities to allow to pass through the City, added another grievance to the King's account against Liverpool.

In the midst of all these anxieties Castlereagh had been conducting the delicate and important negotiations which had resulted from the Spanish and Neapolitan revolutions. An open rupture had occurred between Britain and the Alliance. In August the Eastern Question became acute, and Constantinople was threatened with a Russian invasion. These were the problems which Castlereagh took with him when he accompanied his sovereign to Hanover, the King to receive the homage of his continental subjects, Castlereagh to discuss with Metternich the critical state of affairs on the Continent—and incidentally to prepare the King for a reconciliation with his Prime Minister and a reconstitution of the Cabinet.

¹ Lieven to Nesselrode, Jan. 30, 1821: *Pet. Arch.* Planta to Stratford Canning, Aug. 8, 1821: *F.O. Stratford Canning Papers*, vol. 7, *Appendix* p. 582.

2. THE SPANISH REVOLUTION AND THE STATE PAPER OF MAY 5, 1820

SINCE the meeting at Aix-la-Chapelle Spanish affairs had occupied less of the attention of the Great Powers. Alexander had been as good as his word, and Tatishchev had received peremptory orders to support Wellesley in colonial affairs instead of intriguing against him. He had admittedly carried out his instructions and consequently lost all his influence with the Spanish Government. In October, 1819, he went home on leave and never returned to Madrid. Nevertheless, there were still many causes of friction between Britain and Spain, and their relations sensibly worsened during 1819. Despite the stringent Foreign Enlistment Act passed by the British Government in this year, their policy on colonial questions was still suspect. The controversy between Spain and Portugal over the Rio Plata territory grew more acute, and Britain re-affirmed her obligations to the people of Portugal. The growing British trade with the Spanish Colonies was, however, the greatest cause of dispute. The Spanish Government used every weapon at its disposal to repress it and revenged herself by foolishly hampering British merchants in Spain by arbitrary and illegal decisions. The volume of complaints on both sides swelled enormously in the course of the year, and the archives are full of these irritating controversies. One result was the dispatch of a special squadron under Sir Thomas Hardy to the River Plate to watch over British interests.

Internally, Spain drifted from bad to worse. The feeble Ministers were dismissed incontinently if they endeavoured to cope with the difficulties with which they were confronted. They were lucky if they escaped imprisonment or exile. In

such circumstances their main endeavours were to avoid all responsibility and allow matters to drift. "I am assured," reported Wellesley, "that M. de Lozano de Torres, who is now the King's principal adviser, is ignorant even of the geographical positions of the countries which form the principal objects of the negotiations with Portugal and with the United States, and it may be doubted if the King himself is much better informed upon the subject. The desperate state of affairs is the general topic of conversation, but amongst the persons who surround the King there is no one who dares venture to attempt to open his eyes to the situation of his Government."¹

The King was, in fact, living in a world of his own, pretending that he was still the head of a powerful Empire instead of a weak and almost bankrupt State. Preparations were continued at Cadiz for an expedition to reconquer South America. New and more stringent regulations were issued regarding British traders. The advice of the Powers on the dispute with Portugal was summarily rejected. The ratification of the Treaty with the United States concerning the Floridas was refused.

In July Ferdinand received a sharp warning of the results of this policy in a conspiracy among the troops at Cadiz. It failed for lack of preparation, and D'Abisbal, who was suspected, not without reason, of sympathy with the troops, was removed from the command of the expedition. But Ferdinand became more obstinate and more unpopular than ever, and, as the year wore on, Wellesley's unceasing tale of procrastination and stupidity grew more and more gloomy.

On January 1, 1820, a new military insurrection broke out at Cadiz under two colonels, Quiroga and Riego. At first Wellesley and most other observers attached but little importance to it, for the mass of the people were quite apathetic and regarded the quarrel between the King and the Army as no concern of theirs. When the insurgents proclaimed the Constitution of 1812, Wellesley regarded their cause as completely lost, since that Constitution was in most parts of the country "to the full as unpopular as the system which it is the

¹ From Wellesley, June 24, 1819: *F.O. Spain*, 224

professed object of the insurgents to reform." But when the mass of a nation is apathetic, a minority can accomplish a great deal. In Madrid and other towns there already existed the network of an organisation of clubs ready to take advantage of the situation. Ferdinand was neither able to crush the insurgents nor willing to offer any concessions, and his weakness encouraged his opponents to press for extremes. Gradually other military leaders joined the rebels. D'Abisbal deserted at the critical moment and Madrid broke out in revolt. Too late, the King proclaimed a constitution. The next day his fears led him to accept precipitously and unconditionally the Constitution of 1812, which, as Wellesley said, "has been proved upon trial to be little suited to Spain, and which has therefore been condemned by all classes of the community excepting the framers of it."¹

The first news of the Cadiz revolution had been received by the Western Powers with equanimity. Both Britain and France were occupied with their own domestic troubles and their reports from Spain were re-assuring. Nor could Metternich, immersed in the Vienna Conference, spare much attention for Spain. The Tsar, however, was from the first immensely concerned with the news of the insurrection. A military conspiracy always awoke in him recollections of the past and fears for the future. He was instantly alert, and even before the final revolution at Madrid had occurred, had sent a dispatch to his Allies which anticipated the necessity of Allied interference.² They were invited to discuss immediately the line of action to be adopted in case the King should fail to suppress the revolt and apply for their aid, or if the insurrection should continue.²

Moreover, the Portuguese Ambassadors at Petersburg and Berlin, alarmed at the events in Spain, with whom Portugal was in bitter controversy in South America, seized the opportunity, even before the Madrid revolution, to ask for the guarantee of the 'Holy Alliance' from Russia and Prussia. They were probably inspired by Capo d'Istria to do so. In

¹ From Wellesley, Jan. 17, Feb. 23, March 3, March 13, 1820: *F.O. Spain*, 234.

² Nesselrode to Lieven, March 3, 1820: *F.O. Russia*, 124.

any case, the reply made by Alexander expressed great regret that he had not succeeded in persuading his Allies to erect the Holy Alliance into a system of general guarantee. At Berlin a more guarded answer was given, but that Court was persuaded by Russia to take the initiative in proposing the mediation of the Allied Ambassadors at Paris to deal not only with the Spanish-Portugal question, but also with the Spanish revolution itself.

The Tsar, however, had as yet by no means abandoned his advocacy of 'Liberalism.' Capo d'Istria was still high in his favour, and Capo d'Istria did not desire the Alliance to guarantee the undiluted autocracy which Metternich loved. The Spanish Constitution could not be recognised, because it had been obtained in so reprehensible a fashion. But the interference of the Great Powers was to be paternal and constructive and not merely negative and repressive. In return for their assistance Ferdinand might well be compelled to grant a suitable constitution which, like the *Charte*, emanated from the royal will and could be regarded as a legitimate means of reconciling King and subjects. French assistance might be obtained for such a project, and Austria thus doubly thwarted.

France was, of course, immediately concerned. She had never abandoned her claim to exercise special influence at Madrid on the ground of her geographical contiguity, and even more because her King was head of the House of Bourbon. She was exceedingly jealous of British influence, and had already begun to interfere in the question of the Spanish Colonies in direct opposition to British policy. The new Richèlieu Ministry, in which Pasquier remained as Foreign Minister, wished to assert itself in European affairs and to divert from Paris the too close attention of the Quadruple Alliance. Pasquier had been an official of the Empire, and when he became Foreign Minister in September 1819 he adopted wholeheartedly the views of the permanent officials of the French Foreign Office, themselves trained under the Empire. Henceforward, the permanent official, Rayneval, plays an increasing part in the direction of French diplomacy. He was almost more anti-British than anti-Austrian, and he sought to establish the influence of France both in Spain and

Italy and overseas. It was Rayneval who had inspired the Buenos Ayres negotiations which caused such a sensation when revealed in the course of this year. During the revolutions, therefore, Pasquier desired France to play an active and imposing part. But he was far from being a reactionary, and desired, like Capo d'Istria, to use not only the dynastic influence of the Bourbons but also the example which the 'Charte' had given of a successful constitution originating in the royal benevolence. In such policy he might naturally expect the assistance of Russia.

Both Richelieu and Pasquier wished at once to assert the special interest of their King in the fate of Ferdinand. Stuart, already suspicious of the return of the 'Russian' Richelieu, was amazed to learn that they contemplated sending immediately a special letter of advice to the King of Spain from the King of France, and that this was to be entrusted to La Tour du Pin, one of their most skilful Ambassadors. Stuart protested vigorously, and, finding his objections unheeded, sent off post haste to warn Wellesley. The result was that the Spanish Liberals learnt of the design, and so great was the hostility openly manifested that the French Government abandoned it. Richelieu and Pasquier were furious. The former was especially indignant at a casual but very tactless remark of Stuart's that the Bourbons were so unpopular in Madrid that the people were talking of changing the dynasty. He sent a special letter of protest to Wellington and complained of Stuart's conduct to the other Foreign Ambassadors. There was a sudden increase of hostility to Britain in the French Press, and rumours were circulated and believed at Paris that Wellesley and his Government had instigated and assisted the Revolution.¹

Pozzo di Borgo naturally tried to take full advantage of the situation. He laid the whole blame of the revolution on Britain, because she had prevented the King of Spain from attending the Conference at Aix-la-Chapelle. He inoculated both his Austrian and Prussian colleagues with these views, and got them to write to their Courts proposing joint Allied

¹ From Stuart, March 20, March 23, April 6, 1820: *F.O. France*, 225, 226. Pasquier, *Mémoires*, iv. 492-4. Richelieu to Wellington, March 30, 1820: *W.N.D.* i. 112.

action at Paris. Indeed, even this action seemed scarcely sufficient to meet so serious a threat to established institutions, and the idea of another Conference on the model of Aix-la-Chapelle was openly put forward at Paris, where it found ready support in royalist circles.

Some such reaction at Paris might perhaps have been expected, but the concern which was shewn at Berlin in the Spanish revolution much astonished the British Government. It was, in fact, mainly due to Russian influence that Prussia took up so warmly a question in which she had only a remote interest, though the vain and sentimental Ancillon, who was acting Foreign Minister while Bernstorff was at the Vienna Conference, doubtless wished to make himself important.¹ He shewed, however, the greatest anxiety to learn the British view. As early as March 20, 1820, he told Rose that Russia was likely to invoke the 'Holy Alliance' and that Prussia had been lately urged by that Court to convert it into a general guarantee. He had answered that "this would be to exclude England from the European system," and Rose endeavoured to establish him in this opinion. Nevertheless, urged on by the Russian Ambassador, Alopeus, he continued to press for some kind of action by the Powers with regard to Spain. He warmly approved of the French project to send La Tour du Pin to Madrid, and wished the Ambassadors of the other Powers to support his representations. While admitting the undesirability of opening a formal Conference on the subject, since Pozzo di Borgo's influence would be thus increased, he suggested that instructions should be sent to the Allied Ambassadors at Paris to discuss common action with the French Minister, since Paris was the natural centre for such discussions. These proposals, which were undoubtedly due to Russian influence, in spite of the language in which they were made, were reinforced by a private letter from Hardenberg himself to Castlereagh, which laid stress on the danger of the bad influence which the Spanish revolution might have on France.²

¹ Humboldt had now ceased to exercise any influence on Prussian policy.

² From Rose, March 21, April 1, 1820: *F.O. Prussia*, 123. Hardenberg to Castlereagh, March 31, 1820: *C.C.* xii. 223.

At Vienna the impression made by the revolution was also profound. It occasioned an immediate reaction in Italy, where the Liberals toasted openly the success of their comrades in Spain. Metternich was undoubtedly seriously alarmed. But he had always, in Spanish affairs, followed Castlereagh's lead, and he was, from the first, determined to await news from London before he committed himself in any way. He was not likely, moreover, to support any policy which increased Russian influence at Berlin and Paris. He wrote sharply to Vincent and warned him that the suspicions directed against British policy were entirely false, though he hoped that Sir Charles Stuart would be removed from Paris. He also disassociated himself entirely from Hardenberg's proposals. Though he wrote gloomily to Esterhazy on the general situation in Europe, he accepted, almost without question, the policy of reserve which Stewart informed him was that of the British Government. "Prince Metternich seems less disposed to project any common measure than I ever saw him before," reported the Ambassador. He criticised, indeed, the past policy of Britain towards Spain and her inability to look far enough ahead "so as to prevent great explosions before they arrive." But Stewart was happy to perceive "that he was resolutely determined to decline everything in the shape of any united *démarche* or opinion as to what is passing in Spain." Meanwhile, Metternich awaited anxiously the decisions of the British Cabinet and professed himself ready to support their policy against any attacks which Russia and France might make upon it.¹

While such various opinions and suggestions came from abroad, the British Government were no less anxiously watching the course of events in Spain. The revolution came as a great surprise to them, and they were seriously shocked by it. They felt always a special responsibility towards Spain, and their interests in the Spanish Colonies and in Portugal were, of course, deeply affected. Neither Castlereagh nor Wellington were in town when the news arrived. The latter

¹ From Stewart, April 9 (Nos. 43, 44, 45 and Separate), 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 150. Metternich to Esterhazy, April 7, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 213, iv. Metternich to Vincent: *Vienna St. A. Frankreich, Weisungen*, 343.

had followed events with close attention, and before the revolution in Madrid had desired Ferdinand to grant a moderate constitution. The Great Powers must, however, he insisted, remain neutral in any event. When the Constitution of 1812 had been established by military revolt, he expressed openly the greatest horror. He was shocked as a soldier, and even went so far as to tell Richelieu that the catastrophe was a greater one than the Return from Elba.¹

Castlereagh maintained the greatest reserve. He was overwhelmed with work in connection with the Cabinet's dispute with the King. But the attention of the whole Cabinet had to be also directed towards events at Madrid on which, sooner or later, they must pronounce their verdict. Meanwhile, he was anxious to prevent any attempt at interference on the part of other Powers. The conduct of Stuart and Wellesley with regard to La Tour du Pin's mission was immediately and formally approved. Wellesley was ordered to abstain from all interference and even advice, however much the British Government might desire to see a moderate constitutional system established. Only on two points was Wellesley authorised to express an opinion, if the Kings' life should be in danger, or if an attack on Portugal were contemplated. In the first case the British Government naturally went back to the precedent of the French Revolution, and Wellesley was expressly ordered to impress on the Spanish Liberals "how much of the disasters of France and of its long sufferings and moral separation from Europe was to be traced to the fatal and criminal course pursued towards Louis XVI., and the reigning dynasty." As to Portugal, the British guarantee was again expressly confirmed, and this was to be applied not only to a direct attack but also to "any attempt made by indirect means to subvert His Most Faithful Majesty's authority in Portugal, either by tampering with his troops or subjects or by inviting or accepting the defection of his people from their allegiance in order to incorporate or unite themselves with Spain." In a private letter, Castlereagh confessed that British influence at Madrid was not likely to accomplish much owing to its moderate and disinterested attitude towards the

¹ Wellington to Richelieu, March 13, 24, 1820: *W.N.D.* i. 106, 107.

two contending parties, but it was significant that he had already abandoned all hope of Ferdinand and considered that it was only the Cortes itself which could take the initiative in any change in the absurd constitution of 1812. This attitude was confirmed by all Wellesley's dispatches, which described the bad effect of the projected French Mission. The new Spanish Ministry was moderate in policy, he said, and hoped to obtain the election of a moderate Cortes; but the Clubs were full of undisciplined extremists, whose influence was strengthened by every threat of foreign interference.¹

Meanwhile, the Cabinet had appointed Castlereagh and Wellington to draw up Memoranda on the situation, on which British policy could be founded. Originally the design does not appear to have been more than to formulate Cabinet policy in an explicit manner for the information of its members, but as the effect of the Spanish revolution on Russia, France and Prussia began to be perceived and the desire for a new Conference was so openly expressed in so many quarters, it came to be seen that some definite and authoritative exposition of British policy must be sent to the members of the Alliance. Both Castlereagh and his colleagues refused to commit themselves until the whole question had been thrashed out in the Cabinet. The Foreign Minister refused to answer the pressing demands of the Russian Ambassador and the Prussian and French Chargés d'Affaires for interviews. He had a good excuse in the critical internal situation. He met the foreign representatives, of course, in Society, and did not attempt to conceal his anxiety or the grave view which he took of the situation. But he also hastened to state his personal opinion that all foreign interference would be dangerous and even impossible. Wellington was more loud in his expressions of opinion on the dangerous example of a military insurrection, thinking perhaps of the suspicious discipline of the British Guards. But he, too, took the line that Spain must be left alone.

The two Ministers were meanwhile elaborating these ideas in

¹ To Wellesley, April 25, 1820 (Nos. 14, 15, and Private): *F.O. Spain*, 233. From Wellesley, March 16, 23, April 6, 1820: *F.O. Spain*, 234, 235.

Memoranda, which were submitted to a most careful examination by the Cabinet. Wellington's, a comparatively simple piece of work, was finished on April 16. According to him, the revolution was essentially military and the army was the only real authority in Spain. But interference by foreign Powers was both undesirable and impossible. "There is no country in Europe," he wrote, "in the affairs of which foreigners can interfere with so little advantage as Spain. There is no country in which foreigners are so much disliked and even despised and whose manners and habits are so little congenial with those of other nations of Europe. The pride and prejudices of the Spaniards, their virtues as well as their faults, are brought into action at every moment and in every transaction, and all tend to give them an exaggerated notion of their own powers and to depreciate foreigners." This thesis he proceeded to illustrate from his own ample experience in the Peninsular War, and he reinforced his conclusions by briefly enumerating the strategic difficulties of any invasion of Spain, especially since French troops, according to him, could not be safely employed, because "of all foreigners the French are the most odious to that country."¹

This Memorandum was simply, therefore, that of a soldier. It did not discuss the political aspect of the problem or its connection with obligations of the Alliance. This task was naturally reserved for Castlereagh² himself, and in view of the attitude of his Allies it was necessary for him to take a much wider view of the question. He had before him the Russian Memoir of March 3, which, though written before the outbreak of the Madrid Revolution, had suggested that the Powers might be called on to intervene, the letter of Hardenberg advocating Ambassadorial Conferences at Paris, and the vaguer ideas of Pozzo di Borgo, of which he had only heard indirectly for a reunion of the Cabinets. There had been, moreover, the abortive attempt of France to take isolated action by means of the mission of La Tour du Pin. Three of his Allies therefore considered that the Powers ought to

¹ Memorandum to Viscount Castlereagh regarding the propriety of interfering in Spanish Affairs, April 16, 1820: *W.N.D.* i. 116.

² On the question of the responsibility of Castlereagh and Canning for this document, see note at the end of the chapter.

take united action at Madrid, and their representatives were pressing him for an answer. It was obvious that the doctrines which he had laid down so uncompromisingly at Aix-la-Chapelle and during 1819 were again challenged. Indeed, the answers of Prussia and Russia to the Portuguese Ambassadors made him suspect that the scheme of a general guarantee might be again pressed on his attention. He had therefore to assert once more the British view of the obligations of the Alliance, and to shew that they were not applicable to the situation which had arisen in Spain.

In its first form the Memorandum, which was written in the latter part of April, was designed only as a Cabinet Minute. It was only after its discussion and adoption by the Cabinet that it was decided to send it to foreign Courts. This necessitated a certain amount of revision, since some of the references to the French precedent, out of which the obligations of the Alliance had arisen, were scarcely such as could be communicated to that Power. Some other references to the strategical position of various countries and their liability to attack were also too delicate to discuss openly. The Memorandum was accordingly revised from this point of view, but the alterations to be made were not substantial and did not affect the form of the document, which remained, as Lieven explained, a kind of general review of British policy rather than a document drawn up in a form intended to be communicated to foreign Courts.¹

Written in these circumstances the Memorandum naturally bears a somewhat inchoate character. Its topics follow naturally upon one another, but there is no very clear division of subjects. In some parts the transition is rather abrupt owing to the elision of sentences and the insertion of others, which was possibly partly due to the fact that Castlereagh fell ill immediately after the discussions in the Cabinet were closed.

¹ See the *Duke of Wellington's Observations on Lord Castlereagh's Memorandum: F.O. Prussia*, 122, *Appendix* p. 513. The whole of the Memorandum is printed in the *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, ii. 622, as an appendix to Mr. Temperley's chapter on the Foreign Policy of Canning. There is also in *F.O. Austria*, 148, a draft which appears to be that originally communicated to the Cabinet and in which some of the necessary alterations and other verbal amendments can be traced.

The objects of the Memorandum, as stated in a special minute to the King, were five in number :—(1) To justify British policy in Spain and advise the proper course to pursue ; (2) To refute the Russian propositions and the even more objectionable Prussian suggestions ; (3) To lay down once more the true principles of the Alliance ; (4) To decline the renewed overture of Russia for the Treaty of general guarantee ; (5) To dispel the alarm felt in Germany at the success of a military revolution by pointing out their real means of security and diverting them from distant objects over which they can exercise no control.¹ These objects, however, tend to be promiscuously mixed up in the Memorandum, the particular and the general not being altogether distinguished from one another. Nevertheless, the final impression is a distinct one, and to careful reading the document is perfectly clear so far as it goes.

The Memorandum began with a reference to the effect of the Spanish Revolution on the Russian and Prussian Courts, and the suggestions emanating from Paris for a reunion of the Powers to consider the question, which was peremptorily rejected as unsuitable to the circumstances of the case. "They conceive it preferable that their intercourse should be limited to those confidential communications between the Cabinets, which are, in themselves, best adapted to approximate ideas, and to lead, as far as may be, to the adoption of common principles, rather than to hazard a discussion in a Ministerial Conference which, from the necessarily limited powers of the individuals composing it, must ever be better fitted to execute a purpose already decided upon than to frame a course of policy under delicate and difficult circumstances." .

This important generalisation was reinforced by special arguments in the particular case of Spain, attention being drawn to the uncertain character of its Government as well as to those arguments which the Duke of Wellington and Sir Henry Wellesley had employed. The Emperor of Russia, it was pointed out, had not foreseen the actual case which had resulted, viz. the acceptance by the King of the Constitution and his notification of it to foreign Courts. This made it more difficult for the Allied Powers to deliberate on his proceedings,

¹ Castlereagh to the King, April 30, 1820 : C C. xii 255.

and still more to give any advice except that which sensible men in Spain must already have discovered for themselves.

Moreover, Spain was less likely than any other Power in Europe to "menace other States with that direct and imminent danger which had always been regarded, at least in this country, as alone constituting the case which would justify external interference." Nor should advice be given if there was no intention of following it up by action, as it would then only needlessly irritate. The Allied Powers might individually warn the Madrid Government of the consequences that follow any violence done to the person of the King or his family, or any hostile action directed against Portugal, which Great Britain indeed was bound by Treaty to protect. But these warnings need not be made in a corporate character which would rather tend "to offend than to conciliate or persuade."

In short, there was no direct danger from Spain, however pernicious the example of a military revolt resulting in an almost republican constitution; and therefore the "notion of revising, limiting or regulating the course of such experiment either by foreign council or by foreign force, would be as dangerous to avow as it would be impossible to execute."

The consideration of the case of Spain was then followed, as in previous papers, by a reconsideration of the principles and obligations of the Alliance, which were, however, interrupted and illustrated by references to the specific example under discussion. The Alliance, it was recalled, was made against France. "It never was, however, intended as an union for the government of the world or for the superintendence of the internal affairs of other States." It was, indeed, intended to guard Europe against the "revolutionary power," but rather in the military character in which it had appeared in France than as "the democratic principles, then as now, but too generally spread throughout Europe."

It was admitted that the Alliance might usefully discuss and act in questions outside the scope of the original intentions, but not as a matter of course. "What is intended to be combated, as forming any part of the duty as Allies, is the notion, but too perceptibly prevalent, that whenever any

great political event shall occur, as in Spain, pregnant perhaps with future danger, it is to be regarded almost as a matter of course, that it belongs to the Allies to charge themselves collectively with the responsibility of exercising some jurisdiction concerning such possible eventual danger."

This point of view was supported by two arguments. One, that unless advice was to be supported by force it would be treated with contempt, had already been once used ; the other dwelt on the constitutional differences between the Allies, and led to a discussion of great importance. In great dangers the Allies had a common interest and could all act together. But in lesser and more remote cases their interests were not the same, and above all, they had not the same means of action. This was easily seen in the present case. The Emperor of Russia was a despot and could act as he wished at any moment. But the King of Great Britain was controlled by Parliament and public opinion, which in this case was strongly against the King of Spain. Any attempt at joint intervention of any kind would be attacked by the Opposition and the Government embarrassed. The internal condition of Britain was, indeed, such that the whole of the Government's energies was absorbed by it, and they could not add to their difficulties. This shewed that the Powers could not always "feel alike upon all subjects." The representative Governments must often differ from those "more purely monarchical," and this was especially true with regard to the progress of democratic principles. There was, in fact, a division between Eastern and Western Europe, between autocracy and constitutional government. The Eastern Powers could do little to influence the Western by mere councils, as had been seen in the case of France. They could probably do little more by armed interference, which should never be employed except against an actual and immediate danger. But there was no such danger from France or Spain, who might therefore be permitted to work out their own experiments in their own way.

The general principle of non-intervention was stated in some pregnant sentences—"The principle of one State interfering by force in the internal affairs of another in order to enforce

obedience to the governing authority, is always a question of the greatest possible moral, as well as political, delicacy. . . . It is only important on the present occasion to observe that to generalise such a principle and to think of reducing it to a system, or to impose it as an obligation, is a scheme utterly impracticable and objectionable. . . . No country having a representative system of Government could act upon it, and the sooner such a doctrine shall be distinctly abjured as forming in any degree the basis of our Alliance the better. . . . Great Britain has perhaps equal power with any other State to oppose herself to a practical and intelligible danger capable of being brought home to the national feeling. When the territorial Balance of Europe is disturbed, she can interfere with effect, but she is the last Government in Europe which can be expected or can venture to commit herself on any question of an abstract character." After a reference to the new security of Germany, which might be expected from the completed constitution, and an admission of the special interests of Britain in the Netherlands, the same principles were reiterated with great force. "We shall be found in our place," the concluding paragraph ran, "when actual danger menaces the system of Europe: but this country cannot and will not act upon abstract and speculative principles of precaution. The Alliance which exists had no such purpose in view in its original formation. It was never so explained to Parliament; if it had, most assuredly the sanction of Parliament would never have been given to it." The Cabinet could not alter such a policy now without breach of trust.¹

Such was the paper of which Canning published extracts in 1823, and which has been considered as making an important step forward in British policy. Its significance must not, however, be exaggerated. The reasoning is, after all, only a continuation of that which had been consistently put forward at Aix-la-Chapelle and in the discussions of 1819 concerning Germany and France. It differs from previous papers only in a certain tone of acerbity and in the uncompromising nature

¹ A reference to the discussions at Aix-la-Chapelle was added by Wellington's advice.

of its statements. But it must be remembered that it was concerned with a country in which Britain thought herself specially interested and where she specially dreaded the interference of other Powers. This fact, and the serious nature of the domestic situation of the Government, account sufficiently for the new note of emphasis. The doctrine of non-intervention in the internal affairs of other countries does not differ from that put forward at Aix-la-Chapelle, but it is stated in a more positive form, and made to rest on moral principle as well as precedent and expediency. ✓ Castlereagh had already taken a similar line on the question of the Spanish Colonies, but here the doctrine was laid down as regards Europe.

The system of reunions of the Great Powers to consider European questions was by no means abandoned. Canning had no real justification for his claim that there would be no more 'Congresses.' On the contrary, the system is expressly confirmed, but it is limited to cases in which all the Powers desire it and are interested in the problem to be solved. It was not, however, to be the normal organ of European diplomacy. This was stated more explicitly than at Aix-la-Chapelle, and it is probably true that Castlereagh was, on this point, made to go further than he personally wished. But he had kept his system, and it was to be used again, though without his all-important participation.

Perhaps the most important part of the Memorandum is the distinction drawn between constitutional and autocratic States. This fact, which Talleyrand had perhaps been the first to realise, had been often stated before by Castlereagh: it was, indeed, one of the commonest methods by which he defended any divergence from the views of his Allies." But it was stated now in so definite a fashion as to be a serious warning to the 'Eastern' Powers, that they would disregard it at their peril. It cut right across the natural and ancient system of diplomatic connections followed by this country since the time of Louis XIV., uniting the ancient foes of Britain and France, and the two antagonists Russia and Austria. As will be seen, this change only partially came into effect in this period, but it was a fact of the greatest importance in the nineteenth century. That it was pro-

claimed almost unwillingly by a Tory Cabinet, which was alarmed by the spread of the very Liberalism which united it with Western Europe, added to the significance of the declaration.

The practical considerations concerning Spain mentioned in the Memorandum, and reinforced by other documents, were unanswerable at the moment and produced their full effect.¹ The Memorandum, in fact, succeeded entirely in its immediate purpose. All the proposals and suggestions which had been made were abandoned by all the Powers except Russia, who found herself entirely isolated. In spite of his illness, Castlereagh interviewed the Ambassadors before it was sent to their Courts. Esterhazy sat three hours by his bed, and was eventually made to approve British action wholeheartedly. "The British Cabinet wish, as the Duke of Wellington has often said to me, that the Alliance sleeps," he reported. But he held that this desire was a necessary consequence of the position of the Government and recommended Metternich to accept its conclusions. Lieven, who was tackled later, was naturally more difficult to convince. He dwelt in his report on the internal situation, which he considered the main cause of the weak policy of the Government. He interrogated Castlereagh as to why no mention was made of the Spanish Colonies, and drew from Castlereagh an admission that the British Government considered the Colonies as finally lost to the Mother Country. Bülow explained to Castlereagh that Prussia had never intended to suggest a Treaty of general guarantee, and accepted the conclusions of the Memorandum in this respect. The Prussian Government, which had already been attacked by Metternich for its subservience to Russia, entirely approved, and dispatches entirely satisfactory to Castlereagh were sent to the Prussian Ministers at Madrid and Petersburg.²

¹ The Missions were also supplied with Wellington's Memorandum, the instructions to Wellesley and his reports, letters from the King of Spain to George IV. and a reply, instructions to the British Minister at Rio de Janeiro and a report of Admiral Bowles.

² Esterhazy to Metternich, May 5, 14, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 211, v. Lieven to Nesselrode, May 16, 1820: *Pet. Arch. Appendix* p. 565 Bülow to Bernstorff, May 12, June 20, 1820: *Berlin St. A.* From Douglas, May 23, 1820; *F.O. Prussia*, 125.

Alexander naturally did not accept the British view of the Alliance. He had followed his first Memorandum with another, dated April 30, which forwarded a correspondence with the Spanish Minister at Petersburg, severely commenting on the events in Spain. A joint remonstrance by the five Powers at Madrid was suggested, as well as a proposal that they should recommend "*un régime sage et constitutionnel*." Castlereagh welcomed, he said, the Tsar's devotion to the Alliance but regarded his proposals as impossible. After consulting his Cabinet he told Lieven that he could give him no other answer than that contained in his Memorandum. None of the other Powers accepted the Tsar's ideas, which Castlereagh had already refuted.¹

Metternich received the British Memorandum with relief. He was at first, indeed, delighted with the tone of the Russian proposals, which would embroil the Tsar with his Liberal friends in France and Germany. But when Castlereagh's budget came he accepted its conclusions in their entirety as regards action in Spain. The part concerning the Alliance was naturally not so favourably received, but it was swallowed without protest, and used to answer Alexander in a dispatch to Lebzeltern, which Stewart thought "incomparable." Metternich was indeed always at his best when Russia and Britain were at loggerheads on a question in which Austria had no direct interest, and he delighted to display their differences. But he followed his usual line, and Castlereagh was rewarded for his support in German questions by the complete acceptance of his ideas on Spain.²

The French Court was treated more delicately than the other Allies. Even after the revision there were so many comments on French policy that Castlereagh scarcely liked to communicate the Memorandum and the other documents officially and leave copies in the French Archives. He suggested, therefore, that the French Government should merely see and return the papers. Stuart was ordered to consult Richelieu, who much preferred the more discreet

¹ Russian Mémoire, April 30, 1820: *B.F.S.P.* vii. 943. Lieven to Nesselrode, June 21, 1820: *Pet. Arch.* Esterhazy to Metternich, May 30, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 211, v.

² From Stewart, May 15, 23, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 150.

method. Pasquier and the King were also informed. Both the Ministers professed complete agreement with Britain, and Richelieu went so far as to admit that the idea of the La Tour du Pin Mission was a mistake. Pasquier pointed out, with some feeling, that it was from the neglect of the principles laid down in the Memorandum that all the troubles of the last five years in France had sprung, but he could not oppose its conclusions. When Pozzo di Borgo, therefore, received the second Russian Memorandum and proposed a Conference at Paris, he received no encouragement from the French Ministers.

Nevertheless, the French Government would have seen, without regret, a Conference of the Great Powers on some subject in which France could take an independent line and thus assert her equality in the Alliance.✓ This natural desire was to play some part in the later negotiations of this year at Naples. Moreover, France was by no means ready to abandon the special interest in the King of Spain which her dynastic connection gave to her. The new French Ambassador at London, Decazes, was instructed by Pasquier to keep this idea well in the foreground. It appeared also in a Memorandum of Pasquier's of July 1820, in which it was suggested that concerted instructions should be sent to the representatives of the Allied Courts at Madrid on such principles as the respect of religion and morality, the maintenance of monarchical institutions and fidelity to engagements to other Powers. Castlereagh had, however, no difficulty in evading the necessity of a formal answer to these suggestions. A few words on the effect of interference on French institutions were sufficient. For the moment, therefore, France accepted the British point of view and sent instructions to her Ambassador at Madrid to exercise the greatest reserve.¹

The Memorandum had therefore achieved complete success. Three of Britain's Allies had accepted its conclusions, and the Tsar was left isolated and impotent. Castlereagh, faced with

¹ To Stuart, May 5, May 12, 1820: *F.O. France*, 222, *C.C.* xii. 260. From Stuart, May 25, 29, June 22, 1820: *F.O. France*, 226, 228. Pasquier to Decazes, July 20, 1820: *Paris, A.A.E.* 613, f. 352. French Memorandum July, 1820: *F.O. France*, 240. Decazes to Pasquier, Aug. 11, 1820: *Paris A.A.E.* 613, f. 375. The papers were also sent to Wellesley, and to Clancarty for the information of the King of the Netherlands.

somewhat slow, I have, by delay, procured the fullest and most deliberate examination of the subject in the largest sense, and that I can now refer you to the exposition which my brother will convey to you, as the unanimous opinion of the British Cabinet, formally submitted to and approved by the King" ¹ To these discussions Canning, no doubt, contributed a good deal. He was certainly pleased with the result, and claimed credit that it was due to his influence that no 'Congress' had been suggested.² But, as has been seen, this was the judgment that Castlereagh and Wellington had themselves instinctively formed on the Spanish revolution from the first. It is probable, however, that if they had been left to themselves they would have stated their opinion less bluntly in a communication to foreign Courts. According to Lieven, there was some difference of opinion in the Cabinet as to the extent to which they should insist on their views, and it was the critical state of domestic affairs that induced them to go so far in that direction.³

The final judgment is the same as that held by Mr. Temperley, who was the first historian to realise the importance of this paper, that "the main responsibility rests with Castlereagh," but that the tone of the paper was influenced by Canning and others in the Cabinet, and made rather more explicit and incisive than it would otherwise have been.⁴

¹ Castlereagh to Metternich, May 6, 1820: *C.C.* xii. 258.

² Lane-Poole, *Life of Stratford de Redcliffe*, i. 291.

³ Lieven to Nesselrode, May 16, 1820: *Pet. Arch., Appendix* p. 565.

⁴ *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, ii. 622.

3. THE PORTUGUESE REVOLUTION, 1820-1822

IF Britain was alarmed at the possibility of action of the Alliance against Spain she was even more concerned about Portugal. For while in Spain she had important interests, Portugal she was bound by Treaty to protect. Her guarantee did not, of course, include that of internal peace, but it would be brought automatically into operation by the armed invasion of another Power. Spain, as has been seen, had been repeatedly warned of this fact both before and after her revolution. Its recognition had also to be secured from the other Great Powers of the Alliance. This was not a hard task, since all Europe recognised Britain's special interests in Portugal. Nevertheless, the complicated situation in the Peninsula gave Castlereagh great anxiety, and the peculiar position of the Portuguese Monarch and Government added to the difficulties of obtaining a peaceful solution of problems which affected the New World as well as the Old.

John, Regent of Portugal, had been forced to quit his country by the French invasion of 1807, and had found refuge in Brazil together with the whole of his family and many of his principal nobles. Brazil was in many respects a more desirable place of residence than Portugal, and when peace came the Regent shewed no signs of wishing to return to Europe. His own indolence and weakness, the influence of his profligate and ambitious wife, a certain jealousy of his two sons, Pedro and Miguel, who were also jealous of one another, the certainty of raising a new problem as to the relations of Brazil to its feeble *metropole*, kept John and his Court at Rio de Janeiro, where he expended the revenues of both countries in a manner which appealed to neither. Still, Brazil had gained freedom of commerce and practically inde-

pendence by the residence of the Monarch, a fact which was recognised by the title of King of Portugal, Brazil and the Algarves, which John assumed when his mother died in 1816.

In Portugal there was a Regency which was partly controlled by Marshal Beresford, who still commanded the army which he had made so useful during the Peninsular War. Few important steps were taken without consulting the Portuguese Ambassador in London, Palmella. Wellington's advice was often sought. Beresford naturally, however, shared the unpopularity of the absentee King. A further cause of complaint was the Commercial Treaty of 1810, which had opened Brazil's trade to Britain. The resentment at the loss of this profitable monopoly was not allayed by Britain's determined efforts to abolish the Slave Trade, to which Portugal clung longer than any other Power. But it was, after all, on British help that the Portuguese King and people must rely to protect them from their Spanish neighbours, whose hostility was much in evidence, especially in the dispute as to Olivenza, a border territory which Spain had seized and refused to give up. In this dispute, which was connected with the disposition of the Rio Plata territory in South America, Spain had appealed to the Alliance, and Britain had indeed threatened to abandon Portugal unless she accepted the award of the Paris Ambassadorial Conference. When Spain too hastily assumed, however, that the British guarantee had been annulled, care was immediately taken to explain that it still held good so long as Portugal was reasonable, and, in the dispute, British influence on the whole was thrown on the Portuguese side.¹

The old connection was therefore still in full force when the Spanish revolution broke out. The alarm in Portugal amongst the King's supporters and representatives in foreign States was, as has been seen, used by the Russian and Prussian Courts as a means to press the interference of the Alliance in Spain. Castlereagh's prompt renewal of the guarantee and his warning to Spain were, however, able to check any move from Madrid. But the influence of the Spanish revolution was sufficient in itself, without the intervention of foreign arms, to produce a

¹ See above, Chapter II, Section 1, p. 70.

sympathetic rising in a country suffering like Portugal from a grievance. As early as 1819 Beresford had recognised that only the return of the King could retain the allegiance of the Portuguese, and he had set out to Brazil to effect it. His absence removed the last obstacles to the revolution. It began in Oporto on August 24, 1820. The frightened Regency determined to summon the Cortes. But a new revolutionary Junta was set up in Lisbon, and on October 1 the two Juntas combined and the revolution was complete.

By this time the revolution at Naples, described in the next chapter, had occurred, and the members of the Alliance were in violent controversy over the exercise of the right of intervention. Since, however, there was never really any question of the interference of the Alliance in Portugal during Castlereagh's life-time, it will be convenient to trace here the subsequent history of a problem which did not reach an acute stage until he had been succeeded by Canning. Britain's special interests in Portugal were so well recognised that all agreed that no action by the Alliance could take place there. The general principles enunciated at Troppau and Laibach could indeed be theoretically applied to Portugal as much as to Spain or to Naples. But Castlereagh's emphatic protest in December 1820 against any such application was immediately accepted by all his Allies. Thus, though a group of Portuguese diplomatists never ceased to work for a monarchical restoration under the aegis of the Great Powers, the question never became one of practical politics. Though the Eastern Powers shewed their disapproval of the Portuguese revolution by various diplomatic methods, the Alliance was warned off all interference in a country which could be protected by British sea-power. More urgent was the question of interference by the Spanish revolutionaries, and Castlereagh's problem was not so much the connection of Portugal with the Alliance as the relations of the former with Spain and, of course, also with the King and his family at Brazil.

That monarch was not at all the sort of person to unravel with skill and understanding the complicated tangle into which he had got his royal dominions. But Edward Thornton, British Minister at Rio, was an experienced and able official,

who had handled another difficult ruler, Bernadotte, fairly successfully in the closing stages of the Napoleonic wars. He and Beresford had done their best in the early months of 1820 to shew the King that he must act quickly if he did not wish to lose his Portuguese crown altogether, though Beresford was perhaps more anxious about his own position than the interests of the Monarchy. At any rate, the King's hesitations were finally overcome, and Beresford was named a member of the Regency and sent back to Lisbon with extended powers and the promise that no more money would be taken from Portugal to Brazil. Before he could return, however, the revolution had broken out and he had to relinquish his post and his ambitions for a time.

The news of the revolution reached Brazil on October 18, 1820. It made the King at last ready to return to Europe, but he was now anxious for his own safety if he did so. Moreover, no one could forecast what the effect would be in Brazil itself. Thornton advised him to grant his subjects in both hemispheres a moderate Constitution and send Don Pedro to Portugal. But the King's Court was a nest of intrigue. The two principal Ministers, Villanueva and Arcos, the former hostile and the latter friendly to Pedro, neutralised each other's efforts. The King's actions were paralysed, and when the danger of delay was pointed out to him with some insistence by Thornton, he remarked, rather coldly and drily, that he hoped that the British Government had no intention of interfering in the internal affairs of his Kingdom.¹

This was the last thing Castlereagh desired; but he had no intention of allowing the King to suppose that either the Alliance or the British guarantee would be used to win back for him his absolute authority. Thornton was ordered to make two points quite clear to him: "The first is not to build upon what is called the Holy Alliance any expectation that the King can, by force, reconquer Portugal. I have always endeavoured to awaken his Ministers to the illusory nature of that League as a resource. The next is not to suppose that the guarantee of England applies to the question of authority now pending between

¹ From Thornton, Aug. 12, Oct. 12, Nov. 18, 1820: *F.O. Portugal*, 229.

Sovereign and subject. Neither can it be suspected that this country, even supposing a third Power, such as Spain, to interfere, should take upon itself the burthen of maintaining the King's interests both against his own people and against the Spaniards. I state this as shewing the indispensable necessity of the King accepting what he can save out of the wreck of his own power, which, by bad management and an unfounded jealousy of and indifference to our counsel, His Majesty has exposed to an entire dissolution. I press this the rather on your notice, lest our endeavours to keep the Court of Madrid right should be understood to pledge us to follow up the remonstrances thus made even to war. It is the more necessary to be guarded upon this point as I perceive a settled purpose in some of the Portuguese authorities to take an exaggerated view of the conduct of Spanish agents, as if to lay some ground for making us not auxiliaries, as our Treaties have made us, but principals in defence of Portugal, not in resistance of ordinary invasion but in combating even revolutionary movements to which our engagements were never intended to apply." ¹

At Lisbon Britain was represented by E. M. Ward, a minor diplomatist of pronounced reactionary views, whose influence was, however, not great. He could, in any event, do little more than report progress, since Castlereagh's object was throughout to allow matters to take their course. Castlereagh and Wellington expected much from the influence of Palmella, who had returned to Portugal in the summer of 1820 with a view of going on to Brazil and reporting to the King. Palmella, for one moment in despair, hoped that the Alliance might come to the rescue. But he accepted, loyally enough, the British veto on this course, which Castlereagh had so definitely announced. Castlereagh, indeed, so far from wishing the royal power to be vindicated, hoped to arrange for a compromise. "Whatever turn things take," he told Ward, after informing him of his letters to the Troppau Conference, "any appearance of menace on the part of this country, or any supposition that our influence was likely to be employed so as to favour vindictive measures, or to recom-

¹ To Thornton, Nov. 15, 1820: *F.O. Portugal*, 223.

mend to the King to attempt a system of unqualified reaction, would, as we conceive, be extremely prejudicial to the King's, as well as to the general, interests." This policy was not very palatable to Ward. It was only the fear of British influence, he said, which kept the Portuguese Liberals more moderate than their Spanish comrades. "If the suspense in which they now are with respect to the line of policy to be pursued by the English Cabinet be terminated by a certainty of no interference from that quarter," he reported at the end of the year, "they will in all probability proceed in the same track with their neighbours, and oblige the King to submit to the same terms as his royal brother-in-law."¹

This was not, however, Thornton's view nor Castlereagh's; and Palmella, who arrived in Brazil on December 23, 1820, supported them. Castlereagh continued his attempts to remove from the King's mind the idea that he could get back his old position by the aid of foreign arms, which he knew the proceedings at Troppau and Laibach might very likely encourage. "It appears to me clear," he wrote to Thornton on February 6, 1821, "that His Most Faithful Majesty is laying on his oars in the delusive hope that the Holy Alliance will undertake a crusade for the re-establishment of the old system in Portugal." Such hopes were entirely illusory; but he did not want the King to look to Britain to step into the breach. He hoped, on the contrary, that the fear of Spanish Liberalism would induce him to come to some arrangement with his own subjects.²

There appeared at first to be some chance of effecting this desirable result. Palmella had been warmly welcomed and made Minister of Foreign Affairs. He urged on the King that Pedro should be sent at once to Lisbon and declare for a moderate constitution. When difficulties arose, Thornton's help was obtained, but Court intrigues and Pedro's own equivocal conduct postponed a decision.

That Prince had, indeed, personal ambitions, and he and his favourite Arcos were at the back of a conspiracy of Portuguese, with the result that Rio followed Lisbon's example

¹ To Ward, Nov. 8, 1820; From Ward, Dec. 31, 1820: *F.O. Portugal*, 231.

² To Thornton, Feb. 6, 1821: *F.O. Portugal*, 237.

and had a revolution of its own. The poor King now found himself a constitutionalist in both hemispheres, and was at last ready to return to Europe. On April 25, 1821, he sailed for Lisbon, Thornton accompanying him. Pedro, who was left as Regent in Brazil, succeeded at the last minute, by instigating another insurrection, in obtaining such powers as made him practically independent.¹

In Portugal, meanwhile, the extreme party had been gradually but slowly gaining ground under the influence of Spanish propaganda. Even Ward admitted, however, that events must take their course, and that any interference by foreign Powers would be a mistake. "Let them alone and they will be suffocated in their own stink," he wrote on April 21, 1821, noting that as the Left increased in power their dislike of British influence also increased, and their determination to get rid of the Commercial Treaty of 1810, which appeared to be its symbol. Castlereagh had, however, no intention of interfering or allowing any one else to do so. The only action which he would take was to send a British ship-of-war to the Tagus, in response to an appeal from Brazil, with secret orders to protect the life of Pedro, who was then expected. It stayed, of course, to protect that of the King, who found on his arrival that he could do nothing but make unqualified submission to the leaders of the Cortes. These were men of little experience and judgment, and did everything possible to embroil themselves with the Great Powers. The mob attacked the Austrian Minister's house for refusing to illuminate, with the result that the Ministers of Austria and Russia left Lisbon. The Government also seemed to make a point of being as irritating as possible to Britain. New duties were imposed on woollen goods contrary to the Treaty of 1810, though this, of course, had never been abrogated. Oliveira, the new Portuguese representative in London, demanded a special Treaty of guarantee in the most peremptory manner, and wrote a series of notes on this and other questions of so offensive a tone that "the Archives of this office present no parallel instance."²

¹ From Thornton, March 3, 14, 30, April 27, 1821: *F.O. Portugal*, 237.

² Ward to Clanwilliam, April 21, 1821; From Ward, July 5, 9, Aug. 21, 1821: *F.O. Portugal*, 238-9. To Ward, March 22, 1822. *F.O. Portugal*, 250.

Nevertheless, Castlereagh shewed the greatest patience. He transferred the negotiations to Lisbon and ordered Ward to be as conciliatory as possible. Portugal was not in a position, he knew, to defy Britain and he relied on national jealousies and his own diplomacy at Madrid to keep Spain quiet. He was justified by the result. The Portuguese Foreign Minister, Pinheiro, was much alarmed at the severance of diplomatic relations by the Eastern Powers and looked to Britain for protection. He removed Oliveira at once and attempted to get the guarantee in a more diplomatic manner, hinting that if it were refused Portugal would have to throw herself into the arms of Spain.¹ Ward, at the orders of his Court, had sent him a note which re-affirmed all existing Treaties. But this was not sufficient. Pinheiro demanded a specific engagement that Britain would protect Portugal against the attacks of any Power, or combination of Powers, which might desire to overthrow her independence.

This was, however, just what Castlereagh wished to avoid. He was not going to give to the Liberals what he had refused to their King. A declaration so explicit would commit Britain to defend a Government which seemed to be growing more and more extreme, and would prevent a compromise with the royal power such as he desired. The King himself was equally helpless, and Castlereagh had to stop Sir Edward Thornton from proceeding to Lisbon on a special mission to give him the Garter, lest it should seem to have a secret political significance and increase the ill-will of the Cortes.¹ In such a situation complete neutrality, combined with the protection of Portugal from hostile attack by Spain, was the only possible course.²

No notice was taken therefore of the repeated requests

¹ Wellington wanted the Garter to be sent as a mark of goodwill to the King. An outburst on Dec. 14, 1821, to Beresford (*W.N.D.* i. 207), shews him at his very worst as a political prophet, for he could see no future before Portugal except absorption in Spain as part of a monarchy or a federation of republics. No resistance, he was certain, was to be expected from the King or his family or the nobility. "They are *geldings* in every sense of the word."

² To Ward, March 22, 1822: *F.O. Portugal*, 250. In a letter conveying some "private hints" to Ward on the "delicate instructions" he said that Britain wished to be friendly to Portugal "without reference to the state of its political institutions."

which Pinheiro made for the new Treaty of guarantee. In vain Ward assured him that the old Treaties were still in force and should be themselves sufficient. Pinheiro returned repeatedly to the attack. He said, "the danger was too pressing to leave anything in doubt; if England could not be induced to bind herself to protect Portugal against the Holy Alliance, Spain would. He allowed that a connection with her of this nature would be highly dangerous, as tending to promote those views of annexation which she had never lost sight of, and in furtherance of which she was not niggard of either money or promises in order to strengthen her party." This danger he intimated would have to be incurred if Castlereagh would not give the promise required.¹

No promise was, however, given. Castlereagh had his own methods of protecting the ancient connection with Portugal without the need of committing himself to an indiscriminate protection of a weak and irresolute Government. His repeated warnings at Madrid served to keep the Spanish Liberals quiet. As for the Holy Alliance, they were occupied with other matters, and by this time Metternich had been detached from the Tsar and was, in close co-operation with Castlereagh, warding off a Russian invasion of Turkey. Moreover, Portugal could not be attacked unless Spain was first dealt with, and Castlereagh was still just as determined, as he had been in 1820, not to allow the Alliance to intervene there. It was not until his death broke up the diplomatic connections by which this position was preserved that Portugal came to be in danger, and gave Canning an opportunity for a striking victory over the Holy Alliance, and one of the most eloquent of all his speeches.

Nor would Castlereagh have been much troubled at the final issue of events in Brazil, of which he had already been warned before his death, though he did not live to see the final step, since it took some little time for the plans to be completed. It was thus not until August 15, 1822, that Pedro published a Manifesto declaring Brazil completely independent of Portugal. A new monarchy thus arose in the New World, a result which, as will be seen in a

¹ From Ward, April 20, June 28, 1822: *F.O. Portugal*, 251.

later chapter, was quite in accordance with Castlereagh's plans for other parts of South America. At any rate, so far as the Portuguese revolution was concerned, he had refused to allow the Alliance any jurisdiction either in the Old World or the New.¹

¹ See also H. W. V. Temperley, *The Foreign Policy of Canning, 1822-27*, where the problem of Portugal's relations with Britain is treated on a much larger scale.

CHAPTER VI

TROPPAU AND LAIBACH: THE ALLIANCE DISRUPTED, 1820-21

1. THE NEAPOLITAN REVOLUTION, 1820
2. THE CONFERENCE OF TROPPAU, 1820.
3. THE CONFERENCE OF LAIBACH, 1821.

“ La parole n’a de l’effet qu’autant qu’elle est le symbole et le pré-
curseur de l’action ”—CASTLEREAGH, January 1821.

CHAPTER VI

I. THE NEAPOLITAN REVOLUTION, 1820

THE Spanish revolution raised clear issues which met with decided answers. The revolution in Naples ushered in one of the most intricate and involved diplomatic episodes in European history. The old struggles between Austria and France for power and influence in Italy, and between Britain and France for supremacy in the Mediterranean were complicated by the new doctrines of Liberalism and Nationality, and the new system of the European Alliance. Moreover, three of the European Powers involved had fluctuating policies, while two were involved in great internal difficulties. The total result was naturally a victory for the one man who throughout was able to see his way clearly—Metternich.

British policy was much affected by the fact that until the end of January 1821 the Government were believed by all observers to stand in the greatest danger. Not only did the domestic crisis prevent the Foreign Minister and the Cabinet from giving their full attention to the complicated problem which had to be solved, but it reduced enormously their influence and prestige on the Continent. Had Castlereagh been as free and secure in 1820 as in 1818, there can be no doubt that the result of the Troppau Conference would have been very different. He had, thus, to submit to a grave diplomatic defeat. Nevertheless, he was led by it to the most important assertion of British principles which he ever made, though even the breach which this public and uncompromising declaration made in the Alliance had been repaired, temporarily at least, before he died.

No one in Europe had expected Naples to be the first to

follow the example of Spain. When the question of the Sicilian constitution had been laid to rest, the kingdom of the two Sicilies had apparently entered upon a period of peace and even content. During Metternich's Italian tour Naples had been the only Court where Conservative principles appeared to have justified themselves. The Government was autocratic but paternal, and its officers, many of whom had been trained by Murat, seemed reasonably efficient when compared with the subordinates of other Italian Governments. An Austrian General, Nugent, commanded the Army, and the secret Treaty guaranteed Austrian control; but little of this influence appeared on the surface. Even A'Court, no very enthusiastic observer, drew a contrast between the Neapolitan Government and all others in Italy. It was the only one, he reported in November 1819, that was gaining ground either in public opinion or in the affection of its subjects. The secret societies had transferred their activities to the North, where bad government aided their plans. Now that the Tsar's support had been withdrawn, they had abandoned their visionary schemes for the unity of Italy and concentrated on the less grandiose object of freeing their country from foreign and ultramontane dominion. "Naples," he said, "under the auspices of M. de Medicis is advancing slowly and silently to a degree of strength and importance which it never before possessed." Even after the first events in Spain his confidence was unabated. "The quiet and prosperous state of these Kingdoms," he reported as late as March 13, 1820, "affords but few subjects worthy of being brought to your Lordship's notice."¹

The Madrid Revolution and the acceptance of the Constitution of 1812, exercised, however, an instantaneous and powerful influence on Naples. Even moderate men, A'Court at once confessed, thought a constitution necessary to guarantee the continuance of the good government which they admitted existed. The secret societies were encouraged by those in Spain to begin a new agitation.

Nevertheless, A'Court was greatly astonished when on July 2-6, 1820, the Neapolitan militia rose, and, with the

¹ From A'Court, Nov. 12, 1819, March 13, 1820: *F.O. Sicily*, 86, 90.

assistance of General Pepe, effected a revolution with almost ludicrous ease. "A kingdom in the highest degree flourishing and happy," he lamented, "under the mildest of Governments, and by no means oppressed by the weight of taxation, crumbles before a handful of insurgents that half a battalion of good soldiers would have crushed in an instant!" It was true that the rising had been inspired more by dislike of foreign influence than by revolt against domestic tyranny. It had originated among the Muratist officers of the Army, who had used the secret societies for their own purposes. They had resented serving under an Austrian commander, and there was always the temptation of place and power. They soon found themselves, however, unable to control events. The feeble and cowardly King attempted to evade responsibility by appointing as Regent his son, the Duke of Calabria. But the Carbonari were not to be put off by promises, and, by inciting the mob, forced the King to swear allegiance to the Spanish Constitution of 1812. The moderate leaders were thus saddled at the outset with a form of democracy which gave great opportunities to the extremists. Their difficulties were soon increased by a rising in Sicily directed against Neapolitan control, which was only put down by cruel massacre. Pepe, an intriguing and violent man, joined the Carbonari elements. The wildest hopes and aspirations were exacted in the ignorant and inexperienced population. The British Minister believed that the King's life would be in danger, if any attempt should be made by Austria to restore his power.¹

The British Government were naturally as astonished and perturbed as their Ambassador by the revolution. "What an event and directed against a Government without reproach!" wrote Castlereagh to his brother. This fact clearly distinguished it from the Spanish revolution, but even more clearly apparent were the possible consequences that might flow from it. Harrowby, Bathurst and Canning, at once assured Ester-

¹ From A'Court, July, Aug. 1820. *FO. Sicily*, 90; *C.G.* xii. 279. As an illustration of exaggerated expectation, A'Court instanced that of the University students, "who went in great numbers to the palace to demand that all intermediate dangers should be abolished in these enlightened days and that all should at once be made Doctors." See also R. M. Johnston, *The Napoleonic Empire in Southern Italy*, vol. II. chaps. iv. and v.

hazy that they regarded the danger from Naples as far more serious than that from Spain. Castlereagh himself remained very reserved until a Cabinet had been summoned and the case considered, when he hastened, by letters to Stewart, and a long discussion with Esterhazy, to let Metternich know how far Britain could go. The Neapolitan revolution, he informed him, was considered by the Cabinet to stand in an entirely different position to that in Spain. Thus, while the principles of the State Paper of May 5, 1820, remained unaltered, the different circumstances of the two revolutions entirely changed their application. The new revolution threatened the other Italian States far more directly than the Spanish revolution threatened neighbouring countries, nor had either the people or the Army any reasonable excuse for their action. The Cabinet recognised therefore in the fullest fashion the right of the Austrian Government to act against Naples with armed force, if it was held, as was probable, that Austrian possessions were endangered.¹

"Its consequences," ran the official dispatch, "they apprehend cannot but be seriously felt throughout Italy, and must materially bear upon the safety of all its existing institutions. However anxious the British Government may be to witness the progressive advancement of rational liberty throughout Europe, it is impossible for them to observe these sudden and violent changes without alarm, and their solicitude becomes the greater on the present occasion from the tendency it must have to excite uneasiness in the Austrian Cabinet for the security of their Italian possessions." This was clear enough, but in his private letters to Stewart and conversations with Esterhazy, Castlereagh went much further and shewed himself not only willing but eager that Austria should march forthwith against the rebels. ✂ If Austria thinks fit to set her shoulder to the wheel," he said, "there can be little doubt of her competence to overrun the Kingdom of Naples and to dissolve the rebel army. The prudential question for her to decide will be her means of then reconstructing a system in the country which can, so far, maintain itself as not to press too heavily

¹ To Stewart (Private), July [29] 1820. *Vienna St. A. Varia*; July 29, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 148. Esterhazy to Metternich, July 20, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, vii. Bianchi, *Storia Documentata*, ii. 307.

upon her resources and her exertions, called for, as they are likely to be, in her own Italian provinces, and as they *may* be in Germany."

To Esterhazy he laid stress "on the very delicate and difficult but also very honourable task" which lay before Austria, and while recognising the dangers of the position, discussed the possibilities of an invasion and the forces necessary to prosecute it successfully. Wellington, as might be expected, was even more explicit. "It is time to make an example," he told Esterhazy, and estimated at 80,000 men the strength of the Austrian Army necessary to make victory quite secure.¹

But at the same time Castlereagh made it clear that Metternich must not expect assistance or even open countenance from Britain. It was Austria and not the Alliance which must act. "I have conversed unreservedly with Prince Esterhazy," he told Stewart, "and explained to him that however much we may disapprove and lament so disastrous an innovation, the British Government cannot take any part forcibly to counteract or control it." Esterhazy was perhaps less impressed by this side of Castlereagh's policy than the latter imagined, but he reported to his Court that the arguments of the State Paper of May 5, against extending the action of the Alliance, still held good. Castlereagh had been especially anxious to make this clear, for Stuart had already reported from Paris that Pozzo di Borgo was claiming the Paris Ambassadorial Conference as the natural organ to deal with the Neapolitan question, and that the French Cabinet were obviously waiting to hear from Russia before committing themselves. Castlereagh warned Stuart at once to give no countenance to such ideas, and pointed out that Vienna and not Paris was the natural place for discussion "if any common deliberation should become necessary." Meanwhile he awaited the ideas of Metternich, on whom the first responsibility must fall.²

To Metternich the news came as a great shock. He had

¹ To Stewart, July 29, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 148. To Stewart (Private), July 30, 1820: *Howard de Walden MSS.* Esterhazy to Metternich, July 30, 1820. *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, vii.

² To Stewart, July 29, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 148. From Stuart, July 20, 27, 1820: *F.O. France*, 229. To Stuart, July 28, 1820: *F.O. France*, 222.

agreed readily to Castlereagh's veto on intervention in Spain, but this new revolution threatened the whole position of Austria not only in Italy, but in Germany also. He varied his metaphors between conflagrations, torrents and earthquakes. At one moment he attributed everything to the Russian propaganda in Italy, at another he told Stewart that it was all the fault of Lord William Bentinck and the British Government for keeping him so long in Sicily. He recognised that the time for preaching had ceased and that the moment for action had come. But Metternich nearly always pushed caution to the verge of timidity, and he was very far from taking the rapid and decisive measures which the British Cabinet expected from him. He would do nothing until he heard from the Tsar. One word of encouragement from the North and all Italy and Germany would rise. Men must be clearly shewn that Russia was backing Austria, not the revolution. A personal meeting between the two Emperors had already been tentatively planned for some time. Metternich now suggested that this should take place at Pesth. The Ambassadors at Vienna would naturally be invited, but no other Sovereign or statesman. Austria would thus demonstrate to Europe that Russia was supporting her, while, at the same time a regular Conference would be avoided. Metternich thus hoped to satisfy the objections which he knew Britain would feel to any formal action by the Alliance. All this was conveyed in a dispatch to Lebzeltern of July 26, which distinguished between the two revolutions somewhat in the same manner as Castlereagh, but in far vaguer language.¹

Alexander was in Poland engaged in violent disputes with the Diet which, though it was a product of the royal will, persisted in also having a will of its own. He was also violently angry at the rejection by all his Allies of his views on Spain. Capo d'Istria was indeed explaining to Lebzeltern that the Alliance was virtually at an end, when the news of the Neapolitan revolution and the pleadings of the chastened Metternich reached them. It was too good an opportunity to be lost.

¹ From Stewart, July 16, 24, 26, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 151. Metternich to Lebzeltern, July 26, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 156. From Stewart, July 16, 1820 (Separate): *F.O. Austria*, 160.

The answer sent to Vienna declined the Pesth interview and insisted on a formal Conference, to which the King of Prussia should also be invited and for which Austria should prepare a detailed programme. The little town of Troppau in Austrian Silesia was suggested as a suitable spot for the Conference. Strangely enough, however, it was the Quadruple and not the Quintuple Alliance to which appeal was made, so great was the Tsar's distrust of France, whose views on this new revolution had not yet reached him. He was also far from completely accepting the schemes of Pozzo di Borgo and Capo d'Istria, and Metternich was especially pleased at the anti-Liberal tone of his replies. But the Tsar refused to give Austria anything like a blank cheque to act in Italy. Intervention must be European and not Austrian.

Meanwhile Metternich had been appealing to Castlereagh. In a personal letter he painted the situation in Italy in the blackest colours and asserted that he was faced with the greatest crisis in his career. He pressed, therefore, for as favourable an answer as possible to the questions which he had addressed to him through Esterhazy. These asked, among other things, that the envoys of the new Neapolitan Government should not be recognised, and desired to know what Britain would do if Sicily declared her independence and appealed to her. Metternich was still determined not to accept any proposal for a formal reunion of the five Cabinets, the idea of which had been invented by Pozzo di Borgo and Capo d'Istria, on whom he lavished much abuse. But he indicated that he must have support if he was to be successful in carrying his point of view. What was he to do, he asked, if both France and Russia insisted on a formal Conference? Esterhazy's account of Castlereagh's call to action had arrived, but Metternich wanted something more than secret approval and encouragement. How could he risk a breach with Russia under such circumstances? Even his secret Treaty might prove to be only an embarrassment, for it had never been communicated to the Tsar. His perplexities were increased by the receipt of a communication from Paris strongly urging a formal Conference of the five Powers, alluding to the great interest which the King of France, as head of the House of

Bourbon, took in Naples, and asking for a declaration from Austria of her disinterestedness and intention to respect the Vienna Treaties. The hand of Pozzo di Borgo could clearly be seen in this document.¹

The French Memorandum was, however, only very partly due to Russian influence. That was, indeed, manifest in Richelieu's conversations with Stuart, but Pasquier assigned as the cause of French action suspicions of Austria's intentions to alter the political *status quo* in Italy. He wished, in fact, to begin once more a vigorous policy directed against both Austria and Britain. He stressed, therefore, the family supremacy of the elder branch of the House of Bourbon and dwelt upon the importance of the French interests concerned. Such a policy was not likely to receive support from any of the great Powers, but the Tsar naturally seized on the part which pressed for a Conference, and assumed that France entirely accepted his other ideas.²

When the Russian answer arrived, therefore, Metternich found himself placed on the horns of a dilemma. He was relieved, it is true, from his fear of a Russian-French Alliance, but the Tsar's reply shewed that Austria could only have his support at a price—and the price might be something like a break with Britain. But the Tsar at least offered tangible support, while Castlereagh could give little more than sympathy. Thus, while Metternich did not yet abandon his efforts to find a way to reconcile Russian and British points of view, henceforward he inclined towards the former. His replies, which were drawn up with great ability, were, however, meant to conceal from the Allies his real intentions until the last possible moment. He put forward an entirely fresh scheme. Alexander's plan for a meeting of the monarchs of the three Eastern Powers must be accepted, but the reunion of Cabinets could take place previously at Vienna, so that Britain and France need only be represented by their Ambassadors.

¹ Metternich to Castlereagh, Aug. 8, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Varia*. From Stewart, Aug. 8, 12, 1820. *F.O. Austria*, 151. Metternich to Esterhazy, Aug. 12, 1820. *F.O. Austria*, 157.

² From Stuart, Aug. 11, 17, 1820: *F.O. France*, 230. French Memorandum (read and approved by the King's Council, Aug. 9, 1820): *F.O. France*, 240, *Paris A.A.E. France*, 716, f. 11.

Castlereagh could thus avoid committing himself, while the King of Prussia would be told secretly that he had better not turn up at Troppau. This plan was sent to Esterhazy on August 26, where it is clearly developed. Stewart's dispatch to his Court was, on the other hand, very confused. He clearly found it difficult to follow Metternich's mental gymnastics, and pleaded for instructions.¹

Meanwhile, all Castlereagh's efforts had been directed, as he told Esterhazy, towards localising the dispute. A violent attack by Lord Holland on Alexander in the House of Lords had warned him, if it was necessary, how much capital the Opposition could make out of a false step. He had not much time to spare for diplomacy, so great was the burden of the domestic crisis; but he met the new situation immediately. He was prepared to agree to Metternich's first plan of a meeting of the two Emperors, which Stewart could attend as observer in his normal capacity of Ambassador. But he warned Metternich, in private letters to Stewart, of the danger of allowing Russia and France to interfere too much in Italian questions. France he especially distrusted, the recent revelations of French intrigues in Spanish America in the previous year having aroused the deepest suspicions of the British Cabinet. He concentrated his attention, therefore, on Decazes, newly arrived as Ambassador, and soon acquired considerable influence over that vain Frenchman, who was only too ready to try to dictate to Pasquier rather than to receive orders from him. Through him and by letters to Stuart he made the greatest efforts to get France to abandon her plan for a formal Conference.

For Esterhazy he had not much time. He promised him, however, not to receive a new Neapolitan Ambassador and to refuse all invitations from Sicily. He advised him to get in touch with Lieven and try and influence his policy. The Austrian Ambassador naturally turned to other sources of information. He was seriously alarmed at the Government's evasive and feeble answers to the attacks of Lord Holland and Lord John Russell and went to the King for comfort,

¹ From Stewart, Aug. 25, 1820: *FO Austria*, 152. Metternich to Esterhazy, Aug. 26, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 213, ix.

he and his wife spending nearly a fortnight in the royal company at the Cottage, with the Conyngham family as the only other guests. He testified to the King's devotion to his new mistress and speculated as to the chances of her bringing in the Opposition. The King's goodwill towards Metternich, he reported with delight, could not be exaggerated.¹

While he was staying at this "delectable spot," Esterhazy went twice up to town to see Castlereagh, and at the end of August he had an interview with him, in which all Austria's hopes and fears in Italy were discussed in great detail. Castlereagh was quite ready to share all these, and to give satisfactory replies to the questions which Metternich had asked. He would find expedients to delay recognition of a new Neapolitan Envoy. He would not countenance Sicilian claims to independence. He even said that, so far as he was personally concerned, he would not refuse representation at a meeting of the Great Powers if the other members of the Alliance insisted. But he did not conceal his dislike of this method of dealing with the problem, and rather sought to discuss the more practical question how Naples was to be made once more pacific and harmless. His solution made the Austrian Ambassador very uneasy. For Castlereagh let it be seen that he wished Austria to allow a moderate constitution to exist in Naples, once the present one was overthrown. France and Russia were likely to press for some such concession, he thought, and he intimated to Esterhazy that in such a case Britain could not refuse them her support.²

These conversations with Esterhazy were, however, intended to be strictly private and confidential, as indeed the Austrian Ambassador told Metternich. Nevertheless, Castlereagh appears to have regretted them almost as soon as they were made. Probably he had heard something of the kind of talk with which the King was entertaining Esterhazy at the Cottage. At any rate he warned Stewart that the Ambassador's accounts of private conversations, particularly with

¹ To Stewart, Aug. 5, 1820: *F O. Austria*, 160. To Stewart, Aug. 5, 1820: *Howard de Walden MSS.* Esterhazy to Metternich, Aug. 10, 11, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, viii, *Appendix* p. 551.

² Esterhazy to Metternich, Aug. 18, 28, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, viii.

the King, could not commit the British Government, and that if Metternich attempted to turn them into official communications, he would force "disavowals and explanations" from Castlereagh in the Cabinet and Parliament. He had already, in fact, suspicions that Metternich was choosing a route on which he could not follow him, and was anxious lest his private confidence and sympathy should be used to claim support for measures to which he knew no British Cabinet could agree.¹

These suspicions deepened as a result of the communications which he received from Metternich in the first half of September. That Minister, faced with the demands of Russia and France, had already gone more than half way to meet them. He was already suggesting that he might not be able to avoid such a reunion at Troppau as the Tsar suggested and France still desired. But he still concealed his intention of yielding to Russia behind a cloud of vague proposals, which could be variously interpreted by his Allies. A Memorandum, which contained five propositions, hinted at re-stating and re-forming the Alliance to meet the new circumstances which had arisen. These were presented to the Tsar as fully meeting his views for a more formal reunion at Troppau, while to Castlereagh Metternich protested that he was doing everything possible to prevent a Conference on the model of Aix-la-Chapelle. He desired nothing less, he assured him, than to draw further away from Britain, whose difficulties and limitations he fully recognised. But could he risk, he pleaded, wrecking the whole system which had taken seven years to build up? He had devised a plan, therefore, for a meeting of the two Emperors at Troppau, in order to satisfy Alexander, to be preceded by Ambassadorial Conferences at Vienna of so informal a character that Castlereagh need not be alarmed at them. Surely Castlereagh would even authorise Stewart to signify, by his presence at Troppau, the moral support of the British Government, if that was the only way to satisfy the Tsar! Moreover, as a practical step which Britain could

¹ To Stewart, Sept. 1, 1820: *FO Austria*, 160. He added "It may in this respect be more convenient to advert to these topics in separate or private letters than to give them the official character of being reported in a numbered dispatch." These separate and private letters remain in the Archives as *F.O. Austria*, 160, and some of Lord Stewart's are reproduced in Appendix C.

easily take, he suggested the dispatch of a squadron to Naples in order to prevent France from complicating matters by anticipating Britain in such an action.¹

This last request had, in fact, been already anticipated by the British Government, and a squadron had been ordered to Naples. It was designed, A'Court was told, for the protection of the King and Royal Family if their lives were in danger. It was only to be used as a last resource as a measure of humanity, and the strictest neutrality was enjoined on the British Minister in every other respect. In such guise Castlereagh, remembering how great an effect the death of Louis XVI. had had on British opinion, knew that he would find support at home for immediate action.²

But Metternich's other proposals made Castlereagh very suspicious, and at the same time as he announced this intention he informed Stewart officially that the British Government could be no party to any joint action against Naples. Any Ambassadorial Conferences at Vienna should be designed merely to enable Austria to keep her Allies informed of the course of events, and no attempt should be made to lay down any general principles of the right of intervention. These instructions were developed in a long private letter in such a manner as to leave no doubt of the attitude of the British Government. The Austrian propositions, he said, amounted in substance to the formation of a league of the five Great Powers against Naples, a course to which the British Government could never agree. It would involve them at once in responsibility for acts which they could not control and which would at once be subject to Parliamentary criticism. He urged Metternich, therefore, to take the responsibility for action, and merely consult and deliberate confidentially with his Allies. He would thus get their moral support, which

¹ Metternich to Esterhazy, Sept. 3, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 213, ix. From Stewart, Sept. 3, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 152. Austria's Propositions to the Four Courts: *F.O. Continent*, 43.

² To A'Court, Sept. 16, 1820: *FO Sicily*, 89. Cf. Canning's defence of this step in the debate of March 20, 1821. "If Paris had stood upon the ocean instead of standing, as it did, upon the Seine, could there be any doubt that we should then (1792) have given instructions to secure the safety of the royal family of France": *Hansard*, Commons, March 20, 1821.

would be sufficiently demonstrated to the world by their refusal to recognise the new Neapolitan Government.¹

Esterhazy was also fully informed of this point of view. It was at this moment that he attributed the weakness of the British Government, not to the outside pressure of "real Radicalism," but to the "disguised Liberalism," which was making itself felt even among the supporters of the Government. He admitted that the orders to the Fleet shewed an unexpected degree of energy, but this was due almost entirely to jealousy of France, who had first suggested the idea. "On the other hand," Castlereagh had repeatedly warned Esterhazy that Britain could take no part in a league of the Great Powers against the revolution. "We can," he added, "give a much stronger moral support to a cause which is not strictly our own, than to any to which we were an active party." The revolution, he said, should be treated "as a *special* rather than as a *general* question, as an *Italian* question rather than as an *European*, and consequently as in the sphere of action of *Austria* rather than of the *Alliance*." Lieven, who was now coming into action at the orders of the Tsar, naturally stressed the necessity of the Alliance acting in a far stronger manner than the Austrian Ambassador. He had been, in fact, as Esterhazy said, "*un peu trop Européen*," and alarmed Castlereagh. To this and to a distrust of Esterhazy's too frank reports, which Metternich had shewn to Stewart, the latter accurately attributed Castlereagh's increasing coldness and reserve on the question of Naples.²

That this cautious attitude on the part of Castlereagh was justified was soon shewn by another interview with Lieven on September 20, from which it appeared that the Tsar considered the meeting at Troppau "a Conference in form of the Five Powers." This was a very different account to that given by Metternich, and Castlereagh at once sent off a private letter to his brother protesting strongly against it and complaining that Metternich's dispatches had in no way admitted that he had given way to this extent. The Russian Cabinet

¹ To Stewart, Sept. 16, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 148, *C.C.* xii. 311.

² Esterhazy to Metternich, Sept. 16, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, viii. Lieven to Nesselrode, Sept. 18, 1820. *Pet. Arch.*

was apparently contemplating a formal meeting on the lines of Aix-la-Chapelle, in which not only the Neapolitan but also the Spanish and Portuguese revolutions were to be discussed. Castlereagh admitted that under the Treaties each of the signatory Powers had the right of convening a Conference if it thought fit, but he insisted "that an avowed and formal European Conference is more likely to embarrass than assist us." Moreover, it remained to the British Government to decide whether the subjects proposed for discussion were such as were laid down in the Treaties. Stewart, in fact, was only authorised to observe and report to his Government, "doing justice to the general views of common interest which they so cordially entertain, but to preserve the faculty of acting, upon which they are bound *in the present temper of this country* to proceed with the most scrupulous circumspection." Once again Castlereagh urged Metternich to take the responsibility and not embarrass his Ally by asking her to share it officially. In an even more informal letter to his brother he allowed his irritation more expression. "All we ask of our Allies," he wrote, "is not to annoy and cripple us when it can be avoided, by phrases and forms, which in fact lead to nothing more substantial than to indulge the Emperor of Russia and his Minister, the latter in composing and the former in promulgating high sounding declarations which, be assured, do not fall in with the sentiments which are to be found on either side of the House of Commons." He openly displayed the same impatience and irritation to Esterhazy, to whom he pointed out that the Russian dispatches were quite inexplicable as they had been written after and not before the Austrian offer had reached Warsaw. That Ambassador did not hide from Metternich his alarm at the turn which affairs had taken, which he attributed solely to Lieven. He lamented bitterly that the only one of the Powers whose interests were exactly the same as those of Austria should be the one which threatened to separate itself entirely from her.¹

¹ To Stewart (Private), Sept. 21, 1820. *F.O. Austria*, 160, Sept. 21, 1820: *Howard de Walden MSS.* Esterhazy to Metternich, Sept. 24, 1820. *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, viii., *Appendix* p. 553.

It was not long before it was seen that Castlereagh's forebodings as to Metternich's surrender were in every way justified. The Tsar had regarded Metternich's proposals as virtually accepting his own ideas. Neither he nor Capo d'Istria, however much they might differ as to details, had any intention of accepting anything less than a formal Conference. Richelieu was pressed to appear at Troppau as a Plenipotentiary. Nor was the Conference to confine itself to putting down the Neapolitan revolution. The Spanish revolution was also to be considered, and the whole question of the relations of the Alliance to revolutionary Governments to be discussed. Capo d'Istria, indeed, was planning, not merely to overthrow the illegal and revolutionary constitutions, but also to substitute in their places others modelled on the *Charte*, and his master was not wholly unsympathetic to these ideas, which maintained somewhat the continuity of his policy since 1815.

Metternich was fully aware of these dangers. He would undoubtedly have preferred that the Troppau interview should have been confined to an intimate exchange of views between the Sovereigns, and that the real business should have been left to an Ambassadorial Conference at Vienna in which he would be supreme. This, indeed, he had hoped would develop into that permanent Conference which he had already suggested in the discussions of 1819, and would at last enable him to fill adequately the rôle for which he was so obviously designed—the diplomatic chief of the European Alliance. He still hesitated to believe that Castlereagh would refuse co-operation once he was confronted with a *fait accompli*, and even as late as the middle of September he anticipated that Wellington, at least, if not Castlereagh himself, would come to Troppau. Though he had virtually capitulated to Russia, he still hoped that he could so present affairs as to make the British Government consent to follow his line and give him the necessary diplomatic support in his contest with Alexander and Capo d'Istria.

Nevertheless, the explanations which he was at last forced to make to Stewart on September 20 caused him a good deal of embarrassment. He did not attempt to deny that he had

changed his plans; but he claimed that he had also done his best so to shape the course of events as to meet the views of all. In this he had failed, but he could not let the Tsar go back to Petersburg and leave all Western Europe in confusion, when Russian counsel and aid had been offered so unreservedly. He denied, however, that he had agreed to the formal Conference which Castlereagh had so strongly deprecated. "The notion of a Congress," reported Stewart, "is still studiously discountenanced here, and it is agreed that the meeting is only for those Conferences of Ministers that was projected at Vienna and which, not being accepted by Russia, obliges Austria, in order not to lose more time, to repair to the meeting at Troppau." But it was difficult to see where the difference consisted. The King of Prussia was to go to Troppau as to Aix-la-Chapelle, and Capo d'Istria, in his correspondence with Pozzo di Borgo and Richelieu, assumed that the Conference had the widest latitude. Even Stewart could no longer be deceived, and gave it as his opinion that "when once assembled it would be bold to pronounce the exact limits in which their deliberations or acts may be defined." Metternich informed Esterhazy sadly of the Ambassador's protests and his refusal to see matters in the proper light. Nevertheless, conscious of his rectitude, he was determined to bring his plans to their full fruition.¹

Metternich was, however, much disturbed by Castlereagh's instructions to Stewart of September 16, and he made one more effort to conciliate him. He declared "that it was the most anxious wish and sole object of his August Master to bring the five Great Powers to one common understanding in the present fearful crisis, or, in other words, to find out the mode of combining the *impossibilities* of England with the *forms* of Russia." His motive was, he said, "to combine a general understanding and deliberation by Ministers *at one table and in one spot*." He had accordingly sent Lebzeltern back to the Tsar to make one last effort to get him to modify his views and accept an informal Conference at Vienna before the Troppau meeting. His dispatches to Esterhazy showed

¹ Metternich, *Memoires*, iii. 368. From Stewart, Sept. 20, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 152. Metternich to Esterhazy, Sept. 21, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 156; *Vienna St. A. Wersungen*, 213, ix.

some temper. Anything was better, he wrote, than these *demi-attitudes* of Britain. He would prefer that the Alliance cease altogether rather than merely serve as a source of discord, and he threatened that unless Britain was represented at Troppau in some form the Alliance would be dissolved. Stewart endeavoured to explain these sentiments in one of those long private letters which he had been especially requested by Castlereagh to use for the conveyance of his thoughts on these delicate matters. Metternich had always desired some kind of reunion of the Five Powers,¹ Stewart admitted, but he had tried his best to get Russia to be sensible. Now that he had failed, he undoubtedly felt that he could get more from Russia and France than from Britain, and so he took their side. Castlereagh's objections, it was agreed, were sound from a British point of view, but they did not suit Austria, whose very existence as a Great Power was threatened.¹

These explanations were redoubled in vigour when Castlereagh's impatient letters of September 21 arrived. Stewart felt himself under the necessity of protesting that Metternich had not deceived him. "You know," he reminded his brother, "although I render him complete justice for his great talents and extraordinary union of agreeable qualities, I am fully aware of his political chicanery." Still Stewart insisted that Metternich had not agreed to a formal Conference, and pleaded for his forgiveness in view of the great danger of a Russian-French combination against him. He insisted that the Alliance was still necessary to the safety of Europe, especially in view of the character of Alexander. These arguments, which he had learnt from Metternich, he put forward in a flow of words, which, however uncouth and ungrammatical, explained accurately enough why Metternich had preferred Russia to his ancient Ally. Metternich, indeed, denied that he had agreed to such a Conference as Capo d'Istria was claiming to the Russian Ambassadors at London and Paris had been already arranged. He gave Capo d'Istria the lie direct and he forwarded his Report to the Emperor on

¹ Metternich to Esterhazy, Sept. 29, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 2, ix. From Stewart, Sept. 29, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 152. From Stewart, Sept. 29, 1820 (Private): *F.O. Austria*, 160, *Appendix* p. 515.

September 2, which shewed, however, clearly enough that he had always anticipated that Alexander would obtain a full Conference at Troppau and that Britain would at least allow Stewart to go there in some capacity. The mere presence of a British Ambassador would be enough for Metternich's plans. "If Lord Stewart is authorised to accompany your Majesty," he told the Emperor, "and to be present at the conferences at Troppau, however restrained his rôle may be, the first and most essential difficulty will have been overcome, for the scandal will be avoided and the difficulty will then arrange itself."

It was now clear that Russia was unlikely to accept anything less than a reunion of the three Sovereigns at Troppau to discuss the problems of the revolutions, and both Stewart and Metternich were obviously afraid that Castlereagh would refuse to allow the British Ambassador even to be present there merely as an observer. They endeavoured to obtain his consent by reducing British participation to the lowest possible terms. "You may rest perfectly satisfied (if it should fall to my duty)," wrote Stewart, "of my being a complete non-entity except for the purposes of ample information to my Government."¹

They had good reason for their alarm. During the next three weeks Castlereagh found that his suspicions had been only too justified and that the Conference had assumed a shape entirely contrary to his ideas. Moreover, the crisis of his domestic difficulties had been reached, and the Government was thought, by friend and foe alike, to be within an ace of dissolution. The Opposition pressed for explanations on the question of Naples, and Liverpool was forced to reply that Britain was in no way committed to Austria, an answer which was considered a triumph for her enemies. In these circumstances, reported Esterhazy, it was only natural that Castlereagh should draw back and not display the same moral courage as he had done at the first news of the revolution. This was, however, only a small part of the truth. Castlereagh

¹ From Stewart (Private), Oct. 2, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 160, *Appendix* p. 521. Metternich to Esterhazy, Oct. 2, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 213, 1x.; *Encloses Traduction d'un rapport de M. le Prince de Metternich à S.M. l'Empereur*, Sept. 2, 1820.

had now a much clearer view of the situation, since he could compare Lieven's insistent and straightforward appeals with the more subtle and specious explanations from Vienna. The Russian had been urged in the strongest possible manner by Capo d'Istria to secure the presence of a British Plenipotentiary, and he set about his task with more zeal than discretion. When Castlereagh gave him no encouragement he went off to Wellington, who shewed himself more susceptible to pressure, and appeared to be ready to accept the responsibility if the Cabinet would allow him to go. Lieven's almost frenzied appeals to Castlereagh were couched in exactly the form which was most likely to fail. It was not merely the revolution in Naples, Lieven claimed, but the revolutionary spirit which must be overcome, and the British radicals would be overthrown at Troppau. Castlereagh scarcely troubled to refute these arguments, and referred him to Liverpool, with whom the whole performance was repeated. At the end Lieven was told that he must wait till the Cabinet had met to consider the subject.¹

Esterhazy had a far better appreciation of the situation. He refused to join his colleague in pressing for a Plenipotentiary, seeing that it was difficult enough to prevent the cancellation of the permission to attend already granted to Stewart. He spent the night of October 7 with Castlereagh at North Cray, and discussed the question with him with the greatest frankness and intimacy. He was told that, if Stewart had not already received his instructions, it would be doubtful if he would now be allowed to go to Troppau. To give him full powers was out of the question. Castlereagh said that he would find it difficult to draw up instructions for himself, let alone any one else. Esterhazy saw also that none of the Cabinet would leave England at a moment when their own political careers were in the greatest danger. It was only the fear of secret societies, like the Carbonari, that kept the British Government in touch at all with their Allies. "*Voilà votre véritable cheval de bataille,*"

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, Oct. 7, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, x. Capo d'Istria to Lieven, Sept 18, 1820, Lieven to Nesselrode, Oct. 8, 1820: *Pet. Arch.*

he told Metternich. He was struck by the impression which Lieven's insistence had made on Castlereagh, who said that if Alexander had these ideas it was almost better that he had not to meet him face to face. The old arguments about 'generalising' the question of Naples were again repeated, and Esterhazy entreated Metternich to keep off this dangerous ground.¹

The opinion of the Cabinet against sending a Plenipotentiary was announced on October 12. The matter was really decided in a private meeting of Castlereagh, Liverpool and Wellington, the last of whom told Lieven all about it. Stewart was to be allowed to attend the Conferences under the restrictions already laid down. He was given no power to act, and was not even to sign a Protocol, if one were opened. The British Government did not admit that matters of general policy came within the scope of the Alliance, and Stewart was again referred to the Aix-la-Chapelle Memorandum and the State Paper of May 5, 1820, for the principles which he must maintain. When the Cabinet were informed more precisely as to what was proposed they might send further instructions. Meanwhile, Stewart's only duty was to report to his Court and to watch over "the integrity of the territorial system of Europe as settled by the late Treaties, His Majesty deeming it to be his undoubted right and bounden duty to satisfy himself that the particular measures which any independent State or States may in the present conjuncture think fit to adopt on principles, as they may feel, of self-defence against a danger which, in their judgment, menaces them, shall not be so pursued as to endanger or alter the general balance of power as established in Europe, in the maintenance of which balance His Majesty must ever feel and take the deepest interest." In a private letter Stewart was told that the decision not to send a Plenipotentiary had been unanimous, and made entirely on public grounds and not from a desire to avoid hurting his feelings. The way in which Russia had urged it as an obligation imposed by Treaties made it absolutely impossible for the British Government to give way, but in any case the Government could not place itself in a position

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, Oct. 8, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211.

in which its neutrality would be compromised and it thus be forced to bring before Parliament "more of the Allied proceedings than it can be desirable at such a moment to submit to the invidious criticism of Europe."¹

These instructions were amplified by the frankest explanations to Esterhazy and Lieven. The former naturally dwelt on the bad effects of his colleague's importunities, and plumed himself on his success in obtaining permission for Stewart to be present at Troppau. Castlereagh had soon put a stop to any complaints as to restrictions by saying that Stewart was only allowed to go for Austria's sake and could easily be told to stay away, if that was preferred. But Esterhazy considered, and with justice, that Castlereagh had always wished a British representative to be present in some form, in order that the appearance of unity might be maintained. Castlereagh warned Esterhazy, however, that even this appearance could only be preserved if the other Courts avoided public declarations on general principles and made no attempt to get Britain to abandon the position of neutrality which she had adopted. Castlereagh did not conceal his fears that Alexander was determined to bring up again all the ideas which he had combated in the past, and he intimated that his feelings were just as strong on the subject as ever before. "The more Russia wishes to transport us to the heights," he said, "the further we must descend into the plain."

Lieven naturally was not told this point of view in quite so blunt a fashion, but he was left in no doubt as to the attitude of the Cabinet. Any departure from the principles already announced was absolutely impossible, and any attempt to make them do so would simply mean that they would refuse all further co-operation. There was no escape from this situation, reported Lieven, and the suggestion which Capo d'Istria had made of an appeal to the King was out of the question, since he was in a state of almost open hostility to his Ministers. The Cabinet, indeed, might fall at any moment, and there was nothing to hope from them at present. It was perhaps only natural that Lieven should stress this side of the

¹ To Stewart, Oct. 15, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 148. To Stewart (Private), Oct. 15, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 160.

position rather than the futility of his own efforts to persuade Liverpool and Castlereagh.¹

Castlereagh had thus avoided a declared and open rupture with the Alliance, but in all else his policy was obviously in direct contradiction not only to the extravagant pretensions of Russia but also to the demands of Austria. Prussia had naturally accepted the invitation of her Ally, and the Crown Prince and Bernstorff were on their way to Troppau, while the King was to follow immediately. But Castlereagh was not completely isolated, for, in spite of all the efforts of Pozzo di Borgo and the unbroken succession of appeals which Richelieu received from Capo d'Istria and the Tsar, French policy had undergone a complete and unexpected change. This was undoubtedly partly due to British influence, acting on the more moderate elements of the French Government. For, though, in the second Richelieu Ministry the Ultras were rapidly gaining in power, yet Richelieu himself and his principal colleagues were sincere constitutionalists and anxious not to appear too closely associated with a policy liable to attack by the French Liberals. Their Memorandum, so hastily produced at the end of July, had been dictated partly by a desire to exert their rights as a full member of the Alliance, partly by jealousy of Austrian influence in Italy. But when Decazes pressed most earnestly on his former colleagues the British point of view, Richelieu and Pasquier found it difficult to combat his arguments. Castlereagh was exceedingly careful to say nothing to foment French suspicions of Austria. Such a game would have been easy to play, and to some diplomatists the temptation would have been irresistible. But the last thing Castlereagh desired was to drive Austria and Russia together, and he never lost sight of the fact that France was the natural rival of Britain in the Mediterranean while Austria was there her natural ally. ✓ He was, however, anxious

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, Oct. 15, 1820 *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, x. Lieven to Nesselrode, Oct. 13, 1820, Lieven to Capo d'Istria, Oct. 13, 1820: *Pet Arch.* Lieven does not seem ever to have brought forward a proposal which Capo d'Istria claimed to have originated with Bagot, but which Stuart had already reported as emanating from Pozzo di Borgo, that Canning might represent Britain. Canning had intended to include Vienna in his continental tour, but discreetly abandoned the project lest he should give countenance to such ideas.

to detach France from Russian influence and to secure her support for his own views of the proper position of a 'constitutional' state. There was also the Spanish problem as well as the Neapolitan one to consider, and the more France was bound down to the doctrine of non-intervention the better.¹

While, therefore, Castlereagh defended Austrian intervention in Naples he encouraged every criticism which Pasquier made of the means by which the Alliance was to be implicated in the transaction. Gradually Decazes was brought to look at the problem from almost exactly the same point of view as the British Cabinet. In particular, the idea of a public declaration by the five Powers on the question of Naples was strongly condemned. Pasquier was indignant at this lack of spirit, but gradually also his own dispatches altered in tone. There had always been a difference between his point of view and that of Richelieu, who was more amenable to Russian influence. When, therefore, Pasquier began to be aware that France's rôle at the Conference was intended to be merely a supporter of Russian plans, he began to draw back. Pozzo di Borgo, who had been jubilant at the Franco-Russian combination for a full Conference, with the *Charte* as the remedy against revolution, thus thwarting at once Britain and Austria, began to recount the sad effects of British influence at Paris. There was some truth in this, for the British example would give the French Liberals a fine chance of attack if the policy of the first French Memorandum was carried out; but it was mainly the internal situation which prevented either Richelieu or Pasquier from leaving Paris. After much hesitation, therefore, the final instructions for the French representatives at the Conference left France in very much the same position as Britain. Pasquier justified this change of front by pointed references to the policy of the other 'constitutional' Power, a responsibility which Castlereagh refused to accept, though he welcomed the change and suggested to Metternich that he ought to rejoice at this new check on the schemes of Russia. France was not, however, to influence affairs very much.

¹ To Stuart, Aug. 25, 1820: *F.O. France*, 222. Decazes to Pasquier, Sept. 11, 12, 13, 1820: *Paris A.A.E.* 613, ff. 395, 398, 400.

For Pasquier felt himself bound to allow Caraman, his Ambassador at Vienna, to represent his Government, and endeavoured to check his subservience to Metternich by associating with him La Ferronnays, the French Ambassador at Petersburg, who was in sympathy with the more aggressive attitude of his chief. The exact status of each was not defined, and this vagueness, which Pasquier regretted but could not alter, was to paralyse all French action at Troppau.¹

Meanwhile the gloomiest reports came from Naples, though A'Court admitted that all the best elements in the nation were in favour of some kind of constitution, only the lowest classes being opposed to it. The constitutional cause was, however, bound up with hatred against Austria, and A'Court was, therefore, inclined to believe that European, as distinct from purely Austrian, intervention was the course most likely to avoid serious bloodshed. Both the Queen and the King had secretly appealed to him, and he considered that the Royal Family would be in serious danger if force were used. Castlereagh felt it necessary to give him a full account of all the motives determining the British Government's resolution to be neutral, and cautioned him once more to use the British squadron only as a last resource and on his own terms.²

On October 1st the Neapolitan Government sent to the Austrian Government a protest against their equivocal attitude. Castlereagh told Lieven that it was skilfully constructed, and drew once more the conclusion that the case was not one in which Britain could act. Pitt, he said, had only been able to combat Jacobinism by proving it aggressive, and there was no such symptom in the Neapolitan revolution. "The system of the Emperor," he said about the same time, "did him honour as a monarch and as a man. Nothing could be more pure than the ends which he had set before himself in

¹ To Stuart, Sept. 26, Oct. 20, 1820; From Stuart, Aug. 31, Sept. 21, Oct. 5, 1820: *F.O. France*, 222, 230, 231, 232. Pasquier to Decazes, Sept. 10, Oct. 12, 14, 1820: *Paris A.A.E. Angleterre*, 613, ff. 416, 431. Richelieu to Capo d'Istria, Aug. 10, 19, Sept. 29, 1820: *Paris A.A.E. France*, 716, ff. 24, 26, 30. See also the correspondence of Richelieu and Pozzo di Borgo with Nesselrode and Capo d'Istria in *I.R.H.S.* vols. liv. and cxxvii.

² To A'Court, Oct. 20, 1820: *F.O. Sicily*, 89. From A'Court, Aug., Sept. 1820: *F.O. Sicily*, 90, 91.

internal affairs of other States ; besides, they do not regard mere declarations as of any real or solid value independent of some practical measure actually resolved upon ;¹ and what that measure is which can be generally and universally adopted against bad principles overturning feeble and ill-administered governments, they have never yet been able to divine."¹

Castlereagh also took especial pains to make his attitude absolutely clear to Esterhazy. He went through Metternich's September report to his Emperor paragraph by paragraph, and dictated an observation on each. The old story of the treaty obligations of the Alliance and the limits laid down at Aix-la-Chapelle was again repeated. But Castlereagh's views were, perhaps, best summed up in an observation on the final paragraph : " If it is desired to extend the Alliance so as to include all objects, present and future, foreseen and unforeseen, it would change its character to such an extent and carry us so far that we should see in it an additional motive for adhering to our course at the risk of seeing the Alliance move away from us without our having quitted it." " But," he continued, " if only it is agreed in this Concert, which can often be useful and even necessary in dealing even with subjects *outside* the scope of the Alliance, to take into account the considerations due to our position, we will never refuse to take part, and we believe it to be in many cases useful for the general good."²

Even after the painful discussions of the last three months Castlereagh was still faithful to the idea of Diplomacy by Conference !

¹ To Stewart, Oct. 23, 1820. *FO Austria*, 160

² Esterhazy to Metternich, Oct. 25, 1820. *Vienna St A. Berichte*, 211, x., enclosing *Observations de Milord Castlereagh sur un passage d'un rapport de M le Prince de Metternich à S M. l'Empereur. F.O. Austria*, 157 Professor Alison Phillips (*Confederation of Europe*, 204) only quotes the first part of the paragraph.

2. THE CONFERENCE OF TROPPEAU, 1820

TROPPEAU, though without the historical associations of Aix-la-Chapelle, proved to be a very jolly place for a Conference, and its villas were found to be most suitable to the intimate and delicate negotiations which there ensued. In so small a town no one lived more than a few minutes away from all the rest, and informal interviews and conversations were easily arranged. The real business of the Conference was, in fact, mainly transacted in this manner. Since they were confined to the three Eastern Powers, and more especially to Austria and Russia, our information is by no means complete. The British and French Ambassadors were from the outset relegated to the position of unofficial observers, whose duty was merely to report events. They could not commit their Governments, and they could scarcely expect, therefore, to have the same influence as the statesmen of the three Eastern Powers whose Sovereigns were present. Consequently there is no such record of the Conference as Castlereagh sent to his Cabinet from Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle. The fierce duel which Metternich fought with Capo d'Istria for the confidence of Alexander is known mainly from the former's accounts, and where his own reputation is concerned Metternich is a very unreliable witness. Nevertheless, the reports of the French and British Ambassadors enable a fairly complete picture of the scene to be obtained, not perhaps quite so flattering to Metternich as the complacent entries in his diary suggest.¹

Metternich prepared himself like a knight for battle. From the outset his personality dominated the Conference. There

¹ In many respects the accounts in the Paris archives are fuller and more trustworthy than those in London. There are only a few informing documents, besides the Protocols, at Vienna, Petersburg and Berlin.

was no Castlereagh ready to take the initiative as at Vienna and Aix-la-Chapelle, or to turn the Conference into the right direction with a skilful paper. "Perhaps that is why Metternich gave Gentz his confidence more completely than ever before, and the latter was in his room all day. From Gentz' pen flowed the memoranda and notes which Metternich was forced to produce to combat the 'apocalyptic' lucubrations of Capo d'Istria. He had never felt so happy and important. "No disturbances, no distractions, no gossip, no indiscretion, no women, no grumbling," he told his friend, Pilat. "The idea must have come from Heaven. If only all previous Congresses had been held in such a spot and under such auspices!" Zichy was the only other Austrian of importance to be summoned, so that Gentz had no competitors for his chief's favours.

The Tsar arrived, looking a little fatter but hardly any older, though ruffled and disillusioned after his stormy contest with the ungrateful Poles. Capo d'Istria was with him, and still retained a good share of his master's confidence. Throughout the Conference he was Alexander's principal Minister, and Nesselrode was reduced to little more than a clerk, much to Metternich's disgust. The Tsar as usual, however, conducted much of the business personally, and never scrupled to abandon Capo d'Istria when won over by Metternich's appeals to his vanity or fears. Golovkin, the Russian Ambassador at Vienna, had no influence, but the arrival of Pozzo di Borgo in December was to make a difference, not, however, in the manner expected.

The King of Prussia and his Ministers had been a little put out at Metternich's attempts in August to prevent their participation in the discussions. These were, of course, entirely due to an attempt to meet Castlereagh's wishes, since the two German Powers had drawn very close together as a result of the Vienna Conference of 1820. The Crown Prince preceded his father, and Bernstorff was substitute for Hardenberg during the first part of the meeting. Unfortunately he fell ill, and more than one meeting had to be held at his bedside. When Hardenberg arrived he contributed little to the discussions, and Prussia acted merely as a second to Austria throughout, neither Krusemarck, the Prussian Ambassador at

Vienna, nor Wittgenstein, who also came later, adding much to the strength of their representation.

Caraman and La Ferronnays represented, or rather misrepresented, France. The former was eaten up with jealousy because his colleague refused to recognise his seniority, and was for long completely deceived by Metternich. La Ferronnays hoped to make his name as a diplomatist by pressing forward Pasquier's plans. But he, too, proved useful to Metternich, who allowed him to make a fool of himself and so prevent Capo d'Istria using him for his own ends. Pasquier lamented the feebleness and stupidity of his subordinates but professed himself unable to remedy the evil. Richelieu kept up a correspondence with Alexander and Capo d'Istria throughout the Conference, but grew more and more circumspect as their real objects began to appear.

Stewart had no enviable task in carrying out the duties of an observer. It was of great importance that he should be able to give to his Court a complete account of the plans and plots of the Eastern Powers, for even if Britain was neutral as regards Naples, it was clear that Spain and even Portugal might be discussed. But it is not easy to get full information when there is nothing to give in exchange. Stewart relied on Metternich's friendship and gratitude for past favours, and found himself completely duped. He had some excuse, but he certainly neglected public business by twice going back to Vienna to see his young wife, who was about to bear him a child. Could he have seen the scornful comments of Gentz on "the fool and his accursed wife," he would have put less trust in Metternich's polite protestations made to keep him quiet till the crisis was past. Later he shewed more strength and manliness, and delivered Castlereagh's protests with zest and firmness. It must be remembered that in October and November the British Government was at its weakest, and news of its fall was constantly anticipated. Even Castlereagh would have found it difficult to play his usual rôle under such circumstances, and Stewart was bound hard and fast by his instructions. Gordon, who relieved his chief while he went to Vienna, was always the more Austrian of the two, and in any case had no influence or authority.

In these circumstances, therefore, the Conference was reduced to a contest between Capo d'Istria and Metternich. The latter was already assured of Prussian support, and if he added to it that of the Tsar he felt that he would be safe. The question was, on what terms he could obtain Alexander's countenance for an attack on Naples? On two points the policy of the two Courts differed. Alexander wished to deal not merely with Naples but with the question of revolutions in general, and thus to obtain that guarantee of thrones which Castlereagh had so mercilessly exposed at Aix-la-Chapelle. Metternich, on the other hand, wished to keep the affair of Naples uppermost. He had no wish to complicate matters by bringing in Spain and Portugal, and thus perhaps alienating Britain irrevocably. Secondly, Capo d'Istria at any rate wished the autocrats to declare for moderate constitutional reform on the model of the French *Charte*. For Metternich this course was almost as bad as the acceptance of revolutionary institutions, and he was determined to prevent it. Alexander still harked back to the ideas of beneficent and Christian rule on which the Holy Alliance had been founded. But he had been shaken by his experience in Poland, and he was to be even more seriously affected by news from Russia which reached him during the Conference. On these fears Metternich played with great skill, but he had to accept a compromise which not only committed him to further action with regard to Spain, but also left the issue of Naples in doubt for a long period. If the Neapolitan democrats had only shewn a little more common-sense, Metternich might have bitterly rued the day when he agreed to meet the Tsar at Troppau.

As usual, the Tsar was lavish with plans and protestations. Stewart was immediately granted a long interview, which revealed some curious ideas and prejudices. The Tsar could not stress sufficiently the magnitude of the evil threatening Europe, which, he said, might have been prevented, if only he had been listened to at Aix-la-Chapelle. Stewart could scarcely get a word in edgeways, while the Tsar delivered a long harangue, tracing all present trouble eventually to France, including even the domestic crisis in England, which Sir Robert Wilson, he said, had planned as part of the general plot for

the overthrow of all European Governments. He professed, therefore, an even greater anxiety than the British Government itself for the continuance in office of his old friends and Allies. How could the Sovereigns, he said vehemently to Stewart, "combine or concert with your Opposition who would release Bonaparte to-morrow, or with your Radicals who would reform *toute l'Europe*?" All his own resources were at the disposal of the Emperor of Austria, but the Neapolitan problem was the easiest of the tasks before the Conference. "In his view our great work was one of a much heavier nature," reported Stewart, "and all our faculties should be directed to counteract and oppose that fatal spirit which was making such rapid progress in Europe, and to settle upon some principle of common action and conduct with regard to it, so that military revolution and the machinations of occult sects and incendiaries should be arrested and paralysed." Stewart's expostulations and protestations against 'general' acts were met with an appeal to God, delivered with a look of religious awe which convinced the British Ambassador of the Tsar's sincerity. Stewart hastened to add, however, that Alexander also desired to make his own weight and importance felt in Europe. As for Capo d'Istria, Stewart could not understand him sufficiently to report his conversation.

Metternich professed himself in like case, and he came to the first meeting in considerable doubt. Deprived of British support, he had to face Capo d'Istria alone. Before the first meeting, indeed, Stewart informed him that he must refuse even to sign the Protocols, and, as the French Ambassadors took a similar line, it was decided, despite Capo d'Istria's protests, to keep merely a Journal of the proceedings signed only by the Secretary, Gentz, who was delighted at the prominence thus given to his name. At this meeting, which took place on October 23, Metternich gave a long discourse soliciting the *moral appui* but not the material aid of his Allies in freeing the King of Naples. He dwelt but little on 'general' questions, merely asserting the right of intervention if other States were menaced. Nor was there, in his opinion, need to consider the further steps to be taken as to Naples, since the King could then decide them of his own free will. He added

a gloomy review of the state of Italy, seeing more danger in Piedmont and the North than in Naples itself. These ideas were laid before the Conference in a Memorandum which was accompanied by documents shewing the diplomatic situation with regard to Naples, including the King's secret letters and the open protests of his Government.¹

There was no immediate discussion of these papers, Russia and Prussia promising their opinions in writing for the next meeting. The Conferences were, in fact, merely a means of recording the official documents. The real discussions took place privately between the Ministers of the three Powers. At the Second Conference the Prussian answers to Metternich's memoranda were handed in by Hardenberg. The language of this paper was so determined in its support of Austria that the Russians were convinced that it had been drawn up by Metternich himself! The Russian answer was, however, inexplicably delayed. It had been preceded by violent recriminations between Metternich, Gentz and Capo d'Istria, and Stewart found Metternich "extremely low and out of spirits." According to the latter's account, he had only obtained the promise of a Memorandum by a threat to act alone unless further delay was avoided. The greatest difficulty lay in Capo d'Istria's insistence on knowing Metternich's plans for Naples, before any *moral appui* could be accorded. "Did the Emperor of Austria want of Russia 150, or 200,000 men to cut the throats of the Carbonari? There they were at her disposal. Did they want the dissent of Russia to military revolutions? They had it. But if they wanted an *appui moral* to overturn a government, it must be shewn what was to be substituted in its place. The reconstruction of governments for the welfare of mankind was a subject worthy of the consideration of the great Association of Europe."²

These ideas were given official shape in the Russian Memorandum, dated November 2 but not presented to the Conference until November 6. The case of Naples was treated as

¹ From Stewart, Oct. 23, 1820, *Mémoire of the Austrian Cabinet upon the Revolution of Naples*, Oct. 23, 1820. *F.O. Austria*, 153.

² From Stewart, Oct. 30, 1820. *F.O. Austria*, 153. From Stewart, Nov. 3 (Separate): *F.O. Austria*, 160, *Appendix* p. 524.

exactly the same as that of Spain, and the Treaties of 1815 once more invoked as binding the Powers to put down revolutions. It was also expressly suggested that any intervention in Naples might be avoided by offering a 'National' constitution which the Neapolitans would themselves gladly accept. Metternich could not, of course, allow such doctrines to go unchallenged. He appealed from Capo d'Istria to the Tsar, upon whose mind he had been consistently and indefatigably working ever since the beginning of the Conference. But the Tsar was not yet ready for complete surrender. After violent altercations between the two Ministers, a compromise was arrived at, which was recorded in documents at a meeting of the three Cabinets on November 6, followed by the third General Conference the next day. Capo d'Istria admitted that it was only the spirit and not the letter of the Treaties of 1815 to which appeal could be made, and Metternich hastened to send word of this victory to Castlereagh, whose battle he considered he had been fighting. As to the 'National' constitution, a vague formula was arrived at which left the substance of the issue in doubt. Capo d'Istria, explained Metternich to Esterhazy, wished to use the Muratists to mediate between the Carbonari and the Great Powers, a course to which Austria was so opposed that rather than accept it she would leave Italy and Europe to their fate. With the Tsar's help, however, he asserted that he had successfully combated the idea. But all this was meant for British consumption. At the Conference, Metternich delivered a long eulogium on the Russian papers, and even reproached himself publicly that he had not appealed in his own Memorandum to the Treaties of 1815. "Having flogged them with one hand, he caresses them with the other," explained Stewart; but the truth was that Capo d'Istria had scored quite as many points as Metternich and the main issue was still undetermined.¹

Stewart played no part at all in these discussions, except

¹ From Stewart, Nov. 5, 15, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 153. Answer of the Russian Cabinet, Nov. 2, 1820; Supplementary explanation of the Russian Cabinet, Nov. 6, 1820; Proposition of the Austrian Cabinet, Nov. 6, 1820; Declaration of the Russian Cabinet upon the Propositions, Nov. 7, 1820 *F.O. Austria*, 153. Metternich to Esterhazy, Nov. 5, 11, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 213, xi.

to write a hasty note to Metternich, backing up his Memorandum against the Russian. He accepted completely the Austrian assurances, and acquiesced without any protest in a suggestion which excluded him completely from all the important discussions. "In order to support the dignity of the Cabinets," he reported on November 4, "and to draw a line between the first Ministers and the Ambassadors, it has been thought best to argue and discuss the questions so that the three *monarchical* Powers may be agreed before the budget is opened in the Conference of all. This mode facilitates extremely the position of the French Ambassador and myself. . . . In the Congress of Vienna there existed '*Les Conférences des Cinq et les Grandes Conférences*'; here there is the deliberation and debating with Three, and the communication of decisions with Five." He does not seem to have perceived that this system reduced Britain to the position of a secondary Power.

So content was Stewart with this state of affairs that he returned to Vienna to comfort his wife, convinced that nothing would be done until the French and British Governments had sent their opinions on the subjects in dispute. Caraman was quite ready to accept a similar position, but La Ferronnays insisted on drawing up a Memorandum of his own, which his colleague officially repudiated and which, therefore, had no effect. His protest against comparing the French and Neapolitan revolutions "brought both Metternich and Capo d'Istria upon his back, and he was taken no further notice of."¹

Metternich was thus left alone with Capo d'Istria, and of their secret and confidential discussions we have little record. When Stewart arrived back on November 13 his dispatches, and particularly his private letters, shewed uneasiness. Gordon had arrived on November 11, fresh from London, bearing Castlereagh's warning dispatches of October 28, as well as verbal explanations, and these perhaps stirred Stewart into greater activity. From Metternich he learnt that matters were still undecided. "Metternich was determined, however," he said, "to unmask completely Russia." But singularly

¹ From Stewart, Nov. 4, 19, 1820; Stewart to Metternich, Nov. 15, 1820: *F O. Austria*, 153, 160.

little information was vouchsafed as to the private conversations between the Three Powers, which had been going on in Stewart's absence and were still proceeding. The British Ambassador explained to his brother that this conduct was only natural under the circumstances, especially when the danger of the Opposition coming into power was considered. One incident, however, had made him suspect that the situation in Britain was a matter of confidential discussion amongst the three Cabinets, and he did not trust Metternich very far.

"I own I have reliance on Prince Metternich," he wrote, "but yet he must be regarded as an Austrian minister. His position now is a very anxious one, and unquestionably Russia, under the counsels of M. Capo d'Istria, holds him in a fever of suspicion and terror. I am of opinion the Prince knows our purity of thought and action, and has no care where we are concerned, but 90,000 Russians in his rear and the mystified character of the minister at the helm leads Prince Metternich to consider all points and all objects as secondary to that of committing Russia in the eyes of Europe against liberal and revolutionary doctrines, and to the embarking her in a common cause with Austria against *constitutional* Italy and Germany. Over and over again has Prince Metternich repeated to me: *Il faut que je voye clair*'—'the phrases, expressions, etc., are all very well, but I must secure everything in writing, sealing and signing.'"

As to what this writing was to be, Stewart knew very little. Metternich had indeed shewn him rather casually a project of a Treaty of Guarantee somewhat on the lines of that put forward at Aix-la-Chapelle, and Stewart had written him a letter of protest against it. But the former had not seemed to attach much importance to this incident, and had asked Stewart not to report anything to London until the subject was made clearer. The British Ambassador thought that the three Powers intended to leave the question of general and protective measures to a later stage of the Conference, and that their debates were concerned almost entirely with the details of the methods to be applied to the special case of Naples which had caused the Conference to assemble.

In reality Metternich had been yielding ground every day.

The weakness of the British Ministry and the new hopes, which he now had of Alexander, were driving him further and further towards the Russians. When Capo d'Istria abandoned somewhat his eagerness for 'National' constitutions, Metternich was ready to agree to the rest of his programme for the sake of public and unqualified support by Russia of Austrian action in Italy, which he could obtain in no other way. The news of the mutiny in the Semyonovski Regiment at Petersburg, which reached Troppau on November 14, doubtless helped him with Alexander, on whom the incident made a profound impression. The Russian soldiers' revolt was almost entirely due to the brutality of their Colonel, whom Court influence had placed at their head. But the Tsar saw in it a manifestation of the spirit of revolution which he had come to Troppau to crush, though he attributed some influence to the Lancastrian system of education with which he had been experimenting in his Army. This brought him nearer to Metternich and further from Capo d'Istria on the question of a 'National' constitution. Metternich had now to choose between Britain, powerless to give him any aid and possibly soon to be governed by a Whig Ministry, and a Russia eager to put down revolutionary movements on the Continent. He hesitated no longer and accepted the Russian terms. The result was the '*Protocole préliminaire*,' which was submitted to the general Conference on November 19.¹

Stewart came to this Conference without any suspicions. Not a single word of warning had been given to him or to Caraman of the nature of the business. His amazement and indignation were therefore immense when Metternich proceeded to lay before them a document, already signed by the representatives of the three Eastern Powers, which dealt with the question of revolutions in general and the right of the Alliance to put them down by force. The *Protocole préliminaire* had been drawn up, not by Metternich, but by Capo d'Istria, and the language was of the same kind as that

¹ From Stewart (Separate), Nov. 15, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 160, Metternich, *Mémoires*, iii. 377. The details of the final negotiations are still somewhat obscure. Professor Alison Phillips (*Confederation of Europe*, 206) makes the news of the mutiny reach Troppau on October 28. It only broke out, however, on October 30.

which Castlereagh had so ruthlessly criticised at Aix-la-Chapelle. The preamble based the action of the three Powers on "the principles of the Alliance" and "the rights consecrated by Treaties," and announced their intention "to prevent the progress of the evil with which the body social is menaced, and to devise remedies where its ravages have begun or are anticipated."

These beneficent intentions were crystallised into three principles. "(1) States, forming part of the European Alliance, which have undergone a change, due to revolution, in the form of their constitution (*régime intérieur*) and the results of which menace other States, *ipso facto* cease to be part of the Alliance and remain excluded from it, until their situation gives guarantees of legal order and stability. (2) The Allied Powers do not limit themselves to announcing this exclusion; but faithful to the principles which they have proclaimed and to the respect due to the authority of every legitimate government as to every act emanating from its own free will, agree to refuse recognition to changes brought about by illegal methods. (3) When States where such changes have been made, cause by their proximity other countries to fear immediate danger, and when the Allied Powers can exercise effective and beneficial action towards them, they will employ, in order to bring them back to the bosom of the Alliance, first friendly representations, secondly measures of coercion, if the employment of such coercion is indispensable."

These principles they would apply immediately to the case of Naples, whose King was to be set free and enabled to set up "an order of things which may be able to maintain itself on its own foundations, to guarantee itself against any new revolutionary shock and assure tranquillity and happiness to the nation." This is all that remained of Capo d'Istria's 'National' constitution, but the words were so vague that any measure might still be justified by them. There was to be, however, in any case, an Army of Occupation, accompanied by Plenipotentiaries of the Allies, and the King of Naples was to be invited to meet the Allied Sovereigns at Laibach in order to confer with them as to the best means of carrying out the whole plan.¹

¹ From Stewart, Nov. 19, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 153 F. Martens, *Recueil*, iv. 281.

Stewart now realised that he had been purposely lulled into a false state of security by Metternich, and he was naturally very indignant—even more, perhaps, at the manner in which the transaction had been carried out than at the substance of the document itself. He protested warmly against it, and was supported by Caraman and La Ferronnays, who had been tricked like himself. Metternich tried to soothe them by maintaining that the *Protocole* was an inevitable and natural result of previous discussions, but in vain; and Stewart insisted, with a threat of warning A'Court, that the instructions to the Ambassadors at Naples should be so worded that it was clear they emanated from the three Eastern Powers and not from the 'Allies.' He left the meeting deeply hurt, and hastened to send home long and detailed accounts of the whole diplomatic episode, so far as he was able to explore it, in a rather vain endeavour to excuse his own conduct. It was only natural that "the whole seemed an incomprehensible, or at least an unkind, proceeding on the part of Austria." Metternich himself was, indeed, very uneasy at the course of events, and, when Stewart called on him next morning, he found it difficult to defend his conduct. One comparison which he made between the *Protocole préliminaire* and the secret Treaty made at Vienna on January 3, 1815, between Castlereagh, Talleyrand and himself, was singularly inapt, and might have driven a more ready mind than Stewart's to some vigorous rejoinder. On the whole, however, Metternich was ready to do anything possible to avert Stewart's wrath. He gave him, when challenged, a frank account of the joint instructions to the Ambassadors of the Three Powers at London on the subject of the Opposition and Bonaparte. He also acceded readily enough to Stewart's suggestion that the *Protocole préliminaire* should not be considered as a signed document but only as a proposal accepted by the three Eastern Powers and submitted to the other two. This was formally agreed to at a Conference next day, and Stewart looked upon the alteration as a considerable concession, though he admitted that it was one of form only and changed nothing of the actual circumstances of the situation.¹

¹ From Stewart, Nov. 19, 20, 22 (Separate): *F.O. Austria*, 153, 154
From Stewart, Nov. 20, 22: *F.O. Austria*, 160, *Appendix* p. 527.

Meanwhile, Capo d'Istria was also very anxious to shew his friendliness and consideration. He came to Stewart and professed himself shocked at the manner in which Metternich had behaved.¹ Naturally, he insisted, as Stewart was accredited to the Austrian Government, he had left all explanations to Metternich and had expected Stewart to come to the Conference fully prepared. For his own part, he had by no means desired to hasten the signing of the *Protocole préliminaire*, which had been decided upon at Metternich's special wish. To Gordon, Capo d'Istria was even more frank, and surprised him by stating, "that the first drop of blood spilt in the cause against Jacobinism might prove as prejudicial to non-representative governments as the bursting forth of many revolutions." He even suggested that Britain might play the part of *Mediatrix*, and by encouraging the moderate elements at Naples obtain such modifications in the constitution as would avoid the necessity for the employment of armed forces. But Stewart gave no encouragement to this obvious attempt to win his support for a constitutional régime for Naples. Nor did he draw much closer towards his French colleagues, who were much louder in their complaints than he was. On the contrary, he still hoped that his 'confidential habits' and 'friendship' with Metternich would continue as before. In a few days he had set out once more to his wife at Vienna, apparently under the impression that the others would soon follow him. Conduct so complacent surely merited fewer jeers and sarcasms than were bestowed upon him by Gentz and Metternich in their private letters and diaries!¹

Metternich did not, indeed, trust to Stewart to put such a complexion on the decision as would prevent Castlereagh from breaking completely with him. He did not hope, of course, that Britain would accept the *Protocole préliminaire*, a document, indeed, which he attacked strenuously enough himself. He had, however, a multitude of excuses for his conduct, to which he could scarcely expect Stewart to do justice, but which were sent to Esterhazy for Castlereagh's benefit. He would have been only too glad, he said, to have admitted the

¹ From Stewart, Nov. 20, 1820; Gordon to Stewart, Nov. 24, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 154

British Ambassador to all the most intimate discussions, but that would have meant admitting the Frenchmen too, and thus have prevented the free and searching discussion which had been absolutely necessary to unmask Capo d'Istria. He had been justified by the result, for the Tsar had been saved from his Minister who was, though not a revolutionary, "*philanthrope, idéaliste, et placé éternellement hors de toute ligne pratique et positive.*" Capo d'Istria's itch to handle the pen had also to be gratified. Hence the 'pitiable drafting' of the *Protocole*, "which hardly contained a phrase which could be regarded as correct or even satisfactory." These explanations were accompanied by long and verbose reviews of the course of events, which tried to prove that Metternich was as anxious as Castlereagh to repudiate the doctrine of intervention in the internal affairs of other countries. He hoped that a stray phrase about the German Confederation, which appeared to have misled Stewart and Gordon, would not be pressed. He had no intention of adopting any such project for Europe as a whole. He simply intended to conserve the Europe which had been fashioned at Vienna from the attacks of revolutionaries. Surely Castlereagh could appreciate the importance of shewing them that they could hope for no support from the Tsar, and that had really been his sole object in all these transactions.¹

As a matter of fact, however, Castlereagh had judged matters far better than his brother, and before the *Protocole* reached him he had already sent a formal Memorandum on the part of the British Cabinet protesting against the line taken by the three Eastern Powers at the first three Conferences at Troppau. All his information tended to confirm him in the opinions which he had already adopted. In particular, he was very much disturbed to learn from Sir Henry Wellesley that the King of Spain, whose position had evidently been made more difficult by the Conference, had followed the example of his royal brother at Naples and had secretly appealed to the Allied Sovereigns for assistance. This appeal he had sent through the medium of Saldanha, the Portuguese statesman, who had already set out for

¹ Metternich to Esterhazy, Nov. 24, 1820. *F.O. Austria*, 157.

Troppau. Already the Spanish Liberals were protesting against the Troppau meeting, and the risk for the King if this transaction was discovered was obvious. "This amongst other considerations," he told Stewart, "ought to induce our Allies gravely to weigh how far they can venture on the responsibility of systematically encouraging all the crowned heads of Europe to expect aid from them in these perilous situations in which they are or may find themselves involved. Fallacious hopes may seriously augment their danger by relaxing their legitimate and natural efforts either to maintain their own power by their own means (an effect perhaps already apparent in the facility with which all the recent revolutionary changes have been submitted to), or to accommodate themselves with good faith and before it is too late by some prudent change of system to the exigencies of their peculiar position."¹

In the Neapolitan question itself he had also shewn his 'neutrality' by allowing the King to receive the official letter of the King of Naples announcing his acceptance of the Constitution, though he would not allow the new Neapolitan Ambassador, Prince Cimitelli, to present his credentials. This step had alarmed and angered Esterhazy, who, however, soon found himself exposed to merciless criticism of actions of his Court at Troppau. Castlereagh would have none of the 'general' measures proposed by the Eastern Powers. 'Esterhazy noted an increasing coldness, and complained that none of Stewart's reports were shewn to him. To Lieven, Castlereagh was, as usual, even more hostile. He was fully alive, he said, to the advantages of the personal contact established between the Sovereigns and statesmen by the system of reunions, but, he continued, reported the shocked Ambassador, "on viewing in an abstract manner the spectacle now presented by the Troppau reunion, it is impossible not to consider the right which the Monarchs claim to judge and to condemn the actions of other States as a precedent dangerous to the liberties of the world. There is a very great danger in allowing such a system to be established; and although the individual principles of the Monarchs guarantee the

¹ To Stewart, Dec. 4, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 148

benignity of their own views, nevertheless no man can see without a certain feeling of fear the lot of every nation submitted to the decisions and to the will of such a tribunal." What right had Russia to interfere when she was in no sort of danger? When Lieven replied that Russia, unlike Britain, might be affected, Castlereagh said "Who knows?" but added quickly, "At any rate it is by other methods that we ought to fight."¹

These declarations were put into a more formal shape and more guarded language in a Cabinet Memorandum, and transmitted to Stewart on December 4 for the information of the Conference. Justice was done in studiously polite terms to the good intentions of the Allies, and the Neapolitan revolution was condemned as the result of an "occult sectarian conspiracy." But the British position, already laid down in the dispatches, was re-affirmed with great vigour, and all co-operation in an Inter-Allied occupation of Naples or even in any joint engagement against immediate recognition of the new Government was peremptorily refused. "Still more, therefore, did the British Government refuse to act in any way against Spain or Portugal, and in these two cases, moreover, it did not admit the right of any other Power to act." Lastly, the British Government refused to participate in any system of general precaution such as had been suggested, which was, in fact, the same as those which had been put forward at Aix-la-Chapelle and already refuted. "Reflection has only served to confirm them in the conviction that every attempt to reduce such a system to practice must not only fail, but that the avowal of such a description of League among the Great Allied Powers would seriously tend in various ways to aggravate the danger to which it professes to apply a remedy."

In his official covering dispatch Castlereagh apologised for the summary nature of his note, and intimated that he was quite ready to enter into greater detail if he were pressed. The note was ready for dispatch when Stewart's dispatches containing the *Protocole préliminaire* arrived, and Castlereagh

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, Nov. 29, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, xi. Lieven to Nesselrode, Dec. 4, 1820: *Pet. Arch.*

did not find it necessary to alter a line of what he had written. In a hasty private letter he merely added that first impressions of the *Protocole* were as unfavourable as possible. "To involve us and all other Powers," he said, "without the semblance of discussion in a formal diplomatic complication quite unparalleled in all former times, and irreconcilable, if I correctly understand it, with any admitted principles of public law, does quite astonish me. I can only suppose that Capo d'Istria was determined upon subduing his knight before he would move, and that Metternich with the pistol at his breast and the drag chain on his wheel, submitted himself and, what is more important, the general interests in any sober and rational point of view, to his antagonist at discretion." ¹

This first impression was only too well confirmed by a deeper study of the situation, and it was also obvious that further notice must be taken of the *Protocole*, perhaps indeed public notice, since it was associated with overt acts which might at any moment become a topic of public controversy. The matter was not one to be settled hastily, and Castlereagh had long conversations with Esterhazy and Lieven before the formal dispatch, which was, of course, submitted to the Cabinet, was sent to Stewart. Esterhazy happened to be staying at Cray when Stewart's dispatches arrived, and thus got a sight of them, which he confessed he would not have succeeded in doing if they had been more carefully read over first. He was much perturbed at the tone of Stewart's letters, though doubtless he did not see the more private ones. Still more alarming was the fact that Castlereagh seemed at once to share his brother's anger at the manner in which he had been left in the dark, and Esterhazy, for once, got the full force of it. When Metternich's own propitiatory accounts arrived he obtained further interviews in order to remove the unfortunate impression which Stewart's complaints had produced. Castlereagh had by this time resumed his usual calm and reserve, and did not press the point as to the manner in which the *Protocole* had been presented. But he was as

¹ To Stewart, Dec. 4, 1820 (enclosing Draft Note): *F.O. Austria*, 148. To Stewart, Dec. 4, 1820 (Private): *Howard de Walden MSS.*

hot as ever in opposition to the principles which it set forth, "which were so directly opposed to the political and constitutional system of Great Britain that the latter must disavow and even protest against them." "If the King were to sanction them he would be on the road to his own abdication." Other interviews followed, in which Esterhazy in vain tried to alter this point of view, but without any success. Castlereagh's view was best expressed in a sentence which he kept repeating, "You would have done better to have acted first and talked afterwards." The only practical suggestion which he would make was that Rome, or some other place outside the Austrian dominions, would have been a better place than Laibach at which to meet the King of Naples, whose actions might then be considered as more spontaneous. Esterhazy was forced to try and excuse his want of success by the usual formula of the internal situation, to which he now added jealousy of Russia.

Lieven, who was now in close touch with Esterhazy, had no more success. Castlereagh was perhaps not so cold towards him as to his Austrian colleague; at any rate Lieven thought so, and reported the fact in high glee to his Court. But the substance of the conversation was just as decided and peremptory. Castlereagh's final appeal, however, reveals what was, no doubt, keenly felt by him as he read his brother's tale of stupidity and blundering. "I have never before so much regretted as now," he said to Lieven, "not being with the Emperor and able to submit my thoughts to him. I am so convinced of all that I have just said to you that I have no doubt but that I could have got the Emperor, always so accessible to a frank account of the truth, to share opinions which must have convinced a judgment so enlightened as his own. The Emperor has repeated on every occasion his unshaken determination not to contract new engagements, not to form new ties outside those already existing, not to seek new guarantees outside the General Alliance. This determination is, in fact, Europe's safety-anchor. Why change it now?" Lieven could not answer, and Castlereagh could not pose the question in person in the manner which had so often before impressed and intimidated Alexander. The mischief was

done, and there was no alternative but to register immediate and unmistakable protest against it.¹

The form chosen was a dispatch to Stewart, copies of which were at once given to the Ambassadors in order that they might forward their own translations and comments. It followed familiar lines, but it was more cogent, more directly expressed and more sweeping in its assertions than its predecessors. The State Paper of May 5, 1820, had been subjected to alteration and lost some of its continuity. This paper came straight from Castlereagh's pen, and while its sentences were long and involved, he had communicated to it some of the emotion which the news of the *Protocole* had first awakened in him. The invitation to Laibach was only mentioned to say that Stewart and A'Court could only attend as Ambassadors to their respective Courts and not as Plenipotentiaries. It was to the *Protocole* to which consideration was almost entirely directed. The right claimed of excluding States from the European System and altering their institutions by force was declared to be against International Law, against Treaties, and not likely to be obtained by universal consent. Were the Great Powers prepared to apply such principles to themselves? Then, as far as Great Britain was concerned, the Act of Settlement would prevent their agreeing, and any attempt to recognise it "would be so revolting to every class and description of the people that it might shake His Majesty's title to this throne if not expiated by the punishment of the Minister by whom such advice had been given." If it was asserted that the *Protocole* merely meant to regulate the right of interference for self-defence, the answer was that this was an extreme right which could not be generalised. "The extreme right of interference between nation and nation can never be properly made a matter of stipulation or be assumed as the attribute of any Alliance."

It was particularly unnecessary at this moment, as no one questioned or opposed the right of the Allies to deal with Naples, and the idea that the publication of such an act would discourage other revolutions was illusory. It was just

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, Dec. 4, 10, 1820: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 211, xii. Lieven to Nesselrode, Dec 8, 1820. *Pet. Arch., Appendix* p. 568.

as likely to call into being "that spirit of military energy which was the distinctive and most formidable character of the French Revolution, but of which the late revolutions have as yet exhibited no symptom. The apprehension of an armed interference in their internal affairs may excite them to arm, may induce them to look with greater jealousy and distrust than ever to the conduct of their rulers, in short, may accelerate the progress of republican principles and perhaps lead to the destruction even of the semblance of monarchical institutions within these States. 'What hope in such case of a better order of things to result from the prudence and calm deliberations among a people agitated by the apprehensions of foreign force, and how hopeless on the other hand the attempt to settle by foreign arms or foreign influence alone any stable or national system of government!'"

For these reasons and many others the British Government absolutely rejected the *Protocole*. No mere change of form or expression would content them. The *Protocole* appeared to them to make the Alliance into a Super-State "which would tend to destroy all wholesome national energy and all independent action, more especially within the Smaller States." They hated secret societies and military revolutions, but the opposite extreme "of becoming armed guardians of all thrones" was just as fatal. Such a guarantee involved the right to supervise the conduct of all States, and the British Government, while admitting the right to interfere in self-defence, could not consent "to charge itself as a member of the Alliance with the moral responsibility of administering a general European Police of this description."

Finally, the autocrats were once more warned that they had the British Parliament to reckon with. "The King trusts," ran the last sentence, "that He will not be regarded, however, as presuming to interfere beyond the just limits of those obligations which unite His Majesty with his Allies, if ~~He~~ ^{He} should again recommend to their consideration the wisdom of not being tempted, by the nature of their own particular institutions, to hazard an experiment which cannot fail to excite public feelings and public discussions throughout Europe, the effects of which, in the present

state of moral and political ferment, no human foresight can estimate and no combination of its Powers may be able to control." ¹

The logic and force of this paper were unanswerable. Never before had Castlereagh spoken so clearly and so openly. Its terms were unmistakable, and it was undoubtedly designed as a document which could be laid before Parliament if events rendered it necessary. Yet even now there was just a chance that an open breach could be avoided and that his Allies would accept his point of view. It was this desire perhaps that led him to use expressions to Lieven which certainly made the latter depreciate the force of the document. His heart bled, Castlereagh said, at having to dispatch such a paper, and he reiterated his attachment to the Alliance and his hatred of revolutions which might even be dangerous to Britain herself. It was not the aims and intentions of the Allies which he was opposing but the issue of an official document. But he warned Lieven that if the *Protocole préliminaire* was published he would have no alternative but to issue a counter-blast. The choice lay with the three Courts, not with Britain. He made that quite clear in a hasty private letter to Stewart, which he had just time to include with the dispatch.

"It is singular at this day," he wrote, "that it should have occurred to the Ministers of the three Courts to reform an Alliance which has been found to accommodate itself with great facility to all the exigencies of affairs, upon the exploded doctrine of *divine right* and of passive obedience. They might have foreseen that the House of Hanover could not well maintain the principles upon which the House of Stuart forfeited the throne. . . . It now rests with the three Courts to decide whether they choose to contend against the dangers of the times under separate banners: the choice is with them, not with us: they may contend upon the case as we propose without laying down disputed principles. We cannot adhere to their doctrine, and if they will be theorists we must act in separation upon matters not specifically provided for by

¹ To Stewart, Dec 16, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 148.

Treaty, which seems an odd option for them to make in the present state of Europe. . . ."¹

Before this declaration reached its destination the *Protocole préliminaire* in its original form was, indeed, dead. But it had given birth to offspring which produced the very event which Castlereagh so much wished to avoid—an open and public breach with the Alliance. For so far from following Stewart to Vienna, the Austrian and Russian statesmen continued to plan and plot at Troppau. On December 8 a confidential circular was sent to all the diplomatic representatives of the three Courts, explaining the course of events at Troppau and the invitation which had been addressed to the King of Naples. "This circular I understand," wrote Stewart, "is ultimately the greater part from the pen of Capo d'Istria, but it has undergone the pruning knife of the Chevalier Gentz." The knife had not, however, gone very deep. The circular contained highly controversial statements with regard to the Alliance, and its references to the attitude of Britain and France were deliberately misleading, and implied that these Powers agreed with all the actions of their Allies.²

Capo d'Istria had thus apparently got his own way on general questions, but such attempts as had been made to undermine Metternich's control over the negotiations with Naples had not so far met with much success. The most important was a French proposal for French mediation, which scarcely received serious attention. It had originated some time before in a conversation between Caraman and Metternich. The latter had appeared to welcome, or at least not to discourage, the idea. Caraman had accordingly pressed it upon his Government, and despite the contrary advice of La Ferronnays, received provisional instructions to offer the good offices of the French King, the head of the House of Bourbon, as mediator between the three Eastern Powers and Naples. He hastened to put them into effect, despite the change in the situation. This was just such a blunder as Metternich

¹ Lieven to Nesselrode, Dec. 21, 1820: *Pet. Arch., Appendix* p. 573. To Stewart, Dec. 17, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 148.

² From Stewart, Dec. 10, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 154. The circular is printed in *B.F.S.P.* viii. 1149, and *C.C.* xii. 330.

desired to make impossible, a Franco-Russian combination to obtain the offer of a moderate constitution to Naples. The Tsar was horrified at the idea of 'mediation' between monarchs and revolutionaries, and scathing words were uttered by the Russian ministers. Caraman realised that he had been again tricked, and left Troppau to fill Vienna with complaints even more loud than those of Stewart.¹

Meanwhile, the French Government were in a state of complete embarrassment as to what course they ought to pursue. Their two representatives had been sending reports recommending diametrically opposite views, for the one had been inspired by Metternich and the other by Capo d'Istria. In the circumstances Pasquier had naturally shewn reserve, and even the instruction which Caraman received was only meant to be used if circumstances shewed that it would be successful. Vincent attributed this backsliding to the intrigues of Pozzo di Borgo, but it was really more due to the British influence. For both Richelieu and Pasquier had become more and more anxious to ascertain the line which Britain would follow before taking their own. When the *Protocole préliminaire* arrived they refused to give any opinion before they heard from London. They could not, however, follow the uncompromising attitude of the British Government. They were far more afraid of revolution, and wished to join in the invitation to the King of Naples to Laibach in order that the constitutional Courts might act there as conciliators. At the end of November Pozzo di Borgo was summoned to Troppau, and immediately on his arrival saw how the wind lay and abandoned Capo d'Istria for Metternich. His urgent appeals were added to those of the Tsar that France should accept the implications of the *Protocole*. In these circumstances the French Government adopted a line of its own, which in fact reduced it to complete nullity at this critical moment. It did not accept the *Protocole*, but it did not protest against it; and its consent to join in the invitation to the King of Naples made it appear to acquiesce in all the measures of

¹ Metternich to Esterhazy, Dec. 9, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 166. Caraman to Pasquier, Nov. 13, 1820; La Ferronnays to Rayneval, Nov. 13, 1820; La Ferronnays to Pasquier, Dec. 10, 1820. *Paris A.A.E., France*, 716, ff. 389, 395; 717, f. 131.

the three Eastern Powers. Public opinion was, in fact, moving to the Right in France in governmental and parliamentary circles, and on December 22 Villèle and Corbière, two of the most active of the leaders of the Ultras, were admitted to Richelieu's Cabinet.¹

Another proposition, this time from Capo d'Istria, caused even less embarrassment to Metternich. This was to enlist the aid of no less a personage than the Pope. The Russian had originally intended to invite the Papal mediation in a desperate attempt to check Metternich; but the word had gone out of fashion, and Metternich had no difficulty in obtaining the Tsar's consent to a harmless request that the *moral appui* of the Papal See might be added to the more material pressure of the Austrian armies. Metternich's influence over the Tsar had indeed been increasing as time went on. Stewart, who returned to Troppau about the middle of December, thought that the Tsar no longer listened to Capo d'Istria. "Prince Metternich seems now to believe," he reported, "that he has carried the august Monarch along with him in his own measures, and consequently that there is a decrease of the power of M. Capo d'Istria; that the Emperor of Russia has agreed to an immediate application of force after the intervention of the Pope, without waiting the effect of any other measures of conciliation."²

There was some truth in this claim; but the Tsar was as yet far from accepting all Metternich's plans, and could not be trusted. When the British Note of December 4 arrived, Stewart insisted on seeing the Tsar. He foolishly told Metternich of his intention, and the Austrian anticipated his interview with one of his own, in which "he employed all his talent to obviate its effects." The Tsar was, however, still following his own line. The conversation began with Spain, and it was clear that Alexander had never renounced his intention of taking action there. Saldanha had now reached Paris with the appeals of the King of Spain for assistance. To these, the Tsar said, he had made no answer. But he also made

¹ From Stuart, Dec. 4, 7, 11, 14, 25: *F.O. France*, 234.

² From Stewart, Dec. 16, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 154. Metternich, *Mémoires*, iii. 382.

no secret of his desire to crush the Spanish revolution, which he asserted was the origin of all the others, including the military revolt at Petersburg. Nor would he abandon the general principles of the *Protocole préliminaire*. He was prepared to avoid, he said, any new Treaty, but was determined "to secure to the other Great Powers of the Continent the same advantages that France enjoyed, viz. that in an especial case of military revolt or revolutions by illegitimate means, the European Alliance was to be united against such nation, and concert together as to the means of coping with it by conciliation or force of arms." "To such a reasonable and wise principle," he asked, "was it natural to suppose any Government would object?" Especially, he added significantly, "if the immediate effect of these Principles and Conferences here operated to ward off the '*coups de canon*' from Naples, and accomplished the object of restoring tranquillity there on a well-regulated understanding between the King of Naples and his Government."

It was this last possibility which Metternich especially dreaded, and he vented his irritation on Stewart. "I certainly found him most annoyed," reported the Ambassador. "He remarked that if all the other Powers had adopted a line of neutrality like England, Austria was lost, as she never could have taken upon herself the *odium* attending a separate struggle with Naples." This was doubtless an excuse which Metternich only half believed. Nevertheless, the situation was full of anxiety. Successive Russian and Austrian Memoranda had not cleared up the differences between the two Courts. There was an ominous silence from Paris. All parties agreed in reviling the unfortunate *Protocole préliminaire*; all other measures were suspended until the result of the invitation to Naples was known.¹

In this critical position Metternich found welcome aid in the events which ensued at Naples on the receipt of the Allied invitation to the King. The struggle between the Moderates and the Carbonari had grown more fierce as the Troppau Conference delayed action. The experienced and intelligent

¹ From Stewart, Dec. 21, 1820. *F.O. Austria*, 154. From Stewart, Dec. 21, 1820 (Private): *F.O. Austria*, 160

Carascosa desired, like most well-informed citizens, to transform the Spanish Constitution into a moderate one, with two chambers, a fairly high franchise and a considerable extension of the Royal Prerogative. Had any such suggestion come from Troppau it would have been warmly welcomed. Even A'Court was now strongly of the opinion that some kind of constitution was necessary. "Little as I think," he reported on December 4, "this people calculated to feel or enjoy the benefits of a free constitutional government—endless as I am persuaded will be the confusion and corruption to which its establishment will give rise—I am not the less firmly convinced after all that has passed that the *experiment must be tried*." When the invitation to the King arrived, therefore, the Moderates desired it to be accepted, and at the same time to allow the King power to modify the constitution in order to meet the supposed wishes of the Allied Sovereigns. Both A'Court and Stackelberg, the Russian Minister, used their influence in this direction, and the plan nearly succeeded. But the extremists rallied and forced the King, who cared nothing for the oaths which he was forced to swear, to affirm once more his determination to uphold the Spanish Constitution. With the most solemn and sacred words upon his lips he was at last allowed to leave for Laibach on a British ship,—for he would entrust his miserable carcase to no other conveyance. The incapable Duc di Gallo accompanied him as the representative of the Government. The Moderate Ministry fell and was replaced by an extreme one. After his father's departure, the Duke of Calabria, the Prince Regent, fell entirely under the influence of General Pepe, who had accepted the extreme tenets of the Carbonari.

This news, which reached Troppau on December 24, brought great aid and comfort to Metternich. Had the Moderates won, both France and Capo d'Istria would have had a tangible programme to oppose to his own, and British influence might have helped them secretly. "The situation is much improved by the conduct of the revolutionaries at Naples," wrote Gentz. "... If the Parliament of Naples had been guided by sensible and clever men, it would have accepted without hesitation the King's declaration as the best means to obtain

at least a portion of its desires, and at the same time as the best chance to embarrass the political conduct of the Allies."¹

Metternich was, indeed, quite sanguine as to the future. It was now certain that an Austrian Army would march, and the King of Naples could now declare all his acts had been forced on him. He lamented A'Court's participation in the discussions, which so nearly resulted in a moderate constitution being accepted, and rejoiced in their failure. "He declared," reported Stewart, "he was disembarrassed by the present position from the entanglement which M. Capo d'Istria would have produced, if they had been obliged to work upon any previous fixed constitutional system settled between the King and Parliament."

He faced the Laibach meeting, therefore, with confidence. All the Italian States were to be invited to send representatives, and there was even some loose talk of the formation of a general alliance between them under Austrian auspices. Metternich now hinted that if he could persuade his Emperor, some more liberal and decentralised rule would be introduced into Lombardy and Venetia. But the Carbonari of Naples had removed his greatest danger.

As for wider matters, it was for Capo d'Istria to work out the applications of the *Protocole préliminaire*, a task which he seemed now scarcely to relish, since it had completely failed in its original object of embarrassing the Austrian march on Naples. The applications of the Spanish King would receive no countenance, Metternich also assured Stewart. There could, indeed, be no doubt that now that Russian support against Naples seemed to be assured, Metternich would do his best to avoid honouring the engagements which he had made to obtain it.²

¹ From A'Court, Dec. 4, 6, 13, 22, 27, 1820: *F.O. Sicily*, 91 Gentz, *Depêches inédites*, II. 110.

² From Stewart, Dec 21, 27, 30, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 154.

3. THE CONFERENCE OF LAIBACH, 1821

LAIBACH was chosen for the concluding stages of the Conference as a convenient spot to which the King of Naples and the representatives of the Italian States could be summoned, but which was yet on Austrian territory proper. All the Italian States accepted the invitation, and the presence of their representatives naturally enhanced the importance and excitement of the meeting. Stewart had, indeed, suspected that Metternich wished to revive his project of an Italian 'League' on the model of the German Confederation. This project, which Castlereagh strongly deprecated, was not proceeded with, but the Italian Ministers, with the single exception of Cardinal Spina, shewed themselves entirely subservient to the dictates of the Eastern Powers, St. Marsan, the representative of Piedmont, winning Metternich's especial commendation. They were, however, only summoned together to receive the decisions of the Conference, upon which they had no influence whatever.

Though the King of Prussia did not accompany his brother Sovereigns, more Ambassadors were present, and some of these added notably to the importance of the assembly. Pozzo di Borgo had arrived at Troppau, but only for the final stages. At Laibach he played a more important part, deserting completely the waning star of Capo d'Istria, and wholeheartedly supporting Metternich. Nesselrode was very pleased with him, and informed his wife that the Ambassador was the only person in Europe who possessed the qualities of the true statesman. His French friends were naturally a little disconcerted; but they were reinforced by an important personage, the Count Blacas, who arrived from Rome in the train of the King of Naples, over whom he had already acquired

considerable influence. He altered, in a sense, the French attitude towards the main problem in a manner not altogether approved at home, but since it was vigorous and in accordance with the views of the Right, Pasquier could not disavow it. The total result was to make French policy even less consistent than before, but distinctly further removed from that of Britain. Vincent was summoned from Paris by Metternich, perhaps to counteract these two powerful influences, but he remained no more than a useful factotum, while Lebzeltern was only employed to neutralise Blacas' influence on the King of Naples. The faithful Gentz was still Metternich's main confidant and the keeper of the Conference Journal. As he looked from the window of his charming villa towards that of his Chief, only a hundred paces away, he felt that Laibach was even more heavenly than Troppau.

Stewart's marital anxieties came to a crisis during the Conference. His arrival was delayed by the coming of age of his wife, which necessitated much legal business concerning her fortune. He was therefore represented by Gordon at the critical early stages, though he arrived in time to make some real trouble later on. He had only stayed for three weeks when he had to hasten back to Vienna for his wife's accouchement, again leaving Gordon in charge. He did not return, and was thus absent when the news of the Piedmontese and Greek revolutions arrived. One more check on Metternich's complete control over Alexander was therefore removed, since Gordon could scarcely speak with much authority, and, indeed, Caraman complained at a mere subordinate even taking his seat at the Conference table.

The King of Naples arrived in the middle of January. A'Court had received too late Castlereagh's permission to accompany the King if he wished. But in any case he had no desire to leave Naples, where his moderating influence might do some good, to accompany a monarch for whom he felt so much contempt. The King was, however, accompanied by both Blacas and Lebzeltern. Both encouraged him to hope for complete 'liberation,' and he was only too eager to do what they wanted. No sooner had he landed at Leghorn than he sent private letters to the Allied Sovereigns

repudiating all his promises to his subjects. He still concealed from the weak and stupid Duc di Gallo, his intention of breaking all the solemn and sacred oaths which he had sworn. But he made no secret of it at Florence, where he stayed during the last week of December. Burghersh reported with disgust his lachrymose complaints and imprudent words. At Laibach he was joined by Ruffo, and the two vied with each other in urging the Allies to use force and make no concessions. Metternich had been right in relying on the royal wisdom to grant innocuous institutions to Naples if allowed to act uncontrolled, but even he and Gentz were shocked and embarrassed at the perfidy and cowardice of their miserable client.¹

Capo d'Istria, meanwhile, made to Stewart at Vienna another bid for British support; avowing himself convinced by Castlereagh's notes of the impolicy of the unfortunate *Protocole*. He would now rely on facts instead of words, he said, meaning that he would confine himself to limiting Metternich's operations against Naples by obtaining the offer of such a constitution as would avert the necessity of invasion. To this overture, however, the British Ambassador gave no encouragement. The truth was that Capo d'Istria had now lost his master's confidence, and the Tsar had no intention of trying to prevent the Austrian march on Naples. The combined efforts of Pozzo di Borgo and Metternich had practically removed all his wishes of preserving any relics of constitutional liberty at Naples. A reply had also been received from the Pope declining all interference and asserting his complete neutrality. This answer, which removed another obstacle from Metternich's path, drew from Capo d'Istria the bitter comment "that perhaps one ought to have expected such a reply from a Pope who may be considered as dead and a Cardinal Secretary of State who is dying."²

When, therefore, the informal meetings opened on January 12, Metternich was almost completely master of the situation, and events moved quickly. Ruffo submitted letters from the

¹ From Burghersh, Dec. 25, 27, 1820, Jan. 13, 1821: *F.O. Tuscany*, 35, 36.

² From Stewart, Jan. 4, 1821; Gordon to Stewart, Jan. 14, 1821. *F.O. Austria*, 158. La Ferronnays to Pasquier, Jan. 4, 14, 1821: *Paris A.A.E.* 718, ff. 67, 151.

King of Naples to his son which had been revised by Gentz, and were therefore sufficiently paternal in tone to be approved by the Conference. Instructions were also drawn up to the Ambassadors of the three Allied Powers at Naples, which indicated that an Austrian Army would precede the return of the liberated Sovereign. The only difficulty came from the representatives of Britain and France. These decisions had been arrived at in informal meetings, and the method of record had been left open. Gordon, of course, refused to take any responsibility for such measures, and indicated that his signature could not be obtained on any terms. Blacas talked much of *solidarité* but refused to sign a Protocol, and proposed to send a separate instruction to the French Ambassador. Despite the protests of Capo d'Istria, therefore, a Journal, such as had been used at Troppau, under the sole signature of Gentz, was drawn up of the six Conferences at which these matters were decided. By this means it was hoped to associate Britain as well as France in all the actions of the other Powers.¹

This was the situation when Stewart arrived at Laibach, in time to attend the seventh Conference on January 25. Metternich took care to explain to him at once the strength of his position, which had, he claimed, been much improved by the delay. He had thus been able "to completely commit the Emperor of Russia with all the '*Libéraux*,' not only of Italy but of all Europe." Moreover, the real character of Capo d'Istria had been exposed and his power to make mischief almost completely destroyed. "The sequel of these conferences would shew," boasted Metternich, "that he had not been deceived in any of his calculations, and that he had conducted the Austrian monarchy, under the greatest peril with which it had ever been threatened, to a sure and creditable triumph." On Blacas, to Stewart's great astonishment, he lavished extravagant praise, and indicated that all differences with France were at an end.

All this was no doubt meant to intimidate the British Ambassador, of whose 'deplorable' attitude Metternich had

¹ Report of the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, 5th and 6th Conferences at Laibach by Mr. Gordon: *F.O. Austria*, 158.

recently been complaining to Esterhazy. Nevertheless, Stewart immediately protested against the language of the documents read over at the seventh Conference. He was prepared to pass over several references to the general principles of Troppau. But when he found that the hostile intentions towards Naples were announced as proceeding from *les Souverains Alliés*, thus implicating Britain, he refused to be silent. "They must alter their language, he said, or he would be forced to protest. Otherwise the neutrality of his Court would be compromised."¹

This decided step caused much embarrassment. Apparently Stewart had been expected to be even more complacent than Gordon. Since Blacas had consented to sign and thus to approve all Metternich's measures, the refusal was all the more irritating. It was impossible now, it was explained, to change the language of the documents. But Stewart would not give way, and eventually, therefore, he was allowed to add a declaration on the Journal, which he understood was to be read to the representatives of the Italian States, "that in spite of the presence of a British representative at the Conferences which are being held at Laibach, he is not authorised to associate himself directly in the *Procès Verbal* of the Conferences, seeing that the King, his master, has not judged it to be in accordance with the attitude in which he is placed towards the questions there treated to appoint a Plenipotentiary to these Conferences."²

Many objectionable phrases were still left in the documents, but Stewart considered that he had done enough to safeguard British neutrality. "On an examination of our position I think we ought not to complain," he wrote in his defence. "The strong and energetic sentiments of Great Britain, as developed in your Lordship's dispatches, have apparently set the question of General Measures for the present completely at rest, and, if the '*action sur Naples*' is successful, there is every hope that success will render the recurrence to

¹ From Stewart, Jan. 24, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 158. Metternich to Esterhazy, Jan. 11, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Weissungen*, 217, i.

² In French in the original.

the idea of guarantee less necessary in the minds of the three Powers."

Unanimity having thus apparently been established, other matters were soon decided. It was only with the greatest difficulty that the Tsar was persuaded from accompanying the Austrian Army. The King of Naples was to follow close upon its heels, accompanied by an advisory Ambassadorial Conference composed of Blacas, Pozzo di Borgo, Vincent and a Prussian. A secret letter was sent to the Duke of Calabria advising him what to do when the final emergency came.¹

In these matters Stewart took no part. He contented himself with a warning that the British fleet must remain neutral, drawing from Blacas a hasty announcement that the French fleet would be in the same position, though it was hard to reconcile this 'neutrality' with his actions at Laibach. When, however, the stage was set for the final scene, a new *contretemps* took place. The Duc di Gallo was summoned to hear these decisions solemnly communicated to him, in the presence of the Italian representatives. Stewart decided to attend, and it was fortunate that he did so. For the Allies had prepared an entirely new set of papers to be read to the Duc di Gallo, including an 'allocution' to be delivered by Metternich. These had been drawn up in a Conference to which Stewart was not invited, and were full of phrases designed to shew the *solidarité* of the Allies, while the British protest was omitted altogether.

But if this manoeuvre was designed to prevent his protest it failed in its purpose. In the preliminary discussions, while the Italian representatives were assembling without, Stewart entered an emphatic protest against this procedure. He described the scene to his brother in some detail:

"When Prince Metternich had exposed his *tableau*, I said, 'It was with extreme regret that I did not observe that degree of *ménagement* towards my attitude which I found myself bound to look for, and that I should propose either reading the Journal of the seventh Conference which contained the explanation of my position, or, if that was objec-

¹ From Stewart, Jan. 26, 1821. *FO Austria*, 158. The Journals of the seven Conferences are enclosed. From Stewart, Jan. 27, 1821 (*Separate*) *F.O. Austria*, 160, *Appendix* p 535.

tionable, I should be under the necessity of asking for my separate declarations to be communicated in some part to the Duc di Gallo."

This demand was met by a storm of protests, "Prince Metternich seeing insuperable objections to the seventh Journal, the French Ambassador not approving of it, and, finally, the Russians (M. Pozzo di Borgo) saying that it would have been better not to have been present than to make difficulties at the last; (M. Capo d'Istria) that he did not see the good that was achieved by all the forms that had been given up, to have at this moment the distinct expression of our neutrality." Stewart, however, refused to be browbeaten. He had a complete answer to these arrogant objections. "I had only to reply," he reported, "that, if I had not been invited, I should not have presumed to be present and I would withdraw if desired; but being present I could not give countenance to my Royal Master's name being included in what was now announced as the sentiments of the Allied Sovereigns without any precise explanation." Eventually it was agreed to read at the end of the address the declaration which Stewart had placed on the Journal of the seventh Conference.

Meanwhile, the carriages conveying the Italian representatives had been arriving, and Metternich was betraying his extreme anxiety by every movement. When the compromise was at last arranged Ruffo fled into an adjoining room, whence he watched through a spy-hole the Duc di Gallo receive the 'allocution' and other communications. The representative of the Neapolitan Revolution was, however, unequal to the opportunity presented to him. He made no protest and promised to counsel submission to his fellow countrymen. Metternich could feel safe once more and hasten his preparations.¹

To the Conference which arranged the details of the Austrian invasion, Stewart was admitted after warmly pro-

¹ From Stewart, Jan. 28, 31, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 158. From Stewart, Jan. 31, 1821 (Secret and Separate): *F.O. Austria*, 160. Journal of M. Bois le Comte: *Paris A.A.E., France*, 720, f. 102. Blacas to Pasquier, Feb. 4, 1821: *Paris A.A.E., France*, 718, f. 385.

testing against the previous secret meeting. But his presence had no effect on the proceedings, and he was forced to listen to documents which reiterated the "*solidarité des Puissances Alliées*." Since these were, however, secret documents, he contented himself with recording a protest on the Journals.

Even more important was the decision now arrived at that another reunion of the Cabinets should take place in 1822.¹ Stewart quite failed to see the significance of this point. He merely remarked that he did not think that his own Government would be likely to view such a proposal favourably, in view of their attitude towards the meeting in progress.

The British 'neutrality' had done little, therefore, to mar Metternich's triumph. Russian support for the Austrian march on Naples had been secured without giving up anything substantial. The 'general' principles had been relegated to the background, no constitution had been offered to the Neapolitans, even the French envoys had manifested an almost complete approval of all the transactions. Stewart's protests alone had impaired the 'solidarity' of the Alliance. He had, indeed, caused great irritation to the other members of the Conference. But it had been so made as to produce comparatively little effect on the outside world. Metternich might expect, therefore, that all Europe would be intimidated by the imposing array of force brought to bear on the offending State. It was at this juncture that news reached Laibach of a public protest by the British Government against the proceedings of the Alliance.¹

Castlereagh had evinced growing dissatisfaction with the plans of the Allies. He had been especially disgusted with the conduct of the King of Naples, on which the very frank dispatches of A'Court and Burghersh had given him full information, though he admitted that the conduct of the Carbonari had increased rather than diminished Austria's claim to act in self-defence. But he never ceased to warn Esterhazy and Lieven of the danger of the Troppau principles and the impossibility of Britain accepting them. Esterhazy

¹ From Stewart, Feb. 2 (Nos. 17, 18). *F.O. Austria*, 158. Encloses *Point de vue sur l'armée d'occupation*, dated Jan. 29, 1821. From Stewart, Feb. 3, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 160. Caraman to Pasquier, Feb. 5, 1821: *Paris A.A.E.* 718, f. 391. Metternich to Esterhazy, Feb. 2, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 217, 1.

attributed this 'feebleness' to all manner of motives, fear of the effect on Spain, jealousy of Russian influence in Europe, distrust of French policy, the unpopularity of the Government and the dread of the approaching session of Parliament. He gave better counsel when he recommended Metternich to read Pitt's speeches, and to note that the struggle of Britain against the French Revolution was ostensibly based on material considerations, in which British interests were obviously concerned, rather than on vague enunciations of principle.¹ }

Castlereagh at any rate had repeatedly warned the Eastern Powers that the protests which he was forced to make against their interpretation of the Alliance would be made publicly if they gave publicity to their own views. That situation had now arisen. The circular of December 8, 1820,² which, as has been seen, contained much the same offensive statements as the *Protocole préliminaire*, had not remained secret. It had been brought to the notice of the Netherlands Government, whose recognition of the Neapolitan Revolution had much offended Austria. The Prussian Minister had used it at Madrid. At other Courts it had been allowed to be known, though its contents had been less formally communicated. The circular committed Britain to principles against which formal protests had been made, and since it had been communicated to other Powers, Britain had every right and duty to make her position clear. Even if the Cabinet had hesitated thus to display to Europe the open breach between them and the other members of the Alliance, it was obvious that the circular would soon become known in England. But they had no such hesitation. Castlereagh felt that his counsels had been ignored, and he prepared to defend himself in a public document which could be laid before Parliament.

The British circular, which was dated January 19, 1821, was sent to all British representatives at Foreign Courts.³ It was a result, it was explained, of the circular of December 8,

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, Jan. 2, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 214, i., *Appendix* p. 554.

² See above, p. 306.

³ *B.F.S.P.* viii. 1, 160. The gist of the circular of Dec. 8 was published by the *Morning Chronicle* on Jan. 15, 1821 and all other papers soon copied it.

circumstances under which that Revolution was understood to have been effected ; but they, at the same time, expressly declared to the several Allied Courts, that they should not consider themselves as either called upon, or justified, to advise an interference on the part of this country : they fully admitted, however, that other European States, and especially Austria and the Italian Powers, might feel themselves differently circumstanced ; and they professed, that it was not their purpose to prejudge the question as it might affect them, or to interfere with the course which such States might think fit to adopt, with a view to their own security ; provided only, that they were ready to give every reasonable assurance, and their views were not directed to purposes of aggrandizement, subversive of the territorial system of Europe, as established by the late Treaties."

The attempt by the Eastern Powers to found the general principles upon existing Treaties, was negatived in the most uncompromising manner possible. It was insisted that the British Government had continually protested against any such interpretation, in 1815 and 1818, as in 1820. The only right of intervention, which they could admit, was that founded on self-defence :

" It should be clearly understood, that no Government can be more prepared than the British Government is, to uphold the right of any State or States to interfere, where their own immediate security, or essential interests, are seriously endangered by the internal transactions of another State. But, as they regard the assumption of such right, as only to be justified by the strongest necessity, and to be limited and regulated thereby ; they cannot admit that this right can receive a general and indiscriminate application to all revolutionary movements, without reference to their immediate bearing upon some particular State or States, or be made prospectively the basis of an Alliance. They regard its exercise as an exception to general principles, of the greatest value and importance, and as one that only properly grows out of the circumstances of the special case ; but they, at the same time, consider, that exceptions of this description never can,

without the utmost danger, be so far reduced to rule, as to be incorporated into the ordinary diplomacy of States, or into the institutes of the law of nations."

Lastly, the British representative was authorised to communicate the circular to those Courts which had received that of the Eastern Powers, to whose "purity of intention," however, full justice was to be done. Nor could this "difference of sentiment" make any alteration whatever "in the cordiality and harmony of the Alliance on any other subject, or abate their common zeal in giving the most complete effect to all their existing engagements."

The circular announced publicly what Castlereagh had been reiterating in private for the last six months. It was a singularly frank document. Though it did not actually confess that the British Government had desired Austria to take action against Naples, the diplomatic language employed indicated quite clearly the attitude which had been adopted towards the Neapolitan revolution. But these admissions, though they were attacked in Parliament, were overshadowed by the sweeping condemnation of the doctrines enunciated by the Alliance, made in such a manner as to evoke the applause of Liberals all over Europe. Castlereagh was determined that there should be no misconceptions on this point. With the circular were sent copies of the principal British Notes from 1815 onwards, so that British representatives might be fully instructed as to the policy of their Government.

The Alliance was, however, to be vindicated not destroyed. "You will make discreet use of these documents," ran the accompanying instructions, "to protect the councils of your Government from being exposed to any insinuation of inconsistency or want of candour, but you will be careful not to give copies; and whilst you regulate your language in conformity to the principles therein recognised, you will avoid any discussion, which might give occasion to a suspicion that the different modes, in which these questions have been viewed by the Allied Governments, might possibly produce some abatement in the cordiality of their

union, which, upon all points really embraced by treaty, you will always regard and declare to subsist in full harmony and vigour." ¹

The effect of the circular was, however, immense. Castle-reagh's subordinates were for the most part heartily sick of the methods of the Eastern Powers, and possibly less anxious to preserve the fundamentals of the Alliance than their chief. Stewart, who certainly relished the duty which was given him, lost no time in reading it to Metternich and the Russian Ministers. "It would be wrong to conceal from your Lordship," he reported, "the dismay occasioned and visible in the countenances of the party during the perusal of these documents." The Tsar, Stewart claimed, now found all his excuses for wandering about Europe and interfering with other States peremptorily denied. The French Plenipotentiaries were in a particularly awkward position, as they did not want to be forced to give explanations of the equivocal game which they were playing. Metternich, who denied giving any orders for the communication to other Powers of the circular of December 8, thought that "it would have been better for England under the position imposed by her situation to have been entirely out of the Conferences." He considered that, as far as she was concerned, "*les bienfaits de l'Alliance Européenne étaient suspendus*." But angry as he was, he said that he should make no protest, since it was now too late. He was soon forced, however, to publish the British circular in the Austrian press, together with the Allied circular of December 8, so alarming were the rumours that reached Vienna from other countries.

Stewart and Gordon also communicated the circular to the representatives of the Italian States. They could scarcely give open expression in that place to the feelings of satisfaction, which they, perhaps, felt and certainly evinced in private. But Burghersh reported its great effect at Florence, where it even aroused hopes that the Austrian invasion might be arrested by it. At Turin, "it was hailed very generally as a welcome refutation of many assertions by the Austrian

¹ To Lamb, Jan. 12, 1821: *F.O. Germany*, 21. Marked Circular in *F.O. Continent*, 43.

Minister." At Naples, though A'Court himself had thought it prudent not to communicate it to the Government, it was read in the Assembly and received with long-continued cries of "*Viva l'Inghilterra.*"

"It is likely to be received throughout the German Courts as a sign of salvation from all they must apprehend," reported Lamb from Frankfort, after the German Ministers at the Diet had received the communication. At Madrid the circular was popular with the people, though the Spanish Ministry was disturbed at the references to the right to interfere where security and essential interests were threatened.¹

The debates that ensued in both Houses of Parliament increased and made permanent in Europe this profound impression. Grey attacked not only the 'Holy Alliance,' as the three Eastern Powers were now beginning to be generally called, but also Austrian policy towards Naples, and Liverpool in his reply merely defended his Government and not Austria. Lord Holland's allusions to Alexander's implication in the assassination of his father were irrelevant to the main issue, but advertised the debate. The Tsar remembered with bitterness that he had gone out of his way to show especial friendship to Lord Holland in 1814.

In the Commons, however, where Mackintosh inveighed against the 'sacred trio,' Castlereagh made a warm defence of the Alliance as he understood it, while he complained that "it was too much to be told that the British Government ought to dictate moral lessons to Europe." His tone towards Austria was distinctly warmer than Liverpool's, and he claimed that the Carbonari were aiming at the creation of a united Italian State. His assertion that he would not protest against an Austrian attack on Naples, unless he could back it up by force, was something less than candid, and Tierney, who said that the impression made on Metternich must be, "we cannot do anything but you do

¹ From Stewart, Feb. 2, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 158. From Gordon, Feb. 16, 25, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 162. From Burghersh, Feb. 21, 1821: *F.O. Tuscany*, 36. From Percy, Feb. 19, 1821: *F.O. Sardinia*, 62. From A'Court, Feb. 15, 1821: *F.O. Sicily*, 93. From Lamb, Jan. 30, 1821: *F.O. Germany*, 21. From Wellesley, Feb. 25, 1821: *F.O. Spain*, 244.

something," shewed the real sense of the circular and of British policy.¹

These debates enlightened those at Laibach as to the real state of public opinion in England. The effect was, however, blunted somewhat by Castlereagh's defence of Austria, his explanations to Esterhazy and Lieven, and still more by the sympathy towards the Alliance manifested by the King and Wellington. The Ambassadors' accounts of these manifestations doubtless exaggerated the language actually used, since their own influence and reputation were involved. Castlereagh made no excuses for his circular, which, indeed, expressed exactly his own point of view; and, until he had received the observations of Metternich, he maintained a close reserve on the Naples question. But he then undoubtedly attempted to remove some of the impressions made on the Ambassadors by the bitter tone of the Parliamentary debates. They proved, he said, how wise he had been in issuing his circular, and Esterhazy had to admit that no one could be found in Britain to defend the principles of the *Protocole préliminaire*. Even Castlereagh's assertion that Austria had the right to act in self-defence had been ridiculed by the Opposition. Nevertheless, Esterhazy was convinced, he said, that Castlereagh was much more favourable to Austrian policy than he could avow. "He is like a great lover of music who is at Church; he wishes to applaud but he dare not." Lieven also drew a distinction between Castlereagh and Liverpool, whose condemnation of the Allies was far more severe, he believed, than that of the Foreign Minister and not altogether approved by his colleagues. The King, both Ambassadors considered, was whole-heartedly on their side, though his support was not at this moment of much use to them. As for Wellington, never did he display more clearly his strange lack of responsibility towards his colleagues, sending Esterhazy at his request a letter of advice on the Austrian scheme of Occupation, which was not to be shewn to Stewart but to be regarded as personal and confidential on the part of the Duke. No wonder that Esterhazy reported that the British Government "approves the end which we seek in these circumstances," and that "in

¹ *Hansard*, Lords, Feb. 19, 1821; Commons, Feb. 21, 1821.

spite of the feebleness with which it defends its favourable intentions, we cannot doubt their reality." ¹

This was true enough so far as the success of the military expedition was in question. Nor had Castlereagh tried to conceal in the Parliamentary debates his reprobation of the revolution. But he also used his influence with Esterhazy to keep Austrian policy as moderate as possible. He had been impressed by A'Court's insistence that some form of constitution ought to be left at Naples, and he urged that there should be no attempt to return to the complete autocracy previously existing. This advice he tendered, he said, because of the necessities of the case and not as one who believed that constitutional experiments often lead to good results.

Unfortunately, by this time the so-called 'Constitution' designed for Naples had been already settled. That submitted by Ruffo was so ridiculous that even Metternich "was placed in the singular position of having to advocate the cause of liberty." Capo d'Istria tried hard to get some liberal concessions, but he got no support from Blacas. The final word, moreover, was always to lie with Austria. La Ferronnays, who disliked Blacas' refusal to help Capo d'Istria, caused some embarrassment by suddenly challenging Metternich point blank on this point and forcing the admission from him. Metternich himself, indeed, would have preferred a more liberal policy. He hesitated "between his Emperor's partiality for a pure monarchical system and his own wish to place the question upon a footing which might gain credit to his Government in the eyes of Europe." But the representatives of the Italian States were against him, and the result was a constitution which was nothing more than a sham, its terms being so vaguely drawn that they might mean anything. Esterhazy was, in fact, ordered to inform Castlereagh—and no one else—that the King of Naples would not allow any con-

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, Jan. 30, Feb. 13, March 1, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 214, 1. u. Lieven to Nesselrode, Jan. 22, Feb. 12, 28, 1821. *Pet. Arch.*, Wellington to Esterhazy, Feb. 28, 1821. *W.N.D.* 1. 160. The Duke found the period of Occupation proposed by the Austrians too short, and advised that it be extended to allow seven years in case of necessity.

stitutional liberty in his Kingdom, and that the Powers would support him in this determination.

The outline of this convenient constitution, as well as of the plans for the Austrian occupation, was communicated to the Italian States on February 25, and they were then ready to be dismissed. Before their dispersion, however, it was announced that they would be summoned to another meeting in the next year to deliberate further on the affairs of Italy. The Sovereigns and their Ministers awaited at Laibach the result of the military expedition which was already in motion.¹

While the Austrian army was moving with difficulty towards the frontier of Naples, news was received at Laibach of another revolutionary outbreak. On March 10 an insurrection broke out amongst the Turin garrison, which was soon completely successful. It was unexpected, though in 1820 the North of Italy had been considered as far more dangerous than the South. But by the North had been meant Lombardy, where the 'Sects' were stronger and the hatred of Austria more intense, and it was on Milan that the Neapolitans had mainly grounded their own hopes of assistance. But the North was held down by the Austrian armies, and month after month went by without any signs of activity. "Until the Neapolitan army was under the walls of Milan and its proclamations fixed upon the doors of the Cathedral, the Neapolitans must expect nothing from their Northern brethren beyond good wishes," was the final answer from the Carbonari of Lombardy.

Piedmont was, however, distinct from all other States. Alone it had resisted Austrian influence and pressure. Its nobility, trained during the French occupation to a new outlook, were already contemplating a change in the constitution of the State. The old and reactionary Victor Emmanuel was not unpopular, but his feeble attempts to put back the clock were regarded with contempt. Many of the younger nobles and officers looked to the heir presumptive, the young Charles Albert, Prince de Carignan, who had been educated in France, to help them to introduce a more modern conception of society.

¹ From Gordon, Feb. 16, 25, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 162; *C.C.* xii. 371. Report by Bois le Comte on the fourteenth Conference, Feb. 22, 1821: *Paris A.A.E. France*, 720, ff. 148-9. Metternich to Esterhazy, March 5, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 217, iii.

Such men were little affected by the crude and wild tenets of the 'Sects.' But they were moved to great indignation by the preparations to put down the Neapolitan revolution, in which they saw, not unnaturally, a menace to their own independence. Indeed, Percy reported that the insurrection was largely due to the threats of the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors.¹

Victor Emmanuel, realising his own weakness, and more honest than Ferdinand of Naples, at once resigned in favour of his brother, Charles Felix. The latter was at Modena, and the young Prince Carignan consented, after much hesitation, to act as Regent, until the wishes of the new King were known, recognising by implication at least the new régime set up by the revolution.

This news reached Laibach before the result of the expedition against Naples was known, and caused great consternation. The many prognostications as to the widespread revolutionary plots seemed at last to have come true. Nevertheless, Metternich shewed great courage and refused to alter any of his plans for Naples. The Tsar was even more bellicose, and placed his army at the disposal of his Ally. Within twenty-four hours it was publicly announced that 100,000 Russian troops would march to the assistance of autocracy in the West, and news of this step was sent all over Europe. Metternich professed himself desolated at the necessity of recourse to so desperate a remedy. "*Cent Mille Russes mangent l'Italie*," he said to Gordon, "*j'en suis desolé; mais encore la cendre vaut-elle mieux que la flamme*." Almost certainly, however, he foresaw, as actually happened, that the mere announcement of the intention would be sufficient. In particular, he wished it to be a warning to France. French intrigue was supposed to be behind the insurrection at Turin, but the possibility of French troops being used to put it down was equally alarming to Metternich. He hoped that the Tsar's announcement

¹ From A'Court, March 9, 1821: *F.O. Sicily*, 93. From Percy, March 2, 10, 13 *F.O. Sardina*, 62. Mocenigo, the Russian Minister, had at Naples and Turin been a great intriguer with the Carbonari. He returned from a visit to Laibach in a different mood, declaring to Percy "that he now no longer looked upon the Emperor as a mortal but adored him as a Divinity." Hill, the British Minister, was on leave when the insurrection broke out, but returned immediately.

would make any such step impossible. Alexander himself frankly avowed to the indignant La Ferronnays fear of France as the real motive for his summons to his troops.¹

The French Government were, indeed, considerably embarrassed by the situation. Their Ambassador at Turin, La Tour du Pin, was not only suspected by the Eastern Powers, but was being urged by Carignan to support the institution of a *Charte*. Though induced by Blacas to support reaction at Laibach, neither Richelieu nor Pasquier had really approved of his policy. They were horrified at the idea of being committed to similar action against Piedmont. In these circumstances they vacillated, as usual, and expressed the greatest anxiety to know the line which Britain would take. The idea of mediation, already tentatively put forward as regards Naples, was pressed still further with regard to Piedmont, and when the views of the Tsar's proposal reached them, they appealed to Britain to join them in preventing so great an extension of Russian influence.

Castlereagh's definite refusal of the offer of mediation with regard to Naples had already been sent. But if he was jealous of French action in Naples, he was far more anxious concerning Piedmont, and the peremptory refusal of mediation in the one case made it impossible in the other. He was only less opposed to the use of Russian troops, which, however, he preferred to both French and Austrian, if force must be used. He hoped, however, that this might be avoided. The new King had rejected all idea of a constitution, and "if the tranquillity of the rest of Italy is secured by the arms of Austria, and the internal peace of France (which now seems probable) is confirmed and assured by the moral influence of the failure of the revolutionary effort in the South of Italy, the probability is that Piedmont will by its own endeavours reduce itself to order, in the hope of arresting the entry of foreign troops."²

This wish was unfortunately not realised, though the revolution was soon over. The new King refused all compromise with the rebels, and would not listen to any repre-

¹ From Gordon, March 15, 17, 22, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 163. La Ferronnays to Pasquier, March 19, 1821: *Paris A.A.E. France*, 719, f. 215.

² From Stuart, March 14, 17, 19, 22, 26, 1821: *F.O. France*, 249. To Gordon, April 5, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 161.

sentation or excuse made by his nephew. The latter, after some hesitation, abandoned a cause which obviously became hopeless after Naples had been crushed, and France refused to help in any way. Austrian troops moved rapidly towards the frontier, and the new King was soon accepted as an 'absolute' monarch. An 'Occupation' was, however, deemed necessary, and it was naturally entrusted to Austrian soldiers. Alexander soon stopped the march of his own troops, not merely because of the distance from the scene but also because he was afraid of their exposure to the bad influences of the West.¹

The new King was made of sterner stuff than his brother, and determined to punish before he pardoned. Nevertheless, it is surprising that Castlereagh should have acceded to the request of his Minister, Hill, and sent on May 7, 1821, a formal expression of a wish that Victor Emmanuel should resume the throne. The motive was one that did credit to both.

"His Majesty directs me to express," wrote Castlereagh, "the great satisfaction with which . . . His Majesty would witness the resumption of the Royal Authority by the late Sovereign Victor Emmanuel: the long experience and benignant character of that illustrious monarch could not fail to produce the happiest results in resettling the affairs of His kingdom. Upon this point all the Great Powers have but one common sentiment, and you will endeavour on the part of your Court to impress it in the strongest manner as the surest means of obliterating the effects of recent events. I am confident that in your intercourse with the Piedmont Government, you will recommend a course of policy at once temperate and firm. No doubt the late occurrences must call forth the utmost vigilance and exertion to restore order and to preserve peace; but as some of the public acts taken by the Duke de Genevois (however well intended) have been marked by a tone of harshness which the Allied Cabinets have regarded as to be lamented, you will direct your attention to this object and inculcate, as far as may be becoming, a more measured line of conduct."²

¹ From Gordon, April 17, 24, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 163.

² To Hill, May 7, 1821: *F.O. Sardinia*, 63.

Such advice was not likely to have much influence, though it was also supported by France. The new King was very acceptable to Austria and to the older nobility. Punishment was not spared, and many Piedmontese shared the lot of other Italian patriots in exile or prison. Victor Emmanuel, indeed, was anxious to resume some authority though not the responsibility of the Crown. He wished to command the army, a step which, by weakening the authority of the new King, would have caused much confusion. Castlereagh, therefore, apparently regretting his earlier interference, or perhaps inspired by Metternich at the Hanover interview, sent a new instruction that the opinion of the British Government against this proposal should be conveyed confidentially to the King.

More important was the position of the Prince de Carignan. Austrian influence, now of course much stronger in Piedmont since her troops had restored order, was actively used in an attempt to abrogate his right to the throne. Laval, Charles Felix's reactionary minister, urged his master in the same direction and explained to Hill that "he would not give that Power [Austria] two years' purchase for Lombardy if the Prince is ever Sovereign of this country, not from any affection that is borne to the person of the Prince either here or there, but that the necessary consequence of his reign must be alliance with France or connection with all the Ultra-Liberals." In this matter, however, Castlereagh took no part, and the fate of the young Prince, whose own resignation a quarter of a century later was to inaugurate a new era in the history of Italian unity, was left for a time uncertain.¹

Long ere this the Neapolitan revolution had been completely crushed. The Neapolitans were in no condition to resist the Austrian army. The long delay, with the ever-present menace of invasion, had completed the ascendancy of the most violent party, exactly as Metternich had desired. Members of the Assembly who urged moderation were threatened with assassination by the Carbonari. "A few demagogues carry everything," reported A'Court, "confirming the

¹ To Hill, Dec. 14, 1821; from Hill, April 29, May 28, 1821, Feb. 9, 23, March 3, 1822: *F.O. Sardinia*, 63, 64.

truth of the well-known axiom that in revolutions the majority is as nothing." In these circumstances the decisions of the Sovereigns at Laibach were received with rage and defiance. Had any conditions been offered which gave hopes of a moderate constitution being established, they would, in the British Minister's opinion, have been readily accepted. But the Laibach proposals offered nothing but complete submission to a weak and cowardly ruler, and the harsh and bloody punishments of 1799 were still fresh in the memory. Moreover, however much the extremists were detested by the majority, the whole of the middle classes were desirous of some form of constitutional government. The assembly, therefore, decided unanimously that their King had been coerced, and that the Austrian forces should be resisted in every possible way. Metternich's strategy had obtained exactly the result which he desired.¹

A'Court reported with growing indignation this cruel situation, which he was powerless to influence. Both the Duc di Gallo and the Duke of Calabria sounded him on the possibilities of mediation, and instructions were sent to London to make the same request. But it was in any case now too late. Nor, of course, could A'Court agree to the request made by the Duke of Calabria on March 7, that he should write to Ferdinand to explain the situation at Naples. On that very day the combat of Rieti had resulted in the headlong flight of the Neapolitan troops. "The most violent of their enemies," wrote the disgusted A'Court, "could not have foreseen such a disgraceful exhibition as this." All resistance now collapsed, and the leaders hastened to fly from Naples. A'Court did all he could to expedite their escape. "I have not refused to sign any passport sent me by the Duc di Gallo, it being understood that the most prominent persons should assume fictitious names of which I am supposed to be ignorant. Your Lordship will not blame me, I am sure, for this act of humanity, even should one of the fugitives be General Pepe himself. The history of 1799 had left a stain of blood upon our character here which I have been anxious to efface." He also, at the request of the army officers, forwarded a letter to the King

¹ From A'Court, Jan. 7, 30, Feb. 10, 13, 15, 21 22: *F.O. Sicily*, 93.

asking for specific orders to lay down their arms. But this was superfluous. On March 24 the Austrian army entered Naples. "Thus is ended a revolution," reported A'Court, "which has only served to place in a clearer point of view the cowardice, versatility, profligacy and total want of character of the Neapolitan nation. Even the excuse the Neapolitans now offer for themselves, namely, that they were forced forward by the daggers of the Carbonari, only makes their cowardice more conspicuous. It would be a waste of words to say more of them."¹

Meanwhile, Castlereagh had had to face further attacks by the Opposition, but he was now in a strong position. His skilful leadership in the Commons and the desperate plight of the Queen had made the Government quite safe unless the King made another false step. Only the 'Mountain' made much trouble, and Tierney had resigned the leadership of the Opposition in disgust. The Government could therefore take its own line without fear of defeat. This made, however, no difference in its attitude, as Castlereagh took care to point out. Gordon had informed him that Metternich expected some change in foreign policy as the result of a better situation at home. Against this idea Castlereagh entered an emphatic protest.

"I see by your and Gordon's letters, received to-day," he wrote, "that our Allies will still deceive themselves upon the political attitude of this Government. They idly persevere in attributing the line we have taken, and *must steadily continue to take*, to the temporary difficulties in which the Government have been placed, instead of imputing them to those principles *which in our system must be immutable*, and which, if the three Courts persevere much longer in the open promulgation of their Ultra doctrines, will ere long work a separation which it is the wish of all of us to avoid."²

He was, indeed, very anxious about the fate of the Austrian expedition. Esterhazy noted the bad effect of A'Court's

¹ From A'Court, March 6, 9, 16, 19, 25, 26: *F.O. Sicily*, 93. Prince Regent of the two Sicilies to Count Rudolph, Feb. 24, 1821: *F.O. Sicily*, 95.

² From Gordon, Feb. 25, 1821: *C.C.* xii. 372. To Stewart, March 13, 1821: Alison, *Lives*, iii. 223.

pessimistic dispatches, which naturally made the Government anticipate a sanguinary struggle. "We are expecting every day to hear the result of the Austrian march on Naples," wrote Planta on March 13. "I have my apprehensions, for the thing has been so badly managed by Metternich that he has given the revolution full time to consolidate and gain strength—he has united all parties, even the most moderate against him." This was a view generally held, and the Austrian cause grew the more unpopular the more it was supposed to be in danger. The British Radicals were in correspondence with the Neapolitan patriots, and obtained information and encouragement from them. On March 20 Sir Robert Wilson attacked the Government because of A'Court's instructions to use the fleet to save the Royal Family, and the claims of the Allies that Britain was in perfect agreement with them. Castlereagh had, however, no difficulty in defending the policy of neutrality.¹

More serious still did the situation appear when the news of the revolution in Piedmont arrived. This was followed, as has been seen, by a fairly definite suggestion from Paris, that Britain and France should intervene in the two revolutions. A motion for British mediation was also made in the House of Lords by Lord Ellenborough, while an appeal had also come from Naples itself. Castlereagh's answer to Paris was to send there a Cabinet Memorandum decisively rejecting this idea, whether with or without France, and re-affirming the doctrine of complete neutrality. Pasquier was much upset at this formal rejection of his offer, which he pretended had never been made, though both Caraman and Stuart had been sounded. He was extremely afraid that it might be used to injure France in the eyes of the Eastern Powers, and, though

¹ Planta to Stratford-Canning, March 13, 1821: *F.O. Stratford-Canning Papers*, vol. 8, *Hansard*, Commons, March 20, 1821. The Government found powerful support in Canning, whose defence took, however, a very different form to Castlereagh's. The line which the Opposition recommended, he argued, meant war if persisted in. "He saw," he said, "that the principles of liberty were in operation, and should be one of the last individuals who would attempt to restrain them." But he was for absolute neutrality, confessing, indeed, that the Neapolitan constitution was not a very good one to defend, which was, however, no business of England. The conclusion blunted the notable sentence above, which does not seem to have attracted much attention.

he was soothed by a special dispatch from London, he considered the incident as intended to discredit his policy.¹

By this time, however, all such discussions had been set at rest by the news of the complete collapse of the Neapolitan revolution. The British Government was as relieved as it was surprised. Esterhazy professed himself overwhelmed with the flattery of Society, and Lieven reported that even Liverpool, whose speeches had done so much harm, shewed himself ardent for the good cause. The Radicals were bitterly disappointed; for in the Neapolitan revolution they had found a useful weapon against the Government, and Wilson, who had announced his intention of fighting at the side of the rebels, looked especially ridiculous. The King suggested to Esterhazy and Lieven that their Governments should recall the foreign decorations, which Wilson had won by his bravery in the field.²

The embarrassments of the Government, though lessened, were, however, by no means at an end. The settlement by Naples was long drawn out and complicated by resistance in Sicily, from which Britain found it difficult to disinterest herself entirely. A'Court, who obeyed gladly Castlereagh's instructions to keep entirely aloof from the Ambassadorial Conference, yet chafed at his ignorance of events and his powerlessness to influence them. He was not informed till nearly the end of May of the proposed settlement for Sicily, which took away even the rights which he had secured for her by the 'constitution' of 1816. At this he protested, but was blandly informed by Blacas that the British Government had been fully informed of the change, and had made no comments. Castlereagh was, in fact, not prepared to make any further efforts on behalf of Sicily. This policy he avowed publicly in a debate initiated by Lord William Bentinck, who thus saw practically the last relics of his constitutional experiment disappear. A'Court was only authorised to make

¹ From Stuart, March 26, April 2, 1821, to Stuart, March 27, 1821 (enclosing Memorandum upon Lord Ellenborough's intended motion): *F.O. France*, 245, 249, 251. Pasquier to Caraman, March 17, April 2, 1821; Caraman to Pasquier, March 27, April 7, 1821. *Paris A.A.E.* 614, ff. 65, 97, 112, 119.

² Esterhazy to Metternich, March 30, April 11, May 4, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 214, iv. and v. Lieven to Nesselrode, March 28, May 3, 1821: *Pet. Arch.*

friendly representations on this point if the Sicilians appealed to him, a course which, as the Ambassador pointed out, was not very easy for them. Castlereagh solicited Metternich's good offices "to effect these local adaptations of the new system which may obviate every inconvenient discussion upon so delicate a subject." Austrian policy was, indeed, in this matter, as in most others at Naples, now on the side of moderation, and Metternich was quite ready to meet Castlereagh's wishes and to tolerate the 'constitution' of 1816. But it was found impossible to control the almost imbecile King. The Conference of Ambassadors was thwarted at almost every point. Vincent and Pozzo di Borgo left in disgust at the end of April. Blacas, the most powerful member, was more concerned to establish French influence than to ensure good government. Metternich wrote monitory epistles from Vienna in vain. Nothing could overcome the stupidity, inertia and cowardice of the King. At the end of the year A'Court reported that "not a single measure has been carried into effect of all those which the united voice of the Congress recommended to the earnest and immediate attention of His Sicilian Majesty." ¹

By this time, however, Naples had ceased to occupy the centre of the stage. The flame of revolution had reached the Ottoman dominions, and events were in progress which reduced such squabbles at a minor Court to a position of secondary interest. The news of the rising in the Danubian Principalities reached Alexander while he was planning the final overthrow of the revolutionary spirit in Europe. The moment could not have been less favourable for those who had hoped to win the Tsar's support for the Greek cause. Alexander at once publicly disavowed Hypselántes' claims of Russian support for his rash adventure. The revolt in Morea and the ominous proclamations of the Sultan, which transformed the rising into a national and religious crusade of Greek Christian against Turkish Mussulman, did not succeed in altering this attitude. Nothing, he told Gordon, should be allowed to disturb the

¹ To A'Court, April 5, June 27, 1821; from A'Court, April 22, May 3, 21, 28, June 6, July 22, Aug. 26, Sept. 12, 14, 22, Dec. 29, 1821: *F.O. Sicily*, 93, 94. To Stewart, July 13, 1821; from Stewart, June 6, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 159. From Gordon, May 9, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 163. *Hansard*, Commons, June 21, 1821.

harmonious relations between Austria and Russia. He would be faithful to his Treaties, and, whatever happened, he would not act except with the unanimous approval of the Alliance. No wonder that Capo d'Istria, who saw an event for which all his diplomacy had been preparing, arrive at so inopportune a moment, was, as Metternich told Stewart, "like a man struck by a thunderbolt."¹

For the moment, indeed, the Tsar was far more occupied with the West than the East. In the Neapolitan question Metternich had obtained a victory so complete as to be embarrassing. In Piedmont also he obtained almost all that he wanted. But there was also the other question of first-rate importance. During the whole of the discussions, there was always before the eyes of the autocrats the spectacle of the revolution triumphant in Spain—the *Fons et Origo* of all the others; and for Alexander, Spain was throughout far more important than Naples. He had never receded one step from the position which he had from the first taken up, that it was the duty of the Alliance to intervene, and the Troppau protocols and circulars had been directed to establishing a general principle which applied to Spain equally as well as to Naples.

In this policy he received support from no other Power. Metternich was no more anxious than before to embark in an adventure which would bring Austria no advantage and would isolate him from Britain. Britain never ceased to reiterate the principles of the State Paper of May 5, 1820. France was both alarmed and fascinated, but not yet ready to play the part assigned to her. The Tsar could not, therefore, obtain what he wanted, but he prepared the way for the decisions taken next year at Verona.

At Madrid the Conference had been watched with hopes and fears by the King and his Ministers. The moderates were still in power. Enthusiasm for Naples had cooled, and there was considerable friction between the two fraternal revolutions. Wellesley had hopes that affairs would improve with beneficent results both in Naples and Portugal. But all

¹ From Gordon, March 19, May 9, 13, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 163. From Stewart, May 31, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 159.

depended, as he constantly insisted, on the Allies leaving Spain alone to work out its own salvation. Threats against the revolution, and secret encouragement of the King, would be bound to make matters worse.

"I am still of the opinion," he wrote on January 27, 1821, "that the best line of policy which the Allies could pursue with respect to this country, even for the attainment of their own objects, would be to abstain from all interference in its affairs. An intimation to this effect might be made to the Spanish Government, wherein it might be required that they should abstain from promulgating their principles in other countries. A declaration of this kind would at once gratify their vanity, allay their apprehensions and would go far to deprive them of any pretext, founded upon alleged attacks upon the Spanish Constitution, for exciting Naples to resist the views of the Allied sovereigns."¹

Unfortunately, however, intrigues and alarms continued to increase. The conduct of the King of Naples and the proceedings at Laibach infuriated the mob. The Ministers' suspicions of France were increased by the equivocal conduct of the Duc de Laval. They had learnt something, too, of the Saldanha mission, which added to their distrust of the King. That monarch's fears were much multiplied by a riot at the Palace when the mob attacked his guards. He was driven to approach Wellesley, through the intermediary of the Portuguese Gomez, his confidant in all his secret intrigues. The plan which he submitted for modifying the constitution practically reinstated complete autocracy, and demanded the introduction of a foreign force in Spain to maintain tranquillity. Wellesley sent it back with the blunt advice that it should be burnt, and that the King should trust his Ministers and eschew foreign interference and secret conspiracy. The King's reply was to dismiss his Ministers and engage in a violent controversy with the Cortes.²

Meanwhile, Alexander and Capo d'Istria had been urging in private the necessity of Allied interference in Spain. Obviously such action could only be successfully carried out by

¹ From Wellesley, Jan. 18, 27, 1821: *F.O. Spain*, 244.

² From Wellesley, Feb. 5, 7, 8, 13, 25, 1821: *F.O. Spain*, 244.

France, and this point of view was pressed on the French Government by the Russians by every possible means during the early weeks of the Laibach Conference. The Tsar made no secret of his designs. "Do you imagine," he said to La Ferronnays, "that the sole object of the reunion and the efforts of the first Powers of Europe is to chastise a few Carbonari. . . . Naples, inspired by Spain, may in its turn serve as an example, and when the first part of our task shall have been attained, when in this country now dominated by revolt and anarchy we shall have re-established together with tranquillity a really just and stable state of things, *then perhaps will be the moment for France to take on herself with regard to Spain, the same rôle which Austria is now filling towards Naples.*"¹

Saldanha had brought a letter from the King of Spain "expressing the captivity of the person and family of the writer, and imploring aid and succour." Matters were not yet ripe to give a favourable answer, and Stewart was assured that Saldanha had been given no encouragement either by Russia or Austria. On the contrary, instructions were sent to the representatives of the three Eastern Powers at Madrid to assure the Spanish Government that there was no intention of interfering with Spain, and demanding the same forbearance to other countries. Nevertheless, the Tsar continued to press his ideas upon the French Government. Capo d'Istria and Pozzo di Borgo plied Richelieu with advice as to the necessity of some action with regard to Spain.²

Richelieu and Pasquier were much embarrassed. They were by no means inclined to take up the burden which Alexander wished to thrust upon them, — at any rate, not yet. Richelieu advised Capo d'Istria that he was "extremely frightened" at the suggestions which Alexander had made to La Ferronnays. Pasquier asserted that a rupture with Spain was the greatest danger threatening France. He was, indeed, in a difficult position. The Spanish Ambassador had protested officially

¹ La Ferronnays to Pasquier, Jan. 27, 1821: Blacas to Pasquier, Jan. 20, 1821: *Paris A.A.E. France*, 718, ff. 298, 362.

² From Stewart, Jan. 27, 1821 (Separate): *F.O. Austria*, 160. Metternich to Esterhazy, Feb. 2, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 217, 1. Capo d'Istria to Richelieu, Feb. 13, 1821: *I.R.H.S. liv.* 591. Pozzo di Borgo to Richelieu, Feb. 13, 1821: *Paris A.A.E. France*, 718, f. 449.

at the attitude of France and asked for explanations, which it was beneath the dignity of France to give. The Ambassador was, moreover, in close touch with the French Left, and public opinion in France was in a very uncertain state. At the same time the Duc de Laval was in secret communication with the Spanish King and forwarding his appeals for aid. Pasquier believed that the Liberals, in both Spain and France, were eager for a rupture, the result of which would be a new revolution in France and the triumph of the extreme Left in both countries.¹

These expostulations made the Tsar pause, and prevented him from pressing his plans. When the matter was therefore at last brought up officially at Laibach by Capo d'Istria, the greatest reserve was maintained. Nevertheless, Spain was secretly placed under the ban by the Eastern Powers. "It was decided," reported Gordon, "that the accredited Ministers should remain at Madrid, and, that though they had declared Spain to have forfeited her place in the grand Alliance, it was from a consideration of delicacy towards the King and interest for his safety that the above-mentioned decision was adopted." It was determined, therefore, to confine themselves to secret measures of precaution and an engagement not to have any intercourse with the Spanish Government without previous communication amongst themselves. It was taken for granted that England and France could not be parties to such an agreement, and it was further stated for British satisfaction that it would be kept absolutely secret.²

Alexander had thus admitted that nothing could be done for the present. He realised, he said, the dangerous state of France. Indeed, he dwelt on it far too warmly to please the French Ministers. He promised, therefore, that he would do nothing to make more difficult the relations between France and Spain, adding that if Spain declared war on France, Russia would declare war on Spain. But he made it clear also that the matter was not settled, but merely postponed until affairs made intervention more practical. For the

¹ Richelieu to Capo d'Istria, Feb. 7, 1821: *I R.H.S.* liv. 586. Pasquier to La Ferronnays, Feb. 15, 1821: *Paris A.E.E. France*, 719, f. 8. From Stuart, Feb. 13, 1821: *F.O. France*, 247.

² From Gordon, Feb. 25, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 162.

moment, however, he was content to wait, and the Ambassadors of the three Eastern Powers at Madrid were instructed to announce that there was no intention of interfering in Spain, at the same time declaring that Spain was expected to exercise similar forbearance towards other countries. They were also authorised to declare that Spain and Portugal in their present state could not be considered as forming part of the great Alliance, but this threatening part of the message the Ambassadors wisely decided to suppress. As it was, the feeling in the Cortes against the Laibach Conference during the progress of the Neapolitan invasion was so great that the Foreign Relations Committee recommended that the representatives of the Eastern Powers should be sent out of the country. They suspected always, and with justice, the loyalty of their King, who, during the whole time which the Laibach Conference was sitting, never ceased to declare to his secret confidants that his life was in danger. Even as late as May 17, 1821, Hervey reported this fact, and added, "Whether these fears are real or feigned with a view to persuade the different Powers of Europe that His Majesty is in a state of duress, I am unable to determine; but I am afraid that all hopes have not been given up by the King and his Ultra-Royalist advisers of the interference of the Congress of Laibach in his favour. It is much to be lamented that some explicit declaration and denial of any such intention has not been drawn from the Allied Sovereigns; an official communication of this nature would have disarmed the violent party in this country." ¹

This was, unfortunately, the last thing which Alexander desired, however much he realised that immediate action was impossible. The final declarations from Laibach, on the contrary, re-affirmed the principles of the Troppau Conference, and placed all revolutions under the ban of the Allied Sovereigns. It was announced also that a Conference would be summoned next year at Florence to reconsider the Occupation of Naples and Piedmont. It was significant that this declara-

¹ La Ferronnays to Pasquier, March 2, 1821. *Paris A.A.E. France*, 719, f. 161. From Wellesley, March 1, 12, April 6, 1821, from Hervey, May 17, 1821: *F.O. Spain*, 244, 246. Wellesley now left his post, to which A'Court was appointed in the course of the next year.

tion did not emanate from Capo d'Istria but was drawn up by Nesselrode and Metternich. It was, indeed, the price paid by Metternich for Alexander's support in Italy." He could not now deny the value of principles which had saved Austria's position, and he was perhaps not indifferent to the effect which might be produced on the Southern German States. He still hoped, however, to avoid action in Spain and to control Alexander in the question of Greece, and in this he looked to Britain to support him. Castlereagh was prepared for these documents, which were drawn up without any consultation with Gordon, by the dispatch to Esterhazy of an elaborate *exposé* of the European situation, which emphasised that the Tsar was cured of Liberalism, that Metternich hoped to restrain his plans for Spain, and that France was now as ambitious and aggressive as when Napoleon was on the throne.¹

The Tsar, on the other hand, while he assured Gordon of his pacific views concerning Turkey, made no secret of his wishes with regard to Spain. "He regarded Spain," he told Gordon, "as the *tribune* to which all the revolutionists of Europe have recourse, as to a vehicle from which they can disseminate their pernicious doctrine, and so long as the demagogues can declaim from it and promulgate through such a channel with impunity their material for undermining the security of every government in Europe, it was impossible to impose an insurmountable barrier to the evil, which had been repulsed but not exterminated." He had yielded, he said, to advice and refrained from direct interference but, he added significantly, that he hoped to see Castlereagh himself present at the Conference in the coming year. Gordon shrewdly suspected that the Tsar had by no means abandoned his plans, and meant to press them once more at the next reunion.²

Castlereagh maintained a complete reserve as to these conflicting presentations of the situation. But he could not

¹ Declaration of the Allied Sovereigns, May 12, 1821: Circular to the Austrian, Prussian and Russian Ministers, same date: *B.S.F.P.* viii. 1199, 1201. Metternich to Esterhazy, May 10, 1821. *Vienna St. A. Wessungen*, 217, v. From Gordon, May 13, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 163.

² From Gordon, May 13, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 163; *C.C.* xii. 396.

ignore the final declaration and circulars issued from Laibach. They were a challenge to the doctrine laid down by his dispatch of January 19, and he was soon asked to declare his views in the House. He agreed with all the criticisms which were made of these documents. "He did not scruple to declare," he said, "his disapprobation of the principles advocated in the documents which had been brought to the notice of the House. He could not recognise the principle that one State was entitled to interfere with another because changes might be effected in its Government in a way which the former state disapproved. For certain States to erect themselves into a tribunal to judge of the internal affairs of others was to arrogate to themselves a power which could only be assumed in defiance of the law of nations and the principles of common-sense." But he did not consider that any new protest was necessary, and he paid a tribute to the motives of the Allied Sovereigns, who "did not know how soon the blood of their own people might become the sacrifice of the revolutionary principles which were advocated throughout Europe."¹

Metternich much deplored this language. He was full of bitter complaints, too, of the British representatives abroad. The conduct of neither Stewart nor A'Court was satisfactory, while Lord Burghersh was openly hostile; only Gordon shewed the right spirit. He had expected something better, he wrote, from the Government which had by now got over its main difficulties. They would realise, however, that he had taken into account Britain's interests as much as Austria's, and he believed that in their hearts they agreed with him.²

This was the line which Esterhazy was to take up rather than to make any protest. Metternich, indeed, now began to use every effort to resume his old relations with Britain. The Neapolitan question, with its inevitable Conferences and principles, was over, and Austrian influence firmly re-established in Italy with the help of the Tsar. With Britain's assistance Metternich might easily avoid the payment which he had promised. Nor was he mistaken in imagining that such

¹ *Hansard*, Commons, Thursday, June 21, 1821.

² From Gordon, July 15, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 163. Metternich to Esterhazy, July 16, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 217, vii.

assistance could be obtained. For in Spain the interests of Austria and Britain did not conflict, and their different attitudes could be easily reconciled, while the rapidly-growing danger in the East was making it essential for the two Allies to come together once more. How could Castlereagh complain of principles which, as Metternich proudly claimed, had prevented the Tsar from flying to the aid of the Christian subjects of the Porte because they were 'revolutionaries'? Metternich was on sure ground when he insisted on the '*solidarité*' of British and Austrian interests in the Eastern Question. Already, therefore, the breach in the Alliance was beginning to close. Neither Castlereagh nor Metternich were indeed prepared to abandon the principles which each had so loudly proclaimed during the last six months. But they were ready to forget their differences in face of a new crisis and new conditions. In a short time, therefore, the wounds inflicted on their friendship were already merely scars, and both prepared to use the Alliance as the best means of preventing Russia and France from aggressive action in the East or the West.

CHAPTER VII

THE EASTERN QUESTION: BACK TO THE ALLIANCE, 1821-22

1. THE GREEK REVOLUTION, 1821.
2. THE HANOVER INTERVIEW, 1821.
3. THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE, 1821-22.

"If a statesman were permitted to regulate his conduct by the counsels of his heart instead of the dictates of his understanding, I really see no limits to the impulse, which might be given to his conduct, upon a case so stated."—CASTLEREAGH, Oct. 28, 1821.

CHAPTER VII

I. THE GREEK REVOLUTION, 1821

WHEN some great upheaval occurred in Western Europe British statesmen might be compelled to subordinate British interests in the East to the necessity of facing dangers nearer home. But, inevitably, when the storm passed, the Eastern Question still remained an unsolved problem, pregnant with vital and incalculable consequences. Castlereagh, therefore, like most of his successors was, throughout his career, deeply concerned with it. In the year in which he became Foreign Minister the Treaty of Bucharest between Russia and the Porte had removed the danger of partition which the alliance between Alexander and Napoleon had at one time appeared to threaten. Castlereagh had thus been free to devote his energies elsewhere during the overthrow of Napoleon and the reconstruction of Europe. But in the Eastern Question, as in most else, he was a faithful follower of Pitt, and he never forgot its importance. ✓At the Congress of Vienna he made an attempt, which only Turkish obstinacy frustrated, to bring the Ottoman dominions within the special guarantee which he had at one time designed to safeguard the final Treaty. ✓It was something gained at any rate to have received the Tsar's consent to this proposal on conditions, and his emphatic assurances that there was nothing he desired so much as peace in the East.¹

Nevertheless, at the close of the European settlement, many questions were still left open at Constantinople. The Treaty of Bucharest had been hastily concluded by Russia in order to obtain a free hand against Napoleon. The concessions

¹ *British Diplomacy*, 303; *Congress of Vienna*, 83, 85.

made had included the promise of the evacuation of certain Asiatic territories, which Russia had no serious intention of fulfilling. There were always numerous difficulties over the commercial regulations of the Straits. Moreover, the successful Serbian insurrection which was still in progress was held to be due to Russian instigation. None of these difficulties were serious enough to make a war likely, but there was always plenty of inflammable material about if a conflagration was desired.

It was, of course, Castlereagh's wish to see all these questions amicably arranged, and this was the substance of all his instructions to his representatives at Constantinople. To the old and rather incompetent Liston he wrote, as soon as peace was arranged, urging the Porte "to soften matters in Servia," and thus obtain satisfaction in Asia. "My advice to the Turkish Government," he added, "is to be more solicitous to secure a clear and early settlement with Russia." But the choleric and vigorous Sultan, Mahmoud II., accommodated himself very slowly to the new state of affairs. It was long before he could realise that French arms were at last finally overthrown; when he did so his alarm at Russia's corresponding increase of power was manifest, and he appealed for assistance. Castlereagh's reply was to reiterate his previous advice and point out that the Porte must expect no more than friendly diplomatic support. "The policy then," he instructed Frere, Liston's second in command, "is to make the Porte so conduct its discussions with Russia as to avoid giving to that Power any just or even plausible motive for war . . . in the present state of Europe, and the relative power of the two States, the preservation of peace to the Porte is of infinitely greater consequence than any or even the whole of the points on which it is at issue with Russia." Measures were to be taken in conjunction with the Internuncio, who had similar instructions to press this view on the Porte, with the solemn warning that, if by haughty conduct Russia was given an excuse for war, no assistance was to be expected from the Western Powers.¹

This was, of course, very sound but very unpalatable advice.

¹ To Liston, Nov. 20, 1815: *FO Turkey*, 84. To Frere, Jan. 29, 1816: *F.O. Turkey*, 86. Internuncio is the title generally used to describe the Austrian Ambassador to the Porte, at this period Count Lützow.

The Ottoman Ministers had no intention of accepting it. They relied, as always, on their traditional weapon of procrastination as well as on the jealousies of the Great Powers. The publication of the Holy Alliance increased their fears but not their desire to yield in the disputed points. They hoped for some new catastrophe in Western Europe to relieve them from Russian pressure. The policy of the Sultan was dictated not so much by his Grand Vizir or Reis Effendi (Foreign Minister) as by a camarilla of court favourites of whom Halet Effendi became the most important. To understand and to conciliate or intimidate these powerful subterranean influences was the principal business of the British Embassy.

Meanwhile the Tsar was, as has been seen, profuse in his professions of peace and his attachment to the Alliance. Nevertheless, his Ambassador at Constantinople, Baron Stroganov, took from the first a very strong line on all the questions in dispute.¹ There was no disposition to yield on any point, and conference succeeded conference without any result being obtained. There was no immediate danger of war, since neither Power intended it at the moment, but there appeared to be no desire to remove the obstacles to friendly relations. The Sultan hoped something would turn up; in any case his religion forbade him to give up territory without fighting for it. He continually suggested that the Western Powers should intervene on his behalf, especially at the approach of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, which, he urged, was a most suitable opportunity to put pressure upon the Tsar. When this help was refused him he complained bitterly that he had been left alone to be bullied by Russia. / Meanwhile the Tsar was running up a bill and waiting till the amount was sufficient, and the moment opportune, to make it worth while to press for payment.²

British relations with the Porte were also complicated by the widening circle of her activities in the East. Ali Pasha,

¹ See above Chapter II. section 3, p. 96. There was, of course, no Turkish representative at Petersburg. At this period the Porte was only represented at Paris, London and Vienna, and there only by minor diplomatists, who had no influence on the main questions in dispute.

² From Frere, Jan 6; from Liston, Oct. 25, 1817, Jan. 10, June 25, Aug. 10, Sept. 26, 1818, April 9, 1819 *F.O. Turkey*, 88, 90, 92.

the 'Lion of Janina,' who had made himself practically independent in his Epirote mountains, had been treated with consideration by Castlereagh, and Liston maintained with him a friendly and confidential correspondence. The Porte by no means relished British occupation of the Ionian Isles, and the reversion of Parga on the mainland to the Mohammedan Power in 1817 brought to a head the rivalry between Ali Pasha and his master. Even more significant were the new relations with another Power, which were viewed with jealousy both by the Tsar and the Sultan. In 1812 a 'strictly defensive' Treaty had been signed between Britain and Persia, and British officers remained in the service of the Shah. There were serious frontier troubles between Persia and Russia, and the latter shewed great jealousy of British influence, which was increased when it was known that a Persian Ambassador was coming to London. Castlereagh explained the situation to the Tsar at Aix-la-Chapelle, and assured him that he much regretted the proposed visit. Nevertheless, it was clear that Persia was seeking protection against Russia from Britain, and that the latter was disposed to grant it. Metternich, with usual guile, never lost an opportunity of stirring up the mutual jealousy of the two countries over this question. A rivalry which persisted through the century had already begun.¹

¹ Castlereagh to Bathurst, Nov. 24, 1818 (No. 47): *F.O. Continent*, 41. Metternich to Esterhazy, March, 5, 1819; Esterhazy to Metternich, Aug. 20, 1819: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 210, iii.; *Berichte*, 209, viii. Castlereagh to Cathcart, Feb. 2, 1819; Cathcart to Castlereagh, May 11, 1819: *F.O. Russia*, 117. Planta to Castlereagh, March 12, 1819: *C.C.* xii. 112. F. Martens, *Récueil*, xi. 271. Broughton, *Recollections*, II. 123. The Persian Ambassador, who made a very leisurely journey via Vienna and Paris, where his doings were carefully recorded, was not satisfied with his reception in London, though he was given money and some entertainment. The objects of the Mission were stated by Mr Willock to be four: (1) to acquire some insight into the present position of Europe; (2) to obtain compensation in lieu of a territorial cession by Russia; (3) to invite a British Embassy or Mission to Persia; (4) to ascertain if Persia would be protected in case of invasion by Russia. Castlereagh found it difficult to find time to receive him, and he complained that thirty-two of his notes remained in the Foreign Office unanswered. They had, however, four conferences, June 20, July 28, Aug. 31, 1819, March 3, 1820, in which Castlereagh explained how impossible it was for Britain to do more than had been already done to put pressure on Russia. It was the delay before the last interview which angered the Ambassador, who was also dismayed that a British Embassy was not to be sent to Persia as had been promised. The refusal, he said, might cost him his life. *F.O. Persia*, 6.

Meanwhile, not much attention was paid to rumours of Greek plots and secret societies. Metternich occasionally sent to Castlereagh alarming reports, generally meant to discredit his rival, Capo d'Istria, but these were not supported by much evidence. The plotters were, however, hard at work. The Greeks had experienced a national revival even before the French Revolution, and they felt the full influence of the new ideas of liberty and nationality, which could easily be translated into the terms of their racial and religious quarrel with their alien rulers. They were encouraged by the success of the Serbians, and in 1820 by the resistance which Ali Pasha was able to make against his jealous master. Above all, their revolutionary Committee, the Hetairia, whose headquarters were at Odessa, believed that the Tsar would support them, and that in Capo d'Istria they had an all-powerful advocate at his side.

It was for this reason that they began their revolution in the Principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, which, though governed by Greek Hospodars appointed by the Sultan, were no more Greek than Russia itself. But they were convenient to Russia, who had, moreover, special rights by Treaty to protect their inhabitants. These had also their own social and economic grievances to which appeal could be made. Moreover, the term 'Greek' to many minds included all Greek Christians under the sway of the Porte. The population of the Principalities, however, disliked its Greek rulers quite as much as the Turks. Only the hope of Russian support enabled the two leaders, Hypselántes and Vladimirescu, to obtain any success. When the Tsar's emphatic repudiation of the revolt was announced from Laibach the leaders fled and Turkish troops easily occupied the Principalities, after overcoming one or two heroic but isolated companies of rebels.

But a signal had been given to the real Greeks. In the Morea the Greek population rose in revolt, and asserted their independence by massacring every Turk on whom they could lay their hands. The Sultan could not deal with this insurrection so easily. On the mainland he was still occupied by the resistance of Ali Pasha, and the Greek islanders, most of whom soon joined the revolt, shewed themselves more than

a match for the Ottoman fleet, which indeed had always been largely manned by Levantines, since the Turk, though a good soldier, is no sailor. (

The Sultan's fury was raised to ungovernable pitch by his impotence to punish these rebels. He revenged himself on those nearest at hand. Greek churches were burnt to the ground and Greek Christians were slaughtered in Macedonia and Asia Minor, and, as a symbol and warning, the Greek Patriarch at Constantinople and several of his Bishops were accused of treason and hanged. The moment appeared to have arrived for Russia to act. Stroganov, far removed from those influences which had been restraining Alexander at Laibach, certainly thought so, and he was soon in violent controversy with the ministers of the furious and implacable Sultan, who was encouraged by the fanaticism of his entourage and the insistent demands of the Janissaries.

When the outrage on the Patriarch had been committed the Foreign representatives met to consider whether a joint remonstrance should be made to the Porte. Sir Robert Liston had been succeeded at the beginning of 1821 by Lord Strangford, transferred from Stockholm, a far more vigorous personality than his predecessor, and very anxious to enhance the prestige of his country and its Ambassador. He was to play a very important part in the opening years of the revolution, and, though often lacking in sensibility and tact, he shewed a courage and initiative which was one of the principal factors in preventing the rupture between Russia and the Porte. He was violently pro-Turk, and his sympathies led him to action, which violated the neutrality prescribed for him by his Government, and drew on him a mild rebuke. At the same time his influence was increasingly and successfully directed towards mitigating the vengeance of the Sultan, and his protests did more than those of any other Ambassador to save some of the helpless victims who had been destined to expiate the horrible deeds of their co-religionists.

Lord Strangford opposed the project of a joint remonstrance, and succeeded in convincing all his colleagues, except the Austrian and Russian Ambassadors, that they had no right

to interfere in the internal concerns of the Turkish Empire. Stroganov, however, had no difficulty in finding causes of controversy. He attacked the Porte with greatest violence for its attitude towards the Greeks, its occupation of the Principalities contrary to Treaties, and, with much emphasis, for its detention of the Russian packets between Odessa and Constantinople and its violation of Russian commercial rights in the Black Sea. The Porte received these communications with equal indignation, and, by arresting one of his agents and interfering with his communications with Russia, did everything possible to increase Stroganov's anger. On June 3 the latter presented two notes "conceived in language of no ordinary vehemence," threatening to withdraw from Constantinople unless the Porte changed its tone. When the Russian packets were refused entrance into the harbour of Constantinople, he removed his household to Buyukderi, and declared that diplomatic intercourse with the Porte was suspended. The Internuncio asked Strangford to join him in a joint letter to the Porte urging moderation, but Strangford again refused. The Russian Ambassador, he said, had not asked for intervention, and had always refused all co-operation with him, while the Greeks and their Patriarchs were rebels and traitors, however deplorable the Sultan's conduct. He suspected, moreover, that the Internuncio was acting a part in accordance with a pre-arranged scheme between Austria and Russia.¹

Nevertheless, Strangford used all his influence to persuade the Porte to follow a moderate line of policy. He found the Reis Effendi determined to get rid of Stroganov at any cost, but, at the same time, ready to do anything to avoid war with Russia. He concluded that peace was still possible, if the Sultan did not give way to his passions and the next instructions from Russia were not altogether impracticable. For the next two months Strangford's efforts were directed mainly to preserving the Russian Ambassador from Turkish violence, which the latter certainly did his best to provoke. Stroganov undoubtedly wished to drive the Sultan to seize his official packets, an affront to the majesty of the Tsar which

¹ From Strangford, March 24, April 25, May 1, 1821. *F.O. Turkey*, 98.

would have made a rupture almost inevitable. It was only Strangford's persistent warning, and the pressure which he brought to bear upon the Sultan by every possible channel, that prevented this step being taken and Stroganov forcibly expelled. Strangford also did his utmost to check the massacre of unoffending Greeks in Constantinople and elsewhere, and he claimed that the Sultan had done his best to restrain the fanaticism of the Janissaries. The Russian Ambassador naturally shewed little gratitude for these services.¹

At last instructions arrived from Russia. Stroganov was ordered to present a note to the Porte demanding satisfaction on all the matters in dispute, and to leave Constantinople if he had not obtained it in eight days. The note commented in the strongest terms on the massacre of the Greeks and the hanging of the Patriarch. It even asserted that it was impossible in the future for Christian States to hold intercourse with the Porte, a phrase which was never forgotten. At this Strangford sent home an almost impassioned defence of the Sultan. "The Greek subjects of the Porte," he said, "are everywhere in rebellion against their Sovereign. These rebels are Christians, and the punishment which is inflicted upon them is imposed in the former, and not in the latter, of these characters." The attacks on the Greek churches in Constantinople he compared to the Lord George Gordon riots, and absolved the Government from responsibility. "The execution of the Patriarch was an act of severity, and the circumstances of which it is impossible sufficiently to deplore. But I feel myself bound in conscience and in honour to declare my positive conviction, founded on grounds of evidence which cannot be suspected, that not only that unfortunate prelate, but many, if not all, the Bishops, who shared his fate, were deeply involved in a conspiracy of which the Greek clergy were the principal agents and promoters." ²

¹ From Strangford, June, July, 1821: *F.O. Turkey*, 99. He reported that the Porte had brought over 30,000 Asiatic troops to keep the Janissaries in awe. "Another order not less beneficial has been that of disarming Turkish children. Little miscreants under seven years of age, and armed with daggers and pistols, had till now the privilege of robbing, shooting and stabbing with impunity."

² From Strangford, July 23, 1821: *F.O. Turkey*, 99. Russian Note in Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls der Griechen*, iii. 95.

The Ambassador, however, exerted himself to the utmost to obtain some kind of reply from the Porte within the stipulated time. In a special interview with the Reis Effendi he urged the justice of the demands of Russia, passing over the manner in which she had made them. In this he had much success, but at the close of the interview he was horrified to find that Stroganov was in great danger. "It now became my duty to ascertain," he reported, "what would be the conduct of the Porte towards M. Stroganov in case he should not be satisfied with the answer to be returned to his note. And it was with the utmost horror and alarm that I found in the Reis Effendi's language the clearest indications of a disposition to recur to that barbarous practice which has always disgraced this Government in the case of a Foreign Minister attempting to quit Constantinople on unfriendly terms with the Porte. I do protest, your Lordship, that on no occasion, which has ever occurred in my public life, did I make more earnest, more anxious, nor more laborious efforts than were employed by me to dissuade the Reis Effendi from this most atrocious measure. It was my good fortune to succeed, and to obtain (literally after hours of contest) a distinct assurance that no restraint should be imposed on M. Stroganov personally in case he demanded his passports."

The Russian Ambassador was thus saved from a fate which would have made war between Russia and the Porte inevitable. Probably he did not know all the risks which he was incurring, when he refused to accept the formal answer of the Porte, which reached him according to his computation one day after the stipulated time, and demanded his passports. Again it needed all the efforts of Strangford and all his colleagues at Constantinople to keep from violence the indignant Ottomans. From Saturday to Monday "the Porte was besieged by our united and unceasing representations," reported Strangford, and eventually, though no passports were given, it was intimated that Stroganov would be allowed to depart. "The representations made in His Majesty's name," he claimed, "have mainly produced this gratifying result." In fact, though contrary winds kept the Russian Ambassador from sailing till August 10, he was allowed to go unmolested.

The interval he spent in bitter complaints against the insidious and intriguing conduct of his British colleague.¹

Stroganov's anger can be easily understood. He had undoubtedly done his utmost to bring about a war. Something must be allowed to the natural indignation of a Russian who saw his co-religionists outraged and murdered by the traditional enemy of his race. But Stroganov's attitude not only towards the Sultan but towards his colleagues shews that he was anxious to make all attempts at conciliation fail. He was, however, no diplomatist, and he had failed to use the advantages which the Porte had given him in its first outburst of fury. He got entangled in minor points on which such satisfaction could be given as made it impossible to found on them a declaration of war. He had thus broken off diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey without obtaining the major point of his policy. Was that, however, the policy of his master also? In any case Alexander was in a difficult position, for which he was unable to find a solution until the day of his death.²

The Tsar returned to Petersburg in the middle of June, apparently more resolved than ever to put his faith in the Alliance as the sole guardian of Europe from the scourge of revolution. It was the Paris Liberals, he told Bagot, the new British Ambassador, in his first interview, who were the cause of all the evil. "They were responsible for the Italian, Spanish and Portuguese revolutions. " "To them also might be ascribed the mutinous conduct of one of his own regiments, as well as the serious disturbances which were arising through the whole of European Turkey." They had contrived the rising in the Principalities "with the sole object of distracting the attention of Russia from the affairs of the rest of Europe, and of placing him, as they unquestionably had done, in a very difficult position." He admitted that past history and popular opinion would encourage the idea that he meant to go to war. But he assured Bagot "that he had had no hand whatever in the instigation of these insurrections; that from him they would

¹ From Strangford, July 26, 30, Aug. 6, 10, 1821: *F O. Turkey*, 99, 100.

² See Schiemann's summing up of the situation: *Geschichte Russlands*, i. 316.

mind. From the first he took the line that everything must be done to avert the threatened war, and to achieve this object he was prepared to meet Metternich more than half way. Even before the Austrian dispatches reached him, or he had broken his reserve towards Esterhazy, he had already made the British position clear to the Tsar in a peculiarly arresting form. At the close of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle Alexander had given Castlereagh permission to write to him personally, if ever the circumstances seemed to warrant it. The critical situation in the East now appeared to justify such a step, and Castlereagh therefore sent the Tsar a long letter, which conveyed the view of the British Government in courteous but vigorous language. He did not scruple to class the Greek revolt in the same category as those in the West. "They form a branch," he wrote, "of that organised spirit of insurrection which is systematically propagating itself throughout Europe, and which explodes wherever the hand of the governing Power from whatever cause is enfeebled. If its symptoms are more destructive in Turkey, it is because, in that unhappy country, it finds all those passions and prejudices, and, above all, those religious animosities, which give to civil commotions their most odious and afflicting colours." He therefore appealed to the Tsar to shew forbearance and magnanimity, since his own dominions were not in hazard, and urged him to wait until the tempest had exhausted itself before he interfered on behalf of either his own servants or the unfortunate Greeks, who, after all, had been the aggressors. Finally, he boldly invoked the principles of the Alliance: "Whatever degree of divergence of opinion may have occurred in late discussions on abstract theories of international law, and however the position of the British Government may have latterly been rendered distinct from that of the three Allied Courts by the line of neutrality which the King thought it necessary to adopt with respect to Italian affairs, there, happily, has hardly occurred an instance since the auspicious period which gave birth to the existing Alliance, of any point of grave practical political difference between your Imperial Majesty's Councils and those of my august master. I feel intimately convinced that each State,

avowing conscientiously in the face of all the world its own principles, and at the same time adhering to its peculiar habits of action, will nevertheless remain unalterably true to the fundamental obligations of the Alliance, and that the present European system, thus temperately and prudently administered, will long continue to exist for the safety and repose of Europe." ¹

This attitude Castlereagh maintained throughout all discussions of the question. There is no need to suppose that he did not realise the character of the Greek Revolution or its differences from those in Italy and Spain. But to represent it as exactly the same was the obvious method of restraining the Tsar from measures which might throw the whole of the Ottoman dominions into the melting-pot. Since Castlereagh wanted to preserve the *status quo* he tried to win the Tsar to his view by representing that any change in the East threatened all the institutions which the Tsar wished to protect. He appealed, therefore, to the new Tsar of Troppau and Laibach who must subordinate all ideas of Russian aggrandisement to the necessity of stamping out revolution. As he told Esterhazy during the visit to Ireland, their hopes depended on the fact, that they could be sure that the influence of Catharine the Second no longer governed the Russian policy.

There was, however, a distinct difference between his policy and Metternich's. He was enchanted with the recent communications, he told Esterhazy, when he at last broke his reserve on Eastern affairs, and was ready to work with Metternich in closest co-operation. But he refused to discuss any possibility of change in the Ottoman dominions. "The European system would gain nothing," he said, "by substituting for the embarrassments of a Turkish system those of a Greek—so long as it is impossible to admit the possibility of the extermination of a whole population." He could not follow Metternich therefore into a discussion of eventualities.²

His instructions to Strangford of August 5, written just

¹ To Bagot, July 17, 1821: *F.O. Russia*, 126. Londonderry to His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of all the Russias, July 16, 1821: *C.C.* xii. 403. His Majesty to the Emperor of all the Russias, Carlton Palace, July 16, 1821: *F.O. Russia*, 126. This last was only formal, being sent to preserve in some measure the forms of diplomatic intercourse.

² From Esterhazy, Aug. 1, 2, 24, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 215, viii.

before he left with the King for Ireland, developed the same theme. Strangford was to adopt an absolutely neutral attitude. He had already been mildly censured for consenting to transmit a message from the Porte appealing to the Barbary Powers for assistance, a course "which might also give offence to our Allies, as well as call the strictness of our neutrality into doubt." He was rather to urge the Porte to a more humane policy, and for this purpose to co-operate with the Ambassadors of Austria and Russia, for Castlereagh had not yet learnt of Stroganov's impending departure. The Russian policy of putting forward at such a time specific Russian interests concerning the navigation of the Black Sea and other minor points was strongly criticised. Still Strangford, of whose conduct Castlereagh informed him complaints had been received from Russia, must try and work with Stroganov, and endeavour to bring the Porte back to reason. "The first measure of public safety for the Mahommedan Power," Castlereagh insisted, "is to make every Greek feel that his life and property are safe if he submits to the sovereign authority, and that the fate of the innocent is not blindly confounded with that of the guilty." Due justice must be done to the Tsar's professions of forbearance, and the Porte warned not to provoke him further. The exact methods were left to Strangford's discretion, but he was to keep his hands free as far as possible. "Conjoint representations," it was added, "are rather to be avoided than preferred." British influence would be all the more effective if it was exerted alone.¹

Hitherto neither the Government nor the country had quite realised how serious were the negotiations at Constantinople. It needed the news of the rupture of diplomatic relations between Russia and Turkey to bring home to them the true situation. There was an immediate reaction against the Greek cause. "The public here," wrote Esterhazy, "of course look on the question as one of Liberalism, but they are not prepared to see the liberty of Greece bought at the price of Russian supremacy in the Mediterranean." He thought that Stroganov's departure meant war, and, though Castlereagh was not so despondent, the news which came to Ireland was

¹ To Strangford, July 14, Aug. 5, 1821: *F.O. Turkey* 97.

disquieting. The Tsar had not yet replied to Castlereagh's personal appeal, but the communications which he had sent to Austria, including a private letter to the Emperor Francis, contained ominous passages. Thus, though Castlereagh hoped, as he wrote to Esterhazy from Mount Stuart, that Stroganov's departure, whilst doubtless intended to provoke war, might be made by prudent management a means of peace, he was by no means easy about other matters.

"I agree very much in your interpretation of the Emperor's letter," he wrote, "I still hope he means peace, but I own I had rather not have found His Imperial Majesty at such a moment sounding your Court upon the course eventually to be pursued in case of a rupture. I do not know whether you have seen a Prussian *mémoire* which the Court of St. Petersburg is now circulating, evidently with some satisfaction at finding inconvenient doctrines proceeding from a disinterested and allied Court. This paper, which assumes that it may become necessary to drive out the Turks and to found a Greek Empire in the East, is the production of Ancillon's pen. It was not adopted by Bernstorff, but, being confidentially communicated to Alopeus at Berlin, it was sent to St. Petersburg, and thence through Nicolai to us. I cannot but think that to this imprudent paper may be in some measure attributed the Emperor's letter, in which much of its reasoning is embodied. It was too tempting a hint for Capo d'Istria not to turn to account, for the purpose of leading the Emperor's mind at least to look at the precipice over which it has been so long this Minister's purpose to hurry his master. My hope of averting the consequences of this unfortunate slip in Prussian management rests altogether in the soundness of the doctrines with which Prince Metternich's intended reply would abound, and in the opportune arrival of the instructions from this Government both at St. Petersburg and Constantinople."¹

¹ Londonderry to Esterhazy, Aug. 29, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 215, ix. Nesselrode to Nicolai, July 17, 1821: *F O. Russia*, 132. Ancillon's *Mémoire* is given in Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls*, iii. 336. Lettre de Cabinet à S.M. l'Empereur d'Autriche, July 23, 1821: *Ibid.* iii. 124. The Tsar warmly approved of the *Mémoire*, he told La Ferronnays a little later. La Ferronnays to Pasquier, Sept. 10, 1821. Mikhailowitch, *Alexandre I^{er}* 380. Alopeus, however, warned his Court not to take Ancillon too seriously, since he was vain enough to aspire to become "le Cardinal Fleury de la Prusse." F. Martens, *Recueil*, vii. 417.

Metternich had, in fact, redoubled his efforts, and urgent dispatches had been sent in every direction. Lützow was ordered to intimate to the Porte that Austria was ready to charge itself with any communication or explanation which it might care to make to Russia. Zichy at Berlin was sent a sharp dispatch for Bernstorff's benefit, and the latter soon admitted his imprudence in allowing Ancillon's unfortunate *mémoire* to go forth. Lebzeltern was furnished with a voluminous budget "at one of the most important moments for the future fate of Europe." Russia was to be supported by Austria in her just complaints against the Porte, but a distinction must be drawn between the past and the present, and, above all, the Emperor must be warned that any attempt to aid the Greek revolutionaries would cause irreparable misfortunes to Europe. A letter from the Emperor Francis reinforced these arguments. A circular was sent to Berlin, Paris and London, asking for their co-operation. Peace could only be preserved if the Great Powers became *un faisceau moral*. It was necessary that they should comprehend one another. The greatest obstacle was the distance between them and the time thus lost in communication. Could they not, therefore, by sending instructions to their Ambassadors at Vienna, overcome this obstacle, and thus make the Austrian capital a kind of Allied centre for the Turkish negotiations? This idea was pressed on Gordon as essential to the solution of the problem. He was also assured that, though it was not expedient to inform the Tsar explicitly at this moment, no consideration would induce Austria to support Russia if she went to war. Austria would continue to adopt an attitude of moral support towards Russia, and the Emperor would become, as it were, the guarantor of the correct principles of his brother Sovereign, because this was the best method of putting a check on Russia's actions. Metternich was obviously in great embarrassment. His intimate relations with Russia threw on him a heavy responsibility. Unless he could obtain British support he might be forced to give passive, if not active, support to a policy which he detested.

Castlereagh was not insensible to the utility of Metternich's efforts, or to the difficulties of his position, but he was very afraid

of being drawn into some entanglement. He was ready, he told Esterhazy, when these propositions were laid before him, to discuss all possible methods of preserving the existing state of affairs. But he refused to allow the possibility of any change in the Ottoman dominions. Nor did he think that a good effect would be produced by a too obvious co-operation between the Powers, either at Constantinople or at Petersburg. In any case, no Ambassador or Plenipotentiary could be furnished with instructions adequate to so complicated a situation.¹

Yet it was obvious that everything must be done to encourage Metternich in his efforts to preserve peace and to co-ordinate British and Austrian action at Petersburg and Constantinople. In so delicate a matter there could be no satisfactory substitute for a personal discussion with Metternich himself, and the idea appears to have occurred almost simultaneously to the two statesmen. Castlereagh was preparing to accompany the King to Hanover. A visit to Vienna itself had at one time also been planned, but private and political considerations prevailed over the desire, which George had so long cherished, of meeting the Emperor Francis. A journey to Hanover could not, however, be denied to the new King, who, after the encouragement which he had received in Ireland, was anxious to shew himself to other faithful subjects. For this purpose he was even prepared to separate himself from Lady Conyngham for a short time. There was thus no obstacle to his Foreign Minister accompanying him, and Castlereagh prepared to avail himself of the opportunity which might prove all-important, not only to foreign but also to domestic affairs. In both Metternich's presence would be useful. Cordial invitations were therefore sent to Metternich by Lord Stewart and Esterhazy on the part of the King and Castlereagh. Stewart did not hesitate to point out "what benefit might be derived to the world by Prince Metternich's conversing with His Majesty on the state of the Governments of Europe in general, as well as our own, and in pointing out to him the estimation in which the latter is held abroad." Castlereagh

¹ Metternich to Esterhazy, Aug. 24, 1821 (with Enclosures): Metternich to Lebzeltern, Aug. 24, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 167. Letter of Emperor Francis, Aug. 22, 1821. Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls*, iii, 156, 160. From Gordon, Aug. 15, 23, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 164. Esterhazy to Metternich, Sept. 13, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 215, ix.

was more circumspect. Nevertheless, the letter which he wrote from Aix-la-Chapelle recalled old memories, and was an urgent appeal for a resumption of those unreserved explanations and confidential conversations, which no correspondence could replace. Almost at the same time the same thought had occurred to Metternich. He broached it to Gordon, who was strongly against it because of "the bad effects which would result from it in the way of false interpretations of jealousies, and evil reports in other quarters."¹

Castlereagh approved of Gordon's 'prudence' and 'manliness,' but he did not accept his conclusion. "Were the question chiefly pressing upon our attention," he explained, "one of an ordinary character, and involving immediately the particular form of government under which any portion of Europe was to subsist (as that of Naples lately did), I should feel as you have done about an interview with Prince Metternich, that it might lead to more noise and jealousy than was worth encountering, but the question of Turkey is of a totally different character, and one which in England, we regard, not as a theoretical, but as a practical consideration, and I have therefore no apprehension of giving rise to any misconceptions by a meeting of this nature, which can for a moment be placed in the balance against the real public advantages as well as the great personal satisfaction which I should derive from an unreserved communication with the Austrian Minister at such a moment." Metternich had, however, already accepted, with alacrity, the invitation. Though his answer laid stress on the risks of leaving Vienna at such a moment he was only too anxious to meet Castlereagh. Thus in the middle of October the two had their last and not least important interview.²

¹ Stewart to Gordon, Sept. 21, 1821: *Vienna et A. Varia*, 1821. Esterhazy to Metternich, Sept. 27, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 215, ix. Castlereagh to Metternich, Oct. 1, 1821: *F.O. Continent*, 46. From Gordon, Oct. 3, 1821: *C.C.* xii. 439.

² To Gordon, Oct. 11, 1821: *F.O. Continent*, 47. Metternich to Castlereagh, Oct. 9, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Varia*. Metternich to Lebzeltern, Oct. 8, 1821—"Je parviendrai en peu de jours à placer mieux la question générale, à renforcer le présent et à sauver l'avenir que dans six mois d'écriture. Il faut aussi que je sache un peu ce que sont les Anglais; leur rôle est d'une influence extrême dans l'affaire gréco-turco-russo-européenne": Mikhaïlowitch, *Lebzeltern*, 236.

2. THE HANOVER INTERVIEW, 1821

THROUGHOUT the whole of the Spring and Summer of 1821 the King refused to resume normal relations with his Ministers. None of them were invited to dine with him. Wellington and Bathurst were the only ones whom he would meet in Society. With Castlereagh he would also have been friendly but for the quarrel between Lady Castlereagh and Lady Conyngham, for whom the King's infatuation appeared to increase as time went on. His dislike of Lord Liverpool increased in corresponding ratio. He threw on his Prime Minister the main responsibility for his humiliation in the matter of the Divorce, and he never forgave him for rejecting the royal (or rather Lady Conyngham's) nominee to a Windsor canonry. The death of Lady Liverpool broke down her husband's health and made him for a time almost as irascible as the King. It was Castlereagh, therefore, who, in addition to the heavy burden of foreign problems, had to bear the brunt of the King's ill-humour. He accompanied His Majesty to Ireland, where Lady Conyngham also repaired; and he was treated with marked coldness throughout the visit. A blunder about the Queen's funeral procession added another item to the account against Liverpool, whom the King would scarcely tolerate in his presence.

It was obvious that something must be done. The loss of Canning had thrown an additional strain on Castlereagh, and what if Canning went over to the Opposition? The Government must be strengthened by some means or other. But neither in June, nor later when the death of the Queen had removed the sole reason for Canning's resignation, since there was no difference between him and his colleagues on any other point, would the King listen to proposals for his

return, not only because of Canning's own conduct, but also because he was a friend of Liverpool. Peel had been approached immediately after Canning's resignation in January 1821, but he had just married and had no desire to join the Cabinet at such a time. The Grenvilles were an obvious alternative, but their demands were many, and it was doubtful if they could be met without wrecking the Ministry. There were, of course, continual rumours of the Opposition being brought in. Grey was in great favour with Lady Conyngham. The Duke of Devonshire not only dined with the King but was asked to stay at the Cottage. It may be doubted, however, whether the King ever intended anything serious. He was merely using the Opposition in order to put pressure on his Ministers. Amongst other matters he was pressing on them the appointment of Lord Conyngham as Lord Chamberlain, and to this Liverpool absolutely refused to submit. Before he left for Hanover the King made two things clear—that he would not allow Canning to be readmitted to the Ministry, and that he was determined, if he could, to force the resignation of Lord Liverpool as Prime Minister. He refused, indeed, to transact any sort of business with him.¹

Castlereagh determined to tackle this difficult problem during his continental journey. The King's anger was temporarily assuaged by the dismissal from the army of Sir Robert Wilson for his part in the incident of the funeral procession, though the Ministry admitted there was no military case against him. The King had been disappointed at missing his trip to Vienna; but, after all, that would have kept him a long while from the side of his mistress. He could not take her with him to Hanover; but the trial would be shorter, and there would be the compensation of fêtes, reviews and other spectacular occasions such as George loved. He could display his fine uniforms, if not to his mistress, at least to his admiring subjects. He was delighted, too, at the idea of meeting Metternich.²

¹ *The Croker Papers*, i. 198. *Life of Lord Liverpool*, iii. 142 ff. On the Whig manoeuvres, see H. W. C. Davis, *Brougham, Lord Grey and Canning*, 1815-30. *English Historical Review*, Oct. 1923.

² He was accompanied by Lord Conyngham, Sir Benjamin Bloomfield, Sir Andrew Barnard, Lord Francis Conyngham and Sir William Knighton. Castlereagh travelled separately with Lord Clanwilliam—and, of course, his wife.

All went off well. The King, it is true, had a bad fit of the gout, which was only relieved by sharp 'English' remedies and interfered with the festivities. But, though he was delighted with the loyalty of his Hanoverian subjects, he found them, especially the ladies, a bit old-fashioned, and was not sorry for a rest.¹ Castlereagh he treated with the greatest distinction, especially after Metternich arrived. To the latter he poured out his heart and narrated all his grievances against his Cabinet, and especially against his Prime Minister, while he heaped extravagant eulogy on the Emperor Francis, whom he always called 'our Emperor.' Metternich was cautious in his comments, but he had never liked Liverpool, who, as had been repeatedly proved, was always less Austrian than Castlereagh. He welcomed, therefore, the idea which the King put forward of Castlereagh becoming Prime Minister as well as Foreign Minister, though he took care to insist that the maintenance of the Tories in office was the most important thing for Europe and Britain.²

He discussed the matter with Castlereagh from this point of view. He found that the latter was extremely anxious lest the Ministry be dissolved by some overbearing act of the King. Castlereagh was prepared, therefore, to try and arrange for the resignation of Liverpool, if no other course was possible, and to accept the premiership for himself. According to Metternich he desired the latter's influence with the King "less to maintain Lord Liverpool in his office than to arrange for his withdrawal without the inconvenience of an open rupture." He made it clear, however, that the final decision must rest with Liverpool himself. If the latter refused the proposal and insisted on braving the King, then Castlereagh would go out with him. It seems probable that Castlereagh did not tell Metternich the whole of his thoughts on the subject. At any rate it was soon to be seen how loyally he could work to keep Liverpool in office, though the King left Hanover just as determined as before to oust him from it.³

¹ There is an old joke that George on his return remained 'Tacitus de moribus Germanorum,' but it is not a true one.

² Metternich to Esterhazy, Nov. 9, 1821 (Private): *Vienna St. A. Wersungen*, 217, xi. Esterhazy to Metternich, Nov. 26, 1821 (Private): *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 215, xi., *Appendix* p. 559. Metternich, *Mémoires*, iii. 518. Lieven to Nesselrode, Nov. 2, 1821: *Pet. Arch.*

Castlereagh, however, preceded the King to England in order to prepare Liverpool and his colleagues for the impending negotiation, and there is no evidence that he ever suggested to them the possibility of himself becoming Prime Minister. The situation had, indeed, already improved. For Liverpool had been corresponding with his colleagues from Bath, and, it would appear, had already been induced to give up Canning. Wellington had, at any rate, strongly urged him to do so, and promised him, that Lord Conyngham should not be forced upon him as Lord Chamberlain, if he did. "The question for us is not," the Duke wrote, "whether we shall bear with many inconveniences resulting from the King's habits and character, and which none of our predecessors ever bore, or make way for others equally capable with ourselves of carrying on the public service? but whether we shall bear all that we have to endure, or give up the government to the Whigs and Radicals, or, in other words, the country in all its relations to irretrievable ruin?"

When Castlereagh returned, therefore, he found that there was some prospect of a compromise. But a place near the King's person had to be found for Lord Conyngham. Liverpool agreed to the suggestion that he should be made Grand Marshal, and this offer the King accepted. "All the merit of this reconciliation," reported Lieven, "is due to Lord Londonderry, who has been able cleverly to accommodate the interests and *amour propre* of the two sides."¹

It was Castlereagh also who carried through all the arrangements for the reconstruction of the Ministry which was now at last possible. The Marquis of Buckingham and Charles Wynn gave a great deal of trouble, and it was agreed by all but themselves "that the Grenvilles had been bought very dear." But they were at last accommodated. The Marquis was made a Duke. Wynn was given the Board of Control, and places were found for several hangers-on. The danger of a Whig-Grenville Coalition, which Canning might ultimately have joined, was thus removed. But new additions to the Ministry of more

¹ Wellington to Liverpool, Oct. 26, 1821: *W.N.D.* i. 192. Lieven to Nesselrode, Dec. 9, 1821: *Pet. Arch., Appendix* p. 575. Croker suggests that it was Bloomfield's influence which reconciled the King to Liverpool. But Bloomfield's influence was already gone. *The Croker Papers*, i. 217.

positive value were also obtained. Sidmouth gave up his office, though, at the King's wish, he remained in the Cabinet, and Peel was made Home Secretary in his place. Lord Wellesley became Governor-General of Ireland, where a strong hand was needed, and a place was made for the eloquent Plunket as Irish Attorney-General. The debating strength of the Ministry in the House of Commons was thus much improved, and it was apparent to all observers that there was no chance of its collapse. Even Canning was disposed of by the offer of a princely exile as Governor-General of India, when Lord Hastings should retire, an offer which he did not at once accept, but did not, at any rate, refuse. Huskisson retained his subordinate office of Woods and Forests.¹

The total result was not only to strengthen the Cabinet but to make more apparent than ever the ascendancy of Castlereagh within it. The King made no secret of that fact that, though very pleased at the accession of the Grenvilles, he had accepted the whole arrangement only because of his Foreign Minister and his understanding with Metternich. At a large dinner, at which Esterhazy was present, he said, "I regard Prince Metternich as the first statesman in Europe," and after him Lord Londonderry; these two Ministers understand one another so perfectly, and their agreement is so important in the present state of Europe, that this circumstance alone ought to outweigh all other considerations." The Foreign Minister remained, however, more than ever alone. "Londonderry goes on as usual," wrote Croker about this time, "and, to continue my similes, like Mont Blanc continues to gather all the sunshine upon his icy head. He is *better* than ever: that is, colder, steadier, more *pococurante*, and withal more amiable and respected. It is a splendid summit of bright and polished frost which, like the travellers in Switzerland, we all admire; but no one can hope and few would wish to reach." ²

The Foreign Minister could, at any rate, now look forward to grappling with his difficult task with some sense of security.

¹ Castlereagh to Liverpool, Dec. 5, 6, 9, 1821. Yonge, *Life of Lord Liverpool*, iii. 159-164. Buckingham, *Memoirs of the Court of George IV.*, i. chap. vi.

² Esterhazy to Metternich, Jan. 3, 1822: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 216, 1. *The Croker Papers*, i. 219.

For the world did not stand still while the politicians and their royal master chattered and intrigued. Throughout the whole of this period of uncertainty Castlereagh had been engaged in problems sufficiently difficult to task the whole of his energy and skill. In particular, at Hanover he had arranged with Metternich a complete plan of campaign for the Eastern Question, and already dispatched to Petersburg and Constantinople the instructions necessary to put it into operation.

The news which greeted him, when he arrived at Hanover in the early days of October, was of a rather mixed character. From Lord Strangford he received a fairly satisfactory account. The Porte was ready to evacuate the Principalities, if given an assurance that Russia would not then invade them. The reports of massacre and rapine which were current in Europe were, the Ambassador insisted, much exaggerated. On the whole, the Porte had returned to a more humane policy towards their Greek subjects. "The unanimous character of the steps taken by the Allied Ministers," he added, "and the perfect identity of their language, have produced a great effect on the Porte, which already sees the indissoluble nature of the combination formed by the Great Powers for the preservation of peace and order." Meanwhile Strangford had proposed that the Ambassadors, having been so successful with the Porte, should also approach the Greeks with similar recommendations. His idea was not only to encourage more humane methods on their part, but also "to explain that the sympathy, which they may imagine their enterprise to have in various parts of Europe, is confined to the promoters of principles, which it is the duty of all Governments to discourage," and to induce them to return to their allegiance and thus win the approval of the Powers. He had got so far as to agree to a manifesto on the subject drawn up by the Prussian representative, which his Austrian colleague warmly approved, as well he might, seeing that it included extracts from the Laibach Circular of May 12, 1821.

This extraordinary proceeding, however foolish, was not calculated to do much harm. But Strangford had to admit that the Sultan was afraid of the Janissaries and therefore found it necessary secretly to encourage the idea of war.

Moreover, in an interview with Ismail Effendi, one of the Sultan's chief favourites, he had learnt "that the great object of the alarm to the Porte is the *Holy Alliance*; that the Sultan and his Ministers were firmly persuaded of a secret league against the Mohammedan Powers." The rumour that a Conference was to be held at Vienna had increased these fears. Thus, in spite of all his efforts, the situation was still an unstable one.¹

From Petersburg came news which, on the face of it, was much more alarming. The Emperor had received Castlereagh's letter with warm professions of peace, and had accepted entirely the view that a war between Russia and the Porte "would assist the game of the revolutionists in every country in Europe, to whom and to whom alone the late events are to be attributed." But he pointed out to Bagot that "he had to contend against a strong tide of public opinion and public prejudice, and that he had to oppose his own anxious desire to preserve the tranquillity of Europe to that of the great mass of his people, with whom every consideration conspired to make a war with Turkey inviting and popular." Thus, while he admitted "that there is before us the whole winter in which we can endeavour by our united efforts to avert the calamity of a war," he wished his Allies to consider what was the best course for them to pursue should war be forced upon him. The official answer which he sent to Castlereagh, in the form of an autograph '*Lettre de Cabinet*,' was even more ominous. It pointed out that the Ottoman dominions were not protected by the Vienna Treaty, and that there were limits to the patience of the Russians under such insupportable outrages as had been committed. These arguments were put in even stronger form in the official communications to the Austrian Court, which refused altogether to recognise that the Porte had already made great concessions. Nevertheless, Bagot believed that the Tsar meant peace, and added that the latest news from Constantinople had made it more probable in spite of the bellicose tone of these dispatches.²

¹ From Strangford, Sept. 10, 17, 25, 1821: *F.O. Turkey*, 101.

² From Bagot, Sept. 17, 1821. *F.O. Russia*, 129; *CC* xii. 429. *Lettre de Cabinet à Lord Londonderry*, Aug. 29, 1821. Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls*, iii. 191.

On reviewing the situation Castlereagh was also inclined to take a hopeful view. "The language employed in Count Nesselrode's reply to the Grand Vizir," he informed the Cabinet, "as also in the Russian circular to the Allied Cabinets communicating this answer, is certainly very strong, and, if taken literally and without reference to other circumstances would justify the most unfavourable conclusions." But so much was to be expected. "I do not think," he concluded, "we should be discouraged by anything in these dispatches in our hopes of the preservation of peace. The language of the Emperor to Sir Charles Bagot, and especially His Imperial Majesty's reference to our having the winter before us for pacific discussion, seem to throw the notion of war to a considerable distance. In the meantime we may hope the troubles in the interior of Turkey may subside, and that returning tranquillity, coupled with the improved language which has latterly marked all the State Papers of the Ottoman Government, may so narrow the sphere of discussion as to leave hardly materials for controversy much less for war."¹

Nevertheless the situation was an anxious one, and needed obviously the most careful treatment. Castlereagh and Metternich explored it in the greatest detail. They sent off for Bernstorff, and hoped that Lieven would arrive fresh from Petersburg, so that something like a little European Conference was arranged. Bernstorff, however, would not come, and Lieven was so late that, though the King prolonged his stay at Castlereagh's request for several additional days, he did not arrive until the very day of their departure. Castlereagh and Metternich were thus left alone to arrange a plan of action. They agreed that, while working for the same ends, they must pursue it by different methods. The Tsar must not be offended by the appearance of too close an identity of views between them. Metternich, who had lately received such palpable assistance from Alexander at Laibach, could hardly adopt the same tone as Castlereagh, who had protested against it. But the language, however different, was to be designed to produce the same effect in the Tsar's mind of the

¹ To Sidmouth, Oct. 9, 1821: *F.O. Continent*, 45.

difficulty and dangers of war. Castlereagh could refuse even to envisage such a possibility, and thus to leave entirely uncertain how far Britain would go in opposition to Russia if it broke out. Austria had to discuss the question, but could make the conditions of her participation, or even approval, so difficult that her more friendly attitude would be, in its own way, quite as effective a restraint as that of Britain. Both could appeal to the Alliance, to which the Tsar attached so much importance, with sincerity, however much they had differed about its recent application. Both Courts would, of course, also work together at Constantinople to impress the Sultan with the necessity of complying, as soon as possible, with the Russian demands. Dispatches to Petersburg and Constantinople were forthwith drawn up by both Ministers to put this arrangement into practice.

Castlereagh's answer to the Tsar was contained in a very voluminous dispatch to Bagot, which, though intended for the Tsar's personal perusal, allowed the writer more freedom than a direct appeal. He added, however, a personal letter excusing this method, which, after regretting Lieven's absence from Hanover, paid a tribute to Metternich, and claimed "that the true and generous spirit of the Alliance has constantly been present in our thoughts, and that it has been in fact regarded as the only rule upon which a decision can be taken."

His object at this grave crisis, he said in his dispatch to Bagot, "in which not only the stability of the present European situation, but the moral character and harmony of the Alliance is involved," was to help the Tsar to stem the tide of passion and prejudice in his own Empire. He must refuse therefore to discuss the Russian enquiries as to the attitude which the Allied Courts would adopt in case of war, or to speculate on the possibility of setting up a new system in the East. Such discussions would, in any case, be dangerous, but particularly so with reference to the Turkish Empire. No Great Power could forecast what its position would be during so portentous a contest. Even if war were inevitable it would by no means follow that the impossible task of expelling the Turks and setting up an independent Greek State, "originating in a system of revolt which has been reprovved by the Emperor,"

should be attempted. If any Russian Minister recommended such a scheme, let him formulate it in some clear and intelligible shape and not expect to receive any advice from Russia's Allies, who must, on the contrary, protest against it.

After this direct attack on Capo d'Istria, which, as will be seen, missed its mark,¹ Castlereagh reviewed the situation, and found much hope in the progress already accomplished in bringing the Porte to reason. He appealed, therefore, to the Tsar's liberality and indulgence. The Allies would redouble their efforts, and he was sure that if sufficient time was allowed them they could produce the necessary effect. But due consideration must be paid to the difficulties of the Turkish Government, and for this reason Castlereagh deprecated anything in the nature of an Ambassadorial Conference or concerted action at Constantinople.

He then turned to a consideration of the moral aspect of the question, and his words are so clear an exposition of his general attitude that they merit more extended quotation:

"It will naturally occur to every virtuous and generous mind, and to none more probably than to the Emperor of Russia's own,—indeed it is the first impression which presents itself to every reflecting observer when he contemplates the internal state of European Turkey—viz.: Is it fit that such a state of things should continue to exist? Ought the Turkish yoke to be for ever rivetted upon the necks of their suffering and Christian subjects; and shall the descendants of those, in admiration of whom we have been educated, be doomed in this fine country to drag out, for all time to come, the miserable existence to which circumstances have reduced them?"

"It is impossible not to feel the appeal; and if a statesman were permitted to regulate his conduct by the counsels of his heart instead of the dictates of his understanding, I really see no limits to the impulse, which might be given to his conduct, upon a case so stated." But we must always recollect that his

¹ There is in the French Foreign Office Archives a copy of this dispatch, with a number of interesting marginal comments made by Richelieu soon after it had been received at Paris. He saw at once that, as happened, the Tsar would consider this passage aimed at himself rather than at Capo d'Istria, since he did not understand the British fiction of ministerial responsibility. *Paris A.A.E., Angleterre, Supplement*, 21, f. 326.

is the grave task of providing for the peace and security of those interests immediately committed to his care; that he must not endanger the fate of the present generation in a speculative endeavour to improve the lot of that which is to come. I cannot, therefore, reconcile it to my sense of duty to embark in a scheme for new modelling the position of the Greek population in those countries at the hazard of all the destructive confusion and disunion which such an attempt may lead to, not only within Turkey but in Europe. I am by no means persuaded, were the Turks even miraculously to be withdrawn (what it would cost of blood and suffering forcibly to expel them I now dismiss from my calculations) that the Greek population, as it now subsists or is likely to subsist for a course of years, could frame from their own materials a system of government less defective either in its external or internal character, and especially as the question regards Russia, than that which at present unfortunately exists. I cannot, therefore, be tempted, nor even called upon in moral duty under loose notions of humanity and amendment, to forget the obligations of existing Treaties, to endanger the frame of long established relations, and to aid the insurrectionary efforts now in progress in Greece, upon the chance that it may, through war, mould itself into some scheme of government, but at the certainty that it must in the meantime, open a field for every ardent adventurer and political fanatic in Europe to hazard not only his own fortune, but what is our province more anxiously to watch over, the fortune and destiny of that system to the conservation of which our latest solemn transactions with our Allies have bound us." The Greeks, therefore, he added, must rely on "the hand of time and of Providence" to effect "those silent but by no means inoperative advances to improvement" which the revolution had perhaps thrown back for years.

This is the same plea which British statesmen were so often to advance in the course of the century, and time has passed its own judgment upon it. Few have had better claims to urge it than Castlereagh, for it sums up his whole attitude towards the political problems of his age, and, whatever its limitations, its sincerity cannot be called in question.

From moral arguments he turned to more mundane considerations. It might be alleged that the British Government were actuated by commercial jealousy of Russia. His refutation of this charge led him to state a general proposition which shews that he had learnt a good deal from Wallace and Huskisson. It is well known, he wrote, "that our own commercial prosperity must grow with the wealth and prosperity of all other countries or portions of countries, and that, in point of fact the Turkish Government imposes any undue restraint upon the vent of Russian productions, they proportionally deprive us of the advantages of a wealthier and more extensive customer."

Lastly, he examined the consequences of the admitted rights which Russia possessed, in consequence of her Treaties, of securing protection for the Greeks. He began with a bold challenge to the assertion of the Tsar's last letter, that the Turkish Empire was outside the Vienna treaty. "The nature of the Turkish Power was fully understood," he wrote, "when the existing system of Europe, including that of Turkey, was placed under the provident care and anxious protection of the general Alliance." This was certainly extending treaty obligations in a manner against which Castlereagh had himself often protested; but he used the argument to shew that Russia was not entitled to make her rights an excuse for overthrowing the Turkish Empire in Europe, even if Russia had to go to war to assert them. On the contrary, it enjoined on her the exercise of the greatest restraint in asserting her rights.

Such views, he claimed, were dictated by a regard for the interests of Russia, of whose special difficulties he was fully conscious. He even admitted that war might be necessary. But he did not admit that the Turkish Empire could be overthrown, and the dispatch closed with the solemn warning against "those extreme measures, which though they may, by the Emperor's Government and people, be at first view regarded as remedies, are undoubtedly looked upon by the British Cabinet as leading directly to consequences infinitely worse than the disease to be removed, being in their nature calculated in their judgment to involve His Imperial Majesty's

dominions, as well as the civilized world, in the most awful dangers." ¹

This letter must have left few illusions in the Tsar's mind as to the attitude of Britain if hostilities broke out. Metternich did not go so far. He concerned himself more with the Treaty rights of Russia and the relation of Austria to them. He had agreed with Castlereagh that each should emphasise the special interests of his own country. This took away from the Hanover meeting the character of a demonstration against Russia which might anger the Tsar and drive him to extremes. Lieven, indeed, paid special attention to this point, and after he had discussed the dispatches already prepared with Castlereagh and Metternich, he was convinced that nothing in the nature of a combination against Russia had either been planned or accomplished.

This was true enough in the sense that no agreement was made except to continue the joint efforts to preserve peace. But if a combination had not been made against Russia it had been made against Capo d'Istria. His schemes for a Greek Kingdom had been ruthlessly criticised by Castlereagh, and Metternich had followed suit in milder terms. The Tsar would know that, if he pursued that line of action, he would be alone in Europe, or, even worse, allied only with the revolutionaries.²

Meanwhile it was agreed that Austria and Britain should exert their utmost influence at Constantinople to get the Porte to accept the Russian terms. Metternich had with great adroitness reduced the verbose and threatening language in which these had been expressed into four definite demands—(1) the restoration of the Greek Churches, (2) the protection of the Greek religion, (3) the recognition of a distinction between the guilty and innocent Greeks, and (4) the evacuation and reorganisation of the Principalities. Of these the last,

¹ To Bagot, Oct. 28, 1821: *F.O. Continent*, 47. Londonderry to the Tsar, Oct. 28, 1821: *F.O. Russia*, 126. The dispatch was submitted to Lord Aberdeen, who was amongst the first to desire the freedom of Greece, and he wrote an incisive, if temperate, criticism of it. Stanmore, *The Earl of Aberdeen*, 70-72.

² Metternich to the Emperor Francis, Oct. 29, 1821: *Mémoires*, iii. 522. Metternich to Lebzeltern, Oct. 31, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 168; Mikhailowitch, *Lebzeltern*, 237. Lieven to Nesselrode, Nov. 2, 1821: *Pei. Arch.*

which was to remedy a definite breach of the Treaty of Bucharest, was considered the most important. Strangford and the Internuncio were ordered therefore to continue their ceaseless pressure on the Sultan and his Ministers. The former had in addition to be reprovved for his suggestion of the address by the Allied Ambassadors to the Greek revolutionaries, which had been condemned on all sides. Neither at Vienna nor Petersburg was it approved, and Castlereagh was especially annoyed at the references to the Troppau and Laibach State Papers. Moreover, he objected to a joint address of any kind, "for the reasons often stated for keeping the Alliance in its collective character out of sight at Constantinople."

The influence of the Hanover interview did not, however, stop at direct action at Petersburg and Constantinople. Pressure was also brought to bear on Berlin and Paris to use their influence in the same direction. Copies of the letter to Bagot were sent to both capitals. Bernstorff, who now needed no further chiding to get rid of the influence of Ancillon and Alopeus, entirely accepted the position laid down. At Paris also the effect of the meeting was profound. There had been some indication of a tendency on Pasquier's part to accept the conclusions of the Ancillon *Mémoire*. He would indeed have found much support both on the Left and Right of the Chamber of an active policy on behalf of the Greeks. But, though the French Cabinet hesitated at first, they felt that they had not received much return for their complaisance during the Conference at Laibach. They had accordingly refused all the proposals of Pozzo di Borgo, and they now professed entire agreement with Castlereagh's dispatch to Bagot, sending entirely satisfactory instructions to Petersburg. The Richelieu Government was, however, too weak to exercise much influence. The triumphs of the Ultras were at hand. In December Villèle and Corbière refused to remain in the Cabinet with Pasquier, and when Richelieu would not give him up they resigned. The result was the collapse of the Richelieu Cabinet and the accession to power of an Ultra Ministry, in which, however, the cool and cautious Villèle held the first place. It certainly seemed, however, as if the Hanover

interview had rallied all Europe to friendly remonstrance against the idea of a Russo-Turkish war on behalf of the Greek cause. - The Tsar had appealed to the Alliance and the Alliance had given its verdict against him.¹

Moreover, the interview had completely re-established intimate relations between Castlereagh and Metternich. That each claimed to have influenced and enlightened the other was only natural, and a proof of good understanding. "Prince Metternich's instructions to the Austrian ministers at the several Courts," reported Castlereagh, "will be framed strictly upon the same principles as those I now transmit." The interview, moreover, he asserted, "has enabled that Minister more correctly to appreciate and more cordially to acquiesce in the propriety of that line of conduct which in conformity to long established maxims of British policy His Majesty was induced to adopt in the course of last year, and which Prince Metternich is now fully convinced was equally necessary to the stability and to the consistency of His Majesty's councils both at home and abroad." For this happy result he gave the King much credit, and the King himself was so pleased with his visit that he loudly proclaimed that nothing should prevent him from coming next year to the projected Conference at Florence. Metternich also could report "*Mon entente avec lord Londonderry est complète*"; and claim that his influence had produced a sensible effect on the instructions to Bagot and Strangford. "That gives me the advantage," he boasted, "of being able to prove to Russia how far one can go with England when one understands how to speak her language. . . ." He had forgotten that the conversations at Hanover had been in French. He took the flatteries which George heaped upon him at their face value. It does not seem to have occurred to him that, since the Alliance was now being used to justify the doctrine of non-intervention, and thus to protect what was considered to be a major British interest, the integrity of the Ottoman Empire, Castlereagh might well resume his intimate relations with

¹ To Strangford, Oct. 28, 1821: *F.O. Turkey*, 97. From Stuart, Aug. 16, 30, Sept. 3, Nov 15, Dec. 13, 14, 15, 1821. *F.O. France*, 255, 256, 258. Pozzo di Borgo to Nesselrode, Oct. 8, 1821: Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands*, i. 565.

Austria with equanimity. A few months later Tatishchev was to write to Nesselrode: "*Soyez convaincu que Metternich est le factotum de l'Angleterre sur le Continent.*"¹

¹ Castlereagh to Sidmouth, Oct. 28, 1821: *F.O. Continent*, 45. Metternich, *Mémoires*, iii. 522-23. Tatishchev to Nesselrode, March 11, 1822: Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands*, i. 573.

3. THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE, 1821-2

AT Hanover the campaign had been planned and the issues defined, but there was a long period of anxiety before it was felt that peace was assured. The efforts of Capo d'Istria were incessant. "He seems to me to be labouring night and day," wrote Bagot on October 20, "to produce a state of things in which he hopes to find the rest of Europe at the opening of the Spring, if not allied with Russia in a war against the Porte, at least committed to give their sanction to Russia engaging in it single-handed." Preparations for war were being hurriedly made, and special Russian credits had been arranged at Amsterdam. The Hanover dispatches undoubtedly produced a great effect on the Tsar. He had, indeed, been momentarily piqued by the passage specially directed against Capo d'Istria, which at first sight he applied to himself. He shewed no trace of this ill-humour, however, in a long interview with Bagot at the end of November, in which he reiterated his desire for peace. But he tried to throw the responsibility for maintaining it on his Allies. He told Bagot "that he had already endured the present state of things for more than six months, and that he continued patiently, though with anxiety, to await the effects which the combined influence of other Powers might yet produce upon the Turkish Councils; that he had abundantly proved to all mankind that his sincere desire was to preserve peace, but that if his demands for the fair fulfilment of his Treaties could not be obtained, there remained for him no resource but in arms."

The riddle of peace or war therefore still remained. Bagot claimed that Sir Francis Walsingham himself could not have solved it. He concluded that "the Emperor has now got himself into such a situation in regard to this question that

he can neither advance nor recede, and therefore that the affair is altogether out of his hands till next April, when, if nothing can be settled for him, he must go to war for decency's sake."

This was not very satisfactory, and the opinions that reached Castlereagh from other sources were not more reassuring. Lebzeltern's dispatches were also pessimistic, and Bernstorff was informed by Schöler, his Ambassador at Petersburg, who possessed the confidence of Capo d'Istria, that war was certain. Lieven was pressing on Castlereagh a suggestion that Britain should offer mediation on the analogy of that which she had offered to Spain and her Colonies in 1817!¹ This idea got short shrift; but how far Russian hopes extended was seen when even Lieven insisted on discussing with Castlereagh the possibilities of occupying portions of the Ottoman dominions until brought up sharp by the latter's outburst. "That would be a new Partition, a repetition of Poland!" It was clear that much depended on how quickly the Porte could be got to see reason.¹

Unfortunately, news from Constantinople grew worse and worse. The hostile and uncompromising answer of Nesselrode to the Grand Vizir had alarmed the Sultan, but a fatalistic attitude had been the result, not concessions. The Reis Effendi was dismissed for drunkenness and peculation, and he was replaced by Saadeik Effendi, an adherent of the more orthodox and anti-Christian party. Negotiations were thus delayed, and, when they were at last resumed, the Internuncio, to whom by arrangement they had been at first entrusted, could make little progress. In vain he threatened that war was inevitable unless the four points were conceded. The Porte was unmoved. Strangford, when summoned to his help, could make little more impression. The Turks made counter demands for the surrender of the Greek refugees, and refused to evacuate the Principalities until they had obtained satisfaction. Only after repeated interviews did Strangford obtain

¹ From Bagot, Oct 20, Nov. 29 (and Private), 1821; Bagot to Planta, Nov. 29, 1821: *F.O. Russia*, 129. From Rose, Nov. 2, 19, Dec 13, 1821: *F.O. Prussia*, 127. Nesselrode to Lieven, Oct. 7, 1821: Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls*, iii. 196, 203. Lieven to Nesselrode, Dec. 9, 1821: *Pet. Arch.* Lebzeltern to Metternich, Dec. 1, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 168.

some concessions, which he claimed as substantial, though far from satisfying the Russian demands. A Persian attack at this moment was justly attributed to Russian influence, though the fact was denied at Petersburg, and it was only the immediate counter measures on the part of the British representative at Teheran that prevented matters there from becoming serious. Meanwhile, the Janissaries were getting restless, and Strangford reported with anxiety their threats to put the whole Christian population of Constantinople to the sword.¹

Events seemed to be working out as Capo d'Istria had designed. Metternich almost lost confidence. He sent Lebzeltern dispatches so voluminous that it would be difficult to believe they were all read, were it not that the replies were equally long. He prepared Alexander for the flood of ink by a private letter, imitating Castlereagh's method but not his direct and outspoken language. He could only appeal once more to the Alliance, and the dangerous state of Western Europe. The Alliance was not, however, having much effect at Constantinople, and at the end of December Metternich, in admitting this fact, could only suggest that Russia should try to re-open direct discussion with the Porte by some means or other. In letters to Esterhazy, on the other hand, he attributed the situation at Constantinople to Russian influence, and confessed that the Russian objective of two centuries seemed almost attained. The Ottoman Empire might be dissolved by attack from without or catastrophes within. In either case the result would be the same.²

The Tsar meanwhile was concentrating on London. He did not even answer Metternich's communications from Hanover. His reply was contained in a long dispatch to Lieven, pessimistic in outlook and bitter in tone, which shewed only too clearly the desire that the Alliance should support him in bringing order to the Ottoman Empire, as he had supported it in connection with France and Italy.

¹ From Strangford, Nov., Dec. 1821: *F.O. Turkey*, 102. Lutzow to Metternich, Nov. 20, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 168; Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls*, iii. 222, 242, 245.

² Metternich to Esterhazy, Dec. 3, 15, 1821: Metternich to Lebzeltern, Dec. 3, 23, 1821: *F.O. Austria*, 168. Metternich to the Tsar, Dec 3, 1821: Stern, *Geschichte Europas*, ii. 561.

Castlereagh for his part continued to impress upon the Tsar the logic of the position. On December 14 he sent Bagot a dispatch which drew a fearful picture of the spread of revolutionary movements. South America, Spain and Portugal were in the vortex; France was hesitating between extreme factions equally dangerous; in Italy only the Armies of Occupation kept the revolution in check. The events in Greece were due to the same spirit: "In short, it is impossible that the Emperor should not see that the head of this revolutionary torrent is in Greece, that the tide is flowing in upon his southern provinces in almost an interrupted and continuous stream from the other side of the Atlantic." If any intervention were necessary, therefore, it was against the Greeks rather than against the Turks that it was needed. It was admitted that the Tsar could not act against his co-religionists, but he could at least leave the revolution alone. He ought, indeed, to disavow it, and thus assist the Turks to repress it. Then, and then only, could he safely bring the Turkish Government to account and "extend protection to the Greeks no longer acting in open resistance to the sovereign power of their own State." This letter, though addressed to Bagot, was meant for the Emperor's own eyes, if the Ambassador thought the opportunity favourable. Meanwhile, pains were taken to impress Lieven with the strength of the feeling in the Cabinet on the subject of a Russian war.

In the middle of January Castlereagh attempted a more constructive policy. Bagot was instructed not merely to protest strongly against Russian invasion, "whether for the purpose of conquest or for temporary Occupation," but also to press for the resumption of direct negotiations between Russia and the Porte. "You will see we intend to make Your Excellency the great Pacificator," explained Planta to Bagot. In order to induce the Tsar to agree, Castlereagh summed up the situation at Constantinople in a most optimistic manner. Three out of the four points of the Russian ultimatum had been virtually conceded and would be put into force as soon as the internal situation permitted; the fourth and most important, the evacuation of the Principalities, had admittedly been refused, but only temporarily. Could not Russia assist

by making some small concession, such as insisting that the Greek refugees leave the frontier district ?' As for stopping "the horrible scenes of cruelty and persecution, alike degrading to both the contending parties," this could surely be better accomplished after Russia and the Porte had come together. British influence would be used in that direction to the fullest extent. Any idea of a formal Conference was, indeed, to be discouraged, but perhaps Lebzeltern might act as a mediator, if the Russians and Turks could arrange to meet at some place near the frontier.¹

The crisis of the negotiations took place in the first six weeks of 1822, before this policy could be more than adumbrated. For some time the decision hung in the balance. "The labour and intrigues of Count Capo d'Istria to bring on the war are inconceivable," reported Bagot, "and his enormous presumption still makes him think that he can guide the politics of Russia and lead the revolutions of Greece at the same time. The present is, indeed, a most critical moment. I certainly do not abandon the hope that hostilities may yet be avoided ; but time is passing fast away. The Emperor will not consent to continue his present attitude beyond his Ides of March ; and I see no symptom of a disposition to make any fair allowance for the real embarrassments of the Porte." In these circumstances Bagot wisely kept back from the Tsar Castlereagh's letter of December 14, as not calculated to produce the right impression at such a critical moment. "His jealousy or sensitiveness, or whatever it may be, is so great," he explained, "that if, by an unfortunate accident, he should once possess himself with the idea that your Lordship's letter, instead of being a private and friendly counsel, was designed as a solemn and final admonition on the part of England, he is capable . . . not perhaps of resenting it, but of receiving it with a stubborn resolution that it should not influence him."

The argument contained in the letter was, however, he admitted, the only one likely to produce the desired effect,

¹ Lieven to Nesselrode, Jan. 22, 1822 : *Pet. Arch.* To Bagot, Dec. 14, 1821, Jan. 19, 1822 : *F.O. Russia*, 126, 134 ; *C.C.* xii. 443. Planta to Bagot, Jan. 20, 1822 : Captain Bagot, *George Canning and his friends*, ii. 123.

and both he and Lebzeltern used it at every opportunity. For some time it appeared that it would not avail. The official reply to Austria was so ungracious in tone and loud in its complaint of lack of support that it appeared designed to be the preliminary to a rupture. But at the last moment the Tsar drew back. No sooner had it been sent than he regretted it, and three days afterwards announced a decision which allowed the diplomatists to breathe easily once more. For, when Lebzeltern went to him in great alarm, he was told that instead of sending an army across the Pruth, the Tsar was content to send a diplomatist to Vienna. The dispatch had indeed been Capo d'Istria's last fling at Metternich. His master recoiled when the decisive moment arrived, and determined to take the affair out of the hands of his infuriated Minister, though he did not abandon the position which he had taken up from the first. He still complained that his Allies had misunderstood him and failed to give him the necessary support. But he could not take the responsibility of declaring war. "I am sensible of the danger which surrounds us all," he told Bagot, "when I look to the state of France and the new Ministry—when I see the state of Spain and Portugal, when I see, as I do see, the state of the whole world, I am well aware that the smallest spark, which falls upon such combustible materials may kindle a flame which all our efforts may perhaps hereafter be insufficient to extinguish."

The Tsar, therefore, was prepared to sacrifice his pride to higher interests and make another effort to come to an understanding with his Allies. For this purpose he sent as special envoy to Vienna, the notorious Tatishchev, with new instructions. These, indeed, by no means admitted the arguments of Austria and Britain. If fresh demands were not put forward, the four points were to be so interpreted as to include the protection of the Greeks under Allied guarantee, and the Allies were to be pressed to break off diplomatic relations with the Porte if these demands were refused. This would have given Capo d'Istria all that he wanted, but it was suspected, and probably accurately, that Tatishchev had secret instructions not to go too far, and to bring back what he could. And

though similar instructions were sent to Lieven there was no hint that war would follow if they were rejected.

The Tsar had therefore once again let slip the opportunity for action. Was his motive merely to protect Western Europe from the consequences of revolutions which, after all, were now no more dangerous than in 1820? It may be doubted if the Tsar's idealism went as far. He had no ally, and Austria and Britain were closely combined against him. Could he afford to risk a war with the Porte without any guarantee as to what their action would be in such an event? Was he to throw away all the influence which he had imagined he had earned by his action at Laibach? Was he once more to be faced by an Austro-British combination as in 1815, and this time without any chance of assistance from Prussia?

"The language held by the Austrian Minister and myself in our last conversations with the Emperor," wrote Bagot in an attempt to explain these startling changes, "... certainly called the Emperor's most serious attention to the position into which he was being drawn. He sincerely desires peace. He had long been harassed by the conflicting opinions of his ministers. . . . He saw, or thought he saw, that he was putting to hazard the good intelligence between himself and the Court of Vienna, and he determined immediately to transfer into other hands by which he could get rid of the machinations of Count Capo d'Istria in this particular business and find a creditable way out of his difficulties."

At any rate, the Tsar had given way and initiated a new policy. It was no longer expedient, therefore, to put forward the proposal for direct negotiations at this moment in too formal a manner, and it was merely suggested tentatively to Nesselrode and Capo d'Istria, who indicated that it was a matter to be discussed at a later stage.¹

More time had thus been obtained; and with a Government like that of the Porte time was everything. Not only was procrastination congenial, but it had the virtue of saving the national honour. Strangford and the Internuncio had con-

¹ From Bagot, Jan. 10, Feb. 22, 1822 (Nos. 11, 12, 13, 14, 15 (Private): *F.O. Russia*, 135. Lebzeltern to Metternich, Feb. 19 1822: *F.O. Austria*, 174. Nesselrode to Golovkin, Feb. 12, 1822: Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls*, iii. 290.

tinued their attack on the obstinacy of the Sultan and his advisers, using every artifice and expedient which experience had taught them, and their Levantine officials were likely to produce the necessary results. Miltitz, the Prussian, gave them every assistance, but Latour-Maubourg, lately French Ambassador at London, kept himself aloof and did what he could, though with little success, to revive the old French ascendancy at Constantinople. On Strangford fell the brunt of the negotiations. The Porte's insolent notes had induced Metternich to simulate offence and to shew extreme coldness and reserve. The Porte was threatened with war once more and then left alone. Metternich refused to forward the dispatch to Petersburg, as it deserved no other answer but a declaration of war. The Sultan looked to the British Ambassador, whose refusal of a handsome bribe enhanced his authority with the Divan. But the Ottoman Government appeared convinced that war was impossible, and therefore that there need be no hurry to reply. Strangford was put off with some excuse or other week after week.

At last the formal interview was obtained, and with due ceremony, and some trepidation, the Ambassador delivered an impressive harangue. The result was certainly unexpected. Strangford warned the Turkish Ministers that, unless the Russian propositions were admitted by the middle of March, war and the cessation of all friendly intercourse with the Allies would be the inevitable result. "I could hardly avoid making use of language which I fully expected would have been ill-received by Ottoman pride. But I was completely mistaken. Everything which I uttered was placed to its true account; the friendly part which England was acting seemed to be thoroughly and gratefully felt; and on no previous occasion did I ever experience such marked attention, such perfect amenity and such invincible, I might say such provoking, good humour. It was difficult to avoid entertaining a suspicion that they had already made up their mind to grant what I demanded; that they were resolved to keep this determination a secret, and that they were amusing themselves with the anxiety and agitation under which they saw me labouring." The result of this urbanity was, however,

not satisfactory. The Porte promised to execute completely all the Russian demands—but at its own time. It would fix no date for the evacuation of the Principalities, and matters were therefore left exactly as they were before. It would not listen, of course, to Castlereagh's idea of direct negotiations with Russia. The Sultan seemed indifferent to the result. Strangford almost suspected that there was some secret understanding between Russia and the Porte.

Moreover, a great triumph had attended the Turkish arms. No progress had been made against the Greeks in the Morea or the Islands; on the contrary, they had consolidated their position and proclaimed a constitution. But the power of Ali Pasha of Janina was at last broken. He was betrayed by his wife and assassinated. His head was brought to Constantinople and publicly exposed at the gate of the Seraglio. The exultant Sultan could now hope that his triumphant armies, so long delayed before the fortress of Janina, would soon sweep through the Morea. By now, also, the news of the Tatishchev mission to Vienna had encouraged the certainty of peace. Strangford could do little more than induce by various means some of the more accessible Ministers to realise that the evacuation of the Principalities was still necessary, and within reasonable time, if hostilities were ultimately to be averted.¹

Metternich had thus but little to help him in his negotiation with Tatishchev, which began at Vienna in the first week of March. But he made no mistake about the man and his methods. The situation was one which enabled him to employ his best abilities, and he handled it with great adroitness. Tatishchev was no fool, but he was as vain as Metternich, and had a position to win, which could only be won by peace and not by war. "He is not the man of Count Capo d'Istria," explained Bagot. "On the contrary, he considers him infinitely

¹ From Strangford, Jan. 10, 25, Feb. 25, March 5, 23, 1822: *F.O. Turkey*, 106, 107. *Procès Verbal du Conference du Fev.* 16, 1822: Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls*, III. 265. The head of Ali, the Ambassador noted, excited great interest, and "an English merchant, believing that it would create a similar feeling in England, and speculating on the profits which he would derive from an exhibition of it in London, is now in treaty with the Chief Executioner for the purchase of it, and, from the largeness of the sum which he offers, it is probable that he will succeed in obtaining it."

his inferior." Tatishchev hoped to demonstrate his superiority by settling the dispute with the Porte. Of this ambition Metternich was well aware and took full advantage. Thus, though he made a series of concessions in view of the new spirit of intransigence at Constantinople, he took care always that nothing should be done to give the Tsar a chance to declare war with the approval of the Alliance, which was still the aim of some of the Tsar's advisers, and, perhaps, of the Tsar himself.

Metternich, therefore, as has been seen, sent back the Porte's last note and shewed more displeasure than ever before. But as Strangford was there to take up the rôle of conciliator, this meant nothing. In the negotiations at Vienna, Metternich constantly pushed back the issue to the Four Points, while Tatishchev tried to make it the re-organisation of the Ottoman Empire in such a way as to preserve the rights of the Greeks. Metternich had at last to enter into this aspect of the question, but he had no difficulty in exposing the difficulties of any plan which was proposed, and no progress was made. When Tatishchev turned to means of putting pressure upon the Porte, Metternich had the same destructive criticism to offer. The Tsar was anxious, if necessary, to utilise the expedient of temporary Occupation, but Metternich said that was now too late and would inevitably lead to war. He would give no guarantee that, if war came, Austria would give any assistance or even shew a benevolent neutrality. All must depend on how war came.

At last the puzzled envoy, who, as Metternich had discovered, had no plan of his own, had to ask for at least some pledge of Austrian friendship to take back to his master. Something was indeed necessary to save the face of the Tsar and enable him to wait at least until the Conference due in the Autumn, when he could himself meet his Allies. Metternich accordingly at last gave the promise that, if war arose through the obstinacy of the Porte, he would break off diplomatic relations and thus give the Tsar the necessary moral support. But even this concession was made useless by the condition that he would only do so if the Alliance was united on the question, and, as he knew that Britain would never agree, the situation would,

therefore, never arise.¹ Finally, he suggested that the proper methods for bringing the Porte to reason could only be ascertained by a Conference. Perhaps that fixed for the Autumn could be summoned sooner in order to meet the Tsar's wishes. All this amounted to very little, but it was all conveyed in so sympathetic and anxious a manner, with such professions of devotion to Russian interests and to the Alliance, and with such impartial discussion of diplomatic niceties, that it would have taken a cleverer man than Tatishchev to have exposed its hollowness. He professed himself satisfied that progress had been made towards an understanding, and returned to make his report to his master.¹

Castlereagh, meanwhile, had been dealing with Lieven, who had been pressing him for answers to the same points which Tatishchev had submitted to Metternich. He put him off as long as possible in order that events might develop at Vienna. He must consult his Cabinet, he said, before he could state anything officially on so important a question, and for various reasons the Cabinet could not be brought together until April was well advanced. Unofficially, he was adamant on all the points on which his opinion had already been given. He deprecated any extension of the Russian demands beyond the Four Points, or any attempt to undermine the Sultan's full sovereignty over the Greeks.² Lieven was so impressed that he regarded any attempt to obtain these ends as liable to provoke not only unyielding opposition but even active resistance on the part of Britain.

Castlereagh had thus already adopted a less conciliatory attitude than that of Metternich, and his official reply, when it was at last ready at the end of April, took a very decided line. He regretted, he told Bagot, the new difficulties experienced at Constantinople owing to the obstinacy of the Porte,³ but he expressed equal regret that Russia should apparently be pressing other claims than those contained in the Four Points.⁴ He would shew his disapproval if the Porte

¹ From Gordon, March 17, 25, April 24, 1822: *F.O. Austria*, 170, Metternich to Esterhazy, April 4, 24, 1822. *F.O. Austria*, 174, 175. Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls*, iii. 303-334, 355-367. Tatishchev to Nesselrode, March 11, 22, 1822: Schiemann, *Geschichte Russlands*, i. 572, 574.

provoked Russia to arms by refusing these, but he absolutely refused to engage to break off diplomatic relations in any event. He argued that not only would such a step fail to bring the Porte to reason and be prejudicial to British interests, but that it would promote objects of which Britain could not approve. He was irrevocably opposed to any idea of extending the protection of Russia or the Alliance to the Greeks. Such interference would never be tolerated by the Sultan without war, whoever advocated it, least of all at this moment, when Russia was suspected, however erroneously, of stirring up the Greek revolt. This view of the question led him to some very frank remarks. "We must also be aware," he continued, "although the Emperor's known attachment to his Allies and His Imperial Majesty's undisguised wish for the preservation of peace are circumstances well calculated to inspire confidence in His Imperial Majesty's personal views, that the general impression is (an impression not confined to Constantinople) that there exists a powerful party in Russia with very different views, having great sway within the councils of the State itself, and widely spread throughout both the Church and the Army; that this party aims, if not at the actual expulsion of the Turks from Europe (according to some to give place to a direct Russian occupation; according to others to be replaced by a Greek State), at least at the erection of the Greek subjects of the Porte into a people, under the protection of Russia, with express rights and privileges, in reduction of the present admitted sovereignty of the Porte; and it must be confessed that strong indications of the operative influence of such a party are to be traced in several of the late Russian communications." ¹

This was plain speaking indeed, perhaps as strong as Castlereagh had ever dared to use in all his many encounters with Alexander, for the dispatch was, of course, meant for his eyes. The force of the language was perhaps partly due to the necessity of propitiating part of the Cabinet, who were much

¹ Lieven to Nesselrode, April 17, May 1, 1822: *Pet. Arch.* To Bagot, April 29, 1822: *F.O. Russia*, 134. Lieven to Castlereagh, April 26, 1822 (with Castlereagh's observations in margin); Castlereagh to Lieven, April 27, 1822: *F.O. Russia*, 137.

alarmed at these *pourparlers* with Lieven and Metternich. So Esterhazy thought; but in substance the dispatch represented clearly Castlereagh's own opinions, and he had always considered that the right way to treat Alexander was to talk to him as frankly as possible. The Cabinet were, indeed, occupied more with internal than external questions, and it may be doubted if any of them, except Liverpool and Wellington, understood the complications of the diplomatic tangle into which the subtleties of Metternich and Capo d'Istria had now brought the Eastern Question. But Castlereagh was determined not to be trapped into any joint action with the Alliance against the Turk, however stupidly the latter behaved. Public opinion would not have tolerated such a step for, though the intellectuals were thrilled at the idea of Greek liberty, the mass of the people were more anti-Russian than pro-Greek. They were also, as Castlereagh knew, hostile to the Alliance, and, while he could see that the only possibility of holding Russia back was to use for that purpose her attachment to the Alliance, that was not a policy which he could defend in Parliament.

This point of view he put frankly before Metternich in a private letter. The approaching crisis, he explained, "may possibly compel both Austria and England, *in pursuit of their common* purpose, to place themselves as they did at Laibach, somewhat in a different attitude, consonant to the nature and resources of their respective Governments." He could neither involve his Government in the war nor even take such engagements "as to render it necessary in our justification to bring the whole negotiation before Parliament." After the Hanover interview he could rely on Metternich to understand the position. He hinted to Esterhazy and Gordon that he quite understood that Metternich had obligations to fulfil as a result of the Italian discussions, and he raised no objection to his course of action. On the contrary, he warmly applauded it. But he must keep entire freedom of action for his own country.

Esterhazy was rather hurt at this attitude; he had hoped for closer co-operation. But Metternich took a longer view. He was not anxious to be left so much alone, and he hastened to repudiate the idea that he was bound by any special

obligations because of Laibach, devoting his personal letter mainly to that point. But he agreed at once that, as arranged at Hanover, the two Governments should each take the line that seemed best to them. "Although the Austrian Minister recognises the difference which exists between the language used by Great Britain in discussing the question with Russia," reported Gordon, "from that held by the Cabinet over which he presides; yet he maintains it is exactly what ought to exist in conformity with the respective attitudes of the two Governments." But Metternich pointed out that though their language varied in substance there was not much difference between them. As for the promise of withdrawal of the Ambassador, "the Austrian Minister was aware that the concession was merely one of courtesy and would remain without effect, because he neither believed nor desired that His Britannic Majesty could be prevailed upon to withdraw his Ambassador from Constantinople, and he was from the first of opinion that such a measure should not be put in force unless it were unanimously adopted by the Allied Powers." Similarly, he was able to show that his other concessions amounted to nothing at all. He attached most importance, indeed, to the proposal of a reunion of Allied Ministers, and he pledged himself that he would not admit any interference with the Porte which the British Government might disapprove. In his private correspondence he claimed that his "little card of invitation," would do more to upset Capo d'Istria than the "fire and flame" of Castlereagh.¹

The 'card of invitation' was, at any rate, accepted, but the Tsar may well have found in the 'fire and flame' of Castlereagh a powerful incentive to do so. Other events, however, contributed to a peaceful solution. Strangford had at last obtained some definite results at Constantinople. Various members of the Government, with whom he had contrived "at some risque and not without some expense to establish secret means of communication," had at last chal-

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, April 26, 29, May 18, 1822: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 217, iv. v. Castlereagh to Metternich, April 30, 1822; Metternich to Castlereagh, May 16, 1822: *Vienna St. A. Varia, Appendix* pp. 537, 538. From Gordon, May 18, 1822: *F.O. Austria*, 170. Metternich, *Mémoires*, iii. 545.

cellently, and were full of anxiety to meet each other's views. Thus, in spite of further delays at Constantinople, where Strangford continued his labours with unremitting zeal, nothing occurred to make immediate rupture seem likely. "We feel no doubt that peace will be preserved this year, at least in the East," wrote Planta in June. If further proof were wanted it was given to the world when it was announced that Capo d'Istria had been given long leave of absence and would not accompany the Tsar to Vienna. His hour had not yet come.

There was, however, something else behind this seeming collapse, as Metternich knew well. The crisis in the East had been succeeded by one in the West. For at the same moment as the Tsar had drawn back from armed interference in the Russo-Turkish dispute, he had launched a diplomatic offensive against Spain. The moment was propitious, and no one could prophesy what the result would be. No wonder that it occurred to many observers that the Tsar wished to win freedom of action by involving his Allies in another difficult and dangerous enterprise. Moreover, it was one calculated in view of Laibach to break down the new *entente* between Austria and Britain, on which the plans of Capo d'Istria had broken. Could the intimate relations between Castlereagh and Metternich survive this further test, so inconvenient to Governments so differently constituted? It was significant, Gordon reported, that as Tatishchev's cordiality towards Metternich increased he became "less well disposed to do justice to the zeal and good wishes" of His Majesty's Government.¹

Nevertheless, it was something for Castlereagh and the faithful Planta, both overwhelmed with work during the heat of July, to be relieved from the terrible anxiety of a war between Russia and Turkey. Castlereagh's last important dispatch to Constantinople was concerned, indeed, not with their disputes, but with the horrible massacre of the Greek population of Scio by the Turkish fleet. The revolt of that island had caused such transports of fury that only the threats of the British Ambassador, who had foreseen it and warned the Turkish Ministers in vain, was able to prevent such an

¹ From Gordon, July 2, 18, 20, 1822: *F.O. Austria*, 171. Précis of the Conferences are given in Prokesch-Osten, *Geschichte des Abfalls*, iii. 393-8.

outburst of feeling against Russia as might have undone all the progress towards a settlement. Despite his efforts, many innocent victims in Constantinople were added to the holocaust which the Turks had made of Scio itself.

Castlereagh sent immediately an indignant protest, couched in the strongest possible language, and the Ambassador administered this official condemnation without altering a line. "I hope I may be permitted to avow," Strangford reported on August 26, "the pride which I feel in reflecting that the *only* Government which has hitherto branded the transactions at Scio with the indignant and fearless expression of its abhorrence is that of Great Britain." Before this tribute had been written, Castlereagh was a fortnight dead. Nor did he receive the dispatches in which Strangford described his success in obtaining the Four Points from the Porte, and his failure to persuade the Ministers to send a Plenipotentiary to the frontier. That last expedient had indeed been only suggested by Castlereagh as a desperate means of averting the war, which then seemed so imminent, and he was not anxious for it. "I fear a negotiation on the frontiers (even if yielded) will only entangle the diplomatic discussions, encourage the Greeks in their resistance, and finally bring us next Spring to the probable issue of war," was his final word to Strangford.¹

The real issue would be decided at the approaching Conference at Vienna, which Castlereagh had decided to attend. His instructions, which he drew up for the approval of the Cabinet, shewed that he was already looking far ahead. They were principally directed, not to these miserable chicaneries, but to the issue of the Greek Revolt and the "progress made by the Greeks towards the formation of a Government." They envisaged the recognition of Greeks as belligerents, on the precedent of the South American Colonies, which, however, Castlereagh characteristically thought "must be done with caution and without ostentation, lest it should render the

¹ To Strangford, July 9, 1822; from Strangford, July, Aug. 1822: *F.O. Turkey*, 105, 109, 110. There is a marginal note in the draft on the passage about encouraging the Greeks quoted above. "De[lete] this if it should ever be published." Mr. Temperley (*Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, ii. 84) attributes this to Castlereagh, but it is not, I think, in his handwriting. It is more likely to have been written at a later date when circumstances had changed.

Turks wholly inaccessible to our remonstrances." Nor did Castlereagh leave out of account wider schemes, though he was naturally anxious to keep free of commitments. "Should an intervention be suggested between Turks and Greeks, directed, either to submission upon amnesty and assurances of protection for persons, property and religion, or to the creation of a qualified Greek Government, in either case care must be taken not to commit this country to any immediate or eventual concert of this nature that shall go beyond the limits of good offices: engagements in the nature of a guarantee are to be considered altogether inadmissible."¹

These instructions, in fact, laid down the lines which British policy was to follow for many years. Greece won her freedom, indeed, not by the action of any statesman, but primarily by her own heroism in emergencies, however spoilt by internal dissension, and secondly, by the gradual growth of public opinion in her favour in the Western States. But that had yet to come. Byron had not yet died, and Missolonghi was a name yet unknown in Europe. In Britain, public opinion had tended to move in the other direction. "*Toute l'Angleterre est Turque par haine de la Russie*," reported Chateaubriand.² The phrase has his usual extravagance, but it was true enough that the supporters of the Greek cause were still few in number, as a debate in the House of Commons in July only too clearly revealed. In regarding the salvation of the Ottoman Empire as more important than the establishment of Greek independence, Castlereagh was for once expressing a popular sentiment.

¹ Instructions for the Duke of Wellington: *W.N.D.* i. 284.

² Chateaubriand to Montmorenci, July 19, 1822: *D'Antioche, Chateaubriand*, 293. The Ambassador continued, however, "Ce sentiment a cela de bon dans ce moment qu'il est favorable à la paix. Mais il y a au fond de cette politique quelque chose d'inexplicable ou plutôt très explicable: *la paix, mais avec l'abaissement de la Russie*; voilà tout le secret." *Paris A.A.E.* 615, f. 317.

NOTE

THE REPAYMENT OF THE AUSTRIAN LOAN¹

One of Metternich's objects in going to Hanover, so he told Esterhazy,² was to arrange this difficult question. The Austrian loan was an exception to the British practice of granting subsidies to its Allies during the Revolutionary and Napoleonic wars. It had been contracted in 1795 and 1797 by Thugutt, who had apparently preferred a 'loan' to a 'subsidy' as more consonant with Habsburg dignity. Austria had now to pay the penalty; for, though the British Government would have been ready to forgive the whole or accept some nominal concessions in place of it, the attitude of Parliament made it impossible for them to abandon their rights. From 1816 onwards there had been questions in the House and attacks by the Opposition. The attack had been especially hotly renewed in Parliament during 1821, owing to Austria's unpopularity during the Laibach Conference. Both Castlereagh and Metternich realised that it was time to come to a settlement. At Hanover Metternich seems to have made definite promises,³ but Stadion, the Finance Minister, subsequently refused to ratify them and wrote a Memorandum to that effect, which Metternich forwarded to London in a vain effort to persuade the British Government. Castlereagh altogether refused to accept mere commercial concessions, such as were offered. The amount of the debt and accumulated interest, which was now 14 millions sterling, he did not, of course, expect to obtain. Such an amount it was clearly beyond Austria's powers to pay. "It is a transaction," he explained, "which, under all circumstances and especially the magnitude of the interest which has been allowed to accumulate upon the original capital of the debt, can now

¹ See for a fully documented account of the whole transaction Professor A. F. Pribram's *Oesterreichische Staatsverträge, England*, ii. 553 ff., in *Veröffentlichungen der Kommission für Neuere Geschichte Oesterreichs*, 1913.

² Metternich to Esterhazy, Dec. 5, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 217, xii.

³ Metternich to Stadion, November 18, 1821: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 217, xii.

only be wound up and extinguished by an arrangement in the nature of a compromise, the terms of which should be settled, not only with a just reference to the pretensions and abilities of the parties, but in such a manner as by satisfying the reasonable feelings of both nations, may obviate, if possible, any permanent sense of national injury or injustice, and thereby cement those sentiments of a common interest, which it is the duty of both Governments to cultivate and preserve." ¹

To this request Austria gave nothing but promises. No definite offer was made, and one of Castlereagh's last dispatches dealt with this troublesome question. "I begin to fear," he added in a private letter, "that the Court of Vienna may think we are not in earnest and that we only prosecute these discussions for conscience sake, or rather to have some proofs to lay before Parliament of our industry; I can assure you most solemnly this is the very reverse of the truth, and that I am deeply impressed with the necessity of this matter being finally settled as an essential ingredient in preserving those cordial relations the importance of which we both so highly prize." ²

It was only in November 1823 that Austria at last gave way, and freed herself from her obligations by a payment of £2,500,000. ³

The British claim seems a little shabby in view of all the circumstances. It shews, however, how difficult would have been the task of any British Government had loans been granted instead of subsidies to those who had fought against Napoleon as her Allies. As the memory of the danger grew less the natural instincts of a commercial nation reasserted themselves. Had the sums been larger, much damage might have been done, not only to Europe, but also to the reputation and material interests of Britain herself.

¹ Castlereagh to Metternich, January 19, 1822: *Vienna St. A. Varia*. To Gordon, January 19, March 26, 1822: *F.O. Austria*, 169.

² To Gordon, July 29, 1822: *F.O. Austria*, 169. See also *W.N.D.* i. 389, 586.

³ *B.F.S.P.* xi. 26.

CHAPTER VIII

BRITAIN AND THE NEW WORLD : THE ALLIANCE IN THE BACKGROUND, 1815-1822

1. THE EMANCIPATION OF THE SPANISH COLONIES
2. BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES.
3. THE ABOLITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE.

“ In short let us strive so to regulate our intercourse in all respects, as that each Nation may be able to do its utmost towards making the other rich and happy.”—CASTLEREAGH (on the opening of the commercial negotiations with the United States in 1818).

CHAPTER VIII

I. THE EMANCIPATION OF THE SPANISH COLONIES¹

IN the Old World Britain had been forced to consider her relations to problems that went deep into the foundations of her policy. The whole of her connections with the European Powers had been tested and to some extent changed by the stress of revolution and reaction. Throughout the whole of this period there were, however, changes of even greater importance taking place in the New World, in which Britain was deeply implicated. The future of a whole continent was involved, and the happiness, prosperity and progress of a population destined one day far to outnumber that of Europe. In the course of the ten years during which Castlereagh was in charge of British foreign policy, the domination of Europe over the South American continent was broken, the possessions of Spain and Portugal were reduced to a few scattered and isolated fragments of their once mighty Empires, new States of vast potentialities came into being, the whole balance of commercial and political power was changed.

In this mighty cataclysm Britain was a factor of great importance. The other Powers of Europe were, indeed, also concerned, and, as will be seen, made some attempt to influence events; but they were impotent. The United States was even more vitally interested, but she was compelled to remain a passive spectator until the issue had been placed beyond

¹ The substance of this section was published by me in two articles (*English Historical Review*, Jan. 1912, Oct. 1915). When the first of these was written, however, I had not seen the foreign archives. Much other information has also since come to light, but on the whole the conclusions of the articles appear to have been confirmed. Such changes as have been made here are mainly of emphasis.

doubt. "It is an undeniable historical truth," writes the distinguished Portuguese historian, "that the emancipation of Latin America was performed without any positive help from the United States. . . . On the contrary, England's support assumed a material shape: it was not precisely represented by troops—although some distinguished British officers, as Admiral Cochrane and General Miller, were to be found in the revolutionary ranks, where no American commander was ever seen—but consisted in diplomatic, financial, and even military and naval facilities."¹ The revolution in Spanish America, like all that ever had been successful, was, indeed, won by the courage and energy of the South Americans themselves, and the genius of their great leaders, Bolivar and San Martin. Nevertheless, a connection so close with such important events tested Castlereagh's powers as a statesman perhaps as much as any other transaction in which he took part. They reveal him at his highest as a diplomatist—courageous, far-seeing, tactful and fertile in expedients to meet new and unknown contingencies. They also shew how he was limited by his inability to appeal to public opinion in the manner of his successor. In this case, however, it was his own reputation that suffered rather than the interests of his country. It may be that, had he lived, his quiet methods would have finally crowned his plans by the erection in South America of institutions which might have served the interests of that continent as well or better than the Republics which finally survived.

In these events the connection of Britain with the Alliance was important in two respects. It was both an embarrassment and an assistance. On the one hand, Castlereagh had to oppose the desire of two members of the Alliance, Russia and France, to assist the Spanish Crown with armed forces. This he easily accomplished, and there was probably no real danger of such interference in the period subsequent to the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle. On the other hand, he used the Alliance and all that it represented to exercise an influence on the policy of the United States. In this delicate manoeuvre also

¹ De Oliveira Lima, *The Evolution of Brazil compared with that of Spanish and Anglo-Saxon America* (edited by P. A. Martin), 64.

he had considerable, though by no means complete, success. His policy was always to keep the Alliance in the background, but not altogether out of sight. At the moment of his death, indeed, he obviously intended to use it, if he could, as a means to bring to fulfilment plans which had long been maturing.

The revolutions in the South American Colonies were mainly a result of the Napoleonic invasion of Spain.¹ The loyal Juntas, which were set up when the Mother-Country was over-run by foreign troops, were turned into revolutionary committees by the foolish policy of the Spanish Regency. By the time peace came there was opposition to the Spanish connection in almost every Colony, though the position of the rebels varied immensely. Hardly anywhere had sufficient success been obtained to make re-conquest by Spain seem impossible or even improbable. Large and important sections of public opinion in South America still desired some connection with the Mother-Country. It was only the deplorable condition of the Spanish Government that appeared to make the situation hopeless. If Spain could obtain from her own resources, or the assistance of other Powers, even a slight addition to the means at her disposal, there seemed to be no reason why her domination, so congenial to large numbers in the New World, should not be re-established in some form or other.

Britain was, of course, especially interested as a commercial Power in the manner of such a settlement. Throughout modern history, and particularly in the eighteenth century, her traders had gazed with jealous eyes at the Spanish monopoly. The privileges of the Assiento Treaty had been exploited and abused, but little definite advantage had been obtained. A new situation had now arisen. During the Revolutionary and Napoleonic Wars some British statesmen had even contemplated the conquest of these rich possessions, and British troops had been thrown away on this futile project. Far more advantageous had been the growing trade established with the rebels, which had already knit close relations between South America and Britain.

Castlereagh himself had been brought early into contact with the problem, and from the first he seems to have realised

the possibilities of the situation and the course most likely to be advantageous to his own country and incidentally to the Spanish Colonies themselves. In 1807, as Secretary of State for War, he had protested against the absurd policy of conquest, though he was prepared for action in South America to support British interests.✓ The change of situation in the Spanish Peninsula, however, altered that in the New World. When Castlereagh came back to the Foreign Office in 1812, Britain was in alliance with the Spanish constitutional Government established at Cadiz. But neither the Spanish Regency nor the Spanish Cortes was ready to abandon its monopoly to the British traders, who were already beginning to seek in South America the markets which they had lost in Europe. They claimed, at any rate, in return active assistance against the rebels. One of Castlereagh's first duties as Foreign Minister was to define British policy towards this new situation. Britain was prepared, he affirmed, to mediate between Spain and her Colonies, but only on three conditions: (1) that there should be no secret advantages, such as Spain had offered for active help; (2) that the mediation was to apply to all the Colonies; and (3), by far the most important, that force was not to be used. To this policy then so clearly and emphatically stated Castlereagh adhered throughout the whole of the subsequent negotiations, until the logic of facts had at last made new measures necessary.¹

Such conditions, however, it was impossible for any Spanish Government to accept. Neither the constitutional Regency, nor Ferdinand, after the restoration in 1814, nor even the new constitutional Government of 1820 were ever ready to agree to them. The majority of Spaniards had no desire to effect such an accommodation as could be obtained without the exercise of force. They saw truly that there were many elements in South America ready to accept once more Spanish domination. They were prepared to concede some share in the commerce of the New World to other countries, but the substance of power must still remain in their own hands. Spanish pride and Spanish history prevented any other solu-

¹ To Wellesley, April 1, Aug. 29, 1812: *F.D. Spain*, 204, 128. See also *C.C.* viii. 247, 267, 282.

tion from being accepted. In the Treaty, therefore, which Ferdinand made with Britain in 1814, after British arms had restored him to his throne, all he could allow was, that, if the trade of Spanish America was thrown open, Britain should be treated at least as well as any other Power; in return, Britain promised the strictest neutrality in the struggle and engaged to prevent her subjects from aiding the rebels with the materials of defence.¹

The negotiations of the Congress of Vienna and the Hundred Days absorbed the attentions of both Powers, and no further important negotiations on the subject took place until after the Second Peace of Paris. The powerful Council of the Indies had recommended that Britain should again be approached and her mediation secured. Cevallos, the Foreign Minister, therefore, again attempted to win active British assistance by the offer of special trading privileges. When Vaughan refused even to transmit such an offer to his Court, Cevallos was prepared to accept, he said, British good offices in order to effect a reconciliation. France, he hinted, was only too ready to give the help which Britain refused, but Spain preferred, if possible, to rely on her old ally. Castlereagh's reply to this overture was to repeat, with additional emphasis, the conditions which he had so emphatically enunciated in 1812. He again rejected indignantly the bribe which Spain once more offered of special privileges over other nations. His answer breathes the same spirit as the Circular Dispatch of January 1, 1816. "I can venture to assure you," he concluded, "that . . . to command success the views of both nations ought to be liberal to South America and not invidious to other nations." A system of exclusive commercial advantage to the mediating Power would render her interposition odious and destroy all her just influence; you will perceive that the Prince Regent has never sought for any exclusive advantages. He has always recommended the commerce of South America to be opened to all nations upon moderate duties, with a reasonable preference to Spain herself. . . . Owing to the superiority of Britain at this time over all her rivals in Europe, this open and liberal policy gave her all that she wanted.

¹ *B.F.S.P.* i. 275, 293.

Nevertheless, it is a notable declaration and marks the beginning of a new attitude towards international commerce. In no very long time Britain was even to apply such principles to her own Colonial possessions.¹

Such ideas were quite incomprehensible to the Spaniards. Under such conditions Colonies were not worth having. The Spanish King looked therefore to other combinations to obtain what he wanted. Above all, as has been seen in a previous chapter, he began to turn to the Tsar, whose ambitious and unscrupulous minister, Tatishchev, was engaged in planning wide schemes in which Pozzo di Borgo, to some extent, shared. Already a secret correspondence was going on between the two Courts, in which Cevallos, for whom the King expressed a profound contempt, had no share. The distance between Petersburg and Madrid, however, made these plans develop slowly, and when Cevallos was succeeded by a new Foreign Minister, Pizarro, there was again recourse to London. Several circumstances combined to induce the King to agree. The dispute with Portugal over the Banda Oriental del Uruguay in the New World and the Spanish occupation of Olivenza in the Peninsula had been referred to the mediation of the Great Powers, and Britain had shewn herself ready to do justice to Spain and not allow her protection of Portugal to be abused. Britain was also engaged in negotiations over the Abolition of the Slave Trade, which promised to be of great financial assistance to Spain. There was, too, already begun the important negotiation between Spain and the United States over the Floridas, which some Spaniards thought might be used to influence Britain to a more favourable attitude by taking advantage of her jealousy of her only real rivals in the New World.

Further negotiations were, therefore, desirable, but the Spanish Ambassador, Fernan-Nuñez, when he sounded Castlereagh in October 17, 1816, still refused the necessary conditions. Castlereagh was probably right when he wrote to Wellesley of the Spanish offer: "It is difficult to conceive a rational motive for doing so, unless the Court of Madrid wishes to *drive* the British Government into a peremptory

¹ From Vaughan, Nov. 16, 1815; to Vaughan, Dec. 20, 1815: *F.O. Spain*, 177.

negative, and upon that refusal to found some change either in the system of its political relations in Europe, with a view of procuring support against their revolted Colonies, or in their South American policy, finding the other hopeless in point of success." He refused, therefore, to make a formal reply; and when Fernan-Núñez returned to the attack, Castlereagh repeated to him, verbally, the only conditions under which Spain could hope to win back her Colonies. He insisted "that a long perseverance on the part of Spain, in false notions of imposing by force a restrictive and exclusive system upon that country [South America] had already alienated the minds of the people from her rule, but that the only chance she had of success was to lose no time, for her own sake, and not for ours, to put her system there upon a national footing. In short, I told him plainly that armed assistance was out of the question. . . ." It was clear that what Spain most desired could not be obtained from Britain.¹

In the year 1817, therefore, the King turned to the Tsar for assistance. He and Tatishchev had already evolved a grandiose scheme, acceptance of which by the Tsar would have resulted in the breakdown of the European Alliance. This scheme was not yet quite ready; but Tatishchev's dominating influence over the King and his camarilla was already apparent to all observers. As early as November 1816, the suspicious Vaughan suggested that a treaty had been signed between Spain and Russia, by which, in return for armed assistance against South America, the latter Power was to receive the cession of Minorca. Rumours of this negotiation poured in from all sides, and Castlereagh ordered enquiries to be made at Petersburg. It was justly and indignantly denied. Dispatches were forthwith sent to Tatishchev, warning him that his conduct was arousing suspicion and that the Tsar had no desire to cultivate an influence at Madrid at the expense of the Alliance. A decision appears at one time even to have been made not to send the old Russian ships, which Tatishchev had promised the King should be the nucleus of a new Spanish Armada for South America. This dispatch was, however,

¹ Fernan-Núñez to Castlereagh, Oct. 17, 1816; to Wellesley, Dec. 20, 1816, Jan. 10, 1817: *F.O. Spain*, 191, 184, 196.

cancelled, and another substituted which allowed the sale of the ships, but only on the condition that the transaction was not used to maintain Russian ascendancy at Madrid. On the contrary, Tatishchev was ordered to try and draw Spain and Britain closer together. A second proposal which Tatishchev and the King had the temerity to put forward for Russian assistance in the absorption of Portugal by Spain was peremptorily rejected. It was stated that the ships would only be sent if the scheme was immediately abandoned, and Tatishchev was severely reprimanded for giving it any countenance.¹

Nevertheless, the sale of the ships produced, as has been seen, a great effect on Castlereagh's mind, and this was increased by the attitude of Pozzo di Borgo, who can scarcely have been ignorant of these plans. At any rate Pozzo di Borgo made strenuous efforts to obtain the interference of the Alliance. The discussions on the Spanish-Portuguese dispute inevitably raised questions of policy in the New World, since the territory which Portugal had seized would have immediately fallen under the control of the rebels if she had relinquished it. It appeared plausible, therefore, to suggest a reference of the larger question to the Ambassadorial Committee, in which Pozzo di Borgo exercised so much influence. It was hoped that by means of the Alliance British opposition might be overcome or at least neutralised, and some action set on foot that might develop into a regular intervention, from which the possibility of some form of coercive action would not be excluded.

Such was the plan of Pozzo di Borgo, and he had prepared for it so carefully that, when Fernan-Núñez (now Spanish Ambassador at Paris) appealed on July 2, 1817, to the Ambassadorial Committee, both the Austrian and Prussian

¹ Nesselrode to Lieven, June, 22, 1817; Nesselrode to Tatishchev, April 27, May 27, Aug. 30, Oct. 28, Nov. 29, 1817, Tatishchev to Nesselrode, March 25, May 30, Aug. 7, 11 (enclosing the Convention as to the Ships), 12, Oct. 14, 1817: *Pet. Arch.* The last contained an elaborate justification of his conduct. It concluded: "*Je suis loin de me plaindre, mais je ne saurais point vous dissimuler, à vous seul, que je ne suis point attendu à une pareille mortification. Il y a 16 ans que je sers l'Empereur, il y en a 18 que je suis dans les affaires; mais, sans parler même de temps passé, trois années d'une mission très laborieuse ne m'ont valu qu'une reprimande!*" See also above, Chapter II, section 3, p. 94.

Ambassadors were ready to join in a friendly and encouraging reply, and Richelieu lent his support. But Stuart was not to be hoodwinked ; his suspicions were immediately aroused, and he summoned Wellington to his aid. He refused to allow any action to be taken until reference had been made to London, claiming, according to the indignant account of Pozzo di Borgo, that the question belonged exclusively to Britain to decide.¹

There could be no doubt, of course, as to Castlereagh's attitude. Stuart was strongly supported, and an appeal to Vienna at once brought Austria into line. It was necessary, however, for British policy to be formally and explicitly conveyed to the other members of the Alliance, in order to prevent, if possible, a repetition of such proposals which encouraged Spain to maintain her impossible demands. Accordingly, a Cabinet Memorandum was drawn up, in which Castlereagh announced confidentially to his Allies the policy which he had already laid down so often in response to the appeals of Spain. Britain was ready to undertake the task of mediation but only if the four principles which she considered as indispensable to success were accepted by Spain : (1) that Spain should sign a treaty satisfactory to Britain for the abolition of the Slave Trade ; (2) that a general amnesty and armistice should be offered to all insurgents ; (3) that the South Americans should be placed on a footing of legal equality with the European subjects of the King of Spain ; and (4) that there should be free commerce between South America and all nations, Spain enjoying "a fair preference." To these was added a fifth, the most important of all, which was formulated in such a manner as to be a warning not only to Spain but to Russia and France : "There is another branch of this question of great importance and upon which the Prince Regent is desirous to be most distinctly understood : namely, that H.R.H. cannot consent that his mediation shall, under any circumstances, assume an armed character." His intervention must throughout be understood to be confined within

¹ From Stuart, July 10, 21, Aug. 4, 17, 1817 : *F.O. France*, 160, 161. Wellington to Castlereagh, July 14, 21, 1817 : *W.S.D.* xi. 735, xii. 3. The plan of Pozzo di Borgo may be traced in the voluminous dispatches printed in *I.R.H.S.* cxix.

the bounds of good offices, and the employment of that just influence which must belong to any Great Power when labouring only to promote the welfare of an allied Sovereign and his people. H.R.H. deems it proper to be more explicit on this branch of the subject, as he is persuaded that the party in Spain, which still unfortunately clings to the ancient colonial system of that country, and which has hitherto had influence enough to prevent any effectual attempt at reconciliation, will continue to obstruct any such attempt, so long as they are permitted to indulge a hope of involving other Powers in the contest, and thereby availing themselves of foreign arms, for the subjugation of the Spanish Colonies.”¹

This document put an end to the fine plans of Pozzo di Borgo and Tatishchev. The former, in vain, tried to haggle and to delay decision, but Fernan-Núñez, spoilt this game by handing in a note to the Ambassadors' Conference refusing the British conditions, which was drawn up in as offensive a manner as possible, and not even communicated to Stuart. The Spanish Ambassador also threatened to delay any settlement of the dispute with Portugal until the Colonial question was taken up by the Conference. Castlereagh's reply to this bluster was to re-affirm the British guarantee of the Portuguese dominions in Europe. Otherwise he took no notice of the Spanish note, and thus gave Pozzo di Borgo no further opportunity to entangle the Alliance in the discussion. The formal Russian answer, therefore, could do no more than stress the analogy between the mediation already in progress between Spain and Portugal and that suggested between Spain and her Colonies. It utilised also a proposition, made by Castlereagh in 1815, in the negotiations for the abolition of the Slave Trade, to suggest that some measure of commercial boycott might be employed “in order to make the vast countries of the New World participate in the advantages which Europe enjoys under the stipulations of Vienna and Paris of 1815.” Castlereagh refused to send an official reply to this insidious epistle, but he spoke his mind strongly to Lieven. “Upon what principles of law and morality,” he asked, indignantly, “could

¹ To Stuart, July 22, Aug. 21, 1817: *F.O. France*, 151. Cabinet Memorandum, Aug. 28, 1817: *F.O. Spain*, 204.

England rely, to legitimise her participation in the slightest act of constraint such as it is desired to exercise against these peoples. If she could by any amicable and friendly overture help to bring together again nations, whose union had been consecrated by long passages of years, she would spare no pains to achieve such an object. But, by what right could she force a population, which had freed itself because its government was oppressive, to place itself once more under the domination of that same government?" An unanswerable argument, but how much more readily it came to Castlereagh's lips when the commercial and maritime interests of Britain were affected than when Italians were struggling to be free!¹

A deadlock had thus been produced. Spain would not accept the British conditions; Britain would allow no mediation unless they were accepted. Nevertheless, the problem continued to be feverishly discussed throughout the whole of 1818 until the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle met. The manoeuvres of Pozzo di Borgo to get Spain to the Conference, described in a previous chapter, were especially connected with the problem of the Colonies. Castlereagh had little difficulty in evading them, since he was sure of the support of Austria and Prussia. He might, indeed, have treated such propositions even more contemptuously but for one fact,—his desire to prevent the recognition of the Spanish Colonies by the United States.

Castlereagh had never for one moment lost sight of this danger, which every fresh success on the part of the Colonies made more imminent. Throughout the negotiations he had done his best to make the American statesmen believe that a mediation on the part of the European Powers was possible, or even probable. He had constantly tried to impress Adams with this point of view during the latter's residence at London. Their last conversation had, indeed, left Adams with a strong conviction that Britain intended to intervene in some manner. "With respect to the Spanish South American insurgents," noted the Minister in his diary, "he was not

¹ Memorandum of Fernan-Núñez, Oct. 20, 1817, from Stuart, Oct. 30, 1817: *F.O. France*, 163. Russian Memorandum, Nov. 29, 1817. *I.R.H.S.* cxix, 474, *W.S.D.* xii. 125. Lieven to Nesselrode, Feb. 10, 1818: *Pet. Arch.* F. Martens (*Recueil*, xi. 269) mutilates the important passage as usual.

altogether explicit, but rather evasive, in regard to the probable future policy of England. All that could with certainty be collected was that she will intermeddle as much as possible; that she will side to the utmost extent she dares against the insurgents, but without proceeding to direct hostilities against them, and serve herself by urging Spain to allow them a free trade at least with the English. In all her mediations or offers of mediations, her justice and policy will be merely to serve herself." ¹

This characteristic judgment was mistaken and unfair. But it suited Castlereagh's purpose better than a more accurate one. He did his best to confirm the impression that a mediation would take place and not without success. There was already a strong desire in the United States to recognise nations that appeared to be following the same path to freedom as themselves. In 1816 a commission of enquiry was sent to South America, but its report was inconclusive. Adams, after he had become Secretary of State in 1817, was influenced in his attitude largely by the desire to complete his negotiations for the Floridas purchase before he made any steps towards recognition. But it is doubtful if he could have held back his Cabinet so long had it not been for the undoubted fear, which he constantly expressed, that such recognition would involve the possibility of a rupture with Britain and the Alliance. Henry Clay had already tabled a motion in the House of Representatives for recognition which caused Castlereagh much anxiety. Lieven noted his relief when the news came that it was withdrawn. Meanwhile Adams sent instructions to his representatives in Europe to find out whether recognition of some of the Colonies by the United States would involve hostilities with other European Powers. ²

¹ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, iii. 561. Castlereagh had, as a matter of fact, told Adams that Britain would insist on the commerce being opened to all nations, including the United States. See also W. C. Ford, *Writings of J. Q. Adams*, v. 504-5, vi. 175.

² To Bagot, Nov. 10, 1817: *F.O. America*, 120. From Bagot, Feb. 8, April 7, 1818. *C.C.* xi. 405; *F.O. America*, 131. Lieven to Nesselrode, May 18, 1818: *Pet. Arch.* J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, iv. 91. W. C. Ford, *Writings of J. Q. Adams*, vi. 316, 322, 433. For the steps of the recognition by the United States, see W. S. Robertson, *Hispanic-American relations with the United States*, chapter ii., and J. B. Moore, *Digest of International Law*, i. §§ 35, 36.

During 1817 Castlereagh could send no news to the United States except vague announcements. He had no desire to reveal the deadlock into which the negotiations had fallen as a result of the last manoeuvre of the Russian Ambassadors. He endeavoured rather to utilise the danger from the United States to induce Spain to accept the British conditions. For long, in spite of a good deal of support at Madrid, especially from the Council of the Indies, no result was obtained. But, when the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle drew near, Spain at last shewed some signs of accepting the British point of view. On June 17, 1818, a note was sent to the Powers of a more conciliatory nature, and this was followed by very frank conversations in London between Castlereagh and San Carlos, the new Spanish Ambassador. But Spain, while offering more liberal concessions, still demanded armed assistance. Castlereagh had, therefore, no great confidence in the Spanish concessions, which he regarded as a diplomatic move to get an invitation by some means or other to the approaching Conference. Russia and France appeared to be backing the scheme, and Castlereagh viewed the whole situation with the greatest distrust.¹

Nevertheless, the apparent disposition of Spain to accept the British conditions might prove useful in checking the United States, whose Government, he knew, was indignant at being kept ignorant for so long of a negotiation of the existence of which it was necessarily perfectly aware. Castlereagh had already informed Rush that a mediation was possible; he now sounded him on the possibility of the United States being associated with it, and appeared disappointed by the Minister's assurance "that the United States would decline taking part, if they took part at all, in any plan of pacification, except on the basis of the independence of the Colonies." Castlereagh, however, now sent his Memorandum of August 28, 1817, to Bagot for Adams' information, together with the recent communications from Madrid. It certainly produced an effect. Adams advised the Cabinet strongly against immediate recog-

¹ Spanish note, June 17, 1818. *B.F.S.P.* v. 1217. Tatishchev to Nesselrode, Sept. 15, 1818 (enclosing San Carlos to Pizarro, Aug. 31, 1818): *Pet. Arch.*, Lieven to Nesselrode, Sept. 4, 1818: *Pet. Arch.*, *Appendix* p. 563.

dition of any of the Colonies. The United States must await the result of the mediation of the Alliance. Only after this had failed, as fail it must, would they be "at perfect liberty to recognise any of the South American Governments without coming into collision with the Allies."¹ ...

Such was the diplomatic situation when Castlereagh drew up his instructions for the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle. That they were not easy to frame on this point the alterations in the draft shew. Little more was finally decided than that before any mediation could be attempted, Spain must accept the British conditions. In a portion of the memorandum which he subsequently deleted the most pessimistic opinion of the chances of any success was enunciated, and the embarrassments of a negotiation in London were emphasised, and one at Madrid or even Paris regarded as preferable. Castlereagh seems, however, on reflection to have thought it unwise to bind himself too closely, and, in the end, all such points were left to his discretion.²

At the Conference the subject was only approached gradually after the main problems had been thoroughly explored, and the tension with Russia much relieved by the frank conversations between Castlereagh and the Tsar. It was discussed informally between Castlereagh, Richelieu and Canot d'Istria towards the end of October. No one seemed eager to broach the question officially. "There seems a general concurrence that force would, under no circumstances, be employed," reported Castlereagh on November 2; and it was in fact he who brought the question formally before the Conference in a memorandum which suggested that the

¹ Rush, *Residence* (1st series), 295-300. To Bagot, Aug. 8, 1818. *F.O. America*, 129. J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, iv. 136, 164. Adams was much annoyed at only being allowed to read the papers over in Bagot's presence and not being permitted to take them away. This practice, common to British diplomacy at this time, was due to a fear of publication, which was perhaps more justified as regards the United States than any other Power.

² Second Cabinet Memorandum: *F.O. Continent*, 34. Part of the passage deleted ran: "If they are [held in London], we shall be, beyond all question, rendered the more responsible for a proceeding which now promises little success. The Spaniards, annoyed by the continued armaments going forward in our ports, which we have not the means of effectually repressing, and by the language in Parliament, will distrust us, and the Opposition, by their intercourse with the insurgent deputies will know enough of what is passing to counteract and embarrass the government by daily discussions in the House of Commons."

five Powers should appoint one individual (Wellington being obviously meant) to represent them all, if Spain, as was not likely, should accept the conditions of mediation. Even then the matter appeared likely to drop. The Tsar shewed a disposition to avoid discussion and confessed to Castlereagh: "I am not satisfied with my own Ministers on this subject and I have told them so; they have not spoken out to Spain as plainly as they ought to have done." But the news that came via Paris, during the Tsar's visit to the Army of Occupation, that the recognition of Buenos Ayres by the United States was imminent, induced the French and Russian Ministers to present a memorandum which probably only the Tsar's hesitations had delayed so long. It repeated many of the insidious suggestions which had been made in 1817. It dwelt with great emphasis on the dangers to the world if the whole of the Americas became republican, and claimed that action was therefore urgently necessary. It advocated that the Duke of Wellington should go to Madrid in the name of all the five Powers, but that he should be limited in his functions by a Conference of Ambassadors. The United States, it was even suggested, might be persuaded by Great Britain to be represented on such a body. Finally, and here was the part which especially awoke Castlereagh's anger, it contended that there was no need to avow openly the intention not to use force.¹

Castlereagh's hostile attitude to this paper was intensified by reports from Wellesley that Tatishchev was apparently still prosecuting his mysterious intrigues with the camarilla. He at once told the Russian Ministers "that it was highly un-

¹ Castlereagh to Bathurst, (No. 22) Nov. 2, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 36. Note sur les moyens de négociation pour la pacification des Colonies Espagnoles insurgées: *W.S.D.* xii. 805. There, however, it is called, "Note of the French and Spanish Plenipotentiaries on the question of Spanish South American possessions." Mr. Dexter Perkins points out (*American Historical Review*, July 1923, 667) the interesting fact that the note is based on a draft submitted to the French Foreign Office by Serrurier, who had been Minister at Washington in the time of Napoleon (cf. Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 73). The Russian Ministers had, however, undoubtedly revised it and made themselves responsible for it. Castlereagh expressly says so, and it was with them as much as with Richelieu that he carried on the discussion. See also Richelieu's reports to Louis XVIII. in Cisternes, *Le Duc de Richelieu*, 98-9, 142, 148. Dr. W. P. Cresson, who summarises this document as "hitherto unpublished evidence" in his monograph, *The Holy Alliance* (1922), 79-80, bases extravagant deductions upon it.

satisfactory and objectionable." He seized the opportunity of going into the whole diplomatic situation at Madrid, describing in the frankest terms the suspicions which Tatishchev's conduct had aroused. He did not, of course, he assured them, suspect the intention of their Government, but their refusal to tell the truth had misled Spain and led to the present deplorable situation. "I represented," he concluded, "that instead of thwarting each other, we ought to make Spain see at once the whole of her difficulties; that it was very probable the intervention we could afford to give would neither suit the taste nor the interests of Spain, but that it was better that she should know this, and look to her own efforts, than be carried on under a delusive hope, either that the other Powers would do for her what England refused, or that England (which was impossible) should be made by their intervention to alter her deliberate course of policy."

Capo d'Istria and Nesselrode seemed much impressed by this exposition. Nevertheless, they returned in the Conference, according to plan, to the idea of using the commercial boycott to overcome the resistance of the Colonies.¹ At this Castlereagh lost all patience and went to the Tsar himself in high dudgeon. "I took the first opportunity to submit to H.I.M. the simple point upon which our differences with the other Plenipotentiaries turned, that we held that we were not entitled to *arbitrate* or to *judge* between His Christian Majesty and his subjects, and, as a consequence, not competent to enforce any such judgment directly or indirectly; that we could only mediate or facilitate, but not compel or menace; that the objection on our part was an objection of moral principle, not to be got over, and that as the Prince Regent could not charge himself with the protection of these people, H.R.H. could not justify to his own feelings, even had he the means, the imposing upon them what *might* prove destructive to their safety." After this there was scarcely any need for the ruthless exposure of the idea of commercial coercion, which, as Castlereagh pointed out, Britain had not even applied to Napoleon at the height of his power. ✓The Tsar was completely convinced, and he brought his Ministers into line. The answer of Wellington, which insisted on Spain accepting

the British conditions before he could undertake the office of mediator, was adopted by the Conference as its policy. Before they left Aix-la-Chapelle, indeed, both Capo d'Istria and Nesselrode confessed to Castlereagh that he had been right and that they had been wrong. Tatishchev was ordered to support British policy and induce Spain to give up all idea of armed intervention. No wonder that Castlereagh approved of diplomacy by Conference, when such results could be achieved by it!¹

Thus closed the first stage in the emancipation of the Spanish Colonies. Practically no progress had been made towards a settlement. The intrigues of the Russian Ambassadors had entirely failed. They had not, it is clear, ever obtained the considered approval of the Tsar, whose interest in the whole question had been dictated by a sincere desire to help Spain and Europe generally rather than by any malevolent design to increase his own power. The intrigues of Tatishchev and Pozzo di Borgo had indeed received more encouragement at Paris than elsewhere, and, as will be seen, it was France who was henceforth to be the principal plotter. But Castlereagh had dealt with these manoeuvres, not without some vexation and anxiety, but with complete success, which the commanding position of Britain made easy enough to obtain. Their main effect had perhaps been to help to keep from the Spanish King and his camarilla the real state of affairs and the hopelessness of relying on the European Alliance to win back the Colonies to their allegiance by the application of force. But Ferdinand's obstinacy and foolishness could scarcely be either increased or diminished by the advice of others.

The situation was, however, still very unsatisfactory. Spain refused entirely to accept the British conditions, in spite of the loyal support which the chastened Tatishchev now gave to Wellesley. The Russian Ambassador had lost all his influence as soon as he ceased to hold out grandiose hopes to the King,

¹ Castlereagh to Bathurst (Nos. 48 and 49), Nov. 24, 1818: *F.O. Continent*, 41. Nesselrode to Tatishchev, Dec. 16, 1818: *Pet. Arch.* Answer to the proposition of the French and Russian Ministers that the Duke of Wellington should undertake to mediate between Spain and her Colonies *W.S.D.* xii. 846. The copy in the Record Office was annotated by Canning in 1824.

and in October 1819 he left Madrid on leave, from which he never returned.¹ Spanish attention was occupied with the dispute with Portugal and still more with the negotiations with the United States over the Floridas, a treaty being signed by Onís, the Spanish Minister at Washington, and sent home for ratification. Court intrigues and a justifiable fear that the settlement of this question would leave the United States free to accord recognition to some of the Colonies, caused ratification of this treaty to be refused at Madrid, and a situation of some tension thus arose between the two countries.¹ The military preparations at Madrid were pressed forward, only to result in confusion and, ultimately, revolution. Meanwhile, in most of the Colonies progress was being made by the rebels towards the consolidation of their position, and this fact began to impress itself upon foreign Powers with increasing force.

The effect was naturally most apparent in the United States, whose Government had also necessarily become aware of the part which Britain had played at the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle. Public opinion in the country and the President's Cabinet moved further in the direction of recognition, though Adams was still desirous of delay. He was pre-occupied with the Floridas Treaty, the ratification of which he wished to secure before any overt step was made towards recognition; and the informal approaches, which he now made to both Britain and France for joint recognition of Buenos Ayres, were a result of outside pressure rather than his own desire. He was especially suspicious of Britain. Castlereagh, when Rush approached him in February 1819, expressed surprise at the proposal, and stated that the desire of Britain was to see the Colonies reconciled to Spain under liberal political and commercial conditions. "How far it was practicable to settle it," he said, "giving back to Spain her supremacy and granting to the Colonies a just government under her sway, was not for him to say; but it was the hope to which the European Alliance still clung." Even in March, after Spain had emphatically declined the offer of the Duke of Wellington's mediation, he still stressed the friendliness of Britain towards Spain. In Bagot's opinion this attitude had produced some effect on

¹ See below, Section 2, p. 448.

Adams, though the latter asserted the inevitability of recognition sooner or later.¹

Probably the British Ministers were already not far from a similar opinion, but everything depended on the method of recognition. The passing in 1819 of the Foreign Enlistment Bill to check the active assistance which British subjects, in increasing numbers, were offering to the rebel forces in South America, shewed that the Government were determined to allow Spain, now preparing a new Armada at Cadiz, every chance before any step was taken. The debates on the Bill in the House of Commons proved also how far public opinion in Britain had gone in sympathy with the Colonies. The heroic exploits of Lord Cochrane, who had commanded the Venezuelan Fleet since 1818, soon added to the popularity of the cause, for which large sums of money were raised in London.

Castlereagh's mind had even before Aix-la-Chapelle already turned to the idea, which he had adumbrated in 1807, of erecting, with or without the consent of Spain, independent monarchies in the New World. Such a result would prevent the dreaded spread of republican principles and tend to make British influence predominate over that of the United States. In 1818 San Martin, no lover of republics, had written to him suggesting that a representative monarchy should be set up in Buenos Ayres, rejecting, however, the idea of a Spanish Prince, which, he claimed, would lead to recrimination and persecution. Doubtless San Martin meant to insinuate his own claim to a throne. Castlereagh, at any rate, did no more for the moment than notify Spain of the fact, but he made no secret to both Lieven and D'Osmond that the idea was a congenial one.²

The same idea had, however, occurred elsewhere. In 1818 the French Government sent a secret agent to Buenos Ayres

¹ W. C. Ford, *Writings of J. Q. Adams*, vi. 520-25. Rush, *Residence at the Court of London* (2nd series), 15. From Bagot, Jan. 4, April, 7, 1819: C.C. xii. 99, 122.

² Lieven to Nesselrode, Sept. 4, 1818: *Pet. Arch., Appendix* p. 563. D'Osmond to Richelieu, Aug. 14, 1818: *Paris, A.A.E.* 611, f. 181. Liverpool indicated to Castlereagh, during the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, his readiness to recognise "under some younger branch of the Spanish family," those Colonies which had made a formal declaration of independence (*W.S.D.* xii. 823).

with the result that one, Valentine Gomez, was sent to Paris by the 'Supreme Director,' Pueyrredón, to sound the French Government. The new Dessoles Ministry was persuaded by their energetic and ambitious official, Rayneval, that much could be accomplished by judicious diplomacy. Intervention by force of arms was not altogether excluded. The proposition of Gomez that the Duke of Orleans should be invited to accept the crown was refused, but it was suggested that the Duke of Lucca, a Bourbon Prince, might be approached for that purpose. All this was kept quite secret from Britain. Even the Spanish Government was only informed in the most general manner that discussions were going on. It was the Tsar who the French Government hoped would back their plans, and General Hulot d'Osery was sent on a special mission to Petersburg to win his assent. But the Tsar, as has been seen, was full of distrust of the new French Government, and, in any case, he would have rejected any proposition which did not unite all the members of the Alliance. He rejected the overture and told the French Government to keep in touch with Britain on the subject.¹

Castlereagh had already heard of it from other sources, but he attached little importance to it. He believed that the French Government were simply recurring to the idea of sending a Spanish Prince to the Colonies in the manner in which he had himself advocated. It was not until the next year that these negotiations assumed a sinister aspect. Then a domestic revolution in Buenos Ayres resulted in the publication of the correspondence with France, including a memorandum by Rayneval, who was undoubtedly mainly responsible for the French proposal, which was written in a manner particularly offensive to Britain. These papers, published in the *Morning Chronicle*, roused public opinion. They also made a profound impression on the British Government and on Castlereagh. Stuart was ordered to demand an immediate explanation. Pasquier, who was now at the French Foreign

¹ Bois le Comte, Congrès d'Aix-la-Chapelle : *Paris A.A.E. France*, 714, f. 57. Note secrète remise au Comte Hulot d'Osery : *I.R.H.S.* cxxvii. 81. C. A. Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 91-2. San Martín and Belgrano wished to approach Britain. It was Pueyrredón who insisted on negotiating with France.

Office, much embarrassed, denied that the Government had agreed, and Decazes protested his ignorance of the whole affair.¹

It was clear, however, that the permanent officials and Dessolles himself were involved, and Castlereagh made no effort to conceal his indignation. It was all the warmer because the intrigue had taken place at a time when Britain was defending the French Government against the suspicions of the other members of the Alliance, and passing the unpopular Foreign Enlistment Bill in order to demonstrate the reality of her neutrality in South American disputes. The French explanations had, of course, to be accepted, but Castlereagh made it clear that he regarded the incident as a most discreditable piece of diplomatic intrigue. It had also a considerable effect on his policy. Hitherto he had carefully avoided all intercourse with the agents of the Colonies. Now he sent openly for the Columbian representative, Don Francisco Antonio Zea, and informed him that the British Government would at once recognise any Colony that adopted monarchical institutions. The first step towards official recognition had been taken.²

Though this action was due to the indignation and alarm produced by the action of France, there were other contributing causes. The British Government had little expectation of any settlement even at Aix-la-Chapelle, still less when Spain rejected the offer of the Duke of Wellington. The Spanish Revolution practically destroyed all their hopes. The problem had now practically resolved itself into one of ways and means of according recognition, a delicate question for a Colonial Power like Britain. Castlereagh was, moreover, as has been seen, overwhelmed with the problems of the Old World, both foreign and domestic. In a sense also the British Government were protecting the Spanish revolution from interference, and this made it all the more difficult to take

¹ To Wellesley, Sept. 24, 1819. *F.O. Spain*, 222. To Stuart, July 15, 1820: *F.O. France*, 222; *B.F.S.P.* vi. 1085-1100. C. A. Villanueva, *Bolívar y el General San Martín*, 105, 144-5, 156-9.

² To Stewart, July 15, 1820: *F.O. Austria*, 148. Lieven to Nesselrode, July 21, 1820: *Pet. Arch., Appendix*. F. A. Zea to Bolívar, July 12, 1820. S. B. O'Leary, *Memorias del General O'Leary*, xvii. 294-7. Decazes to Pasquier, July 18, 1820: *Paris A.A.E.*, 614, f. 345. It may be noted that Decazes' No. 3 on the subject about this date appears to be missing from the Paris archives.

advantage of Spain's weakness. But little therefore was done but to watch events, and encourage such attempts as were made by the constitutional Government of Spain to tackle the problem. These were feeble enough. Though deputies from overseas came to the Cortes, there was still no disposition in Spain to recognise the facts of the case. The shrewd and sensible Bardaxi, who, when he left the French Embassy in April 1821 to become Foreign Minister, had announced his intention of working for a settlement, tried to induce the Cortes to be sensible. But the King was, of course, stubbornly hostile, and his Minister could obtain little support from the constitutionalists. The emissaries sent by Bolivar to effect a settlement were eventually ordered to quit the country, and the impasse continued. One important result had been to drive the royal party in Mexico, where the rebels in 1820 had been completely defeated, into opposition to the lawless and irreligious Mother-Country, and the independence of Mexico was effected by a bloodless revolution on the part of the royal officials and the erection of an empire under Iturbide.¹

Meanwhile public opinion in favour of recognition had been growing apace in the United States. Henry Clay never ceased to taunt Adams with his subservience to Britain. "If Lord Castlereagh says we may recognise, we do; if not, we do not," he said. "A single expression of the British Minister to the present Secretary of State, then our Minister abroad, I am ashamed to say, has moulded the policy of our Government towards South America."² This attack was, of course, unjust. Adams was mainly concerned about the Floridas treaty, which he thought in great jeopardy, when Clay unexpectedly carried a motion in the House in favour of recognition in May 1820. Adams had, indeed, some difficulty in holding back the other members of the Cabinet. The Presidential messages grew more favourable towards recognition. In February 1821 Adams at last secured the ratification of the Floridas Treaty after he had almost lost patience. There seemed now

¹ From Stuart, April 30, 1821 : *F.O. France*, 251. From Hervey, May 24, June 5, 25, Oct. 4, Nov. 19, Dec. 16, 1821 : *F.O. Spain*, 246, 248.

² Quoted by J. H. Latané, *The Diplomatic Relations of the United States and Spanish America*, 59.

to be nothing in the way of recognition, but even now Adams was very doubtful as to the course to pursue. He and Stratford-Canning had unfortunately not got on together too well, as was only natural between two such masterful men. Nevertheless, towards the end of April 1821 Adams startled the British Minister with a friendly approach, stating "that a new series of events was apparently commencing in Europe, and that circumstances affording ground for a closer connection might possibly arise in the course of their development." Matters were also very unsettled in South America, lamented the Secretary of State, who had "intended to intimate a readiness to *receive* any overture from Great Britain." ¹

Unfortunately this conversation, which might have proved so fruitful, was interrupted and apparently never resumed. Adams and the Cabinet gradually obtained sufficient information and sufficient courage. The Presidential message at the opening of Congress in the autumn of 1821 foreshadowed action, and at last in March 1822 the President, in response to a request of the House, definitely recommended recognition. By a Bill signed by the President on May 4, 1822, provision was made for the expenses of "such missions to the independent nations of the American Continent as the President of the United States may deem proper." Even then Adams hastened to assure Castlereagh, of whose reception of the news he still apparently felt some fear, that he would shew no undue haste. "Of the view which will be taken of this measure, as well by Spain as by the preponderating Powers of the European Alliance, we are yet to be informed," he wrote to Rush. "We trust it will not be considered, even by the British Cabinet, a rash or hasty measure at this time. Should the subject be mentioned to you by the Marquis of Londonderry, you will remark that it was not understood or intended as a change of policy on the part of the United States, nor adopted with any design of turning it to the account of our own interests. Possibly no one of the proposed diplomatic missions may be actually sent before the next session of Congress." ²

¹ From Stratford-Canning, April 27, 1821: *F.O. America*, 158.

² Adams to Rush, May 13, 1822: J. B. Moore, *Digest of International Law*, i. 88.

Still, action had been taken. On June 19, 1822, the representative of Columbia was formally received by the President of the United States. Castlereagh had now to meet a new situation. He had, indeed, for some time been preparing for it. There was nothing to hope for from Spain. It was time to make a move. He had now resumed his intimate relations with Metternich and was once more member of a strong and united Cabinet in a commanding position in the Commons. He could therefore take his own course, though he could not ignore the increasing strength of public opinion in Britain in favour of the Colonies. This was, however, more interested in the commercial than the political aspect of the problem. The South Americans were good customers; trade with them was rapidly increasing. So long as this advantage was preserved the great mass of public opinion would not worry too much about the niceties of diplomatic recognition. Even the Opposition could not indulge in too many heroics on the subject, since Spain herself was a constitutional State.

Castlereagh determined, therefore, to divide the commercial from the political problem. Commercial recognition must be given at once; political recognition could wait on circumstances, and if possible could be used as a means of encouraging monarchical rather than republican institutions in South America. The united weight of Britain and the Alliance or of Britain and France, or in the last resort even of Britain alone, could possibly bring about this latter object if time were allowed. In particular the approaching Conference would afford an opportunity of bringing the Alliance to bear upon the problem in the manner which British interests required. But commercial recognition could not wait. In the eyes of the Spaniards all South American vessels and all vessels which traded with South America were nothing else than pirates. British merchants would no longer tolerate such a condition of affairs with regard to what had become one of the most important parts of their foreign trade.

The situation was made easier by a change in the British attitude towards commercial intercourse with the British Colonies. Until the end of the Napoleonic Wars the monopoly of the Mother Country had been maintained quite as rigor-

ously as that of Spain. Nor would it have been given up but for the fact that other countries retaliated. But first the United States and then Portugal and the Netherlands imposed retaliatory restrictions, and thus forced an entry into the trade of the Empire. The whole system of the Navigation Acts, so long regarded as the bulwark of maritime power, and approved by Adam Smith as such, was breaking down under the stress of new conditions. The Government had been for some time engaged in preparing legislation to admit the vessels of other nations to this trade, and to allow them to use British ports much more freely than before. They were encouraged to adopt this attitude by the advice of Wallace, the Vice-President of the Board of Trade, since 1818, who, even more than Huskisson, is entitled to the credit of initiating the new Free Trade Policy. It is not clear who first devised the scheme of extending the provisions of the Act to the vessels of the South American Colonies, thus giving them a definite status. But the Cabinet accepted it without demur, and Castlereagh appears to have welcomed it. It would at least give him a breathing space. Meanwhile, he prepared methodically and with great circumspection to deal with the difficult political problem.¹

It is characteristic that it was France that Castlereagh first approached, and it did not take long for the alert and subtle Chateaubriand to seize the importance of the question. In their first interview on April 10, 1822, the Ambassador had commented unfavourably on the approaching recognition of the Colonies by the United States, for, as he said, "There are already enough republican ideas in the world; to increase the sum of these ideas is to compromise more and more the fate of monarchy in Europe." "We English also," replied Castlereagh, "are by no means disposed to recognise the revolutionary governments." Both Chateaubriand and Montmorenci questioned the sincerity of this declaration. They were convinced that sooner or later public opinion

¹ Planta to Stratford-Canning, May 11, 1822: *F. O. Stratford-Canning Papers*, vol. 8, *Appendix* p. 584; *Bathurst MSS* (*Hist. MSS. Commission Report*, 1923), 518, 525. Spencer Walpole (*History of England since 1815*, ii. 84) does full justice to Wallace, but never realises that the Spanish Colonies had anything to do with the question, nor, of course, gives Castlereagh any credit.

would force the British Government to recognise the independence of the Colonies, whether they desired it or not.

Castlereagh, however, made his position clearer in a second interview on May 5, 1822. Commercial recognition, the admission of the vessels of the Spanish Colonies to British ports and the dispatch of commercial agents to South America, would be equally advantageous both to Britain and to France. "As for the political issue," reported Chateaubriand, "Lord Londonderry imagines that those who to-day direct French affairs have no desire to see revolutionary governments multiply. The British Government has no more love for these governments and will only recognise them at the latest possible moment; still, a moment will come when it can no longer delay, and it is this moment which we must anticipate. Lord Londonderry claims that he has refused every offer, which Spain on the one hand and the Colonies on the other have made, of special advantages to British commerce in order to induce the Cabinet to take up the cause of one against the other. He now asks that France should agree to act in concert with England in everything pertaining to both the commercial and the political aspect of the Spanish Colonies; he proposes in short to open a loyal and frank negotiation between the two countries on the measures to be adopted in the present circumstances." Meanwhile Castlereagh promised to send no reply to Zea, the European agent of Columbia, who from Paris had formally demanded an interview.

Chateaubriand received this offer with all the suspicion of a neophyte in diplomacy. He had been greatly impressed with Castlereagh's presence. "The more I see of the Marquis of Londonderry," he confessed, "the more finesse I find in him. He is a man full of resource, who only says what he wants to say." Nevertheless, he recognised the advantages which France could obtain from this offer. He was flattered also by the consideration shewn to himself and his country by the mere fact of such an interview. He advised his Government to imitate the example of Britain in the matter of commercial recognition, and at least to begin a discussion of the political question. "If Europe is obliged to recognise the *de facto*

Governments in America," he urged in a memorable phrase, "all its policy ought to be directed to bringing monarchies into existence in the New World rather than these republics, which will send us their principles with the products of their soil."

Montmorenci had, however, no confidence in his Ambassador and still less in the British Government. The matter was seriously considered by the French Cabinet, but the offer was rejected. The difficult relations between France and Spain, it was explained, made it impossible for the French Government to act with the same freedom as the British. Castlereagh received this answer with his usual calm. He had, perhaps, expected no other. He assured Chateaubriand that Zea would only be received as a private individual and that he would wait for further information before he took any irrevocable step towards recognition.¹

Some notice, however, must be taken of Zea. He was already a personage of importance, in touch with the Opposition in both Britain and France. Sir Charles Stuart had refused to receive officially his request for an interview, but he had of course notified Castlereagh of its existence, and Zea's secretary had been in London for some time awaiting the signal to summon his chief. An interview now took place between him and Castlereagh. The Foreign Minister stressed the advantages of the commercial recognition which was already prepared, refusing, however, even to consider any idea of special privileges for Britain. Moreover, he discussed with him the possibilities of establishing monarchical institutions in South America, and urging him to approach the Spanish Government directly with propriety in that sense. Further he could not go till his Allies and Spain had been won over, or at least warned.

Castlereagh next approached Lieven, and in a long interview he explained to him the whole situation, telling him frankly of all the steps which he had taken and asking him to explain matters to the Tsar. The Austrian and the Prussian Ministers

¹ Chateaubriand to Montmorenci, April 12, May 7, 21, 1822; Montmorenci to Chateaubriand, May 6, 13, 1822: d'Antioche, *Chateaubriand*, 234, 262, 264, 270, 271.

he also warned, but less in detail, since their Courts were not so interested in the question. He promised them, however, that they would be kept informed of all measures before they were adopted.¹

He had also, of course, to deal with Spain itself. That distracted country was passing through a series of crises, brought about by the cowardly and treacherous King and the inexperienced and excitable Cortes. There was a strong party which desired to effect a real settlement with the Colonies, but it never succeeded in obtaining the decision. On the contrary, the official attitude of both Bardaxi and his successor, Martinez de la Rosa, had been to refuse every offer of the Colonies. When the recognition by the United States was announced, an official note of protest was sent to all the Powers, which, however, promised to attempt a reconciliation on more liberal lines than heretofore. Castlereagh refused to answer this officially, but told Onis to urge his Court to produce more explicit offers as soon as possible. Such energy and resource could hardly be expected from the Spanish Government. No reply came from Madrid; and Onis again pressed for an answer to his note, to which France had already replied with an assurance that no premature action would be taken. Accordingly Castlereagh had to make an official reply, which he couched in such terms as to shew that the moment for action had come and that Spain would delay at her peril. He welcomed the new offer of liberal concessions and promised that, "so far as possible, the British Government would take no steps to prejudice the negotiations." But the note continued, "His Britannic Majesty would not act with the candour and explicit frankness which he owes to his Ally, the King of Spain, were he not, under present circumstances to warn him of the rapid progress of events, and of the danger of delay. His Catholic Majesty must be aware that so large a portion of the world cannot, without fundamentally disturbing the intercourse of civilised society, long continue without some recognised and

¹ Lieven to Nesselrode, June 10, 1822: *Pet. Arch., Appendix* p. 577; Memorandum by Clanwilliam, April 26, 1822: *F.O. Supplementary, Colombia*, 114. Esterhazy to Metternich, July 5, 1822: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 216, viii.

established relations; that the State which can neither by its councils nor by its arms effectually assert its own rights over its dependencies so as to enforce obedience, and thus make itself responsible for maintaining their relations with other Powers, must sooner or later be prepared to see those relations established, from the overruling necessity of the case, under some other form."¹

There could be no mistaking this warning. It left Castlereagh entirely free to develop his plans at the approaching Conference in the manner which he had designed. Even had it not been made, sufficient evidence was forthcoming during the next month that public opinion in Britain was moving rapidly in that direction. When Zea at last came over to London he was fêted by the City in a great dinner on July 10. There was a debate in the House of Commons on July 23, in which full recognition was urged by the Opposition. Castlereagh would not agree; but he admitted that "the whole was purely a British question, uninfluenced by foreign Powers and resting only upon the law of nations, and the character of generosity and prudence, which he trusted this country would ever maintain." Spanish obstinacy could no longer prevent other Powers from acting in accordance with the obvious facts of the case.

Castlereagh obviously intended that the solution should be found at the approaching Conference. He had already prepared the way by his frank conversations with the Ambassadors. On August 4 he circulated to the other members of the Alliance the only written communication to which he had been committed, the Note to Onís, adding that "the approaching meeting at Vienna will afford me an opportunity of fully explaining to the Allied Cabinets the sentiments of His Majesty's Government upon this important question."²

The subject is therefore discussed at some length in the instructions for the Conference. These assumed that some

¹ Memoir of the Government of Spain addressed to Foreign Governments respecting a Pacification with the Spanish American Provinces, May 3, 1822. *B.F.S.P.* ix 889. Onís to Londonderry, May 27, June 11, 1822; Londonderry to Onís, June 28, 1822: *F.O. Spain*, 262.

² *Hansard*: Commons, July 23, 1822. To Bagot, Aug. 4, 1822: *F.O. Russia*, 134.

means must be found, even for the sake of Spain herself, "of restoring an intercourse where she cannot succeed in re-establishing a dominion. The whole may be regarded rather as a matter of time than of principle." Recognition, in fact, might be considered as inevitable; the question was one of ways and means. In discussing these Castlereagh dismissed as premature any decision with regard to territories within which the contest still continued—"very limited" in number—or the States in actual or intended negotiation with Old Spain. It was with regard to "the territories in which the struggle may be said to be over, and the possession become complete on the part of the local government" that the discussion must turn.

There could, of course, be no question as to commercial recognition already accorded by the change in the Navigation Acts. But the political question was more difficult, and Castlereagh, as was his custom, drew up his instructions so as to allow himself the fullest possible latitude as to the course which he would pursue when he met the other members of the Alliance. "The question then resolves itself," they continued, "into one rather as to the mode of our relations than as to whether they shall or shall not subsist, to the extent, in matter of right, as regulated by the law of nations.

"In judging this point it is material to distinguish the following descriptions of recognition :

1. The recognition, *de facto*, which now substantially exists.
2. The more formal recognition by diplomatic agents.
3. The recognition *de jure*, which professes to decide upon the title and thereby to create a certain impediment to the assertion of the rights of the former occupant.

Now, as to the last description of recognition, there can be no fair pretence for calling on this country to commit herself by its adoption. It is for the two contending parties themselves to settle the question of title, not for third parties to interfere. They have a motive of convenience in doing so, however difficult may be the adjustment.

"The practical question then is—How long should the *de facto* system of recognition be maintained to the exclusion of the diplomatic, and when should the latter be adopted ?

indeed, have been no New World called into existence to redress the balance of the Old, but there would have been no Monroe Doctrine stated in the manner which Adams was at last enabled, by Canning's offer, to employ. It would have been more clear to posterity that the independence of the Spanish Colonies had been won and maintained by the enterprise and heroism of the South Americans themselves. It may be even that Bolivar would have been induced to follow the course that appealed so strongly to himself and perhaps the majority of South Americans at that time, and erect not republics but monarchies in the New World.

Castlereagh's death proved fatal to all such plans. When Britain was seen to be in open rupture with the other Great Powers the way was open to other combinations. The magnificent gesture which Adams made on behalf of a cause already determined and the wonderful reply which the oratorical genius of Canning was alone capable of producing were both false and both wonderfully successful. They have come ringing down the years, awakening new hopes and ideas in succeeding generations, which never cared to know till our own day the history of the events which made them possible.

2. BRITAIN AND THE UNITED STATES

CASTLEREAGH's plans for South America had not come to full fruition before his death, which changed the whole diplomatic situation. It is natural, therefore, that they were not perceived by contemporaries or realised by historians.⁴ It is more extraordinary that the important work which he accomplished with regard to the relations of Britain and the United States has not been more adequately recognised by posterity.¹ For it was apparent to some, at any rate, of his contemporaries that he did more than any one else to make possible more friendly relations between two peoples estranged by two dangerous and destructive wars, which had apparently left behind such legacies of hatred and misunderstanding as to prevent them from ever realising their common interests and ideals. Certainly no other British statesman did more to lay the foundation of the hundred years peace which few in either country at that time expected and certainly many did not desire.

It is possible that had Castlereagh come to the Foreign Office a little earlier, the futile and humiliating war of 1812-1814 between the two countries would never have been fought. Not that he differed from other statesmen or the mass of his countrymen at that time in insisting on the exercise of those maritime rights which produced the catastrophe, but because he attached greater importance to friendly relations with the United States. At any rate, throughout the struggle he was always ready to listen to any proposal for a settlement, and, though the more pressing and important problems of the

¹ The important part which Castlereagh played in this connection has been well brought out by Dr G. M. Trevelyan in his *British History in the Nineteenth Century*, 177-178. How late such recognition has come, however, may be seen by the fact that his name is not mentioned in the seventh volume of the *Cambridge Modern History*.

Congress of Vienna prevented him from negotiating the Peace of Ghent, his influence throughout these negotiations was always on the side of conciliation and compromise, and he saw at once the folly of the plan, which some of his colleagues would have supported, of continuing the war in order to impose a humiliating and disastrous peace on the United States.

The Treaty of 1814 had only been obtained by ignoring the causes of the war. Though the European peace had removed most of them by taking away the necessity for those practices which had aroused the resentment of the United States, yet their validity was still a subject of dispute, and many other problems remained for settlement of a peculiarly difficult and dangerous kind. The commercial relations between the British Empire and the United States, the boundaries between the two Powers in North America, the rivalry of their fishermen on the Banks of Newfoundland, their interests in the Spanish Empire, including the Floridas and Cuba, the financial claims left unadjusted by the Treaty, claims which the United States has always urged with a peculiar tenacity, in all these problems a false step or an impulsive appeal to national feeling might have produced a situation of grave peril. Only a strong desire for amicable relations on the part of Castlereagh, which was responded to gradually and almost despite themselves even by men who hated Britain most intensely, could have prevented so many and such varied causes of friction from resulting in the permanent estrangement of the two countries concerned. Castlereagh did not, indeed, solve all these problems or even the majority of them, but he approached them in a new spirit and with a new language, which survived even the obvious hostility of some of his successors, until it became the natural mode of intercourse between the two peoples.

He had no illusions as to the difficulty of his task. But he hoped by avoiding controversy and never losing an opportunity of conciliation to allow the influence of Time to accomplish what the statesmen were powerless to achieve at once. For this reason he endeavoured to transact business with the United States as much as possible by conversation,

and as little as need be by written communications. He soon had some experience of what Adams could do when he took a pen in his hand. He succeeded in persuading Rush to talk matters over with him, rather than to allow himself to be entangled in formal communications. The advice which he gave to Stratford-Canning on his appointment to Washington shews an appreciation of the situation arrived at after long experience. He advised the Minister "to transact your business with the American Government as far as possible by personal intercourse with the Secretary of State rather than by written notes, thereby avoiding, as far as the nature of the business will admit, diplomatic controversy. The tendency of the American Government is rather to contentious discussion; their official notes are generally seasoned to the temper of the people, being more frequently communicated to their legislative bodies than the Papers of other States usually are. The ancient relations of the British and American nations and the jealousies as yet imperfectly allayed, incline the Government of the United States to maintain their pretensions with us, perhaps in deference to those prejudices, in a tone of greater harshness than toward any other Government whatever. The American people are more easily excited against us and more disposed to strengthen the hands of their Ministers against this than against any other State." ¹

In such a policy there was, of course, no place for the Alliance. In the question of the Spanish Colonies it had remained in the background; with the direct relations on the United States and Britain it had no connection. Nevertheless, Britain's obligations in Europe had an influence on the attitude of the United States. Their leaders persisted in regarding as one a Europe composed of many different nationalities and endowed with widely differing institutions. It was a common-place in American oratory, when the difference between the ideals of Europe and America were emphasised, to include the British amongst those peoples languishing under a cruel despotism. The confusion between the Holy Alliance and the European Alliance, which the attacks by the British Opposition increased as time went on, was perhaps

¹ To Stratford-Canning, Aug. 7, 1820: *F.O. America*, 150.

more apparent in the United States than elsewhere. Nevertheless, that the consciousness of a common inheritance was always deeply felt in spite of these outward manifestations was clearly revealed in the course of these negotiations. In spite of the unfortunate events that had divided the two nations, there was a greater response to Castlereagh's policy of conciliation in the United States than in any other country of the world.

The struggle between the force of this underlying sentiment and the legacy of hatred and mistrust is apparent in the mind of the man who had the greatest influence on the foreign relations of the United States during this period, John Quincy Adams. He was the greatest of a great family of public servants, all of whom united in rare combination intellectual and moral qualities of a high order. His father had been perhaps the first American to envisage and plan the independence of the Colonies, and that accomplished, he had become the first Minister of the new Republic to Britain. His first interview with George III. did equal credit to both. It was natural, however, that his son should inherit a deep suspicion and dislike of British policy. It was only the milder Gallatin that had made the negotiations at Ghent, in which Adams had shared, at last successful. Nor when Adams assumed in 1815 the same position at the Court of London as his father before him did he lose one whit of his hostility. His diary and correspondence reveal how he attributed every advance which was made towards him to the calculating hypocrisy of his hosts. Even Wilberforce and the "Saints," whose opinions might have appealed to his own intensely religious nature, were to him merely men "who under sanctified visors pursue worldly objects with the ardour and perseverance of Saints."¹

¹ J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, iii. 557. How far Monroe himself shared these feelings in 1815, is seen by a dispatch of July 21 of that year which concludes—"It can scarcely be presumed, that the British Government, after the result of the late experiment, in the present state of Europe, and under its over engagements, can seriously contemplate a renewal of hostilities." But it often happens with nations as well as with individuals, that a just estimate of its interest and duties is not an infallible criterion of its conduct. We ought to be prepared at every point to guard against such an event. You will be attentive to circumstances, and give us timely notice of any danger which may be menaced." *B.F.S.P.* vii. 73. But Monroe's suspicions seem to have died down more quickly than those of Adams.

Nevertheless, Adams was a man of such great capacity, honest character and lofty moral principles that in the long run he served well the interests of the two countries. Fortunately he had not to remain long in London, where he was constantly affronted by the presence of that part of the British nation which he distrusted most. When he became Secretary of State to Monroe in 1817, though he maintained all his principles and prejudices, yet his care for the interests of his countrymen, his aversion from cant and humbug, his power of writing convincing and cogent State Papers, made him almost against his will an instrument in the creation of better relations with Britain. If he hated intensely the British aristocracy, he had a better appreciation of the power and influence of Britain than any other politician of his day, one, indeed, that transcended the facts. This point of view, while it made him anxious to avoid all close intercourse, yet caused him to wish for accommodation and settlement. And as he came to be entangled in difficult and even dangerous disputes with other countries, there began to appear almost a gruff recognition of something like a common interest between the two English-speaking nations. At any rate, the blandishments of other Powers, particularly of France and Russia, which were lavished freely on a nation, which, it was already clearly seen, was destined to rival Britain in maritime and world power, never produced any effect on his eminently Anglo-Saxon character. He remained, however, always and above all, an intensely patriotic American.

His successor as Minister at London, Richard Rush, had, from the first, a very different outlook. He was far more tolerant towards the vices and far more ready to perceive the virtues of his hosts. His dispatches to Adams are perhaps scarcely as cordial as his Memoirs would lead us to believe ; but he had to reckon with the prejudices of the Secretary of State. No Minister, at any rate, was ever more anxious to establish good relations between two countries, and he soon learnt to appreciate the character of Castlereagh, to which his Memoirs do ample justice. As Acting Secretary of State before the return of Adams he initialled the most important transaction between the two countries in these years, and, in

moments of diplomatic conflict, his friendly and equable manners did much to relieve the strain. Nor did he ever fail to relish the charm of living in the greatest city in the world or the delights of the English countryside.

Charles Bagot, who went to represent Britain at a capital which three years before had been burnt by British troops, was just as successful, though he disliked intensely the task which he accomplished so well. To him the Society of the half-built Washington was utterly alien, and, indeed, drew from him those gibes and sneers in which George Canning and his friends delighted. But, unlike Canning, Bagot realised the danger of exercising a sense of humour at the expense of other people's feelings, and was careful to keep his criticisms to himself. The first document that he found in his office was a Memorandum, left there informally by Monroe, on diplomatic etiquette, amusing enough to a British aristocrat, but which Bagot wisely regarded as indicating how careful he must be in a Society so different from that to which he had been accustomed. Both he and his charming wife, a niece of the Duke of Wellington, tackled all their difficult problems with the greatest tact and goodwill, and if their residence at Washington was to them no more than a weary exile, rendered necessary in order to obtain the promised reward of a first-class mission in Europe, they had at least the satisfaction of knowing that they had been eminently successful. It was, indeed, a marvel to Americans, who could remember envoys like the elder Jackson, that a British Minister could be courteous and eventually even highly popular. "I shouldn't like to see Bagot come home too soon," wrote the Duke to his niece at the end of 1817, "as we were certainly never on such good terms (I believe never before on any terms at all) with the Government of the United States as we have been since he was appointed the Minister; and as he gives so much satisfaction to everybody at home and abroad, of which I hear from all quarters, I hope he will be able to stay." Stay he did till the middle of 1819, though not without many secret grumbles at the hardship of his lot. He even learnt to appreciate the warmth and good nature of Washington Society, once his prejudices had been overcome, and in 1819 reported with

pride to Planta that a ball had actually been given in his honour, an incident which demonstrated the new relations between the two countries.¹

Stratford-Canning, who succeeded him, was hardly so successful. He chafed at his remoteness from Europe and had no charming wife to help him in Washington society. "Washington is not the Island of Calypso," he wrote to his mother, "nor is it the most delightful thing in the world to live far away from one's country, and all that the name comprehends, amongst those to whom the hatred of that country is at once a passion and a principle."² His energy and sense of power made him weary Adams by too many and too insistent demands. Their mutual dislike led to one outburst which fortunately resulted in no more than a display of temper. Stratford-Canning had a passage of arms also with the French Minister, Hyde de Neuville, who was even more popular at Washington than Bagot, though this quarrel was, perhaps, scarcely his own fault. In intellectual ability and command of diplomatic technique he was, of course, a far greater man than his predecessor.

The first business was to endeavour to settle some of the problems which the diplomatists at Ghent had abandoned in despair. The Americans had been much disappointed that no commercial treaty had been concluded at Ghent. Their growing maritime and commercial population looked on participation in the trade of the Empire as vital to their interests. American ships were not allowed to carry the products of Canada or the West Indies to Europe, any more than British ships were permitted to share in the trade between one American State and another. By the Convention of 1815, which was only to last for four years, all concessions were refused by Britain, and commercial intercourse between the two countries was resumed in the same manner as before the war. Adams continued to press the question, but the offers which were made were so insignificant as not to be worth accepting. In 1818 Gallatin was ordered by his Government

¹ From Bagot, April 6, 1816: *F.O. America*, 114. Captain Bagot, *George Canning and his friends*, 35, 63. Bagot to Planta, March 5, 1819: *F.O. America*, 130.

² Lane-Poole, *Stratford-Canning*, i. 325.

to come over to London to assist Rush in negotiating a new Convention of a comprehensive character. Castlereagh was preparing to set out for Aix-la-Chapelle, but he did his best to create an atmosphere of goodwill before he left. Gallatin and Rush and the British plenipotentiaries, Robinson and Goulburn, were invited to spend a night at Cray, and Castlereagh opened the proceedings with an informal speech of the most conciliatory nature. His last act, before getting into the carriage which was to take him to Dover, was to send for Rush and communicate to him a concession on impressment, which he had persuaded the Cabinet to make.¹

But though progress was made on subsidiary points, Britain was not yet prepared to give up her Colonial monopoly, and little more could be done than to renew for ten years the Convention of 1815. The Americans, therefore, refused to allow any trade between the West Indies and the United States. Not until, as has been seen, the growing sense of the utility of international trade, which Wallace and Huskisson had recognised, at last induced the British Government to amend the Navigation Acts, could further concessions be obtained. It was only natural that the people of the United States should consider that these advantages were due more to their own retaliatory measures than to any goodwill on the part of the British people. "That nothing is to be obtained from the goodwill of foreign nations and everything from their fears and interests," wrote Stratford-Canning, "is a capital article in the creed of this country. One and all, Government and people, continually bear it in mind. This opinion of theirs, which is true enough in the main, would seem to point out the policy which we must pursue with regard to them. To take up ostensible grounds and to give way after they have resorted to retaliatory measures, can have no effect but that of encouraging their boldness without conciliating their affections."²

¹ W. C. Ford, *The Writings of J. Q. Adams*, vi. 80, 103. Rush, *Residence at the Court of London* (1st series), 306, 318. Count Gallatin, *A Great Peace Maker: Diary of James Gallatin*, 126.

² *B.F.S.P.* iii. 83, vii. 69. Stratford-Canning to Robert Wilmot (Under-Secretary of State for War and Colonies), Nov. 7, 1822: *F.O. Stratford-Canning Papers*, vol. 8.

The commercial negotiations had been complicated by other matters of dispute even more irritating, if of less practical importance. Chief of these was the question of impressment of British subjects from American ships, the principal cause of the war of 1812. The Treaty of Ghent had only been concluded because this thorny question had been omitted from it, but the Government of the United States could scarcely allow it to drop completely, since they had fought a war in protest against it. Repeated efforts were made to get the British Government to abandon the Right of Visit and Search, but without avail. It was impossible to surrender a doctrine on which the security of the British sea-power had been held to depend. Castlereagh was himself prepared to make many concessions, and persuaded the Cabinet to go farther than they wished. But a principle was at stake which could not be arranged by compromise. No agreement, therefore, could be obtained either on impressment or on the "Rule of 1756," which the United States also desired to be repudiated. Nevertheless, Rush was of the opinion that if Castlereagh had himself been in charge of the negotiations instead of at Aix-la-Chapelle the result would have been different. As it was, the controversy remained, though fortunately never again to be revived in practical shape. Castlereagh was right when he said to Gallatin, "Time will do much more than we can."¹

On other questions left unsolved by the Treaty of Ghent more progress was made. A clause in the Treaty appeared to make the British Government responsible for all the slaves who had escaped to freedom by taking refuge with the British armies, though they had certainly never intended to grant so importunate a demand. It was settled by reference to the arbitration of the Tsar, whose decision, based on an interpretation of the text of the Treaty and not of the principle involved, was given in favour of the United States. The irritating dispute as to the right to use Newfoundland as a base for fishing on the Grand Bank was solved, though only temporarily, by agreement on certain practical measures, which it was hoped would allay the jealousy and ill-feeling of the fishermen of both countries. The British Government alto-

¹ Count Gallatin, *A Great Peace Maker : Diary of James Gallatin*, 133.

gether refused to admit that the people of the United States had still the advantages of the Treaty of 1783, which it was claimed the war of 1812 had abrogated. Even as it was, the British Press broke into fierce denunciation of the Government. But Castlereagh was unmoved by it, and told Rush that "he thought it of less moment which of the parties gained a little more or lost a little more by the compact than that so difficult a point should be adjusted and the harmony of the two countries, so far, be made secure." A breathing space had, at any rate, been obtained to allow Castlereagh's principle to act, though the controversy was not finally closed till our own day.¹

In all these disputes Castlereagh had only very partial authority, since it was commercial and maritime rather than essentially political interests that were affected. In the questions more clearly to be judged by political standards he had, however, more control and therefore more success. Most important of all, perhaps, were the negotiations concerning the armaments on the Great Lakes. The war of 1812 had clearly shewn that the strategic situation on the Canadian frontier depended almost entirely on the command of the Lakes. Wellington had insisted on it as the key to the situation, when invited to take command in 1814. It was only natural therefore that, immediately peace was obtained, both countries should shew the keenest anxiety to secure their position by establishing naval superiority. Castlereagh had from the first, however, desired an arrangement to prevent so dangerous and ruinous a competition. He had in 1814 been overruled by the military advisers, and the British Government adopted the view that as they were the 'weaker party' in North America they ought to be allowed control of the Lakes as a measure of defence. Naturally the Government of the United States could not agree to a suggestion which would have left them open to attack, while Canada was almost completely protected. Nevertheless, Madison and Monroe were no less anxious than Castlereagh to avoid the construction of rival fleets. Adams was instructed in 1816

¹ *B.F.S.P.* vii 71-236. Rush, *Residence at the Court of London* (2nd series), 58-59.

to make proposals to Castlereagh on the subject. The moment was not propitious, and, though Castlereagh was sympathetic, Adams, with his usual pessimism and distrust, saw no hope of concluding an agreement. But the matter had only been postponed by Castlereagh to get his naval estimates approved. In April 1816 he reopened negotiations, and at once agreed that no new construction should be begun until the matter had been discussed further. The shipbuilding race was thus at once stopped; and, when Adams confessed that he lacked definite instructions from his Government, Castlereagh was glad to transfer the negotiations to Washington, where the conciliatory Bagot might hope to obtain more success. That Minister was less enthusiastic than his chief; but Monroe received the offer most favourably and made the definite suggestion that naval armaments should be limited to the few vessels necessary for customs and police. Castlereagh obtained the agreement of the Cabinet, and the result was that Bagot and Rush, now Acting Secretary of State in the new Monroe Cabinet, settled the question by means of an exchange of notes. Never was so important a decision settled in a more informal manner. No legislation was necessary, since the necessary action was within the competence of the executives concerned. But little opportunity was given, therefore, to those in either country who wished to maintain a jealous and hostile attitude. Both Monroe and Castlereagh were in advance of public opinion, but both had the courage of their convictions and the power and authority to translate them into action. Never have two men served the cause of international peace with greater discernment and greater success.¹

This was a positive achievement and the greatest contribution to the establishment of good relations between the two peoples during this period. But the work done in preventing disagreeable incidents or disputed questions from developing into something worse was also of the greatest value. In the delicate question of the Floridas, indeed, the indefensible

¹ The details of the negotiation are given in the impartial and comprehensive study of Dr. J. M. Callahan, *The Neutrality of the American Lakes and Anglo-American Relations*. See also W. C. Ford, *The Writings of J. Q. Adams*, v. 497.

conduct of Andrew Jackson in 1819 produced a situation which, in the hands of a diplomatist less zealous in the cause of peace than Castlereagh, would undoubtedly have resulted in war.

The British Government made no secret of the fact that it would have preferred East Florida to remain in the hands of a weak Power like Spain, rather than be transferred to a vigorous rival like the United States. The safety of the British West Indies was considered by some to be in danger; and from 1816 onwards it was constantly necessary for Castlereagh to deny the rumours, sedulously spread and partially believed, that the British Government intended to annex Cuba as an offset to this extension of American power. There was no truth in these rumours. Castlereagh was, indeed, anxious at the situation which had arisen between the United States and Spain. He acceded, therefore, to the Spanish request to intervene in the dispute. He had sounded Adams warily on the subject before the latter left for America, and naturally had been met with little encouragement. But while Spain desired Britain to assume a menacing attitude, Castlereagh instructed Bagot to act in the most friendly manner and to take every precaution not to offend the United States. Even so, however, Castlereagh hoped that he might be able to do something "without abandoning the negotiation to its fate, which, under the fluctuation of events on the other side of the Atlantic, might take a sudden and highly unfavourable turn, if the American Government considered all other States utterly indifferent to the course it might pursue towards Spain." Bagot was therefore to offer British assistance in overcoming the notorious obstinacy of the Spanish Government—and incidentally to obtain as good a frontier as possible for Spain in return for the Floridas, which Castlereagh admitted must go to the United States. "Were Great Britain to look to its own interest alone," he confessed to Bagot, "and were that interest worth asserting at the present moment, at the hazard of being embroiled with the United States, there can be no question that we have an obvious motive for desiring that the Spaniards should continue to be our neighbours in East Florida rather than that our West Indian Possessions

should be so closely approached by the territory of the United States, but this is a consideration which we are not prepared to bring forward in the discussion at the present moment in bar to a settlement between Spain and North America." On the contrary, he desired to effect an accommodation, "the avowed and true policy of Great Britain being in the existing state of the world to appease controversy and to secure if possible for all States a long interval of repose."¹

When, therefore, the serious incident produced by the unjustifiable proceedings of Andrew Jackson occurred, it was possible to treat it in a way which relegated it to oblivion. That General had won his reputation by the successful defence of New Orleans against Britain at the close of the last war. In 1818 he invaded Spanish Florida on the pretext that it was being used as a base for attacks by the Seminole Indians on American settlers, and put to death after trial by court-martial two British subjects, Arbuthnot and Ambrister, who were accused of inciting the Indians to attack. This high-handed action was condemned by a majority of Monroe's Cabinet and of Congress. Only the more fervent and nationalist Americans defended so great a violation of international law and ethics. But popular opinion ran strongly in Jackson's favour, and some politicians saw in the fact an opportunity of future triumphs. Adams himself regretted the deed, and had no shadow of responsibility for it. Nevertheless, he thought that the honour of his country depended on sustaining its General, and all his unrivalled power of dialectic and strength of will were used to justify an unjustifiable act of force. The dispatch in which he argued the case for the defence is the most able State Paper which he ever composed. The complicated series of events were so described and explained as to convince even the most hostile critics of Jackson's innocence. The Cabinet were won over to his view, and though the Senate condemned

¹ To Bagot, Nov. 10, 1817: *F.O. America*, 120. W. C. Ford, *Writings of J. Q. Adams*, vi. 294, 307. The most comprehensive and accurate account of the negotiation is by H. B. Fuller, *The Purchase of Florida*, which, however, does not take into account the report of Don Luis de Onís, the Spanish Minister at Washington, *Memoria sobre las Negociaciones entre España y los Estados-Unidos de América*. There is an English translation of part of this latter work. A good short account for British readers is in Channing, *History of the United States*, vi. 334-342.

Jackson he remained unpunished and supported by the administration.¹

Such an event naturally produced violent criticism in the British Press, and it was for some time doubtful whether the Government would not be forced to demand redress, even at the risk of war. Fortunately Adams' piece of special pleading provided an opportunity of acquiescing in a situation which was obviously produced against the wish of the responsible Government in America. The British Cabinet refused to make a diplomatic incident of the outrage, and friendly relations continued. Castlereagh reviewed the situation with Rush after all danger was over. "He remarked," noted the Minister, "that it had been a case of no common difficulty; the Cabinet had found it so, and he hoped that the proper inferences would be drawn by the Government of the United States respecting the conciliatory dispositions of England on that occasion.

"I replied that I believed my Government would not fail to draw the proper inferences, and certainly I had not failed in making communications to it calculated to lead to them; for that here on the spot I had seen and fully appreciated the difficulties which encompassed His Majesty's Ministers; whose wisdom and firmness throughout that whole transaction, if I might presume to say so, I considered a blessing to both countries. He then added these words: That had the English Cabinet felt and acted otherwise than it did, such was the temper of Parliament and such the feeling of the country, he believed WAR MIGHT HAVE BEEN PRODUCED BY HOLDING UP A FINGER; and he even thought an address to the Crown might have been carried for one, BY NEARLY AN UNANIMOUS VOTE."² Even those who agree with the American historian, who has most closely studied these transactions, that "the enquiry was not pressed by England as all patriotic citizens must hope the United States would push a similar one," must admit that the advantages gained were such as to justify the restraint and foresight of men who had never flinched before

¹ Adams to Erving, Nov. 28, 1818: *B.F.S.P.* vi. 331, where a very full collection of documents on the subject is given.

² Rush, *Residence at the Court of London* (2nd series), 151-153.

the threats of Napoleon at the pinnacle of his power. When the Spanish Government, therefore, refused to ratify the Floridas treaty, Britain was able to continue its good offices. Wellesley was ordered to advise ratification in the strongest possible manner. Even Adams was convinced that the British Government had acted in a friendly and wise fashion, however self-seeking were its motives.

A similar wise restraint was shewn by Castlereagh in dealing with the complicated frontier difficulties between Canada and the United States. The boundaries between the two countries were either non-existent or disputed along the whole length of frontier. They had, indeed, formed the principal subject of the Treaty of Ghent, which had set up five boundary Commissions, which throughout these years were gradually feeling their way towards some sort of solution. But nothing had been decided concerning the vast hinterland, which was still uninhabited and for the most part unexplored by white men. The issue was no less than the domination of a continent, and both in Britain and the United States there were men already keenly alive to it. It was obvious that to decide a problem so vast and unknown would tax the resources of all those in the two States who desired more friendly relations. A clause was inserted, therefore, in the commercial Convention of 1818, which agreed that a line of latitude (49°) should be accepted as the frontier between the two countries "from the Lake of the Woods to the Stony Mountains." The rest of the continent to the Pacific Coast was to be open for ten years to the "vessels, citizens and subjects of the 2 Powers," each of which reserved all its rights intact for future discussion.¹

This wise decision was not maintained without some difficulty. The Floridas Treaty had completed the transfer to the United States of the whole of the claims which Spain had asserted and Pitt refused to accept in 1790.¹ Even before its ratification expression had been freely given in both Congress and in the American Press that the United States had now undisputed right to the whole of the Pacific Coast. A Bill to settle the Columbia River was introduced into the House on January 25, 1821.¹ Stratford-Canning thought that he ought

¹ *B.F.S.P.* vi. 4.

to take notice of these claims; and, in order to make his enquiry as informal as possible, raised the subject in a casual call on Adams, of which he had given no notice. Adams may have suspected a trick to obtain some avowal from him when off his guard, or it may have been just one of the outbursts of anger which sometimes overcame him. At any rate, he flared up and treated Stratford-Canning to a display of temper which that proud man found it hard to stomach. The substance of it was repeated in a second interview when Adams, as Stratford-Canning explained to Planta, "seemed determined to *shew claws* on the subject of Columbia; there was an evident determination to browbeat me, partly perhaps to enforce that diplomatic discipline for which the present Government was not long since complimented by the newspapers, and partly to impress upon me, and through me upon Lord Castlereagh, a due sense of the resolution taken by this country to maintain its claims at every hazard."

Stratford-Canning behaved with commendable restraint, though his dignity was not unnaturally offended and his suspicions fully aroused. He would have been glad to press the matter further, but his chief sent him a peremptory order to stop the discussion. He was to confine himself to sending home full information to his Government and not to give the impression that it was desired to open so thorny a question at that moment. This was fortunate, for nothing serious was intended by the Government of the United States. The Bill was not passed, though Stratford-Canning insinuated that it might have been inspired by the Government. The only result of the incident was to make the oration of the Secretary of State on Independence Day even more vitriolic than might have been expected.¹

When, therefore, Adams was confronted with the insolent Russian ukase of September 16, 1821, prohibiting foreign vessels from approaching within 100 Italian miles of the Pacific coast of America down to latitude 51°, he was able at once to consult with Stratford-Canning as to the attitude which

¹ From Stratford-Canning, Jan. 28, Jan. 30, March 7, June 5, Dec. 30, 1821; Stratford-Canning to Planta, Feb. 6, 1821: *F.O. America*, 157, 158, 159. To Stratford-Canning, April 10, 1821: *F.O. America*, 156.

Britain was likely to adopt. Both Powers made, though separately, an emphatic protest against the Russian pretensions, leaving their own rivalries to be settled at a future date. Russia was, of course, helpless against their united action, and eventually agreed (1824) to withdraw her indefensible claims. How different the situation would have been if either Power had yielded to the temptations of insisting in 1818 on some selfish solution, which would have immediately awakened into active life the slumbering elements of hostility which existed in both countries.¹

These successes are not those which win the applause of contemporaries, but they are amongst the greatest achievements of the statesman. Castlereagh was assisted to obtain them by many of the most able and foresighted of his own countrymen and by American statesmen of similar temperament to his own. It cannot be denied, however, that the greatest share of the credit should fall to him. He saw from the first the fundamental fact that more friendly relations between the two nations was of far more importance to Britain than any brilliant diplomatic triumph. That he was anxious to secure the permanence of British influence in the New World his attitude towards the Spanish Colonies clearly shews, but even in this delicate question he so handled affairs as never to offend the susceptibilities of the United States. It was, perhaps, his greatest achievement that all that he did was done so unobtrusively and with such little desire to enhance his own reputation that it obtained the obscurity necessary for success.

¹ From Stratford-Canning, Feb. 19, 1822 : *F.O. America*, 166. *B.F.S.P.* ix. 471-494. *Correspondence of the Russian Ministers in Washington*, 1818-1825, *American Historical Review*, Jan. 1913.

3. THE ABOLITION OF THE SLAVE TRADE ¹

THROUGHOUT the whole of Castlereagh's tenure of the Foreign Office the movement for the Abolition of the Slave Trade was a continuous charge upon his time and energy. Public opinion, continually instructed and directed by great societies under the leadership of enthusiastic and devoted reformers, never ceased to exercise a formidable pressure upon the Government. The subject was one in which almost the whole nation had become interested. It could not be ignored. To the leaders of the movement no sacrifice appeared too great to secure the complete cessation of the abominable traffic. They insisted that it should be put in the forefront of every diplomatic transaction. The relations between Britain and every other Power were thus affected, particularly with other maritime Powers, with whom, naturally, there was always the most friction. It was not long before all nations discovered that the Abolition was an effective weapon with which to bargain, and it was only natural that the progress made during this period was only obtained by unusual effort and sacrifice on the part of Britain and by unremitting efforts on the part of her Foreign Minister.

Castlereagh's record on this question as a young man had not been a good one. Like Liverpool, he had opposed Abolition as unpractical and sentimental. There was something ironical, therefore, in the fact that more was done under his tenure of the Foreign Office to obtain complete Abolition than in any other period. But Castlereagh, like many other practical statesmen, not only carried on the crusade as a

¹ A detailed account of the diplomacy of the Abolition of the Slave Trade is much needed. Professor Coupland's brilliant *Walberforce* naturally passes over these transactions somewhat lightly. I am indebted to Mr. E. Smallpage of Liverpool, who is engaged on researches upon the subject, for many valuable hints.

matter of policy, but also came himself to be something of an enthusiast in the cause for which he had to fight. The most practical of the Abolitionists gradually recognised that he was doing all that could be done, and gave him their confidence and support.

To Castlereagh, however, the methods and outlook of the most fervent Abolitionists were always repugnant. His practical character and his experience of the motives which moved foreign statesmen and foreign peoples made him distrust the sweeping and often unwise proposals which the advocates of the movement wished to make part of British policy. He had to take into account the interests of the Powers concerned, and he was aware how little their statesmen could be reached by the religious appeal which exercised so deep an influence in Britain. He had also to consider the effects of these efforts on other British interests, which the Abolitionists were often ready to ignore completely. He could not hope, indeed, to satisfy the demands of those most interested, however persistent and skilful his policy. Thus he was always on the defence, laying an unsatisfactory report before an uncritical and emotional public, which was always ready to blame but apt to forget when praise was due, and always unable to realise the burden which had been thrown upon an overworked and ill-supported Minister. It was, however, something that Wilberforce himself was more practical than many of his followers and often accepted Castlereagh's advice as to the best method in which to conduct the campaign.

During the settlement of 1814-15 Castlereagh had worked unceasingly to secure the final Abolition of the Slave Trade by all the European Powers. He was indeed forced by the pressure of public opinion to make offers of which he by no means approved and which he believed retarded, rather than helped forward, the movement. Nevertheless, a great deal was done. The Slave Trade was condemned by a special declaration attached to the Vienna Act and signed by all the European Powers. Holland abolished the trade completely in return for the retrocession of its East Indian possessions, and Sweden did the same for similar reasons. Louis XVIII. was compelled, in 1815, to ratify the law passed by Napoleon during

the Hundred Days in a vain attempt to influence public opinion in Britain. Only Spain and Portugal still allowed the trade to be pursued under their flags. In these operations Castlereagh had received consistent support from Austria and Prussia, and, above all, from the Tsar, who professed great sympathy and was in direct correspondence on the subject with Clarkson and Wilberforce, with whom he had interviews in 1814, when he did his best to discredit Castlereagh in their eyes.¹

Castlereagh's problem, therefore, so far as Abolition by municipal law was concerned, was limited to Spain and Portugal; and since both of these countries desired many benefits from Britain, he might hope to accomplish his object at a price within a reasonable time. But it was one thing to get laws passed against the Slave Trade, it was another to get them enforced. As Castlereagh had repeatedly pointed out, unless some means were obtained for international action the British Government could do nothing to stop the illegal traffic. Now that war had ceased the belligerent Right of Search had lapsed also, and no ship flying a foreign flag could be even inspected much less captured or detained. To secure some international agreement allowing search and capture was therefore of paramount importance if the Slave Trade were to be rooted out. Such an agreement must, to be effective, include all the principal maritime Powers, including the United States. Otherwise slavers would simply sail their ships under the national flag which secured them immunity from the British fleet. This practice had already been steadily followed by British, American and French slavers, with the result that the trade in slaves still reached terrible proportions. It was estimated by the African Society in 1816 that nearly 60,000 slaves were still carried every year across the Atlantic. And since the traffic was insecure and the demand reduced, the lot of the unfortunate slaves was even worse than before the Act of 1807 had been passed. Everything was sacrificed to speed. The sufferings of the slaves were ignored even more than before, when their value

¹ See *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, i. 496; *British Diplomacy*, 215.

was greater, with the result that a third of the slaves sometimes died on the voyage from Africa to South America.¹

Castlereagh saw that this was in every sense a problem that could only be solved by the erection of special international machinery. So long as the old national rivalries and jealousies existed with regard to the employment of sea power, the slavers would be able to defy all efforts to put them down. It was impossible for each Power to maintain a fleet sufficiently strong to police the African and American coasts effectively. Only Britain, in fact, had enough cruisers and sloops to carry out operations over so wide an area. An efficient international police force, therefore, meant in substance the right of Britain to search the ships of other nations. But it was just this maritime right that had called forth such bitter protests during the Napoleonic wars. France and the United States, therefore, the two Powers most affected, saw in the proposal an attempt to legalise the most extreme doctrines of British maritime law. To overcome their hostility and obtain their consent to some practical measure was, therefore, the main problem which Castlereagh had to solve, and in view of the state of public opinion in both these countries, it was a hopeless one from the first.

Nevertheless, Castlereagh made a brave attempt and did succeed in placing the problem on a new basis by the expedients which he devised. He hoped that the machinery of the Alliance might be of some assistance. The declaration which he secured at Vienna he used to institute formal and permanent conference of the Great European Powers at London. This was to be both a centre of information and a centre of action. In the Memorandum which Castlereagh drew up for the guidance of his office on the subject, he suggested that the Committees set up at Paris and Vienna in 1814-15 should be taken as models for the machinery. There was to be a joint secretariat nominated by the Powers concerned, and "an apartment at the Foreign Office where the Chancellerie may be held and to which each Plenipotentiary may send an employé to copy papers."

¹ Queries proposed by Viscount Castlereagh to, and Answers of, the African Society in London, Dec. 1816: *B.F.S.P.* vi. 26.

The first formal meeting was held on August 28, 1816, and all the Great Powers were represented. Fourteen meetings were held before the Aix-la-Chapelle Conference, and two more in 1819. But they did not achieve very much. Much information was collected by Castlereagh from the African Company at Sierra Leone and the African Institution in London, and his own naval officers and agents. But the Powers were mainly concerned with their own interests, and France, the only other maritime Power represented, was fiercely hostile to all proposals. Castlereagh's main activities had, therefore, gradually to be transferred to separate bargainings with the various Powers concerned, a prolonged and painful process, which occupied a large portion of his energy until the end of his career.¹

Meanwhile, it was of the utmost importance to get the trade completely abolished by Spain and Portugal. With Spain separate negotiations had been in progress at Madrid ever since Ferdinand had been restored, and had only been temporarily suspended during the Congress of Vienna to await the result of its deliberations on the subject. In 1814 Spain, like France, had been offered the bribe of a colony if it would agree to immediate and complete Abolition. This offer had been rejected. Finally, only the refusal of subsidies and the threat of commercial boycott produced even such concessions as a promise to restrict, as far as possible, the use of the Spanish flag to genuine subjects of the Spanish crown, to limit their operations to the South of a line drawn 10° North of the Equator, and to abolish the Slave Trade completely in eight years. All Castlereagh's efforts at Vienna could secure no more than this, and the Spanish Slave Trade remained, when peace finally came, as a profitable and increasing form of commerce which was attracting capital from all the maritime countries.

This failure was much criticised in the House, and Castlereagh continued, without intermission, his efforts at Madrid and London. If his attempts to put pressure on Spain and other nations by means of international action failed, he was more

¹ Proposed Proceedings : Memorandum on the Conference and Protocols of the Conferences in *F.O. Slave Trade*, 1, 2.

successful in direct negotiations. There were various means of putting on the screw. The British fleet exceeded the limits of its rights in harrying Spanish traders even South of the Equator, and the complaints of the Spanish Government were ignored or treated with the greatest procrastination. Above all, Castlereagh made it clear that all efforts at mediation in the Colonial question depended on Spain agreeing to Abolition.¹ Influenced probably more by these considerations than by a Spanish translation of Stephen's pamphlet, the majority of the special Commission which the Council of the Indies had appointed to consider the question, advised immediate Abolition at a price. Castlereagh told Wilberforce the good news and entreated him to be quiet about it lest the price should be raised. He persuaded him also to drop his measure for the registration of West Indian slaves, so as not to complicate the necessary Parliamentary sanction. Negotiation and bargaining continued between London and Madrid for a year and a half before terms could be arranged. At last, on September 23, 1817, a Treaty was signed by which, in return for £400,000, Spain agreed to abolish the Traffic immediately North of the Equator and altogether after May 30, 1820. Moreover, she allowed, under definite restrictions, the Right of Search to the British fleet, so that steps could be taken to make her decrees effective. This was a great advance, though there was much criticism of the price to be paid. But Wilberforce gave the Treaty his blessing and the Commons voted the money.²

From Portugal less could be obtained. The Trade was an old-established industry and very lucrative to Brazil, which absorbed a large number of slaves every year. The King was friendly to Abolition, but his Queen was interested in the trade, like most of her Court. Portugal had therefore done nothing to carry out a promise made in 1810 to abolish the trade gradually. At Vienna Castlereagh had, after protracted negotiations, arranged a Treaty with Palmella, by which Portugal agreed to abolish immediately trade North of the Equator, to restrict Portuguese traders to Portuguese markets,

¹ See above, Section I, p. 413.

² *B.F.S.P.* iv. 33; R. I. and S. Wilberforce, *Life of Wilberforce* iv. 285.

to adopt practical measures in concert with Great Britain to make these regulations effective, and to abolish the traffic altogether after eight years. In return, the Treaty of Commerce of 1810 was to be modified in her favour, the balance of a loan of £600,000 owed by her to Britain, was remitted, and she was given £300,000.¹

The Cabinet, after a good deal of grumbling, finally agreed to pay this price, but, at Castlereagh's suggestion, the money was withheld until Portugal had completed her side of the bargain. This, indeed, took some time to accomplish, since it was at Rio that ratification had to be obtained and the necessary action taken, and it was only by the exercise of unrelenting pressure that Castlereagh obtained a further Convention, dated September 28, 1817, to carry out the terms agreed upon. It was satisfactory that this conceded a qualified Right of Visit and Search, so that the British fleet could see that the law was obeyed. Slaving South of the Equator was still, however, to be legal under the Portuguese flag for another five years, the only legalised traffic left after Spain's Abolition came into force. Unceasing efforts were made by Castlereagh during his life-time to get rid of this last barrier to universal Abolition, but in vain. Nevertheless, during his tenure of the Foreign Office every civilised State in the world had pledged itself to abolish the hateful traffic.

Important as these Treaties were, Abolition depended on something more than paper restrictions. The profits were too great for them to be lightly given up, and seamen of all countries were prepared to run risks to obtain them. Castlereagh, had, as has been seen, obtained a modified right of visit in 1817 from both Portugal and Spain. He negotiated a similar arrangement with the Netherlands, who, by a Treaty dated May 4, 1818, not only promised to enforce more strictly and specifically their prohibition of the Slave Trade, but also to allow the Right of Visit and Search in specified areas under restrictions almost as stringent as were later applied to Spain and Portugal. This concession was not, indeed, obtained without much trouble, and it was only King William's personal influence that eventually overcame the opposition of some of

¹ *B.F.S.P.* iv. 85.

his Ministers. Clancarty too worked hard and received his chief's congratulations on the result.¹

By these treaties there was brought into being the nucleus of an effective international police force to compel obedience to the laws of the different states concerned. The really effective agent was of course the British fleet, whose cruisers and sloops had by now become very expert in detecting slavers and pursuing them in their hunting grounds on the Guinea Coast. Judicial organs were provided by Mixed Commissions stationed at Sierra Leone and other places, on which the States concerned had equal representation and whose decisions were final. The service was no easy one to staff adequately, especially at Sierra Leone, which was already beginning to earn its reputation as the White Man's Grave.

But all these concessions of the Smaller Powers, won by a judicious mixture of bullying and bribery, would be of little avail, if the two great maritime nations of France and the United States, who were not amenable to such influences, refused to agree to similar measures of control. Both had, of course, abolished Slave Trading, but in both there were large sections of opinion, such as indeed existed in Britain also, who were adverse to the law. In the United States the same religious influences which had won the victory in Britain were powerful and alert. But in France the pioneers of Abolition were the same men who had crusaded for the Revolution. The Royalists would have none of them, and the King alone shewed any zeal in the cause. Abolition was held to have been imposed on France by her enemy, and, as Castlereagh had foreseen, this fact entirely alienated public opinion. Royalists, officials and the rising commercial classes all saw in Abolition merely a weapon for the maintenance of British supremacy.

Moreover, while France was occupied by foreign troops, any further measures would be considered as dictated at the

¹ To Clancarty, Feb. 3, March 27, 1818: *F.O. Holland*, 98. See also *C.C.* xi. 432, 434, 436. Clancarty urged the importance of presents on this occasion. "An exception might well be made to your rule, on the ground of sacrificing to humanity, in all treaties where such a concession is made as that of a Right of Visit for the prevention of the traffic in slaves—at all events, when Brougham has declared that this concession was cheaply purchased from Spain by £400,000, you are not likely to be quarrelled with for a single £1000 for a snuff box": *C.C.* xi. 436.

point of the bayonet, and therefore humiliating to French pride. In the period, therefore, before the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle no concession could be obtained. France had accepted Abolition, but she would do nothing more to make it effective. For some time, indeed, there was talk of the reconquest of San Domingo, and the reduction of the inhabitants of that black republic or empire once more to the condition of slaves. Nor could Britain, whose West Indian Islands still allowed slavery, have made any protest. Fortunately both for France and the inhabitants of the island this idea was abandoned as too hazardous and costly. But the Abolition laws were disregarded with impunity by French subjects, and French harbours had become a refuge for British slavers. It was not, indeed, until nearly three years had passed that the stipulations of the second Treaty of Paris were carried out by the promulgation of definite laws on the subject. In the London Conference France opposed all British plans and her influence was also used to prevent the Tsar also from supporting them. In this way the obviously impracticable proposal for a boycott on the Colonial produce of Slave Trading Powers was rejected. It was not likely, therefore, that France would support another proposal which Castlereagh brought before the London Conference in February 1818, of extending the Right of Visit to all the Abolitionist Powers by mutual agreement. Richelieu and the King were personally favourable, but they confessed that they could do nothing in the face of the opposition of all parties in the country.¹

Another proposal, which originated not with Castlereagh, but with Alexander, was also opposed by France. This was a suggestion for the formation of a 'maritime league' against the Barbary Powers, whose pirate ships exacted a heavy toll from all States who refused to pay tribute or were not strong enough on sea to retaliate. British commerce, after the daring and successful bombardment of Algiers by Lord Exmouth in

¹ B.F.S.P. viii. 259-317. Cf. Schefer, *La France moderne et le problème coloniale*, 186-189. There were at one time suggestions for stocking the French Colonies by means of the slavers of Spain and Portugal, but the Treaties of 1817, which restricted their trade to their own possessions, prevented this scandal.

1816, was safe, and Castlereagh had no wish to incur heavy responsibilities as the protector of other Powers. But he could hardly press the Abolition of the Slave Trade in Blacks while refusing to take any steps to protect Whites from a similar fate. Accordingly, he agreed to link up this question with that of the Right of Visit, much to the Tsar's annoyance, Lieven being severely scolded for giving provisional assent. But France opposed the 'maritime league' as bitterly as the Right of Visit, and no progress could therefore be made, much as Russia and the Smaller Powers desired action.¹

Matters were in this condition when the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle drew near. The Abolitionists were determined to seize the opportunity, and though Wilberforce felt that his own presence might embarrass Castlereagh, Clarkson was sent out to watch affairs on behalf of the African Association and, in particular, to appeal once more to the humanity of the Tsar. The British Cabinet had also to do its best. Castlereagh was instructed therefore, not only to press for a joint note to Portugal from all the Powers urging complete Abolition, but also to endeavour to obtain a Convention for mutual Right of Search from all the Powers. In order to attain this he was allowed, despite the protests of the Admiralty, to agree to a maritime league to repress the Barbary pirates, even if France refused to join, though it was made clear that this was not desired from the point of view of British interests.²

Unfortunately, nothing whatever of importance could be obtained from the other Powers. The letter to the King of Portugal was readily signed; pious opinions and humane declarations were also easily obtained; but no concessions were made with regard to the Right of Search. France still insisted, amongst other reasons, that such a concession was impossible, since the foreign troops had not yet left her territory. The other Powers explained that such measures would be useless unless France and the United States were included. Even the Emperor of Russia, influenced by Pozzo di Borgo, would not accept the British proposal. He had, indeed, in this, as in most other matters, an alternative plan. He suggested

¹ F. Martens, *Recueil*, vii. 263-4.

² Second Cabinet Memorandum on the approaching Conferences at Aix-la-Chapelle: *F.O. Continent*, 34.

that the trade should be declared piracy and that its suppression should be entrusted to a 'neutral institution' established by all the Christian States, with a fleet and a court of its own and headquarters in some suitable spot in Africa. To this body, he suggested, the Right of Visit might be conceded by all nations without any national jealousies being aroused.

This emanation of the Holy Alliance was hardly a practical proposal, and Castlereagh had no difficulty in shewing its difficulties. ~ In any case, the Tsar did not suggest that it should come into being until after Portugal abolished the Slave Trade five years hence, unless the King's heart was touched, as was not likely to be the case, by the eloquent appeal from Aix-la-Chapelle. For his more immediate measures Castlereagh could win no support. It was in vain that he wrote long Memoranda shewing that the Right of Visit was in accordance with international law, was strictly limited to its purpose, and gave Britain no right which she was not prepared to grant to other Powers. No effect was produced and nothing was done. In these circumstances, therefore, no steps were taken to institute the international fleet to act against the Barbary pirates, who were to be merely assaulted with words instead of guns, a project in whose success no one had any confidence.¹

Castlereagh visited Paris on his way home and discussed with the French Ministers means by which France could help to repress the Slave Trade, but he had no illusions as to the utility of these measures. He had, however, done all that he could, and public opinion in the House and outside recognised the fact. Nor did he cease to press France to execute her laws, and to furnish her Ministers with the evidence of their infringement, with which he was constantly supplied by his own agents and the indefatigable African Institution. But the all-important Right of Visit, it was clear, he could not obtain, and it must have been a counsel of despair when he advised

¹ *Conferences at Aix-la-Chapelle*: B.F.S.P. vi. 57 ff. Wheaton, *History of the Law of Nations*, 613-616. Only Tripoli paid any attention to the joint protest. Tunis and Algiers refused to listen. Pozzo, of course, attributed this to British perfidy. Castlereagh refused to intervene further. I.R.H.S. cxxxvii. 221, 229, 241. Castlereagh to Stuart, June 5, 1821: F.O. France, 245.

Wilberforce in 1821 to begin a Press campaign to convert French public opinion.¹

Nor had he much more success with the United States, with whom the same discussions proceeded throughout these years. There was in Congress, it is true, an Abolitionist party which was almost as vehement as that in Britain. But it had not sufficient influence to overcome American hostility to the Right of Visit. Adams claimed that the American Constitution did not permit the Government to allow American subjects to be judged by a foreign court such as had been set up at Sierra Leone. He persisted in regarding the British persistence as nothing more than hypocritical self-seeking. Rush was himself anxious to meet Castlereagh's wishes, but Adams was unshakeable. The negotiations were transferred to Washington, and Stratford-Canning urged every possible argument, sometimes, perhaps, without too much tact. Congress passed an Act inflicting the penalties of piracy on slavers, but this, of course, left their legal position unimpaired in relation to other countries. All that Stratford-Canning could obtain was a suggestion that the British and American fleets should co-operate as far as possible in their several efforts to check the traffic, and orders were sent accordingly.²

Castlereagh had thus failed to obtain the practical measures which he foresaw at Vienna were necessary if the Slave Trade was to be really abolished. Such failure was inevitable. Abolition had been obtained from the European nations mainly by British insistence and not by a long and intense education of public opinion as in this country. There was thus no means of compelling them to make the necessary sacrifices of national pride. Castlereagh had some right to believe that the final result would have been better, if he had been allowed to go more slowly in 1814-15 on the question of Abolition, and thus gradually to prepare the way for the measures necessary to enforce it. Nevertheless the results obtained are seen to be immense, if the alternatives are remembered.

¹ R. I. and S. Wilberforce, *Life of Wilberforce*, v. 101.

² *B.F.S.P.* vii. 373, ix. 61, x. 247. Wheaton, *History of the Law of Nations*, 640 ff. From Stratford-Canning, March 8, 1821: *F.O. America*, 157. Lane-Poole, *Life of Stratford-Canning*, i. 311. J. Q. Adams, *Memoirs*, v. 216, vi. 13. W. C. Ford, *Writings of J. Q. Adams*, vii. 84.

Without the relentless pressure of public opinion in Britain the Slave Trade would have been enormously developed as soon as the war had ceased, and the slaves would have been transported not by tens, but by hundreds of thousands. Even worse, the system would have been applied to Africa itself with incalculable consequences to the human race.¹

As it was, the trade was more than held, and the means by which it could be defeated were discovered and made effective by experiment. The expedients of the Right of Visit and International Courts applied to the smaller maritime nations by British insistence were successful. They were Castlereagh's own contribution to the cause and were only won by the unrelenting efforts of himself and his subordinates. They added immensely to the burden of affairs, already too great to be borne. How many interviews had Castlereagh to seek with the Foreign Ambassadors, how many committees to attend, how many dispatches to write and receive! His correspondence was enormously swollen by this subject; and though much of the routine work could be done by subordinates, the Foreign Secretary had to control and supervise the whole, and, above all, be ready at any moment to satisfy the House of Commons and answer their critics, who knew their subject from long years of experience and were supplied by information by an elaborate and efficient organisation. No wonder that Castlereagh occasionally grew impatient with men who expected him to work miracles. On the whole, however, he satisfied the 'Saints.' Wilberforce always recognised the sincerity and practical character of his work, and took into consideration the multitude of other matters that had claims on his energies. In spite of growing differences in both domestic and foreign politics the two men continued in friendly relations until Castlereagh's death, to which, though Wilberforce scarcely recognises the fact, the unrelenting efforts which he had made on behalf of Abolition had undoubtedly contributed.

¹ The point, admirably made by Mr. Trevelyan in his *British History in the Nineteenth Century*, 51, has also been emphasised in Professor Coupland's *Wilberforce*, 509-10.

CHAPTER IX

THE DEATH OF CASTLEREAGH: THE END OF THE ALLIANCE, 1822.

1. THE SPANISH PROBLEM: PREPARATIONS FOR THE LAST CONFERENCE
2. THE DEATH OF CASTLEREAGH AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.
3. CASTLEREAGH AND THE ALLIANCE.

“What a comment upon the vanity of human pursuits, the inanity of glory, and the impotence of power! What must have been the agonies of that mind, which in the midst of a career of unparalleled success was thus driven to suicide by despair!”—JOHN QUINCY ADAMS.

CHAPTER IX

I. THE SPANISH PROBLEM: PREPARATIONS FOR THE LAST CONFERENCE

EVENTS in the East and the New World had occupied the greater part of Castlereagh's attention during the last year of his life, for they presented urgent problems for solution. In both questions he hoped, as has been seen, to make considerable advance in the approaching Conference. There was, however, nearer at hand a problem even more urgent, which was to be the main object of the Conference, when it came, and which, in the last few months of Castlereagh's life, began to dominate the whole political situation—the problem of Spain itself. It was connected with both the others, for the recognition of the Spanish Colonies depended in part in the internal situation of Spain, and the Eastern question on how far the attention of Europe was diverted to the West. Moreover, the condition of Spain inevitably had a great influence on that of France and the rivalry of France and Britain in the Peninsula. Gradually, therefore, the Spanish question became the most important in European diplomacy.

Since Laibach affairs in Spain had gone from bad to worse. The new elections in October 1821 still left the *Moderados* in office. But the King was continually intriguing against them, with the result that the extremists were continually gaining power. Bardaxi, the able Foreign Minister, complained bitterly of the treachery of the King and his disinclination to trust his Ministers. Yet there was no one to replace them. "I consider their remaining in office as indispensably necessary for preserving Spain from all the horrors of civil war," reported Hervey in November 1821; and when

they were defeated in December as a result of royal intrigues and attacks from Left and Right, he gave up hope of a peaceful solution, and could only add—"Spain is an Augean stable, and the present Constitution . . . has hitherto only stirred up the ordure, which paralyses every nerve and clogs every sinew of the political system." "This country . . . is in a state of complete anarchy," he stated in January 1822.¹

A new Ministry came into power in February, with the poet Martinez de la Rosa as Foreign Minister. They were still Moderates; but the extreme Right and the extreme Left were both obviously gaining in power. There was now open talk of a counter-revolution. Isolated risings began in Navarre and Galicia. The royalists were openly plotting in France, and in May there were revolts in Catalonia, which were followed by the setting up of a Regency to act in the name of the captive King.

France was intimately connected with these events. The Villèle Ministry took some time to find its feet. It had come into power not only because of the reaction of the Right, but because of the dissatisfaction felt at the weak foreign policy of its predecessor during the year 1821. The new Foreign Minister, Montmorenci, was vain and inexperienced, and the whole Cabinet was eager to shew its capacity to deal with great affairs. Behind it stood the Comte d'Artois, inspired with a fanatical devotion to the cause of legitimate monarchy. The King was now completely under the control of Madame du Cayla, who was always ready to use her influence on behalf of the Ultras. This was just the situation which Castlereagh and Wellington had always feared. "I cannot conceive a more unfortunate event than the formation of this royalist administration," wrote the Duke to Castlereagh when he heard of Richelieu's fall. "In order to acquire a little popularity and a national character, they must meddle in foreign politics and this against the system of the Quintuple Alliance."²

Such a Ministry naturally saw in Spain an opportunity of crushing their Liberal opponents and asserting the power of

¹ From Hervey, Oct. 25, Nov. 8, Dec. 16, 1821; Jan. 6, 7, 1822: *F.O. Spain*, 248, 255.

² Wellington to Castlereagh, Dec. 17, 1821: *W.N.D.* i. 209.

France. Villèle himself was, indeed, far too cautious to take up the cause of the Spanish King lightly, but he was not yet formally President of the Council, and Montmorenci soon shewed himself only too anxious to adopt the policy of his officials and win a reputation by organising a Counter-Revolution in Spain. The *Cordon Sanitaire*, established to keep out the pest, had developed in everything but name into an army of observation. Nor, as will be seen, were the Tsar and Louis XVIII. deaf to the appeals which Ferdinand was sending them by every possible channel.

Such relations could not be concealed. Hervey, who was too jealous of French influence to be an impartial judge, had reported his suspicions of the French Minister, La Garde, as early as February. One of Tatishchev's agents had also appeared, and the Russian Minister, as well as the French, talked openly of the possibility of a Counter-Revolution. In April Spain protested against the maintenance of the *Cordon Sanitaire*. In May Martinez de la Rosa ordered his Ambassador at Paris to present a strong note to the French Ministry protesting against the assistance given to the Spanish insurgents from French territory. "These intrigues," he told Hervey, "could not be brought home to the French Government but they could all be directly and indubitably traced to French interference." The same complaints were made openly in the Cortes. The effect was disastrous. "The conduct of the French Government is to me inexplicable," reported Hervey, "unless they have been deceived by the accounts which they have received from this country; for no measures could be more calculated to continue the anarchy which at present prevails here, and to prevent any modification of the Constitution, than those they have adopted."¹

Martinez de la Rosa was, however, right. The French Government was not implicated officially, and Montmorenci's repeated asseverations to Stuart that he had not interfered were true enough. But he had encouraged his friends to stir up resistance to the Cortes in Spain, and nothing was done to prevent the Spanish refugees from sending arms and money

¹ From Hervey, Feb. 11, 28, April 4, 6, May 12, 27, 1822: *F.O. Spain*, 255-6; *C.C.* xii. 453.

to their friends. He had no intention, however, of going further at the moment. The army in the South, which was continually being increased and in June was given a definite organisation, was meant only to prevent contagion or an attack from the Spanish Liberals. He deprecated any idea of the Powers attempting by force to change the state of affairs in Spain. That could only come from within.

The sincerity of this attitude was soon tested by the Tsar's diplomatic offensive, which had been launched to cover his retreat on the Eastern Question.¹ There was, of course, no difficulty in finding an excuse. Since Troppau, the King of Spain had never ceased to solicit aid by various subterranean channels. It was considered better, however, to found the dispatch on an appeal made by the King of Naples to the Allied Sovereigns on behalf of his royal nephew at the latter's request. The Tsar invoked the principles of the Troppau circular, and proposed to his Allies "to form a European Army to which each of the Allied Powers would furnish a contingent, and whose aim should be to crush out the centre (foyer) of revolutions in Spain or anywhere else where it could go." The Tsar was himself ready to provide his contingent immediately, and, if the principles of the proposal were adopted, would be ready to discuss the detailed arrangements. "The deplorable events in the East," he said, "would be no obstacle, since Russia had sufficient troops to make her rights respected there and at the same time to fulfil her duties towards the Alliance."

This dispatch was immediately communicated to the Governments of Vienna and Berlin; discretion was, however, allowed to Pozzo di Borgo and Lieven as to the manner and opportunity of its presentation at Paris and London, and neither was very anxious to sponsor such ideas. But, of course, Britain and France were bound soon to find out about it from their representatives abroad. Metternich, indeed, found it necessary to explain away to Gordon the reply which he had sent to Petersburg. This by no means rejected the Tsar's idea altogether, but merely alluded to some of the difficulties of assembling the suggested Allied army, and hinted

¹ See above, Chapter VII., Section 3, p. 398.

could not be concealed from them, though Pozzo di Borgo delayed his communication as long as possible. Metternich, indeed, took good care to let them know his attitude through Caraman, and this did a great deal to reassure them. They were soothed by his assumption that the initiative belonged to France, and even went so far as to suggest a Ministerial Conference at Paris on the lines of those which Metternich was holding at Vienna.¹

New events at Madrid, however, made the situation even more critical. The King's Guards had, for some time, maintained a threatening attitude towards the populace. In the first week of July this developed into a regular insurrection, at which the King undoubtedly connived. But his courage failed him at the critical moment, and the Guards were overcome by the National Militia, who put up a stout resistance. The result was a great outburst of indignation among the people. The Ministry fell, and its successor was naturally more extreme and less likely than ever to agree with the King. The French Ambassador professed to fear for the King's life, and induced many of his colleagues to join with him in an address to the Ministry which threatened them openly with interference if the King was harmed.

Hervey refused to join in this manifesto, not merely because he thought it unwise and unnecessary, but also because he imputed to France the responsibility for the abortive attempt at Counter-Revolution. "As far as circumstantial evidence goes," he reported, "the different facts which have come to my knowledge respecting the conduct of the Count de la Garde and of the French Government are confirmation, strong as proof of holy writ, that the whole plan of the Counter-Revolution was concerted between the King and the Cabinet of the Tuilleries." He had no doubt that, if the plot had succeeded, the "French Army would have immediately crossed the frontier."²

This was hardly the case. The French Government were not yet committed though many of their friends were, and

¹ Lieven to Nesselrode, June 10, 1822 : *Pet. Arch.* From Stuart, May 23, July 1, 1822 : *F.O. France*, 270, 272. Montmorenci to Chateaubriand, June 24, 1822 : *Paris A.A.E.* 615, f. 271.

² From Hervey, July 5, 6, 8, 9, 11, 1822 : *F.O. Spain*, 257.

the *Pavillon Marsan* was much alarmed lest the failure at Madrid should betray them. But Montmorenci himself was not yet ready. He had preferred to work through Spaniards and was not prepared for the failure. But Chateaubriand, who, against Montmorenci's will, had been transferred from Berlin, where he had done nothing but sulk, to the London Embassy which he intended as a stepping stone to the Ministry, was constantly urging independent and vigorous action on his Chief. The Spanish problem must be solved by France alone, and he intended that France's opportunity should be also his own. Villèle wished to avoid all trouble. Stuart was probably not far wrong when he summed up the situation in the middle of July as follows, after an interview with Montmorenci: "This language induces me to suspect," he concluded, "that a difference of opinion prevails even in the French Cabinet respecting Spanish affairs," and that on the one hand H.R.H. Monsieur and the majority of his advisers, supported by the members of the Government whose opinions are the most violent, consider the present state of things to offer an opportunity for open interference to protect the interests of royalty, in preference to that indirect support which they think will bring on a repetition of the misfortunes resulting in this country from a similar system in the year 1791, but . . . on the other hand, M. de Villèle and the Vicomte de Montmorenci, in obedience to the wishes of the King, do not conceal their determination to maintain their neutrality, subject only to engagements which may compel them to adopt the same course with the other members of the Alliance."

At any rate no overt step was taken and instructions were sent to La Garde to observe a strict neutrality, though his conduct was stoutly defended both by Montmorenci and Villèle. The latter was especially warm on the subject to Stuart, and added "that the approaching Congress would enable them to explain their situation with respect to Spain fully to the other Powers of Europe, and to concert the establishment of a system in which France would take the part which the great Confederation shall deem it expedient to pursue."¹

¹ From Stuart, July 11, 15, 18, 29, 1822: *F.O. France*, 272. The instructions which reached La Garde on July 6 are given in *W.N.D.* i. 394.

It was now, indeed, obvious that the Spanish question would be discussed at the approaching Conference. Montmorenci, who looked to action with the Alliance, had already sent a special envoy to consult Metternich. The latter had replied to Vincent with one of his long letters of advice, which, however, deprecated interference and thought the best way was to leave Spain to work out her own salvation. He naturally hastened to send this dispatch, so consonant with British policy, to Castlereagh, whose presence at the future Conference the Spanish question had made even more necessary. It was clear now that it would be the principal question of discussion there, Metternich told Lebzeltern in the middle of July, bidding him keep the Tsar quiet in the meantime. "It is evident that his [the Tsar's] views are now much more engrossed with the aspect of affairs in Spain and France than in Turkey," wrote Gordon, "and Austria has perhaps been but too successful in her arguments for diverting them from the East by darkening the picture of Western Europe."¹

During these months of June and July, therefore, Castlereagh could have had no illusions about the urgency of Spanish affairs. They were pressed upon him from every side. Lieven's overtures were followed by interviews with Chateaubriand, who detected in Castlereagh's conversation an extreme distrust of French policy. After the Guards' attempt these suspicions were openly expressed to the French Ambassador, who indignantly denied them. He was sure, however, that Castlereagh did not believe him. "Have you an official communication to make to me on the part of your Government?" asked Castlereagh at the close of the conversation, and when Chateaubriand said that he had none, he replied, "If you had come to a decision, one would see the position which England would take; until then I cannot even venture on advice."²

The position then was problematical. The Tsar had called

¹ From Gordon, July 2, 1822: *F.O. Austria*, 171. Metternich to Vincent, July 9, 1822: *F.O. Austria*, 175. Metternich to Vincent, July 10, 1822: Mikhailowitch, *Rapports de Lebzeltern*, 421. Metternich to Lebzeltern, July 15, 1822: *ibid.* 372.

² Chateaubriand to Montmorenci, June 21, 1822: *Paris A.A.E.* 615, f. 269. Chateaubriand to Montmorenci, July 16, 1822: d'Antioche, *Chateaubriand*, 315.

the Alliance to action, but no one could foresee what the decision would be. What France had done or would do was equally uncertain. This, no doubt, explains the paucity of the reference to the Spanish question in the instructions for the approaching Conference. We do not know the exact date on which these were finished, but almost certainly they were not written before the last days of July, during which there were many Cabinet meetings. There can be no doubt but by that time Castlereagh was fully apprised of the seriousness of the situation. Yet the instructions only contain two short clauses about Spain: "The Spanish question has been stated to divide itself into two branches—the European and the American. With respect to the first, there seems nothing to add to or to vary in the course of policy hitherto pursued, solicitude for the safety of the royal family, observance of our engagements towards Portugal, and a rigid abstinence from any interference in the internal affairs of that country must be considered as forming the basis of His Majesty's policy." Then follows a sentence which is specially significant in the light of the conversation with Chateaubriand. "It is of greater importance that the British Plenipotentiary in his passage through Paris should have a full explanation with the French Government and should endeavour to come to some distinct understanding with them, founded upon these principles, the arguments in favour of which are too well understood to require insertion in this instruction."¹

The British Plenipotentiary was thus left with a very free hand, and this is entirely in accordance with Castlereagh's habit. He had done the same in 1814 and again at Aix-la-Chapelle. The references to the most important and therefore the most debatable points of policy had been summed up in a few brief sentences, while points on which the line of action had already been determined were discussed at much greater length. There need be no surprise therefore that the instructions which, as we have seen, dealt in detail with the Turkish question and the Spanish Colonies should be so brief on this point. The decision could not be made until the facts

¹ *W.N.D.* i. 286.

were clearer, and that decision Castlereagh intended to make himself.¹

That he also intended to pay a special visit to Paris on the way is especially significant. He recalled, perhaps, the important interview which he had with Talleyrand in September 1814, on his way to the Congress of Vienna. At this new Vienna Conference the situation was, indeed, very different, but there was the same suspicion of the Tsar and the same dread of a Russian-Franco Alliance as in 1814. Castlereagh knew that Metternich would follow his lead and with Austria went Prussia also. If he could come to an understanding with France there would be no danger. He had seen that nothing could be done with the egoistical Chateaubriand, who did not possess the confidence of his Government. Montmorenci was perhaps not much more amenable. But suppose Castlereagh had met Villèle on his way to Vienna? There was much to draw the two statesmen together, for Villèle, though chief of the Ultra party, possessed both caution and commonsense. It is impossible not to imagine that the issue of the Conference of Vienna would have been very different if that interview had taken place.

The instructions were drawn up by Castlereagh for his own use. They would have been very differently phrased, we can be sure, for any one else. But it was not until July was well advanced that Castlereagh could be sure that he could go himself to Vienna. For, in addition to the complicated problems of diplomacy, he was faced with a domestic intrigue which nearly prevented him from accepting Metternich's urgent invitations to come to his aid. As has been seen, the King left Hanover determined to attend in person the Conference next year. He would share in one at least of these

¹ It was only natural that Canning should afterwards lay stress in the House of Commons that the instructions paid so little attention to what proved to be the main purpose of the Conference. He was, of course, entirely unaware of these conversations, and Castlereagh naturally sent out no instructions to his Ambassadors on the main issue. He may well have thought therefore that Castlereagh did not realise the importance of the Spanish question, though it is clear that he did. I cannot therefore accept the conclusions of Mr. Green's interesting paper that Canning deliberately obscured the issue. See J. G. S. Green, *Transactions Royal Historical Society*, 1913, pp. 103-128, and Mr. Temperley's criticism in *Cambridge History of British Foreign Policy*, ii. 56.

meetings of the Sovereigns from which his Ministers had always kept him, but whose attractions to one of his temperament were alluring indeed. There were, however, two obstacles in his way—his devotion to his mistress and the opposition of the Cabinet. The former showed no signs of diminution; Lady Conyngham's influence was still unchallenged in the inner circle. In March Bloomfield was finally removed from a position in which he had already lost the King's confidence, and was consoled or silenced by being sent as Minister to Sweden. Sir William Knighton and the Conynghams shared his duties between them. But would Lady Conyngham wish the King to go for a long visit abroad into circles where she could scarcely accompany him? This speculation was already engrossing Society in the Spring of 1822. "We are far less disturbed by the war between Russia and Turkey than by the dismissal of Bloomfield, the little *bouderies de femme* and the very uncertain plans of the King for his journey," explained Lord Stewart, who had been on leave all winter, in a very confidential letter to Esterhazy.

The mistress might, however, be circumvented; the Ministers were determined to stop the visit if they could, but knowing their Master they avoided controversy until the last possible moment. Stewart, who must have known a good deal, continued, "the King is waiting to see how Parliamentary affairs turn out before settling his plans. *I do not believe in the journey. Entre nous*, the Government will prolong the business of the session *on purpose* until July in order to stop the journey to the Continent at the last moment." The result was embarrassment and uncertainty throughout the whole summer as to what would be done. Moreover, some of the Cabinet were not anxious for a Plenipotentiary to be present at the Conference, the original reason for which was, after all, the affairs of Italy, with which Britain had no concern. Castle-reagh, on the other hand, while he must even less than his colleagues desire the King to accompany him, gradually came to see the urgent importance of his own presence at the Conference, and it might be that he could only secure that by permitting the King to go there also. The King for a long while held stoutly to his design. He tried to commit his

Ministers by proclaiming openly his intention of making the journey. He informed Chateaubriand on June 14, at a ball, in such a way as to be heard by the whole diplomatic circle that he intended to go via Paris. According to Lieven, Lady Conyngham had offered to go separately to Vienna and remain there incognito, so as to avoid the terrible separation.¹

There were obvious difficulties in this course, however, and, at any rate, about this time the King gave way and arranged to go to Scotland instead. Lord Stewart told Metternich that Knighton and Lady Conyngham were mainly responsible for the decision, the latter not being able to face Lady Londonderry, who would, of course, accompany her husband. Perhaps one of the reasons was that no invitation had come from Vienna. Metternich had been careful to avoid anything that might incommode the Ministry. Only when Neumann wrote in great agitation to report that the King was much offended by this omission was a pressing invitation sent by the Emperor of Austria. Metternich would, of course, have gladly entertained the King if only thus he could obtain Castlereagh's support. On June 6 he wrote to Castlereagh a private letter which shewed the importance of the meeting and pleaded that he should not be left alone to face the Tsar, whom France would quite likely support. He promised to act on a suggestion of Lord Stewart's and to separate the affairs of Italy, the discussion of which might embarrass a British representative, from the more important problems. These latter could be discussed as informally as possible at Vienna itself, while Castlereagh need not attend the Conference on Italian affairs at Verona, which had now been substituted for Florence as the place of meeting. This plan appealed to Castlereagh, but he could give no assurance to Metternich in his answer of June 22 that he would be able to come. Everything would depend on how matters stood when Parliament rose. Meanwhile, he wanted as much information as possible, and he told Esterhazy that he would welcome a pressing invitation from Metternich with a programme designed to shew the

¹ Esterhazy to Metternich, March 26, April 24, 1822; Stewart to Esterhazy, April 24, 1822 *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 216, iii. v. Chateaubriand to Montmorency, June 18, 1822: d'Antioche, *Chateaubriand*, 287. Lieven to Nesselrode, July 5, 1822: *Pet. Arch.*

usefulness of his attendance and excluding inconvenient items.

Metternich certainly sent him all the information at his disposal, but he could no more than Castlereagh commit himself too explicitly on questions as complicated as those of Spain and the East, and his personal letter of July 8 was extremely vague. He could only stress once more his immense desire for a personal interview. His letter of the same date to Esterhazy shews how keen was his anxiety to see Castlereagh, and the Ambassador was urged to use every means at his disposal to ensure the visit. Meanwhile, Castlereagh was struggling to complete the business of this terribly long session, which it could be seen would now be prolonged to August. It was not until the very end of July that the decision was taken and he was at last able to inform Metternich of his plans. He hoped, he said, to set out with his wife on August 15, and spend three or four days at Paris on the way. He would arrive in Vienna, however, before the Sovereigns, so as to be able to have with Metternich preliminary conversations on events which would demand "an anxious and profound examination."¹

¹ Castlereagh to Metternich, June 22, July 29, 1822; Metternich to Castlereagh, June 6, July 8, 1822; Stewart to Metternich, June 21, 1822: *Vienna St. A. Varia*, 1822, *Appendix* pp. 541-549. Metternich to Esterhazy, July 9, 1822: *Vienna St. A. Weisungen*, 217, vii. Esterhazy to Metternich, June 22, July 4, 5, 1822; Neumann to Metternich, June 22, 1822. *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 217, vi. vii. The decision was not taken by the Cabinet until July 25. It was even then intended to keep it secret, but Lord Francis Conyngham had already informed "all the ladies at the Opera-house": Buckingham, *Memoirs of the Court of George IV.*, 1. 355.

2. THE DEATH OF CASTLEREAGH AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

THE session of 1822, which did not end till August 6, had been in some respects the most arduous of any which Castlereagh had to undergo. The business of the Foreign Office had at any rate never been greater. Even in May Planta had complained of it. "The anxiety and work at the Foreign Office has been very severe during this session—and burdened as I am with the *shafts* of the wagon has been almost too much for me."¹ How much greater must have been the burden on Castlereagh, who had not only the responsibility of the Foreign Office but also the management of the House of Commons! Three problems of the highest importance were impending; the Greek Revolution, the recognition of the Spanish Colonies and the situation in Spain. In all, the position was uncertain and a false step might lead to serious and incalculable consequences. Castlereagh, as has been seen, hoped to use the approaching Conference to find solutions for these questions. Yet he could not be sure of being allowed to go until the end of July, and only then after much trouble with his selfish and passionate master, made all the more unpleasant for him by the fact that his wife's refusal to recognise Lady Conyngham was one of the difficulties in the way.

No wonder, therefore, that Castlereagh was worn and tired. Since 1819 his health had been less good. He was obviously feeling the strain of the late hours in the House, where his attendance was always necessary. Attacks of gout kept him in bed more than once, though they did not stop his work. But

¹ Planta to Stratford-Canning, May 11, 1822: *F.O. Stratford-Canning Papers*, vol. 7, *Appendix*, p. 584.

the real strain was mental more than physical. Ever since the affair of the Divorce Castlereagh had had to bear an extra burden. He was virtually Prime Minister, though without the prestige and relief from office which the title might have given him. He had established so commanding a position in the Cabinet, and was so necessary to the management of the King, that a double responsibility fell upon him. For over ten years he had borne more than any one man could reasonably bear. The additional strain was too much for him.

At such a crisis he had no confidant in whose friendship and sympathy he could seek relief. His colleagues respected and admired him ; several had, indeed, a deep affection for him. But his reserve cut him off from that kind of close intercourse in which a tired and anxious man can find some alleviation. By nature he was a complete 'introvert' ; he was inhibited from finding relief in expression of his deepest thoughts and emotions. The only two human beings whom he loved, his wife and his brother, returned his affection, but they were neither of them capable of understanding him. How much his mind was in need of some relief is seen by the fact that as early as May the 'introvert' became momentarily an 'extrovert' and suddenly unburdened himself in the most intimate manner to a casual and surprised acquaintance. The temporary weakness was fought down, and the unremitting labours continued. The work of the session was brought triumphantly to a close. "Lord Londonderry has shewn in this session," reported Neumann, a shrewd critic and by no means given to eulogy, "uncommon vigour and extraordinary tact in managing the interests of the Government." "And he told me," he added, "that he was sinking beneath the weight of the fatigue which he felt." When Chateaubriand congratulated him on the approaching close of the session Castlereagh replied, "Yes, it had to end or I should end." ¹

¹ It was to Lord Tavistock that Castlereagh thus 'unbosomed' himself, describing "the torment of carrying on the Government under the general circumstances of the country." *The Creevey Papers*, ii. 38. Neumann to Esterhazy, Aug. 6, 1822 : *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 216, vii. Chateaubriand to Montmorenci, Aug. 15, 1822 ; d'Antioche, *Chateaubriand*, 346.

Other observers noted his obvious ill-health, though always physical rather than mental, so instinctively, except in the one instance noted above, did his mind repress the torment which it was enduring. Only a deep melancholy was manifest to those most closely associated with him. "I never had any idea of the estrangement of his mind, which indeed did not appear distinctly until two days after the last time I saw him," wrote Planta at a later date. "I had thought him during the latter part of the Spring very much worn by the session, and though not ill as to his bodily health much oppressed with the weight of business." At a dinner which was held to celebrate the close of the session he was even congratulated on standing the strain so well. Clanwilliam and Hamilton Seymour, one of his personal staff, who were most with him at this time, as Planta had gone out of town, had noted, so the former wrote to Lord Stewart on August 13, "a certain, to him, unusual restlessness of mind and a degree of uneasiness about trifles entirely alien to his general disposition. He said he dreaded the responsibility of going to Verona, and that he thought that there were plots against him." He went to Cray to seek relief amongst its flowers; but in vain. He was overcome by the consciousness that he had not strength to carry out the duty that lay before him. Hamilton Seymour wrote shortly afterwards: "On Thursday, 8 August, 1822, I saw Lord Londonderry go by himself towards the river at the foot of the grounds of Cray, and there was something so melancholy and dejected in his manner, that I resolved to follow him and, if possible, by conversing with him, to draw him out of the state of gloomy reflection in which he appeared to be absorbed. After, in vain, endeavouring to make him converse upon some other subjects, I mentioned our approaching journey to Verona, and said, 'I hope, Lord Londonderry, you are looking forward with pleasure to our continental trip; the journey, I think, will be of use to you and you will have the satisfaction of renewing several of your former diplomatic acquaintances.' Lord Londonderry drew his hand across his forehead, and said, very slowly, 'At any other time I should like it very much, *but I am quite worn out here*' (keeping his hand upon his forehead),

quite worn out; and this fresh responsibility is more than I can bear.' ”¹

Next day he went up to town. Almost all his colleagues had by this time dispersed to their country seats assured of a long holiday. Only Liverpool and Wellington remained. The former was about to marry a second time and had little attention to spare for his colleague's anxieties. Wellington was preparing to go to the Netherlands to inspect the fortresses. He it was who first certainly noted that Castlereagh's mind had given way. Castlereagh could still discuss public matters with his usual clarity, but the calm and reserved man had become excitable and alarmed. He was obviously also suffering from 'persecution mania,' and thought that his life was in danger—no surprising thing, seeing that he had carried pistols since 1820 to protect himself.

No other man but the Duke could have told the truth to his friend so simply and directly. Long afterwards he told Stanhope what occurred: "I told him, from what you have said, I am bound to warn you that you cannot be in your right mind. He was sitting or lying on a sofa, and he covered his face with his hands and said, 'Since you say so I fear it must be so.' " The Duke offered to stay with him, but Castlereagh would not consent. He tried then to see Dr. Bankhead, Castlereagh's doctor, and, failing to do so, wrote him a letter of warning, before he had to set out on his own journey.²

Meanwhile Castlereagh had paid a last visit to the King, who was preparing to set out for Scotland. The King was also alarmed, and warned Liverpool, who refused to believe the truth. Dr. Bankhead, however, came immediately on receipt of Wellington's warning. He completely misunderstood the case and was not particularly disturbed. Castlereagh went

¹ Planta to Bagot, Sept. 3, 1822. Bagot, *George Canning and his Friends*, ii. 131. Clanwilliam to Lord Stewart, Aug. 15, 1822: Alison, *Lives*, iii. 180. This letter is there quoted in part only from the Londonderry Papers. There is a French translation in the Vienna Archives (*Varia*) of the whole which contains other interesting items. Hamilton Seymour to Lord Stewart, Aug. 20, 1822: Alison, *Lives*, iii. 181.

² *W.N.D.* i. 251-258. Stanhope, *Conversations with the Duke of Wellington*, 126, 272. There is some discrepancy in the evidence as to whether Castlereagh saw the King or Wellington first on this day; but it was almost certainly the latter.

back with his wife to Cray. There he got rapidly worse and was kept in bed during the 10th and the 11th. The usual remedy of bleeding was administered and a number of 'lowering' drugs. The result was naturally to increase his mental weakness, and delirium of a violent kind ensued in which fears of persecution and conspiracy were expressed.¹

There was an obvious danger of suicide, for Castlereagh asked for his pistols, and, when these were refused, for his razors. The fate of Romilly and Whitbread was warning enough, yet Castlereagh was left alone for a brief time on the morning of August 12. He had remembered the existence of a small knife in a dressing case in the drawer of his washstand. With this he cut his throat so quickly and efficiently that he died almost immediately in the arms of the doctor, who had hastily entered the room.²

The shock to his wife was so great that for some time it was thought that her reason would also go.³ She shed no tears until Clanwilliam saw her in the evening, and by his own grief provoked her own. It was by her desire that Castlereagh was given a State funeral in Westminster Abbey. Most of the Cabinet were able to be present, and all the Diplomatic Corps. Large crowds were in the streets. It was a small group only who, by an obviously rehearsed effect, uttered a loud cheer as the coffin was carried into the Abbey. History has remembered this outrage more than the sorrow and dismay of Castlereagh's friends or the even greater tributes which his political enemies paid to him by their recognition that their most powerful foe was no more.

For it was apparent to all that an event of the greatest consequence in European history had occurred. Even Brougham,

¹ These were painful enough to all his friends. Lord Clanwilliam wrote to Stewart, "I believe I have omitted nothing; there is only one subject on which I have still something to say, the ideas upon which his imagination dwelt during the various moments of his delirium. I reserve these for the conversations, which I shall have with you when we see one another again." It was these aberrations which allowed the baser sort of his enemies to spread a rumour that he could not face blackmail for some grave offence committed long ago. There is no reputable evidence for this charge. Yet it is sometimes mentioned as a fact, without qualification (e.g. by Sir Herbert Maxwell in *The Creevey Papers*, II. 41). One is almost tempted to wish that the law of libel could be invoked on behalf of historical characters thus maligned.

² All these facts were established at the inquest. Brougham thought Bankhead deserved to be tried for manslaughter for leaving Castlereagh alone even for one moment.

who, at a later date, could pen a condescending and untrue picture of his rival, admitted the fact at the first shock of the news. "Well! this is really a considerable event in point of size. Put all their other men together in one scale, and poor Castlereagh in the other—single he plainly weighed them down." To Castlereagh's colleagues and subordinates it seemed for a moment as if the end of all things had come. "My prospects and my hopes have vanished as much as a young man's can," wrote Clanwilliam, "and I have lost at once a father and protector, a brother and a friend." "The blow was so awful and so thoroughly unexpected by me . . . that it stunned me quite," explained Planta, when he could at last find heart to write to Bagot, "—and though considerable time has now elapsed, I am not yet, and fear I will not be for a long time, the man I was."¹

Fears for their own personal interests mingled in these regrets—needlessly, for Canning treated them both with great kindness. To all, indeed, came immediately the question: how will this great gap in the political world be filled and how will it affect me and the interests committed to my charge? To the King, receiving at Edinburgh the extravagant welcome of his Scottish subjects; to Canning about to sail for India, in spite of the protests of his wife; to Liverpool, called to reconstruct a Cabinet which, at the close of the session, seemed so safe and strong; to Wellington, who, though soon to be prostrated with illness, was the most likely to be called to fill, however inadequately, Castlereagh's place at the approaching Conference; to Peel, who, his friends assured him, seemed to be the only man who could assume Castlereagh's burden, and must therefore throw off his modesty and indifference, a problem of the greatest difficulty was presented. It took some time to solve. Over three weeks had passed before Canning, who this time received better advice from his friends than in 1812, had swallowed his pride, received the King's pardon, and entered into "the whole of the inheritance" of the man he had once affected scarcely to regard as a serious rival.

By that time the European situation had changed. In any case, no other man but Castlereagh could have carried out his

¹ *The Creevey Papers*, ii. 44: Letters of Clanwilliam and Planta as above.

plans at the approaching Conference. All the personal connections on which they depended and the preparations which he had made by interviews and private letters were made of no avail by his death. Foreign statesmen took stock of the situation and prepared new combinations. Chateaubriand imperfectly understood Castlereagh, but he immediately divined the inevitable effect of his death on the approaching Conference. "I believe," he wrote to Montmorenci, "that Europe (and in particular France) will gain by the death of the first minister of Great Britain. I have often spoken to you of his 'anti-continental' policy. Lord Londonderry would have done much harm at Vienna. His connections with Metternich were obscure and disquieting; Austria deprived of a dangerous support will be forced to come near to us." Montmorenci agreed; and the result was much to encourage those elements in the Villèle Cabinet which saw in the state of Spain an opportunity to re-establish the position of the Bourbons in France and of France in Europe.

As for Metternich, he broke out into extravagant and egoistical eulogy, which has done more to injure Castlereagh's reputation than all the abuse of Byron and Cobbett. He was, however, deeply and profoundly affected. It has been seen how much he relied on Castlereagh to thwart the plans of Russia and France. Now he was left once more to face the Tsar alone, and he did not relish the task. "The effect it has produced upon Prince Metternich in particular is visible and affecting to the highest degree," wrote Gordon on August 24. "His Highness's spirits are dejected and he would seem to say his best hopes are blasted." In this condition of affairs it was only natural that the issues of the Verona Conference were practically decided before the Duke of Wellington's tardy appearance on the scene.¹

There was, in fact, to be a complete revolution in British policy which would have been inevitable even if Castlereagh's successor had been one endowed with less brilliant and striking gifts than Canning. The connections between Britain and

¹ Chateaubriand to Montmorenci, Aug. 13, 1822; Montmorenci to Chateaubriand, Aug. 17, 1822: d'Antioche, *Chateaubriand*, 342, 348. From Gordon, Aug. 24, 1822: *F.O. Austria*, 171.

the European Alliance had depended on Castlereagh himself. It was not only a question of policy, but of personality. No one else in Britain had the experience or training necessary to pursue the course which Castlereagh had followed, even if they had desired to do so. The knowledge of this fact was the most oppressive of all the burdens, which lay on Castlereagh's mind, when he felt his strength fail and yet tried to force himself to get ready to represent his country once again at a European Conference. In his last interview with the King he gave utterance to this deep anxiety. "Sir!" he said, "it is necessary to say good-bye to Europe; you and I alone know it and have saved it; no one after me understands the affairs of the Continent."¹ The cry came from the depths of his consciousness. It was at once a plea of justification and a confession of failure.

¹ Neumann to Esterhazy, Sept. 21, 1822: *Vienna St. A. Berichte*, 216, ix.

3. CASTLEREAGH AND THE ALLIANCE

HISTORY has no scales by which it can measure hypotheses. It is possible that if Castlereagh had been able once more to represent Britain at a European Conference, his character and achievements would have been differently judged by his generation. But he was cut short at the crisis of his career. His work had depended on his own personality. Friends and enemies alike had misunderstood it. His reputation was obscured by the brilliant and dazzling character of his successor, whose magnificent speeches were received with enthusiasm in every quarter of the globe. It was inevitable that Canning, now that his chance had come, should emphasise to his own advantage the differences between himself and Castlereagh and thus enhance his own contribution to history, and that Canning's friends and admirers should lose no opportunity of belittling Castlereagh in order to increase the reputation of their own leader.

Meanwhile such defenders as Castlereagh possessed did his cause but little good. His work had been performed in secret and could not yet be revealed. His private papers were, indeed, in chaos and were not for a considerable period released from Chancery. His brother entrusted his own private correspondence to an "excellent and invaluable divine," the Rev. S. Turner, a friend of the family, who, according to a fashion which has even now scarcely disappeared, was considered a suitable person to write the life of one who had been the Foreign Minister of Britain during ten fateful years. Mr. Turner, with a rare modesty, did, indeed, at a later date, suggest that the talents of Sir Walter Scott would be more suitable to the task, but Sir Walter professed himself incapable of doing it justice. Moreover, Mr. Turner had added to this

great responsibility that of the See of Calcutta, and Lord Stewart's private papers were lost with the Bishop's other effects while being transferred to the new diocese.¹

The Third Marquess of Londonderry was, however, indefatigable in defence of his brother. We owe to him, besides the *Letter to Lord Brougham* (1839), published in answer to the patronising and unfair sketch of Castlereagh in Brougham's *Historical Characters*, the more valuable contribution of the twelve volumes of the *Memoirs and Correspondence of Viscount Castlereagh* (1848-1853). Unfortunately, these were given to the world without much explanation or editing. Much in them therefore remained obscure and even unintelligible, and Castlereagh's laboured and tortuous style attracted few readers in an age when history was considered mainly as an exercise in eloquence.

Castlereagh found, a little later, a staunch defender in Alison, whose *History of Europe* was succeeded by *The Lives of Lord Castlereagh and Sir C. Stewart* (1861). He was given access to the Londonderry archives, and some new letters of importance were included. But though Alison had considerable knowledge of the Napoleonic period, his standpoint was so obviously partisan, his arguments so repugnant to the spirit of his times, and his scale of values so ludicrous, that his book did little to make Castlereagh's achievements understood. A historian who could place Lord Stewart on the same plane as his brother was obviously incapable of appreciating the merits of Castlereagh's work.

Whig and Liberal writers thus had an easy task in holding up Castlereagh's career to obloquy and ridicule, though foreign historians were from the first more appreciative, and both the histories of Capefigue (1839-41) and Thiers (1845-62) paid high tributes to Castlereagh's diplomatic skill. The publication of the *Wellington Supplementary Dispatches* (1858-72) revealed many new and important facts, especially on the period 1814-15. Lord Salisbury's essay in the *Quarterly* (1862) was written before the essential volumes of the *Supplementary Dispatches* had appeared, and though he was able to make an incisive and convincing defence of some of Castle-

¹ C.C. i. 143-4.

reagh's aims and achievements, it is significant that one who was himself at a later date to place much trust in the 'Concert of Europe' had no idea of the functions and objects of the European Alliance which Castlereagh had devised.

At last the records of the Foreign Office were opened to 1815. They were used by both Oncken in the *Zeitalter der Revolution, des Kaiserreiches und der Befreiungskriege* (1887), which had been preceded by several articles on Castlereagh's diplomacy in 1813-14, and by Fyffe, the second volume of whose *History of Modern Europe* was published in 1886. Both these historians were able to do justice to Castlereagh's share in the European settlement of 1814-15. But in Fyffe's day the archives were only available to 1815, and while he was able by his exceptional knowledge of the printed sources to expose the malicious statements of Greville and Stapleton, he could not describe the working of a system, of which, however, he was the first to point out the true nature. For long Fyffe had no successor, and it was not until the twentieth century that British historians began to investigate the documents which reveal the work which Castlereagh performed.

The result has been a great revulsion of feeling, which has been intensified by the new interest aroused by recent events in the history of the last European settlement. For the first time the difficulty and danger of the problems which Castlereagh had to face, have been realised, and the result has been, perhaps, to exalt unduly some of his achievements. A true picture of these could not, indeed, be obtained even from a perusal of the whole of the records of the Foreign Office. For, as has been seen, Castlereagh relied a great deal on conversations with the representatives of foreign Powers in London, and the records that survive in the archives of other countries are an essential element in the evidence of his career. Not all of these are yet fully known, but the most important have been seriously studied and have provided us with such convincing results that the rest are unlikely to disturb the total effect to any great degree. Unless, therefore, private collections yield unexpected results, it is improbable that much new evidence will be forthcoming sufficiently important to affect materially our judgment of Castlereagh, though, of course, each succeed-

ing year of history is itself a comment on his actions and the great experiments with which he was connected.¹

One conclusion is at any rate quite clear. That Castlereagh was not only courageous and laborious, but also amongst the foremost of his age in diplomatic skill and resource is now generally accepted, and is proved by an overwhelming mass of testimony. The great qualities of which Castlereagh gave evidence in the period 1812-1815 are, indeed, scarcely so apparent in these later years. When, however, all the circumstances are taken into account, his technical ability is seen to be of the highest kind, and the manner in which he obtained his ends shews again and again the touch of a master-hand. He was at his best perhaps during the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle, where the decisions finally taken were almost exactly those laid down in his instructions, in spite of the difficulties raised, not only by the continental statesmen but also by his own Cabinet. In the end, Castlereagh had not only obtained what he wanted, but had obtained it in such a manner as to silence by sheer force of argument and conviction those who had disagreed with him. Nor had he left in any one that resentment and suspicion which a too obviously displayed triumph often incurs and thus defeats its own ends.

Such successes Castlereagh could only achieve, however, when he was able to come into personal contact with European statesmen. It was only then that his energy, resource and powers of persuasion were able to find full opportunity. He had thus, it must be admitted, to incur a severe diplomatic defeat during the Conferences of Troppau and Laibach. Yet the manner in which he retrieved the domestic and foreign situation in 1821-22, and obtained once more a commanding position in Britain and Europe is evidence enough that his abilities remained unimpaired until the final catastrophe.

Whatever he thought of the objects of his policy, it must be allowed, therefore, that he was a diplomatist of the very highest class. His knowledge of men and affairs, his physical and moral courage, his persuasive and convincing character in conversation, his ability to appreciate the point of view of an

¹ We may learn, however, many interesting facts when the Windsor archives are made accessible to historians.

opponent and find means to reconcile it with his own, above all, his capacity to make those with whom he came into contact trust his judgment in those transactions between States, where the future is obscure and risks must always be run, make him rank as one of the ablest of British Foreign Ministers.

A great diplomatist can, however, be a very bad statesman. It is the ends which men seek by which they must be judged. No amount of technical ability will compensate for a failure to appreciate what is right and what is possible. Few have surpassed Metternich in diplomatic skill, yet his career has been almost universally condemned because he used it to maintain a harmful and repulsive hegemony over central Europe. Was Castlereagh any wiser? It is not sufficient answer to point out that he failed to make his wider schemes permanent. How far had he the right to attempt to put them into practice? Above all, was his conception of the European Alliance one worthy of a sincere and farsighted statesman? If so, why did it fail, and were the causes such as Castlereagh could have foreseen and prevented? On the answer to these questions will depend the place which will ultimately be his in history, and must be shortly discussed here.

It is as well to remind ourselves once more at the outset that the Alliance grew out of the necessities of the greatest war in which Britain had ever engaged and was meant to protect her from her ancient and inveterate enemy. It was only this aspect of it that enabled Castlereagh to obtain for it the consent of his countrymen. He thus grafted his new conception of diplomacy on a vigorous sentiment of the British people and obtained for it some measure of support. As his relations with the Cabinet clearly reveal throughout these years, he could not have secured their consent on any other terms. The skill with which he carried out the delicate negotiations necessary cannot be too highly praised. He was leading to a new conception of international diplomacy men who were quite incapable of appreciating all the issues involved in the new scheme which he had devised.

That the idea of Diplomacy by Conference was itself a great conception and one well adapted to the needs of Europe

and Britain, few will deny. The only objection that can be urged against it is that it was in advance of the age. But the statesman who determined to try and make the new idea, which, as has since been clearly proved, is essential to the preservation of European peace, is surely entitled to lasting honour. A situation had arisen which promised to make it a success. The desire for peace amongst the European peoples and the habit of confidential intercourse, which their rulers had contracted during the final stages of the war, appeared to make more possible what would have been previously regarded as only an idle dream. Castlereagh, who had succeeded in overcoming the apparently hopeless obstacles in the way of a European coalition in 1813-14, had perhaps some right to expect that he could obtain an even greater triumph in the years of peace.

Much success he certainly did obtain. By the system of the Alliance the difficult problems connected with the European settlement were overcome with surprising ease. France could certainly not have been brought back into the community of nations with such unanimity and safety unless the European Alliance had been in existence. After 1818 the Quadruple Alliance against France was to be maintained, indeed, but allowed to sleep in the Chancery safes unless awakened by some flagrant act of aggression. Meanwhile, all the Great Powers were bound together in an association, which was apparently based upon practical interests, which had been tested by experience and which might become gradually of overwhelming importance. Even as late as July, 1820, Adams could describe the political system of Europe as "a compact between the five Principal European powers . . . for the preservation of universal peace," conclude that "it has proved effectual to its purposes by an experience of five years," and anticipate that "as a compact between governments it is not improbable that the European Alliance will last as long as some of the states who are parties to it."¹

Castlereagh might be pardoned for taking a similar view. Yet in a little over two years it was realised that the great experiment was over and that Europe had come back to that

¹ W. C. Ford, *Writings of J. Q. Adams*, vii. 47.

state of nature, in which Canning so rejoiced, of every country for itself and God for them all.

The reasons of the failure will have already occurred to those who have read this book. They were many, some inevitable, others possibly avoidable. To determine the exact influence of each is a task beyond the powers of history, whose generalisations are nearly always untrue, so complicated are the facts of human nature which it is called upon to explain. It may not be out of place, however, to attempt to summarise here some of the conclusions which appear to result from the evidence which we possess.

In the first place then it may be pointed out that the European Alliance depended, to a large degree, on the personal connections established between the European rulers at a particular moment. Its aims and objects were never formulated; it never obtained the stability of a definite constitution. It was enshrined only in the vague words of Article VI. of the Treaty of November 20, 1815. Such had been and continued to be Castlereagh's conception of Diplomacy by Conference—a mere agreement on the part of the Great Powers to meet together from time to time to discuss international affairs. He had devised it in fact to suit a Britain and an Europe in which he himself would possess a commanding position, and he was justified by the fact that so long as he lived the system continued in spite of the inconvenient and unexpected events of 1820-21. But no system which depends on the personal connections of a particular individual can hope to survive for long. In relying too much on his own diplomatic skill and experience Castlereagh made it almost impossible for a successor to continue his policy. As has been seen, he realised this fact only too poignantly when he felt his own strength failing.

It may be doubted, however, whether any attempt to formulate the system in such a manner as to ensure its permanence would have stood any chance of success in that age. The objects of the Alliance were merely conservative. None of the statesmen accepted the fact that the world must change, though some of them, especially Metternich, had perceived that some such process was going on. Their conception of

politics, economics and social life was a static one, and if the Alliance had been formulated it was only this idea to which expression could have been given. In a Europe in which a new national life was beginning to arise, as the result of the French Revolution, new methods of education and other mysterious and still unascertained forces, an Alliance, whose only object was to preserve the *status quo* from destruction by force, was bound to fail, even if the statesmen had been prepared to accept an elaborate constitution drawn to meet every emergency that could be foreseen.

Nor had the rulers the right to impose such restrictions on their peoples. Even Castlereagh and Richelieu only represented a minority of their countrymen. The three autocratic monarchies were even less able to express the wishes of their subjects. So great an advance in the European polity could only have been successful if it had been brought about by the pressure of an enlightened and enthusiastic public opinion in the various countries concerned. Had Castlereagh, for example, been sustained in his attempt by the same organised and powerful body of opinion as supported the Abolition of the Slave Trade, how different his position would have been !

But such an expedient was the last on which Castlereagh would have relied. He lacked both the capacity and the desire to win the support of the mass of his countrymen to his policy. To Parliament he had indeed to submit, and he recognised also that there was a public opinion outside Parliament which was the ultimate arbiter of the policy of the nation. But it never occurred to him, as it did in some sense to his successor, to appeal to it boldly and with sincerity and make it realise the truths of which he was himself convinced. This was a fatal weakness, and made the task which Castlereagh had set before himself a hopeless one from the first. For, as has been seen, the Alliance not only never commanded popular support, but was never understood by contemporary opinion. The confusion with the Holy Alliance, the attacks of the Opposition, and the revolutionary outbreaks in Southern Europe completely obscured that aspect of the Alliance which Castlereagh wished to emphasise. Castlereagh's cumbrous speeches were quite incapable of bringing home to his countrymen these new ideas.

In the rest of Europe the appeal was even less possible. In France the European Alliance was naturally associated with the Quadruple Alliance, directed against her, out of which it had grown, and in the other countries of Europe the mass of men were only very faintly conscious of their interest in it.

Castlereagh, like most statesmen of his age, had indeed but little trust in democracy. It was associated in his mind with 'revolution,' and revolution meant violence, murder and aggression—that aspect of the French Revolution which had necessarily impressed itself most strongly on the minds of its opponents. How strongly that emotion was felt by that generation, it is difficult now to realise. For revolution was associated not only with the overthrow of the *ancien régime* in France, but with the Napoleonic domination of Europe, which had succeeded it. When the revolutions in Southern Europe came, therefore, it sometimes seemed to those who had overcome the French Revolution as if Britain and Europe were again in even greater danger than before. Even in 1818 Canning could write of Britain, "The dangers in my conception are greater than in 1793; the means of resistance and the sense of necessity comparatively nothing."¹ After the Neapolitan revolution he applied the same comparison to Europe.¹ Castlereagh had the same fears, and, as he had more responsibility at the critical time, they affected him perhaps even more. How much his Cabinet and Parliament agreed with him is seen in the manner in which the repressive Acts of 1819 were accepted by them. It was scarcely possible for one so situated to lay the foundations of the Alliance on popular understanding and consent.²

Nevertheless Castlereagh was far from submitting to the theories of Alexander and Metternich. His protests in 1820-21 against the use of the Alliance to put down revolution were obviously genuine and not made merely to satisfy public opinion. He saw at once that, if the new instrument were thus

¹ Canning to Bagot, Aug. 24, 1818, Oct. 25, 1820: Captain Bagot, *George Canning and his Friends*, II. 82, 103.

² Castlereagh left a codicil to his will allowing his wife to sell her diamonds if necessary. As Clanwilliam pointed out to Stewart, in the intimate letter previously quoted, this direction could only be meant as a safeguard against successful revolution in Britain.

used, it would soon cease to function in the sense in which he desired it. No one could have asserted more strongly than he did that the Alliance had no concern with the domestic policy of any state. The State Paper of 1820 is only one of a series of documents, which emphasise this point and culminate in the public protest of the circular of January 19, 1821. There can be no question but that Castlereagh felt just as strongly about it as Canning. The difference between them was that Castlereagh wished to preserve the new system of Conferences, and was, therefore, prepared to forget what had happened at Troppau and Laibach in order to perpetuate his scheme. His presence at Vienna in 1822 might have made the Alliance once more accept this doctrine, as it had done at Aix-la-Chapelle. Canning had no desire to bring back to its proper functions an institution with which not his own reputation but that of his predecessor was connected.

But even if Castlereagh had succeeded at Verona, it is difficult to see how his success could have been more than temporary. To the three Eastern monarchies there was no possibility of any compromise with democratic institutions such as the aristocracy of Britain and France had already been forced to make. While Castlereagh thought the Carlsbad Decrees useful and necessary, and condemned the foolish and irresponsible democrats of Naples and Spain, he was by no means unwilling to try and use his influence to obtain in those countries some form of Parliamentary institutions better adapted, according to British ideas, to their necessities. In Naples, Spain and Portugal he hoped that the Crown and the democrats would come to some agreement and erect a more workable form of government. But it was impossible for such ideas to be accepted by Metternich and the new Alexander that existed after Troppau. There was no possibility of permanence in an association of such autocracies with constitutional governments. The rift between Eastern and Western Europe was bound to destroy the Alliance.

When, indeed, the Alliance had apparently been used at Troppau and Laibach to overthrow the revolutionary governments in Naples and Piedmont its end was already near. The protests, which Britain made, were considered as directed

against the Alliance itself, and not merely against the use to which Alexander and Metternich had contrived to put it. Castlereagh, indeed, took the greatest pains to distinguish between the illegitimate objects for which the Eastern Powers tried to use the Alliance and the legitimate aims, which had been defined in the Treaties which he had signed and, indeed, largely devised. But such a distinction, though clear enough to impartial analysis, could be easily obscured by emotional rhetoric or malevolent design. Henceforward it was extraordinarily difficult to make his main objects apparent. Only a striking success at Verona would have shewn the world that the Alliance was meant to restrain the Great Powers rather than to oppress the Small.

Castlereagh never solved the difficult problem of relations between the Small and the Great Powers of Europe. The distinction was one which had only just been realised, and had never been clearly formulated. It was, indeed, to thwart all the efforts of the publicists and lawyers throughout the nineteenth century, and has only been solved, perhaps, in our own day by the gradual appreciation of the logic of facts. To have brought all the Small Powers into the Alliance, as Capo d'Istria and the Tsar at one time thought of doing, would clearly have been to make the machine unworkable. Yet it was obvious that, apart from the question of revolutions, the interests of the Small Powers were deeply affected by the Alliance. So long, indeed, as the Great Powers were united, the rest might protest against their exclusion, but they had no alternative but to obey. Castlereagh saw clearly the dangers of this situation, but he could find no real solution. He proposed to avoid them by a diplomatic and tactful treatment of those States which were necessarily excluded from the Alliance. But this course could not be expected to satisfy the Small Powers, and the result was that they adopted an attitude of hostility towards an institution which reduced their influence and importance in Europe. This undoubtedly contributed to the failure of the Alliance to appeal to elements of public opinion from which it might have been expected to obtain support.

At the best, moreover, the Alliance could only work very

spasmodically in an age in which communications were so difficult. The Tsar might be glad for an excuse to leave Russia for several months, but the Foreign Minister of a constitutional State, with whose Government he could only communicate at long intervals when abroad, found it very difficult to spare the necessary time. Castlereagh had to be brought back from the Congress of Vienna to defend his colleagues from the attacks of the Opposition. Had the Queen died a little earlier and necessitated the summoning of Parliament, he might have been forced to return in similar fashion from Aix-la-Chapelle. It was obviously impossible for him to attend at Troppau and Laibach even if he had desired. The Hanover interview was only obtained because George had necessarily to visit his continental dominions at least once in his reign. It has been seen how difficult it was for Castlereagh to arrange for his journey to Vienna in 1822. It was scarcely possible under such conditions to make the Conferences a normal organ of European diplomacy. The European States had attained a unity such as they had never before possessed, but it needed new developments in communications and transport before they could express it in political institutions.

If these circumstances were sufficient to make impossible the continuance of the European Alliance as Castlereagh had planned it, they made the grandiose and sentimental schemes of the Tsar appear entirely ridiculous. The extravagance of Alexander's ideas was indeed one of the chief reasons why the Alliance so soon ceased to appeal to reasonable men. It can hardly be doubted that the Tsar was sincere. Most of the evidence, at any rate, points in that direction. But the manner in which he attempted to turn the simple idea of Diplomacy by Conference into a guarantee of thrones and governments did almost as much harm to Castlereagh's plans as a more hostile attitude. Castlereagh was able to defeat these schemes during his lifetime, but their mere existence made much harder his task of persuading the British Cabinet to agree to his own plans. Not for the last time the practical statesman found the unbalanced and emotional enthusiast one of the principal obstacles in the path to peace.

For all these reasons, therefore, it must be admitted that Castlereagh was attempting an impossible task. Yet the end which he set before himself was one so noble, and the effort which he made to overcome his manifold and overwhelming difficulties was so gallant and persistent, that it is difficult to avoid paying a tribute to his courageous statesmanship. Politics, and especially international politics, so rarely produce men who rise above a weak opportunism, that the spectacle of a man trying almost single-handed to put into practical shape a new conception of international diplomacy is one that compels admiration. Few men could have obtained even the measure of success which was his, and that was only won by almost unparalleled devotion to duty. Castlereagh undoubtedly gave up his life to the cause of international peace.

Did he sacrifice to this endeavour the special interests of his own country? It was Canning's contention that Castlereagh had laid too much stress on European interests, that he was, in fact, not sufficiently a patriot. This is a strange charge to make against one who had conducted the final stages of the most glorious period in the history of his country, and negotiated a peace which laid, broad and deep, the foundations of a new Empire overseas. Yet the charge appealed to Castlereagh's contemporaries and has often been repeated by historians. There is obviously some measure of truth in it. Throughout his career Castlereagh was always more ready than his colleagues to sacrifice some minor point of British interests to what he considered the more important interest of general goodwill among nations. This characteristic was clearly seen in the treatment of France in 1814-15. It is apparent also in these later years, especially in his dealings with the United States. That for over one hundred years Britain remained at peace with these two countries, in spite of many occasions of acute controversy, must be considered as in part the result of his wisdom and restraint. No one cared less than Castlereagh for that kind of prestige which is obtained by flaunting a diplomatic victory. When he had obtained his own way he was anxious that it should be accepted by other countries as their way also. His policy of co-operation and

conciliation prevented him from indulging in those appeals to patriotic sentiment which never fail to win popular applause.

Castlereagh was, however, a careful steward of his country's interests. If he subordinated minor points to the cause of international peace, he never gave way on what he regarded as essential. So far as material interests are concerned, it is difficult to see what he could have done to make more permanent and extensive the power of the British Empire. Nor did he ever cease to maintain British influence in those portions of the world where it was considered that British interests necessitated its special exercise. The connections with Portugal, Spain, Constantinople and Persia were kept specially close during these years, though care was taken to prevent, if possible, a diplomatic contest with Britain's rivals. Over reviving France, Castlereagh was naturally especially watchful. Yet how wise was the policy which he advocated with success in 1819! He became, it is true, more suspicious and hostile in 1821-22. But he still hoped to reconcile the interests of the two countries, even in problems where they appeared to be most apart. He undoubtedly intended, if possible, to act with her rather than against her, even in the questions of Spain and the Spanish Colonies.

It is true, however, that Castlereagh did not obtain for this country the prestige and influence which she obtained under Canning and other Foreign Ministers, by the encouragement of liberal movements on the Continent. He was, indeed, on the other side. The ridiculous shapes which these movements assumed were especially repugnant to his practical common-sense, and he sacrificed them ruthlessly to what he conceived to be the greater interest of Europe—peace and rest after the storms of recent years. Such attempts as he made to persuade the rulers of that age to treat their subjects with more wisdom and humanity and even allow them some form of constitutional government were never avowed. Lord Salisbury defended this attitude in 1861. "If he had only constructed," he wrote, "a few brilliant periods about nationality or freedom or given a little wordy sympathy to Greece or Spain or the South American republics, the world would have heard much less of

the horrors of his policy.”¹ Castlereagh was, indeed, incapable of such hypocrisy. He never held out his hand to any nation or party unless he saw some way to produce a practical result. Nevertheless it is his greatest condemnation that he failed to appreciate the fact that nationality and self-government were the master forces of the nineteenth century, and that, until they were given room for development, all schemes for international peace would be of no avail. Only when those under the inspiration of these great ideas could be disciplined and taught by experience some of the practical wisdom to which Castlereagh rightly attached so much importance, could his schemes for international co-operation be accomplished and his country obtain the only kind of influence in the European policy, which can be durable and of advantage to the Power which possesses it.

It is this fact which has deprived Castlereagh of the credit and honour which is rightly his. If he avoided the extravagances and crudities of his opponents and worked for great ends, which many of them could not perceive, with wonderful patience and diplomatic skill, he failed to associate his ideas with the deepest emotions of his age. No statesman can succeed who does not steer his vessel into the main stream, however skilfully he may navigate the shallows. His cargo of ideas is soon left behind in the race. So it was with Castlereagh, and thus much of his labour was in vain.

But not all. For though the ideas of international conferences between the Great Powers was never revived in the shape in which he had devised it, and did not remain part of the Treaty obligations of the Great Powers, yet its influence never wholly disappeared. The ‘Concert of Europe’ is a direct descendant of the European Alliance; and, though the ‘Concert of Europe’ was too vague and spasmodic a machine to focus the forces that make towards peace and prevent the final catastrophe, yet it was to render great service to Europe in the course of the century. For this and for the work which he did to overcome the particular difficulties of his age, Castlereagh is entitled to the gratitude not only of his own countrymen but of humanity.

¹ Salisbury, *Essays, Biographical*, 53.

The man to whom that gratitude is due we shall never know intimately. The curtain of reserve was never raised until the personality behind it was no longer the Castlereagh who had played so great part in European affairs. Yet behind the smiling, inscrutable and splendid presence a glimpse can sometimes be caught of a character that would have been singularly winning and attractive if it had not been oppressed by a too conscious sense of duty and responsibility. No statesman ever gave himself more completely to the public service. He sacrificed to it not only his comfort and his health, but all those personal and intimate emotions which are the greatest part of the lives of most men, however exalted their state. If we can learn from his failures, the sacrifice will not have been made in vain.

APPENDICES

- A. CASTLEREAGH'S CIRCULAR DISPATCH, JANUARY 1, 1816.
- B. OBSERVATIONS OF THE DUKE OF WELLINGTON UPON
THE MEMORANDUM OF LORD CASTLEREAGH,
APRIL 1820.
- C. SEPARATE DISPATCHES AND LETTERS FROM LORD
STEWART TO CASTLEREAGH, 1820-21.
- D. PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CASTLEREAGH
AND METTERNICH, 1822.
- E. PRIVATE LETTERS FROM ESTERHAZY TO METTERNICH,
1819-22.
- F. DISPATCHES FROM LIEVEN TO NESSELRODE, 1818-22.
- G. PRIVATE LETTERS FROM JOSEPH PLANTA TO STRAT-
FORD-CANNING, 1821-22.

APPENDIX A

CASTLEREAGH'S CIRCULAR DISPATCH.¹

Foreign Office, *January 1, 1816.*

At the close of the diplomatic transactions which have been concluded at Paris, and which from their magnitude and importance must be considered as prospectively forming the basis of our diplomatic policy, I feel it necessary to transmit for your information, and to call your attention to, the principal instruments that compose this great political settlement amongst the nations of Europe.

Although the object of this transaction has been equally to provide, in liberality and in justice, for the interests of all Powers, whether parties to these deliberations or not, you will perceive that the conduct of these negotiations has necessarily fallen into fewer hands, and been almost exclusively managed by the four principal States, whose efforts and whose resources have chiefly been instrumental in subduing the revolutionary power of France.

As the difficulty of combining these great Powers in one common system of policy was, perhaps, the main cause why Europe was so long desolated by revolutionary violence, it is the more important, now that it has been once happily effected, and that under its influence the arms as well as the councils of Europe have achieved so much, to cherish that union, as the best security to which we can look, against the recurrence of a similar danger.

The Treaty of Alliance, which has been signed at Paris between the Courts of London, Petersburg, Vienna and Berlin, will point out to you the intimate union which subsists between the Sovereigns, thus allied for the preservation of the peace and independence of Europe; and will at the same time impress you with the importance of cultivating the confidence of the Ministers of those Powers, accredited to the same Sovereign as yourself, as having a common duty to perform, and being charged in common with you, to watch

¹ *F.O. 146, France (Archives), 12.* The dispatch, to write which Castlereagh took "advantage of a bad day to spare the pheasants," was in the first instance addressed to Rose and then made circular to all Missions: *C.C. xi. 104.*

over and to preserve the peace at which all have so much reason to rejoice.

You will avow to them the nature of the instructions you have received. You will invite them, in the spirit which has so happily carried the Alliance through so many difficulties, to adopt an open and direct mode of intercourse in the conduct of business, and to repress on all sides, as much as possible, the spirit of local intrigue in which diplomatic policy is so falsely considered to consist, and which so frequently creates the very evil which it is intended to avert.

The note addressed to the Duke de Richelieu, and which conveyed to the French Government a copy of this Treaty, as well as the note announcing the appointment of the Duke of Wellington to the chief command of the Allied troops in France,¹ will fully explain the conciliatory as well as liberal views which animated the Allied Sovereigns towards Louis the 18th and his kingdom, the first object of the Alliance, in truth, being to save both, and through them the rest of Europe, from becoming again a prey to revolutionary anarchy and violence.

The above documents will enable you distinctly to trace the line of your duty both towards your colleagues, the representatives of the Allied Sovereigns, and towards the representative of the King of France ; but it will be the object of your especial care to make the other Courts, with whom we have been acting as Allies in the late contest, but who are not signing parties to this Treaty, feel that its spirit is not the less friendly to their interests, nor its object the less one which they should approve.

Such an Alliance could only have owed its origin to a sense of common danger ; in its very nature it must be conservative ; it cannot threaten either the security or the liberties of other States ; if the course of their past councils did not sufficiently dispel such an idea, it is obvious that the individual interests of these Sovereigns must at once diverge upon any question of injustice or spoliation ; all the other States of Europe, therefore, ought to view this connexion with favour and not either with distrust or jealousy ; and, if they are not immediately invited to accede, it is because the contracting parties are of opinion that it is better to suffer this Treaty, like that of Chaumont, upon the model of which it is framed, to remain in its present state as a basis of general security and confidence, unless a danger shall actually arise, to which it is meant to be a remedy, when, as was the case in the Treaty of the 25th of March [1815] signed at Vienna, the instrument of accession can be framed with more precision, to meet the particular exigency of the occasion.

There is, however, a natural disposition in Courts the most

¹ *B.F.S.P.* iii. 246, 248.

interests of your own Court ; it is the province of a Foreign Minister to be vigilant and to keep his Government well-informed ; but I wish you without running into such an extreme to inspire as far as possible a temper of morality and confidence amongst those who are accredited to the same Court. The language of such a Power as Great Britain is calculated in itself to do much ; but when its views and principles are understood, when it is distinctly known to be leagued with no particular Court to the oppression of another, that its only object is the peace of the world, and that it is determined to use all its means to combine the Powers of Europe against that State whose perverted policy or criminal ambition shall first menace the repose in which all have a common interest,—I am sanguine in my hopes that the most salutary results may be expected from such a line of policy.

As the politics of the Continent may now be considered as again restored to somewhat of a settled course, you may expect to receive from me, from time to time, more regular and detailed instructions for the direction of your conduct ; the present dispatch, with its enclosures,¹ will, I persuade myself, relieve you from all doubt, as to the general principles upon which it will be your duty to conduct the Mission with which you are charged.

¹ Documents relating to the transactions of 1814-15.

APPENDIX B

OBSERVATIONS UPON THE MEMORANDUM BY LORD CASTLEREAGH, APRIL 1820¹

THE Memorandum, as originally drawn by Lord Castlereagh, was constructed only for the consideration of the Cabinet and of the King. The question now to be considered is whether it shall be communicated to the King's Ambassadors and Ministers at foreign Courts, to be communicated by them to the Governments to which they are accredited or otherwise made use of according to their discretion.

A great part of the Memorandum with some modifications must be communicated generally to the Allied Courts in answer to the Russian communications, and the whole of it, with some alterations, might be communicated with advantage. Most of the topics to which it refers have been brought under the consideration of the Allied Cabinets in the discussions at Paris in 1815 and at Aix-la-Chapelle, and it might be advantageous to bring them under their view again.

The first alteration which I would suggest is the omission in the fourth page of the first sheet regarding General Pozzo di Borgo.² I believe we have obtained this fact only through a private channel; and we could not well make use of it in an official paper.

It appears to me that in reasoning upon the question of interference in the affairs of Spain some use might be made of the Protocole of the Conference of Aix-la-Chapelle. I have not got that paper before me, but as well as I recollect there is a declared intention not to interfere in the affairs between nation and nation unless called upon. If I am correct in this recollection I would use that topic in this manner. First we were not called upon, and could not interfere nor even appear to interfere. I would secondly

¹ *F.O. Prussia*, 122. It is endorsed on back, "The Duke of Wellington's observations upon Lord Castlereagh's Memorandum on Spanish Affairs as originally drawn, April 1820." It is probably filed here because of its references to German military security. I have found no other copy in the Record Office.

² There had been a reference to Pozzo di Borgo's desire for a Conference.

apply it to the proposition from Prince Hardenberg that France should be put forward on this occasion. As long as Spain does not call upon the Allies to interfere they cannot interfere at all. If Spain should call upon the Allies to interfere the question of interference or non-interference will come to be considered ; and the time and mode of interference would be important parts of the question. But this country could never consent to interfere with arms for the same reason that it could not interfere with arms in the disputes between Spain and her Colonies ; nor would it be possible for our Government in any case to entrust to the Minister of any foreign Power the character and interests of this country in any discussion or transaction with any other foreign Power. It appears to me that this would be a better mode of putting forward the objections to entrust France with this negotiation, supposing it should even be thought proper to undertake it, than to found it upon our national jealousies.

It is very desirable to take this opportunity of reminding the Allied Ministers of our opinions of the nature and objects of the Alliance ; and the discussion at Aix-la-Chapelle might be recalled to their recollection. All that part of the Memorandum likewise which points out the difficulties and dangers of any interference with the revolutions in France and Spain is very important, as well as that part which relates to the safety of the other States from revolutionary dangers. But I would omit the mention of any State, excepting those of the Germanic Body, in the official Memorandum. These States by their organization in a Confederacy and by mutual consent have in a manner guaranteed each other from the dangers of revolution ; and their acts and the situation in which each of them finds itself placed is a fair subject of discussion in a State Paper ; and it is desirable to shew Prussia, for instance, that she is more safe from revolutionary danger than she has yet considered herself.

But I don't think we could safely discuss with Foreign Governments the mode in which this system can be applied to other States not now forming a part of it with a view to revolutionary questions, or in other words contests between Governments and people. As long as Germany is safe from revolutions the German Powers ought to be satisfied ; and they might be expected to wait till the danger should appear for the measures of safety to be adopted in respect to the Netherlands, Denmark, Italy and others.

APPENDIX C

SEPARATE DISPATCHES AND LETTERS FROM LORD STEWART TO CASTLEREAGH, 1820-21¹

(i)

Vienna, September 29, 1820.

(Most secret, private and confidential.)

. . . It will be in your recollection that Metternich, building upon his own ability to divert the Russian Cabinet from their propositions sent from Pultowa, adopted such a plan as might continue in an unquestionable manner the countenance and support of Russia and France to the operations to be pursued in Italy, and also place England in such a position in connection with the whole, as to give the effect of a moral union, directing all the Great Powers, and nevertheless not confine any one of them from a separate conduct, which Prince Metternich knew fully the British Government's peculiar sentiments, and our Constitution and Parliamentary difficulties, indispensably required.

The Austrian Minister was placed (I conceive) in this situation. A great evil had arisen which threatened an immediate loss of certain provinces in Italy, and doctrines, under this evil, were disseminated, by which the whole Empire was convulsed and endangered, and the European system menaced with a complete overthrow. To combat this evil *in limine* with vigour, all the disposable force of Austria was instantly put in motion, and she took the initiative in preparing for action, as well as in proposition. To obtain the declarations of the Great Powers as to their common mode of viewing this new and extraordinary revolution, and to secure their union of moral feeling, became Metternich's primary object. For it was evident, that unless all the five Powers were disposed to view the event and the portentous era in which it occurred in the same colours and under the same aspect, the difficulties of Austria in contending with it and commencing her overt acts, would be increased ten-fold.

¹ *F.O. Austria*, 160.

In the course of an early correspondence, it appeared Russia, France, Prussia, and England were all united in their definition of this revolution and of its dangerous consequences. The moral feeling seemed thus established, but then there arose in the sentiments that were put forth from each Cabinet a discordance as to forms and modes of proceeding under the impending dangers, which threw the Austrian Minister into the dilemma of looking either to reconcile these differences, or of losing some one of the great moral *appui* to his stupendous undertaking.

It was thus, that when Russia and France pressed for a *reunion* of Sovereigns, and Conferences of Cabinets, and that England opposed anything like joint deliberations or joint modes of action, that Prince Metternich sent his propositions to Pultowa to change their plan of *reunion* according to the arrangements stated by Russia to have been agreed upon at Aix-la-Chapelle, and to substitute Ministerial Conferences at Vienna, and a meeting of the two Emperors afterwards at Troppau. These Ministerial Conferences were to afford confidential explanations, while they were to impose on the abettors and agitators of revolution in Europe and give force to the operations of Austria; and the meeting of Sovereigns was afterwards to add by their countenance a solidity to the effect of the deliberations.

That Prince Metternich tried to accomplish this plan on the one hand, to effect what might answer our views, I cannot doubt; but on the other, I equally admit that he wished to secure and commit Russia and France to whatever line of conduct the general good, as well as the particular interests of Austria, induced her on the present occasion to adopt. I cannot, however, deny, that I think Prince Metternich was desirous to adopt his measures (when the above Conferences took place) under the sanction, if not in the name of the five Powers; and with respect to acquiescence or approbation on their part, he wished to secure and have it pronounced before he struck his blow. I mention this decidedly here, because, although the Prince has always talked of Austria's separate operations, he has more than once admitted, that whatever Austria carried into effect should be countenanced by the other Powers, and that, when Naples was occupied, it would belong to the King, who would be set free to call upon his Allies to assist him in upholding his Government, and on this point the sentiments of Sir William A'Court, were those Prince Metternich announced.

The Austrian Minister, from reasons I have already detailed to you, failed in his too sanguine views of changing the Russian projects, and by return of his messengers he found that Russia adhered to her own opinions, and by the last accounts from England she also evidently persevered in her line. With respect to France, from communications that arrived, it seemed she would depart

from her own ideas to meet the general wishes of the other Powers, and there did not now appear any difficulty with her. That Prince Metternich deceived himself as to Russia, I admit and lament; that I feared it would be so, is equally true; and that having once taking up the line of opposing a formal *reunion* of Sovereigns, he would have done better to have adhered to it, at possible risks, I am inclined to believe. And here I should add, that when Metternich wrote to Prince Esterhazy upon the receipt of the last Russian dispatches and seemed to throw out his intention of abandoning his ground in consequence of the Russian resistance, he certainly made no communications of a similar nature to Warsaw, so that probably he was only feeling his way with us to ascertain if he could bring us nearer the point before he again replied to the Russian Cabinet.

The fact, however, is that the game now playing is for a stake no less deep, perhaps, than the existence of this Empire, and the calculation (I am sure) has arisen in the minds of this Government: "If we have not all the Allies with us in the moral union and common deliberation, who are most essential in this crisis? And if we must quarrel with any, who are those who will be most indulgent to us, understand our position best, and from whom we have the least to dread?"

Without the positive support and acquiescence of France, the hydra in Italy would raise its head beyond all power of being crushed, while it would be fostered and fed from the *limitrophe* provinces of the former country. Without Russia's bearing the features of committal in this concern, she would be ranged as a secret supporter of the *Libéraux* in the *Presqu' Ile*, and Austria would not dare to move with Russia's colossal means *in terrorem*, and without the declaration of her will, or what her intentions and sentiments were. It is unnecessary to allude to Prussia, as Austria feels this Power so intimately and closely connected with her as to act the same part as herself.

Without England (however disadvantageous as it undoubtedly is both for the existing Alliance, and for the Austrian interests in particular, to act), still from the nature of the present evil, the territorial rather than the maritime Powers will be most considered, and, if a common understanding of all cannot be achieved, it is most natural to fear England on the present occasion will stand alone. The consequences of shewing to Europe that there is a schism in that powerful Alliance, which is its best safeguard, Prince Metternich argues, can never be contemplated without dismay, and he asserts that even the appearance of a difference of sentiment would agitate all the Powers of the second order. He said an inference so disastrous in its consequences has been (he has assured me) the *but* of all his labours. England has most powerfully and effica-

ciously appeared on the theatre by her late bold determinations, and Austria is certainly contented and satisfied with the British Government, but she accuses Russia of playing the game of throwing difficulties in the way, to prevent that general and moral *entente* upon the question, the appearance of which is so desirable for the common end.

Prince Metternich also asserts that in considering the last overtures which Russia made to England by Count Lieven, that with respect to the line of action claimed from England, Russia declared herself to be of the same opinion with the British Government. If this fact is really so, the question naturally occurs, whether Russia is desirous or considers it prudent or beneficial to exclude England from the general and moral union that it is wished to establish.

Had Russia acceded to the Austrian arrangements, France undoubtedly would have done the same, and ministerial Conferences would ere this have been established at Vienna, during which deliberations the Austrians would have been acting; and yet the deliberations would most probably never have arrived at any formal acts, but would have been confined to explanations, general communications and a centre of information, while they would have afforded all that *moral entente* which was of such immense importance to Austria in the prosecution of her objects.

Prince Metternich's preliminary *Mémoire* was drawn up to prepare the Courts for such points as might be submitted for deliberation. He went too far in suggesting a concert (and now wishes to explain this away under the head of *une entente préalable*) upon certain propositions, and not far enough in explanation of the essence and difficulties of the business. However, if I remember the paper correctly, it declares (previous to stating the five distinct queries) that the Emperor takes the existing relations and treaties of Europe as the basis from which His Imperial Majesty will never depart, or words to the above effect. Now this appeared to me to take away all idea of any aggrandizement on the part of Austria, or of her aiming at supremacy in Italy incompatible with existing treaties, as well in the *formal official declarations* to the Government of Italy through the Austrian Ministers, which were sent in copy to England. Other details connected with the occupation of the Neapolitan country, I was led to believe, would be laid hereafter before the Ministers in Conference when the *entente préalable* was established. In making these remarks, do not imagine I have the presumption to combat your view, but I only wish to explain how my mind was possessed and how it has reasoned upon the course of the business here.

To come next to the argumentative and forcible points (six in number) in your letter,¹ which arrive at the decision that no

¹ To Stewart, Sept. 16, 1820 : C.C. xii. 313.

expectation can be given of the possibility of the concurrence of England to the Austrian propositions, I should do Prince Metternich injustice if I did not assure you that I believe he fully concurs in their wisdom and force, situated as Great Britain now is. I hope I have not erred in confidentially stating these particular paragraphs to him. I am aware that I have departed from your directions, and that the whole was altogether for *my private information*, but yet they contain so much momentous matter and true argument, that the knowledge of them may be of essential service at the present crisis; and as I have a full persuasion that the best and most useful consequences may arise from them, I have ventured to use my own discretion in this instance, especially as you conclude the *six points* by saying, "The objection to such a system in a Government such as ours, is insuperable and I presume the consequences of it as above stated would not be less alarming to Prince Metternich." My desire therefore was, that Prince Metternich should know these objections in the energetic manner they are laid down, and I hope I shall stand excused in departing from the letter of your directions.

On the other parts of your letter, I have hinted the course of reasoning generally to Prince Metternich, with a view of shewing him the insurmountable difficulties under which England labours, what you consider the true policy of the Government, and how firm you are upon the line of conduct you have adopted. It is certainly to be lamented that Russia, who is neither confined by a Parliament nor a free Constitution, should be placing *entraves* on the progress of the common and universal good. Where two great Powers mean a common purpose, it best becomes that Power to yield who is least hampered by forms, and who is the most mistress of her actions. The contrast that you draw between the different manner the Neapolitan revolution influences the particular interests of Austria and Great Britain, is too clear and convincing not to be at once admitted; and, indeed, I do not consider that Prince Metternich would dispute a single point in your letter as coming from a British Minister. But what he would assert *as Austrian Minister*, I conceive to be: that Russia puts unnecessary impediments in the course Austria wishes to adopt, she having no means to do so, whereas Great Britain is circumscribed and obliged to take the course she has decided upon; that although it is not against the interests of *Austria* that Great Britain should take the line she is disposed to do, it is not for *her* [Austrian] interests that Russia and France should have the same separation of action; because they are less to be confided in, and because their decisions become most vital, from their geographical position and immense power, in this anxious affair; that Russia and France are not disposed, as Great Britain, to leave Austria to herself and unembarrassed in her course; on

the contrary, their ambition induces them to be prominent in the counsels, if not in the decisions, of all that is to be done; that it is Russia and France that endeavour to incorporate Great Britain as a passive member, and that Russia has gone so far (if this cannot be effected) as to propose that England should be excluded, whereas Austria wished to shape her course only to gain the moral *appui* of all the five Powers to oppose a revolutionary change, which is admitted by all to be pregnant with danger and evil example to all Governments.

To avow that the late overtures to the four Courts from Austria are conformable to these arguments (which are those Metternich has used personally to me), is more than I am prepared to do, but I think that Prince Metternich's great endeavour has been to take that position with all the Powers most conducive to give the most formidable impression, and to produce the most salutary results, without, however, wishing to *gêner* in the mode of action any particular Power.

I have now endeavoured (although I fear very imperfectly) to explain the course of reasoning I have heard during these last months. I now arrive at the effect your last official despatches have created. The sincerest and most cordial approbation attends the decision relative to the fleet and the instructions to Sir William A'Court, and certainly this feature may make a very material change in such ultimate decisions as the Court of Vienna may make.

I write this hasty private letter before the return of the messengers who have been dispatched to Pesth to communicate with the Emperor [of Austria], but I shall not send my courier until their return, and until I know the result of Prince Metternich's renewed deliberations. But the bearing of his mind, when I last saw him, was to send Mons. de Lebzeltern to Warsaw to work upon the *esprit* of Count Capo d'Istria, to make a renewed effort to get rid of the formal reunion at Troppau, and to find out a *moyen terme* by dividing the period and obtaining the Russian consent to previous ministerial Conferences; to ascertain if a more formal *reunion* was expedient or necessary; to suggest also the possibility of having them at Vienna as less formal, and possibly thus affording less objects for general observation.

These measures were to be taken to meet as far as possible the sentiments of the Cabinet of Great Britain. But Prince Metternich confided to me at the same time that, if they failed, he feared he had no resource left. He added that the Emperor being in one quarter, and himself in another, was very inconvenient at the present moment. From the advices he received from His Imperial Majesty, he found him already extremely out of humour at all the difficulty that seemed to be arising, and certainly if his magnanimity was shaken, and if he was to trace back his steps, or be

chancellor, there is no saying how evils would increase or difficulties multiply. . . .

(ii)

Vienna, October 2, 1820.

(*Most secret and confidential*)

. . . (Cypher) I hope you will not imagine I am led or overpersuaded out of my instructions or your sentiments by Count Metternich in what I advanced. You know, although I render him complete justice for his great talents and extraordinary union of agreeable qualities, I am fully aware of his political chicanery (cypher ends). Still, when we consider him on the present occasion, we must view him as an Austrian Minister, who has a duty to perform paramount to all others, viz. to place the Empire he has charge of in the securest position, and, looking to all possible chances, to preserve the power and independence and the present order of things throughout the Emperor's dominions unimpaired.

You will already have seen that I admit Prince Metternich was inclined to change his position during these anxious discussions on paper, and finding he could not work upon Russia as he at first projected, he directed his battery to bring England nearer the mark, keeping Russia *merely informed* that the Emperor of Austria would accept the meeting at Troppau. It is however here to be observed, that although Prince Metternich accepted the meeting, he never assented to its being *dans toutes les formes convenables*. This phrase, which came from Russia, Prince Metternich asserts should not be saddled upon him, as although in his conscience and duty he will not allow the Emperor of Russia to return to St. Petersburg without a meeting with the Emperor of Austria, which would commit the former on the steps to be taken, still the Prince has been contesting by courier after courier against *les formes convenables*, crying out against having *les drapeaux déployés*, insisting only on confidential communications *viva voce* in the most unofficial shape. When you read the phrase above quoted from the Russian despatches, Prince Metternich flatters himself you had not read the Austrian one. In it you would have discovered his not having committed himself to Russia to any such Conferences *avec toutes les formes convenables*.

In truth, although you are quite right as to my not having read the Russian despatches, and consequently must have been ignorant of the Emperor of Russia's impressions, yet how could I doubt what Prince Metternich's impressions were, when he declared to me most positively, all that the Emperor of Austria had engaged to was to meet his Ally at Troppau, and it certainly appears by all

the diplomatic operations since, that whatever may have been the Emperor of Russia's impressions, the Austrian Cabinet had never yet agreed to *him* to the formal *reunion* with *les formes convenables* as proposed.

With respect to all the diplomatick game that I think has been introduced into this affair, I hope to make things work right at last; although we may rail at and lament it, it is out of the nature and course of things to *écarter* management and chicane from hence. The correspondence of the last years between this Court and Russia must prove this fact in an incontrovertible manner to you. It is in vain to arrest a great river in its course, but, by confining its inundations and turning its stream, you may keep it within a certain district. I therefore really considered, if Great Britain retained her position, we should not be too hard upon the manner in which Metternich contrived to bring Russia and France to the same post as himself. And here we must in candour admit, that if these two Great Powers were to hang back or to coalesce, all Italy would be in their hands, and the Emperor of Russia has brought Mons. de La Ferronnays with him to Warsaw, and between the Duc de Richelieu, the above Minister, and Mons. Pozzo di Borgo, stranger things than an *understanding* have turned out.

Russia and France, however, being agreed with *Austria*, could *she* do also without shewing that England, to whom Austria is more naturally (than the other Powers) allied, was disposed to lend as great a moral *appui* as England could do in her particular situation? [*sic*]. It was very important to Austria that it should be seen that England in a moral sense was not separated. Russia could dispense with England because she has China at her back, but Austria could not dispense with Russia because she could not leave Russia in her rear.

The result of my reasoning then goes to prove that Metternich has had a very difficult game to play in a very vital question, that he has been called on to look a little further than the exact evil before us, and that he has been obliged to weigh well *les pouds et les contres* upon the grand question of the existence of the Empire. I have assured you in my private letter that Metternich fully understands and is disposed to consult the convenience of our Government, and I have a perfect confidence he will do so, short of one step, viz. the security of his own.

The present difficulties have undoubtedly brought forcibly into consideration the advantages and disadvantages of the present great Alliance. Out of the five Powers that compose it three have pure monarchical institutions. The other two, England and France, have constitutional governments. The measures of the former in all points connected with their publick administration and safety, should be vigorous, prompt, and immediate. In the constitutional

Governments they can be committed to nothing without previous deliberation and discussion; and although they can act upon a great crisis or contingency, they cannot be pledged upon any probable evil, nor take measures to forestall futurity. If I am right in this view, I should like to ask if, in administrative questions, the Alliance is not a bar to the immediate action of the Government purely monarchical? But then, on the other hand, under the late convulsions of Europe and the anarchy that reigned, the Alliance was its salvation, and the manner in which the Powers of the second order are kept in check with it occasions it to be generally respected by all the friends of good order as the bulwark of the safety of Europe. As out of evils it is always best to choose the least, I consider the majority of the Great Powers adhere to this League, because in bringing it as near as they can to common agreement and united agency, it is preferable to all other natural changes or monstrous incongruities than an ingenious mind might figure himself as growing out of an annihilation of the present order of things [*sic* '].

We must, however, consider that the moment has now arrived for the first time when we are to see how this great Alliance practically works. If it cannot hang together in keeping its moral influence intact, and if it does not hold out to Europe this picture, it is difficult to pronounce what Power may be first disposed to abandon it. With the character of the Emperor of Russia there is unquestionably more advantage in this great Alliance than if His Imperial Majesty was gifted with other qualities. The keeping him secure makes it of inestimable advantage to Austria, and Prussia is no less supported by it under her present difficulties, but if it should not be brought to bear and be able to act with great difficulties in a portentous era without some positive or marked separation, the possibility exists that other engagements will sooner or later arrive.

In like manner to choosing the least of evils, as before cited, Prince Metternich finds himself now obliged to decide between two that are present, either to forego having Russia (who if not *for* would be *against*) and France and to stand singly with England, or to sign and seal with the two former and trust to the known dispositions of Great Britain. Had the Cabinet of Russia acted and answered as that of Berlin, none of the present difficulties would have occurred.

To conclude, I can only declare that Prince Metternich read to me to-day his report transmitting all the late correspondence to the Emperor, and it really is so fair and candid an exposition, and one that, I am sure, when you take all things into your view, that you will be equally disposed to admit as just and equitable to all parties, that I have entreated His Highness to forward the same

to England translated for your perusal. I should apologise, my dear Brother, for writing so much, but I feel the delicacy and difficulty of the moment, and as you will see in Metternich's report to his Sovereign that he thinks the chances are that England will allow her Ambassador to repair to Troppau rather than that the Emperor of Russia will be induced to agree to change the projected meeting to Conferences at Vienna, I shall only say, if this should be the case, that you may rest perfectly satisfied (if it should fall to my duty) of my being a complete nonentity, except for the purposes of ample information to my Government, and that I shall entirely consider going thither as accepting the invitation of the Emperor of Austria to be nearer his person, and to be the channel of important information; and although my presence may afford the countenance of England openly, which Metternich desires, still upon the official invitation I shall receive from this Court, and my positive instructions to take no part, but to listen and report, you may be enabled to support that line before Parliament which the wisdom and judgment of the Cabinet have decided upon.

(iii)

Troppau, November 3, 1820.

(Separate. Most secret and confidential.)

The clouds here begin to lower, and the placid aspect of the first week has given way to dark and thoughtful countenances. If your Lordship were not so fully aware of the characters in the drama, you might think me too susceptible of daily impressions, and my reports might bear the features of inconsistency; but in recalling to mind the positions at Vienna, Paris, and Aix-la-Chapelle, I am sure you will entirely understand what may be the *carte du pays* here, and I have no difficulty in writing just as things occur.

I found Prince Metternich, in a long conversation yesterday, extremely low and out of spirits. He had had the previous evening three hours conference with Mons. de Capo d'Istria. The large field of theories, which the latter entered into upon the construction of the governments of empires and nations, and upon the possibilities of a reconstruction upon general principles, which all enlightened politicians would sanction, led to such a vast chapter, that, Prince Metternich assured me, he could neither follow the Russian Minister, relate what passed, nor give further explanation than that he was clearly of opinion it was Mons. de Capo d'Istria's intention to lead us into all the labyrinths of his general views, and of the theories of the questions which revolve in his brain, and he would not even touch upon, or express a sentiment how the positive case and existing evil was to be handled. "At last,"

added the Prince, "losing all patience, I rose from my seat, and taking Count Nesselrode, who was in a different corner of the room, into my Cabinet, I told him that I had now talked three hours with his colleague, that they had been in possession of the Austrian paper ten days, and that I fearfully predicted when they did deliver their sentiments, they would be couched in such a mode as in no shape to meet the views I entertained; that if unfortunately this was the case, or if a much longer delay occurred, Austria could not stand with her arms across while her existence was undermining, and that, therefore, allowing two or three days more, if they did not declare themselves, I should come forward with my positive declarations and take that line which the interest of our Empire demanded." The Count Nesselrode (decidedly more than ever *sous le bec* of Mons. de Capo d'Istria) seemed extremely alarmed at this strong language, and entreated Prince Metternich *pour l'amour du Ciel d'attendre*; that he promised their communications would be everything Austria could desire, and only to allow time and means *de bien placer les questions*.

Without stating more of what passed with Prince Metternich than I have already written, your Lordship will see that his mind shewed great symptoms of discontent. This was increased in the evening by an assertion of Mons. de Capo d'Istria that reached the Prince, "that he (Capo d'Istria) had had three hours conversation with Prince Metternich, and that he believed now *les affaires marcheront*, as the Prince and himself had made great progress in seeing all the great points in the same point of view."

Mons. de Gentz called upon me this morning, and it may add some light to the moment I write in, to give your Lordship heads of his conversation. He mentioned to me that the two Russian Secretaries of State had been with him, evidently with the view of launching out the ideas of one of them, to try and sound how they might be borne when formally brought before Prince Metternich. Mons. de Capo d'Istria implied that all Austria had *stated* as yet, were *des misères* (this was agreeable to one of the compilers of the Austrian Memoir); that for his part, we were now to consider general principles, and general actions. Did the Emperor of Austria want of Russia 150 or 200,000 men to cut the throats of the Carbonari? There they were at her disposal. Did they want the dissent of Russia to military revolutions? They had it. But if they wanted an *appui moral* to overturn a government, it must be shewn what was to be substituted in its place. The reconstruction of governments for the welfare of mankind was a subject worthy of the consideration of the great Association of Europe.

Mons. de Gentz asked if they would be legislators as well as pacificators? And where they would find that immense mind

that could give a code of administration such as was alluded to ? If Mons. de Capo d'Istria had it, in God's name let him produce it ! Although the Russian Secretary of State did not pledge himself to produce it, yet he went on to argue, " The measures now to be taken must be for every possible supposition. Austria certainly has a secret treaty with Naples that may give her more right and power to act now than Russia. We have no treaty of the kind. You wish to restore the King, the Prince Royal, and the Marquis de Circello. We care nothing about this Government. We ought to look to the nation, so that that government is established which all enlightened men will approve most. The Emperor of Austria has always professed the principles of absolute monarchy. Russia, on the other hand, has looked to the proper mixture of liberty and constitutional rights, that affords a more enlarged and better basis of government. Our views should be now turned to reconcile these."

Mons. de Gentz said, " In the present times and at this moment, the Minister that could do all this would be one of those miraculous beings which had never yet descended from the skies." " Yes," but rejoined the other, " although we may not do everything, we must do all we can. It is said that England and France may not be able to join with us in our sentiments, but I wish to shape our course in a manner, that, if England and France support opposite doctrines, we shall nevertheless in our conduct and actions have the *appui* of all the rational and the *bien pensants de l'Europe*. Mons. de Gentz confessed he was lost in amazement.

" It is possible," continued Mons. de Capo d'Istria, " that the British Ministry may be overturned ; it is possible this strange *Procès* may not be carried ; it is possible it may be carried ; it is possible that the elections in France may be unfavourable, that they may be *mediocre*, that they may be very good. For all these, and innumerable other hypotheses, we must be prepared and enter upon the views of them all, in the decisions and principles that are to be agreed upon."

I might add a great deal more, but, indeed, it is too wild to take up your Lordship's time with. But it is the more to be deplored, as the individual who deals in all this language, has that exuberant fancy, that he can go on, and by degrees paralyze, and lose those with whom he converses, and they leave him with a certain wonder, which for a time has the effect of wishing to develop where he ranges, or within what limits he would be confined.

It is difficult certainly, to reconcile all this language with that of the Emperor his Master, and to what extent Mons. de Capo d'Istria has power will be hereafter seen, but by placing before the Emperor the necessity of upholding his great character, and, above all, holding out specious delusions that all principles for general

government will throw more weight and power into Russian hands, it is possible that this Minister may paralyze dispositions, which appear on the outset to be all that Austria could have desired.

There is no doubt a rage for constitutions in the present times, but the above ideas go to an extent for universal government upon one great code of general principles, which happily, however, is a rage, the symptoms of which are not yet apparent except in the overflowing brain of the projector. Whatever may be the result of these Conferences, and to whatever point the ideas may be ultimately fixed, I cannot help hoping that this despatch will not prove entirely uninteresting as a slight record of Mons. de Capo d'Istria's outset in the private deliberations.

(iv)

Troppau, November 20, 1820.

(*Most secret and confidential. Separate.*)

I have endeavoured in my numbered despatch to give you such a detail of what passed at the Conferences of this day that will make up, together with our Journal, the official account of the occurrences. I shall dedicate this letter to those confidential observations which our present position calls for.

The French Ambassador and myself had already had more than one communication on the subject of the Conferences of the three Powers taking an unnecessary shape of mystery and *reticence*. In calling upon the Ministers the door had been refused to us, because they were *en conference*. Whatever the dignity of Cabinets required to be kept up over Ambassadors, it was pushed too far, and the dignity or indignity in the eyes of the publick towards us as representing two great nations, was not sufficiently attended to.

Anxiously disposed to afford every facility to the prosecution of the labour under consideration, you may be assured, especially with the view and line my Government had adopted, I should not have been on the *qui vive* to find fault, if there had not been an indecent regard to our situation, which nothing but the wish to operate upon and to carry Russia forward, pledging her to a signed act, unmindful of every other consideration, can account for. These considerations, nevertheless, should not have induced me to shew ill humour, or to make an observation in the Conference, had there not been a conduct practised which I could not understand.

Prince Metternich gave me to believe the Conference about to be held this day related to the *action* upon Naples, and the invitation to the King, and that there would be ample time to consider our more general measures during the time the King of Naples' answer was to be waited for. Your Lordship then, may well judge

of my surprise, when the "Protocole préliminaire" was read, with the signatures of the Ministers of the three Cabinets affixed, not only without any previous observations, but with the certain knowledge of the Austrian Ministers that I was ignorant even of the substance of it.

Coupling this with His Highness's request to me, not to give my Government any idea of the notions in agitation until a result had been aimed at, and lulling me into the belief that the measure of *any act* was postponed, the whole seemed an incomprehensible, or at least an unkind proceeding, on the part of Austria.

When I knew in addition the instructions that had been sent to the three Ministers in England, and when I plainly perceived the policy here was framing more upon alarm of future visionary evils, aided by the spectre of Buonaparte raised into *reality by a breath*, it was impossible for me to be entirely silent, but I trust your Lordship will consider my remarks to have been confined within the strict limits of my instructions (taking into consideration the particulars of my situation and my information pointed out in my different letters). I consider Austria to have taken a line of policy since this meeting commenced, which I did not foresee. Her whole attention is engrossed in securing Russia in her own *marche politique*, and regardless of all future consequences she brings this Northern Power to act even at Laybach in her immediate and most intimate concerns, and she fetters herself, to secure this *appui*, with the commanding influence and dictates, which will ensue wherever the Emperor Alexander presides.

From Laybach, His Imperial Majesty (if he arrives there) will accompany His August Brother, the Emperor of Austria, to Naples; and then Austria will exclaim (perhaps too late) upon Russian influence in Italy! With the magnanimous conduct of Great Britain, and under the auspices of the *reunion* at Troppau, Austria might surely have played a part more congenial to her immediate and *future* interests. Fearing, however, a change of purpose in Russia, and a change of Government in England, she resorts to a fixed concert between the three great monarchical Powers; and it may not here be superfluous to remark, that, when I was conversing with Prince Metternich upon what might grow out of separate engagements, he observed that Lord Castlereagh and himself made a separate treaty during the Congress at Vienna, which Russia would never forgive, but the portentous crisis of self-preservation required it. In the same manner events might occur when two or three of the Allied Powers must take measures for their own security, even if not approved of by the whole.

The considerations, which this part of the question open, are vast and uncomfortable, and will suggest themselves in an enlarged and enlightened view of your Lordship's mind, unaided by any

thing I can urge, but I cannot forbear from observing, that I consider the opinion of the three Cabinets to be, that France will have the *power* as well as the *will* to become a party to the late act. If so, will it not place France in a more immediate understanding with the three Courts than Great Britain? And may not this powerful influence and new concert change the nature of an European Alliance founded on especial treaties, stipulating the *Casus foederis et Belli*, and interpose in its room a more undefined and perhaps inexecutable engagement on the part of those who adopt it?

However specious and fair the outside of this project may appear, it would seem to embrace an arbitrary and inconvenient extension, by which European questions are to be decided by the united councils of the Alliance. But suppose the three Powers mistaken in their calculations as to France, in what respect shall we stand, if these three Powers have executed a treaty which commits them, and separates them in opinion from the rest of Europe? And it is essential for me here to announce to your Lordship, that I consider the principle of the treaty, described in the "Protocole préliminaire," irrevocably *signed* by the three Cabinet Ministers here. That Prince Metternich, with his usual ability, will enter into all the developments of this great question, and bring all the specious arguments in favour of it, and in defence of his course of conduct, I am fully aware, and that my humble and far less able reports may not rightly conceive and judge of this *projet* is equally possible. But under the impressions I have, and under the conduct that has been pursued, I should ill discharge my duty, if I omitted the most candid exposition I am able to afford.

Having reflected anxiously during the night on this "Protocole préliminaire," I called upon Prince Metternich this morning before the Conference in which the Journal of the preceding one was to be settled; and, entering into all those reasonings which I have already touched upon to your Lordship, I concluded by informing him that the point I most deplored was the formal act of signature (which was a pledge to the principle) before Great Britain had the opportunity offered of announcing to her most confidential Allies, an opinion upon a matter of general European policy. Had the Protocol been presented as a simple *projet*, it did not so effectually shut the door to our explanations, but, where points were signed, it was a mockery in the 7th Article to wait for such determinations as the two other Cabinets pronounced, as certainly it was not intended by the three Powers that the principle, which had been officially signed, should undergo any change. It might, however, I continued, be more decent for transmission to the other Powers, if the Cabinets, before the final *redaction* of the day's Journal, would consider of the expediency of withdrawing their signatures, to present the document to the two absent Courts, as a *projet*

embracing the views of the three Powers, and that it should be understood as not signed until communications were had with the two other Powers.

Prince Metternich entered into my suggestion, after a very long and warm conversation, and immediately had a private conference with the Ministers of Russia and Prussia, and I was informed before the general meeting that it would be declared by the three Powers that this Protocol was delivered without signatures and only as the united opinion, but as yet not the act, of the Cabinets. That the above Ministers may, nevertheless, have a secret understanding between themselves on the subject, is evident, and that nothing is gained but the momentary form in the paper, is, I fear, equally true. But as there have been no signatures as yet in the course of our proceedings, and the withdrawing of them in Conference marks some little consideration, as I have succeeded in obtaining it, I hope it will meet with your Lordship's approbation.

Your Lordship will not, I am sure, suppose that I have courted in the course of these affairs any particular communications with the French Ambassador. I have, on the contrary, studiously avoided the semblance of any confidence that could at all detach us from our natural Allies, but the remarks upon the constant course of the Conferences were not uncommon for two individuals placed in our situations, and, while I avoided anything like a common understanding with the French Plenipotentiaries, I thought the independence and uprightness of our position required from those with whom we had so long acted more reference, more *égard* and more *ménagement*.

With Prince Metternich, however I may feel momentarily hurt, I am convinced that my explanation will neither operate upon our confidential habits, nor for an instant weaken our friendship. He has done much (for him) in yielding the point to me in general Conference, after an official committal, that I considered of most moment; and I should hope what has occurred will make His Highness more explicit and communicative in future, without in the smallest degree disturbing our harmony.

He was very anxious that I should detain my present messenger until to-morrow, or next day, but really with whatever readiness I comply on common occasions with His Highness's requests, the moment is too critical to permit me to yield to any delay in the information so necessary to be communicated to my Government.

I should add to this despatch, that at the close of the Conference of this day Mons. de Capo d'Istria came to me, and entering upon the whole subject expressed his concurrence in my general observations, and said, "He would in his instructions to Count Lieven (which I should see) come to my aid in the details I should have to give to my Government." Although this little anecdote is

possibly insidious, I mention it merely to show that our cordiality and understanding is not for a moment disturbed. . . .

(v)

Troppau, November 20, 1820.

(*Most secret and confidential. Separate.*)

My mind remained uneasy and anxious at the mystery described in my separate despatch (marked A¹) that seemed to hang over the horizon here as far as Great Britain was concerned ; and, determining to develop the history from the data already in my possession, two modes presented themselves, either to go direct to the Emperor of Russia, and appealing to his personal good will towards me, inform him fairly of my suspicions, or to challenge Prince Metternich direct upon the fact, and claim a full avowal from our habits of intimacy. After deliberation, I decided upon the latter, having the other in reserve, if Prince Metternich failed me.

I went to His Highness, therefore, this morning, and at once challenged him as to what were the purport of the late secret instructions to Count Lieven, which were agreed to in common with Austria and Prussia. Prince Metternich surprised, asked what I alluded to, saying he knew of nothing but the Journals, papers, etc., transmitted. I rejoined, I meant the instruction relative to the British Government ; that a sentence which he had read of a despatch to Esterhazy put me on the *qui vive* ; that I consequently bestirred myself and knew something had occurred ; that I did not understand mystery, above all between him and me.

Finding me very warm, he said that, as I had *asked* him, he would tell me everything, but that he had pledged himself not to make the confidence, if I had not done so. He then related that the three Cabinets, deeply alive to the sudden and probable change that might take place in the British Government, had communicated together upon the consequences and the measures necessary for them to adopt ; that the Emperor, keenly sensible to the declaration pronounced by Mr. Tierney to the Duc Decazes (*viz.* that if he was in power the first motion he would make in the

¹ From Stewart, Nov. 15, 1820 : *F.O. Austria*, 160. It contains the following passage : " Prince Metternich, whose habits of confidence with me seem (and I believe are) nearly unbounded, was reading to me hastily yesterday his last dispatches *from* Prince Esterhazy. Unconscious exactly where he ought to have stopped, he read so much of a sentence as stated that the three Powers had taken into their consideration an immediate change so likely to take place ; and here, throwing down the despatch, he said it was *one* of the *Chancellerie*, and proceeded to read another, although I observed there were many long pages still to conclude in the former one." See Chapter V., Section 1, p. 223.

House of Commons would be the liberation of Buonaparte), and dreading the idea of so tremendous a spectre returning upon the theatre of Europe, had proposed to the other Courts a joint Instruction to their Ministers applicable in the event of a change of Government. This was a direction, to protest immediately in the most formal manner against all idea of altering the treaty by which Buonaparte was detained ; to declare he was an European, and not an English prisoner ; to denounce the interruption of communications between the Allies and England, if this was not adhered to ; and, in short, to arm their Ministers in London *le cas échéant* (as projected in another case already at Paris) to adopt an united *démarche* on the above head.

I demanded now of Prince Metternich where was the necessity in such a measure of mystery towards me ? I expressed wonder that the Great Powers could really be intimidated, by perhaps an idle *propos*, to resort at Troppau to a state deliberation and measure, upon such a point. But having done so, the taking of a measure in common concert to be concealed from us, broke in upon our usual habits of confidential intercourse, without (in my judgement) the least necessity. He must know, that sooner or later this would be known and the secrecy agreed to would wound our Government more than the circumstance itself, which I treated as *insignificant*.

I am sure Prince Metternich felt mortified. He replied, "The agreement as to silence had been taken from delicacy towards the present Government, as it was unpleasant to speak to any man of his death ; that it was an awkward point to make a diplomatick communication to us upon ; that the state of Europe at present was not so when Fox succeeded to Pitt, and the former took up the wise course of the latter ; that Mr. Tierney's and Lord Holland's declarations could not be forgotten ; that the continental Powers would be imprudent, not to guard themselves against possible dangers ; that the Emperor of Russia was very eager upon it ; that the Government could not take it unkindly, and that, as I had asked what had occurred, he felt after his explanation to me, and my opinion, that it would not hurt Lord Castlereagh's feelings ; that he might write to him, or direct Esterhazy to make a full explanation."

I only added, that I regretted in a meeting, where from *necessity* three of the Great Powers were thrown in continual private Conferences together to further especially the object of it, that any particular Conference on other topicks should take place to the exclusion of other parties, as it might unnecessarily give rise to suspicion, for it was impossible to say how many measures might grow up, and how far things might possibly go, if this general consultation was kept up. I continued, there might possibly be some reason in his remarks, but on the other hand, *this anecdote* could

not fail under its mystery to make me uncomfortable in the embarrassing position in which I was placed, supposed to be permitted to hear every thing, although I admitted I could not take a decisive part in any thing.

I confess to your Lordship, I am indignant at what I conceive a pusillanimous *démarche*, of three, perhaps *four*, of the Great Powers of Europe (as France may join, and as yet I know not if she is aware of it), and where a mystery is made from motives of false delicacy, how can one be sure, if there are more weighty inducements, the same may not be practised towards Great Britain, because she cannot play precisely the same game as these three Cabinets? I am also wounded with respect to Austria, because Prince Metternich ought to feel the magnanimous part the King my Master and His Government are now acting to Austria in particular. That Prince Metternich will make plausible and dexterous excuses; that the thing is contemptible in itself, is perfectly true; but just at this moment (wishing ardently as I do to avoid all *tracasserie*) it presses very uncomfortably upon the mind when one contemplates the exact scene, and the course we are committed to here.

I shall be glad to know how this is opened, or appears to your Lordship, I shall not wonder if it was now made into a general disclosure by all, but we must not forget the course of it, nor can we be sure that there may not be some further engagements and further concerts still in the wind. My utmost study will be directed not to embarrass or appear *suspicious*, because my harmony with the Prince must not be disturbed, or else I should be shut out from a great field of information; but I hope to keep your Lordship fully and *accurately* informed. Prince Metternich did not offer to shew me the secret instruction, perhaps you will be able to see it in England.¹

(vi)

Troppau, December 21, 1820.

(*Separate. Most secret and confidential.*)

... I should apprise your Lordship, that shortly after the departure of my last messenger, Prince Metternich informed me that Mons. de Saldanha² had arrived at Paris from Madrid, charged with certain letters. It was considered in Cabinet by the Allied Ministers that there was no possibility of declining to receive these letters, and under this decision Mons. de Saldanha had been in-

¹ Nesselrode to Lieven, Nov 5, 1820: *Pet. Arch* I do not know if Castlereagh ever saw it.

² See Chapter VI., Section 2, p. 298.

formed he might proceed to Vienna, at which place he is expected shortly to arrive.

Prince Metternich added to this information the joint opinion of the three Powers of the impossibility of holding out any expectations to the quarter from whence Mons. de Saldanha derived his instructions. Under these circumstances your Lordship's dispatch¹ was of great importance, and, having read it myself with its main inclosure to the Emperor of Russia, and to the Ministers of Austria, Russia and Prussia, I am apt to believe it had considerable impression.

With respect to Spain, there is no doubt but the Russian Cabinet are sore as to their first counsels being overruled, and there is an evident desire in the background, if the difficulties were not of that stupendous nature as not to be overcome, to do something in this field of revolution there, for their own reputation. The task is too tremendous, however, and the dissent of the two other Powers too decided, to make me believe that any serious thoughts will be given to afford any aid to that Peninsula.

The desire of the Emperor of Russia is as apparent as ever, to become the general protector and arbiter, and when I mentioned to Prince Metternich in conversation, that I was afraid His Highness assisted this aim, and was affording His Imperial Majesty in the regulation of the conduct of the three Powers too much preponderance, the Prince replied, this was far better, however, than to give in to what the Emperor of Russia's mind was directed to, which was no less than that there should be only two directing Powers in Europe, the one continental and the other maritime. His Imperial Majesty intended to leave Great Britain the latter, while he usurped the former himself. I naturally smiled, at what appeared so absurd, and your Lordship will hardly believe these very words came from the Prince's mouth, while you will as little suppose me capable of coining them. I name, however, the anecdote to shew you how preposterous the language is, which is sometimes held, and how very difficult it is to get at the real opinion of all.

It is unquestionably, however, the Emperor of Russia's passion to regulate these Congresses. He has a passion for the little war of the *Mémoires* that are given in from each Cabinet, and the examination of them, and the interest or rule he can excite in the other nations of Europe have a far greater charm with him than governing his own.

Should things be triumphant in the management adopted for Naples, it is hard to pronounce positively that Russia will not attempt more, but, at all events at present, there is a general denial among the Cabinets to give any encouragement to Mons. de Saldanha's mission further than the receipt of the letters.

To Stewart, Dec. 4, 1820 : *F.O. Austria*, 148.

(vii)

Laybach, January 27, 1821.

(Most secret and confidential. Separate.)

. . . Upon a recurrence to all the transactions since the 2nd of July, which I have endeavoured humbly, but faithfully, from time to time to report, I think your Lordship will perceive that the line I have throughout traced as the object of the Austrian policy has been steadily persevered in, and appears now to be nearly arrived at its completion.

Prince Metternich, having decided in his own mind that the Austrian monarchy had neither the power nor weight sufficient to strike an immediate blow, to bear its odium, or to incur the risk of its failure, all the first efforts were directed to embark Russia completely in the same cause. The *toxin* of military revolt and occult sects was so successfully sounded in the Emperor of Russia's ears, that when the account of the insubordination at Petersburg arrived, His Imperial Majesty launched into the same ocean with the Austrian Minister, and his own helmsman no longer kept His Imperial Majesty steady in the course, which his more cautious and tortuous policy would have influenced His Imperial Majesty to move in. The physical strength of the three Great Powers was next accurately weighed, and Austria, unmindful of what the future effects of Russian co-operation might lead to, grasped at the present and immediate advantage, and in this position the important act of the Preliminary Protocol at Troppau was consummated.

Austria now felt she would proceed more boldly, but still, as you Lordship has well observed, rather preferring always more complicated than direct proceedings, she dispatches Mons. de Lebzeltern to Italy, out of whose mission I consider much of the present features of our position take their birth. Without dwelling upon the little drama of the Pope's mediation with Naples, which came in here as an interlude, the essential object for Austria after the close of the Troppau Conferences, was to repair her rejection of French mediation, and to secure the aid of France not only in all the measures to be adopted in Italy, but likewise, if possible, to unite her with the three other Powers in their immediate measures with regard to Naples.

Mons. de Blacas has been of late a prominent feature in Italian politics, and His Excellency's receiving the chief direction of French affairs at the Conferences afforded an opportunity which was not to be lost. I cannot discover to what extent Mons. de Lebzeltern and Mons. de Blacas may have gone, in either combining to advise, or separately to prompt, the King of Naples to take the measures

of protection he did at Livorno before he met the Allied Sovereigns at Laybach ; but of this I entertain no doubt, that, although Prince Metternich in his language to me disapproved of what was done, still, from a conversation I had with Prince Ruffo, His Excellency gave me clearly to understand that His Sicilian Majesty did not act from his own individual agency. Without sifting this further, I have stated enough to shew that there was a secret action at work before the Sovereigns arrived at Laybach.

From Mons. de Blacas' extreme intimacy with the King of Naples, it hardly admits of a doubt, that His Excellency must have been a party and privy to the first proceedings of the King. The desire of France to raise herself up in the Alliance has been long evident, and, in proportion as she gains consolidation in her institutions by the increasing strength of her Government, this wish naturally augments. Besides this, the vanity belonging to all Frenchmen has been largely played upon in the person of Mons. de Blacas, and circumstances have tended to produce the line of conduct detailed by Mr. Gordon in his paper, and exemplified in the proceedings of the Conferences.

The desire and purpose of Great Britain, in no degree to influence, or wish to commit the French Government to any other line of conduct than their own views and policy may lead them spontaneously to adopt, might render it unnecessary for me to call your Lordship's attention to this part of the subject, if I did not think it connected with the main operations of Austria, and necessary for a true picture of all the transactions here.

In conversation with Mons. de Blacas, His Excellency has declared to me, that he found the Cabinets on their arrival, so fixed in their purpose, and so determined to hear no opposition to the exact course they chose to steer, that he found it almost useless to make suggestions, and considering above all things, the importance of unanimity and *solidarité* he had determined to embark in all their measures as to Naples.

We must, therefore, no longer conceal from ourselves that we stand alone in our position, and that Austria has enlisted the other three Powers under her banners, in her present purpose. She has facilitated immensely her position by having succeeded, through the means of her various efforts and negociations, to produce the present posture of affairs, but as to what may grow out of it hereafter, it is difficult to determine.

APPENDIX D

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN CASTLE- REAGH AND METTERNICH, 1822 ¹

(i)

Foreign Office, *April 30, 1822.*²

(Most private and confidential.)

MON PRINCE,

I have directed Mr. Gordon to put your Highness in full possession of all the directions that we have given at St. Petersburg and Constantinople as applicable to the present critical state of the Turkish question.

My private and confidential conversations with Prince Esterhazy will also have apprized your Highness that I begin to foresee a crisis approaching (brought on by the untoward and impracticable conduct of the Porte), which may possibly compel both Austria and England in pursuit of *their common purpose*, to place themselves as they did at Laybach, somewhat in a different attitude, consonant to the nature and resources of their respective Governments.

The distinctive character of the Turkish question, as compared with the Italian, has enabled us to employ our first offices with much more activity, but when the final question arrives for decision, ours must be a policy, which, whilst it gives to Russia the benefit which she is entitled to, of our admission that the Ottoman Government has failed in the point of justice, will neither involve us in the war, or so implicate us, as to render it necessary in our justification to bring the whole negotiation before Parliament. The period I had the happiness to pass with your Highness this autumn at Hanover was precious to me in every point of view, publick and private, and especially from its enabling us so thoroughly to understand the common views, as well as the dissimilar facilities in point of action of our particular machines of Government, that I feel persuaded that your Highness will at one glimpse

¹ *Vienna St. A Varia, 1822.*

² In Castlereagh's handwriting.

of the question instinctively seize and understand the course we have taken.

We could not order our Ambassador away without seeing British persons and property safe ; such precautions without a protecting force would probably bring trouble, if not hostilities, upon us. The departure of Lord Strangford would in its moral effects give a new impulse to the Greek insurrection, particularly to the maritime branch of it ; this surely is not desirable. In short I can conceive no one motive for such a step, except so far as it might have a chance of intimidating the Porte into submission. I own I cannot regard such a consequence as probable, but sure I am, that we cannot risk the consequences of occupying so advanced a position, in order to try such an experiment.

I shall await with impatience but with entire confidence for your Highness' letters and proceedings : I flatter myself, that in endeavouring to tempt Russia back to her ultimatum, that we are furnishing you with a new fulcrum, on which you may bring your lever to act. I have tried to assist you also in giving time, by making Constantinople, rather than the frontier, the place of discussion.

I cannot too warmly acknowledge my obligations to your Highness for keeping me so minutely informed of all your proceedings. I trust you will be of opinion that I endeavour to turn them to the best account, and that, whilst we endeavour to keep our own Vessel of State out of the political breakers, at a moment when we must keep quiet, we study to give our Allies, as far as the times will permit, a safe and easy passage.

Yours ever, Mon Prince, with unalterable regard and personal attachment,

LONDONDERRY.

(ii)

Vienna, May 16, 1822.¹

(*Très secrète et confidentielle.*)

MY LORD,

Je remercie V. E. de la lettre secrète et confidentielle qu'elle a bien voulu m'adresser par la dernière expédition qu'elle a faite à Mr. Gordon.² Je l'en remercie et parceque cette lettre m'offre un gage nouveau et précieux de sa confiance personnelle, et parcequ'elle me prouve qu'elle a saisi et qu'elle entre dans les idées qui ont réglé la marche du Cabinet que je dirige.

Je vous prie d'attacher quelque valeur à l'une des dépêches réservées,³ que le prince Esterhazy vous soumettra, et dans laquelle je me suis appliqué à traiter les importants sujets que vous avez

¹ Copy.

² No. (i) above.

³ Metternich to Esterhazy, May 16, 1822 : *F.O. Austria*, 174.

touchés dans votre lettre secrète du 30 avril. Vous vous convaincrez que je prends à tâche d'établir deux importantes vérités : 1^o, celle qu'unis pour le fond dans la poursuite d'une cause, nos deux Cabinets peuvent se trouver astreints, dans l'intérêt même de cette cause, à s'appliquer à la recherche de moyens et de formes différents sous des rapports souvent essentiels; 2^o, que nous insistons d'une manière explicite sur la différence positive que nous reconnaissons exister entre les affaires d'Italie des années 1820 et 1821, et celles du Levant telles qu'elles sont placées aujourd'hui.

Vous partagerez, je n'en doute pas, le sentiment de la nécessité que la dernière de ces thèses soit tenue constamment dans un grand jour. Le sort de l'Empire Ottoman interesse à un degré si éminent la politique de chaque Puissance prépondérante, et ce sort est tellement mis en jeu par suite de la présente complication, qu'il doit importer à votre Gouvernement autant qu'au nôtre, qu'il ne s'établisse pas des préjugés qui pourraient ou paralyser l'action politique de la Grande-Bretagne, ou exposer le principe de l'Alliance à recevoir un échec difficile à réparer dans l'intérêt général de l'Europe. La faction *russo-grecque* et celle *grecque pure* s'appliquent à faire confondre les questions de 1821 et celles de 1822. La raison en est simple ; les deux factions ne peuvent manquer de rechercher des motifs pour arriver à démontrer aux Alliés (et particulièrement à l'Autriche) qu'il est de leur devoir de faire en 22 ce que l'Empereur de Russie s'est offert à faire en 1821 : dans le cas que les Alliés, et l'Autriche en particulier, n'admettraient pas la thèse, la faction compterait en tirer le profit de tâcher de démontrer à l'Empereur Alexandre que rien n'est ingrat comme le métier de faire tout pour de soi-disants Alliés qui, l'occasion échéant, ne font rien pour la Russie. Tel est en effet le plan de ces hommes, et c'est autant pour le déjouer que pour être vrais, que nous ne perdrons jamais une chance pour protester contre une prétention fausse en elle-même, ainsi que pour placer dans une grande évidence ce que, dans la thèse, il y a d'erroné.

[Hopes that Britain will help in working out the methods which Metternich has conceived and for which Tatishchev has been sent to Vienna.]

J'admets en thèse que la complication présente est d'une nature autre que les affaires d'Italie en 1820 et 1821. La différence entre les deux affaires date, non de l'*origine* de l'affaire grecque, mais des *errements* que la *politique russe* a suivis depuis le mois de juin de l'année dernière. Je serais le premier à établir en principe que les affaires d'Italie eussent changé entièrement de caractère le jour où l'Autriche eût reconnu qu'il existe en elles des côtés liés à sa *politique spéciale*. Il n'en a pas été ainsi, ni dans l'affaire de Naples ni dans celle de Piémont, mais il en est ainsi dans la brouillerie de la Russie avec la Porte.

La complication du moment offre donc des côtés saillants, lesquels touchent d'une part à la politique de chaque Puissance, et de l'autre à l'Alliance ; et dès ce moment chaque Puissance a le droit de consulter son intérêt national et particulier dans l'affaire ; elle a le désir de chercher que l'affaire, prise dans son ensemble, soit placée de manière à ce qu'elle ne se trouve point en opposition avec le principe de l'Alliance ; la recherche même doit aller au delà : il faut l'étendre aux moyens de faire servir l'Alliance au lieu même de la cause en instance.

Persuadés de cette nécessité, nous avons indiqué à l'Empereur de Russie une chance qui pourrait servir le but. Nous avons proposé à ses efforts de rapprocher les conseils des Puissances dans le but de s'entendre sur les moyens les plus aptes à faire comprendre à la Porte *qu'il n'est pas une cour qui voudrait autre chose que ce qu'elle doit désirer elle-même*. Nous ne voyons pas que l'Angleterre pourrait trouver une difficulté à prendre part à une prise en considération pareille. L'Angleterre, ainsi que le reste des Alliés, veut la conservation de la paix politique, et le rétablissement des relations de bon voisinage entre la Russie et la Porte. Ces relations sont troublées de fait ; il ne peut se trouver rien de compromettant dans celui d'un appel aux Alliés *d'aviser de commun accord aux moyens aptes au rétablissement de ces relations* ; ce qui pourrait être compromettant se trouve reculé aux décisions qui ne pourraient être que le résultat de la recherche d'arriver à un accord entre les Alliés ; or ce terme reculé n'offre point de risques. Il n'en offre pas, car les risques de guerre sont imminents par leur nature et le temps travaille toujours à les amortir ; il n'en offre pas, car les Cabinets arrivent au conseil forts de leur indépendance entière, et si celui britannique n'eût point conservé dans tout le cours des pourparlers, qui ont lieu depuis un an, toute son indépendance, il l'eût regagnée par les dernières explications entre V. E. et le Cabinet de Russie.

Chaque plan offre toutefois un ou plusieurs côtés faibles ; celui que nous avons en vue a celui de reculer peut-être des décisions importantes. Le mal n'est pas pour la cause de la paix qui est celle de l'Europe, mais il porte sur les projets de la faction qui désire la guerre. Aussi le *Cabinet de Russie* n'accordera-t-il à notre proposition qu'à son corps défendant, et dans la seule supposition qu'il ne puisse point parvenir à vaincre la répugnance de l'Empereur à prononcer le mot de *guerre*. Il conservera l'espoir de conduire les pourparlers de manière à les faire servir à son but secret ; mais nous serons alors à deux de jeu, et je n'ai pas vu qu'en 1821 le Cabinet de Russie ait gagné le procès. Le jour où je verrai l'Empereur Alexandre entrer dans notre proposition, j'aurai en mon particulier le sentiment qu'il en ira en 1822 ainsi qu'il en a été à Laibach, c'est à dire que le bien se fera.

Je craindrais de ne pas être compris par V. E. si nos entretiens à Hanovre ne m'avaient prouvé qu'elle a saisi le principe que je me trouve dans le cas de faire valoir souvent dans des formes plus faciles à saisir qu'à définir dans nos relations directes avec la Russie. Il faut prendre les choses et les hommes tels qu'ils sont ; quand un Cabinet prépondérant se trouve dirigé par un individu de l'esprit et de la trempe du Comte de Capo d'Istria, tout se complique ; ce qui ne doit pas subir ce sort, ce doit être le principe que défendent les autres Cours ; or il m'est démontré que dans aucune complication des dernières années, *le principe véritable* ne s'est maintenu placé dans une évidence plus grande que dans la présente grâce aux soins réunis des Cabinets alliés.

Je vous prie, Mylord, de ne me savoir aucun gré de la recherche de vous tenir au courant non seulement de nos paroles, mais encore de nos pensées secrètes. Je vois le salut dans ce fait. Je désire être compris par vous, voilà une ambition toute honorable.

Veillez agréer l'assurance de mon amitié inaltérable et de ma haute considération.

METTERNICH.

(iii)

Vienna, *June 6, 1822.*¹

MON CHER MARQUIS,

La Providence a secondé nos vœux, et le dénouement que pourra prendre l'affaire la plus compliquée qui ait pu être réservée à nos méditations et à nos communs efforts satisfera à ce que réclame le bien général, si les Cabinets ne se relâchent pas dans la poursuite de la marche qui déjà a porté des fruits aussi heureux. C'est bien aujourd'hui que de nouveau je sais apprécier à leur juste valeur les moments que j'ai en le bonheur de passer avec vous l'automne dernier. Jamais je n'eusse pour ma part pu me livrer avec l'abandon réclamé par des circonstances que trop épineuses, à la somme entière de mes calculs, si je n'avais pu fonder ces derniers sur une connaissance aussi intime du point de vue du Cabinet britannique. L'une des suites immédiates de notre rencontre a été le rôle que Lord Strangford a rempli d'une manière aussi éminemment honorable qu'utile. C'est à lui, à sa fermeté et à son habileté que nous devons les amendements que la Porte a mis à sa marche, et c'est dans ces amendements que se trouvent aujourd'hui sinon les motifs, mais certes les seuls prétextes qui puissent servir les intentions constamment pacifiques de l'Empereur de Russie.

Le moment actuel, mon cher Marquis, est immense. Je le regarde franchement comme le point de départ d'une ère nouvelle, et si les

¹ Copy.

résultats devaient ne pas répondre à mon attente, la faute ne saurait être qu'aux Cabinets alliés. Je suffit, pour justifier mon opinion, de s'arrêter à quelques considérations.

La politique de la Russie a reçu un coup décisif. Une Puissance faible le ressentirait différemment que le monarque le plus indépendant en Europe. L'Empereur Alexandre ne se donnera pas pour battu, et il ne le pourrait pas. Les fautes immenses qu'a commises son Cabinet devront être colorées par lui comme autant de sacrifices que S. M. I. a bien voulu [porter] à l'intérêt de l'Europe. Ce que la politique de la Russie va perdre de force en Orient, l'Empereur devra vouloir, dans l'intérêt même de son honneur, le remplacer par une grande activité dans la politique de l'Europe. Les ouvertures les plus récentes qui nous sont venues de Saint-Pétersbourg sur les affaires d'Espagne ¹ sont un premier précurseur de ce qui nous attend. Les risques que courent les Cabinets sont toutefois bien moindres, dès qu'ils se trouvent porter sur un champ qui n'est point apte à l'action matérielle. Les lois les plus fortes sont celles imposées par la situation géographique des Empires, et celle de l'Autriche, de la Grande-Bretagne, de la France, et de la Prusse établit et circonscrit forcément la Russie dans une ligne plus reculée. Les quatre Puissances sont donc maîtresses de leur action, mais, pour qu'elles le restent, elles doivent s'entendre et ne pas se laisser diviser.

Ce bien ne peut être atteint que par le contact le plus direct entre les Cabinets. L'Empereur de Russie ne peut manquer de mettre une grande activité dans l'exposé de ses vues. Il a besoin de distraire sa nation et l'Europe sur les événements de toute une année. La France a un gouvernement neuf ; il est des questions sur lesquelles il lui est facile de se tromper, et je ne crois pas en faire autant si j'admets que ce que la dernière proposition de l'Empereur de Russie a pu renfermer de surprenant pour les trois autres Cabinets ait en droit de surprendre à un même degré celui des Tuileries. Le Général Pozzo pourrait, je n'en doute pas, nous apprendre beaucoup sur ce fait.

J'adresse par le présent courrier une dépêche réservée ² à M. le Prince d'Esterhazy, qu'il aura l'honneur de communiquer à V. E. Je la supplie de lui vouer toute l'attention qu'elle mérite. Vous y verrez l'expression la plus forte de notre vœu que vous puissiez vous ménager une chance de ne pas laisser s'écouler la prochaine réunion sans votre intervention personnelle. J'ai prévu bien des objections et je les combats avec facilité. Pour que celle-ci puisse avoir lieu, il faudrait que je fusse bientôt informé de vos déterminations. Je suis tellement convaincu de la haute valeur que chacun des monarques attachera à votre présence—ne fût-elle même que

¹ See above, Chapter IX., Section 1, p. 472.

² Metternich to Esterhazy, June 6, 1822 : *F.O. Austria*, 175.

passagère et momentanée,—que je ne forme aucun doute que chaque modalité, par laquelle elle pourrait être assurée, serait acceptée par eux.

Il est une autre circonstance qui ajoute au poids de mes calculs. L'homme, qui depuis plusieurs années a fait le plus de mal, qui n'a pas laissé échapper une occasion pour intervertir la marche des choses naturelle et conforme à la raison et à la justice la plus ordinaire, cet homme est encore là, et il ne semble pas prêt à céder le terrain. Il succombera à des efforts réunis ; il saura déjouer ceux partiels. Son caractère le porte à ne pas se donner pour battu, et à regarder comme autant de victoires le bien qu'il peut empêcher. Vous savez que sa haine est principalement dirigée contre l'Angleterre ; vous seul pouvez lui imposer, car vous seul pouvez représenter votre Puissance dans des circonstances particulièrement délicates.

Si vous me voyez, Mylord, attacher une haute valeur à la série de mes calculs, c'est que j'ai le sentiment qu'il n'en est pas un qui ne porte sur des considérations d'une valeur positive. Il y a longtemps que j'ai pris l'habitude de chercher le mal là où il est, et à ne pas perdre mes moments à combattre des fantômes. Mais je sais aussi où sont les remèdes : et les seuls forts sont les remèdes simples. J'admets que vous ayiez de graves difficultés à m'opposer, mais aussi devez vous admettre que le but que j'ai en vue est tellement grand que rien ne saurait m'effrayer, ni arrêter l'élan de mes vœux ! Ce but, c'est le repos général ; non seulement celui matériel,—car celui-ci ne sera pas troublé de sitôt,—mais le repos moral. Et celui-ci ne saurait être atteint qu'au moyen des explications les plus franches et les plus étendues entre les Cours sur ce qu'elles peuvent et doivent vouloir. Jamais peut-être combinaison n'a-t-elle prêté d'avantage à des explications pareilles, car *l'Empereur de Russie doit absolument vouloir créer une forte action morale* ; dès ce moment, il faut la dépouiller de ce qui n'est que vague, et nous serrer sur un terrain pratique et conforme aux attitudes réelles des Puissances. Un grand jeu sera tué par ce seul fait.

Il doit, après cette longue lettre, vous rester, mon cher Marquis, une question à me faire : c'est celle de *la nature des objets sur lesquels il serait nécessaire de s'entendre*. Je vous répondrai en peu de mots, et d'une manière qui devra vous paraître satisfaisante. Je ne sais rien qu'il puisse s'agir de faire, mais beaucoup de ce qui devra être évité. Vous connaissez assez la marche de mon esprit pour ne pas savoir combien il répugne à la recherche des affaires. Celles-ci se présentent plus que je ne le désire souvent, et mon soin constant va à empêcher que l'on en crée de gaieté de cœur. Le Cabinet prussien a un penchant à seconder les vues de l'Empereur Alexandre ; je ne connais pas encore celles du Cabinet français : la réunion lui servira de pierre de touche. Si vous me manquez, je serai seul de mon bord, et la lutte alors devient inégale. Le Ciel

m'a doué d'assez de courage pour ne pas la refuser, mais je ne trouve pas les questions bien placées, si c'est tout juste moi qui devrais soutenir seul ce qui pourrait l'être par les deux Cabinets qui s'entendent le mieux, vu que leurs intérêts politiques sont les plus uniformes.

Veuillez au reste et dans tous les cas me faire connaître vos intentions et vos possibilités le plus tôt possible. Je ne vous demande pas moins de m'indiquer, sans aucune réserve, ce qui pourrait dans le choix des paroles et des formes, servir le grand intérêt que je défends dans la présente lettre.

Agréé, etc.,

METTERNICH.

(iv)

Foreign Office, June 22, 1822.¹

(Private and confidential.)

MY DEAR PRINCE METTERNICH,

I find Prince Esterhazy proposes to send a courier to Vienna this evening, and, although the time will not permit me to reply to the very satisfactory communications, which have lately been received from the several centres of negotiation, yet I cannot deny myself the gratification of thanking you for your letter of the 6th inst., and of replying, as far as I now can, to the enquiries which it contains.

Prince Esterhazy will report to Your Highness in detail the considerations which have determined the King, after a very mature and anxious consideration of the question in all its bearings, to postpone His excursion to the Continent to the ensuing year, and to devote His attention for the present altogether to the interior of His dominions at home, which, although generally tranquil and prosperous, in some of its interests experiences at this moment a very severe and anxious degree of pressure. In all such cases, the presence of the Sovereign forms in itself a most important resource, whether we view it in the nature of a remedy or a consolation; and, if His Majesty should be enabled in the course of this summer to make a visit to His subjects in Scotland, He will have satisfied a very loyal and affectionate desire, which His Northern subjects feel, to see His Majesty in that part of His Empire.

I can assure Your Highness that the King very reluctantly abandons His plan of paying His respects this summer to His August Ally and Friend, the Emperor of Austria, and I have no doubt Prince Esterhazy will do justice to His Majesty's sentiments

¹ In Castlereagh's handwriting.

in this respect. Had considerations connected with our domestic interior weighed less seriously in influencing the King's decision, the uncertainty when it may be possible for His Majesty to prorogue His Parliament (at soonest not before the end of July or the beginning of August) rendered it difficult for His Majesty, without inconveniently deranging the understood movements of the Allied Sovereigns, to make His visit to Vienna. The whole of His Majesty's engagements must at all events have been run so close in point of time, as to have been liable to an embarrassing derangement from the slightest casualty that might affect their execution.

Had the King felt himself enabled under existing circumstances to accomplish the purpose which His Majesty has had so long and so seriously at heart, and which it would have been peculiarly agreeable to Him to have realised at a moment, when His Majesty might have found the Emperor of Russia and King of Prussia at Vienna, as it was His Majesty's gracious purpose that I should attend them, the flattering desire, which your Highness has so kindly and constantly expressed, that I should personally take a part in your ensuing deliberations, would have been realised without effort, and in the natural order of things. I will not yet despair that I may be enabled to join you, but, as the considerations, which must influence the decision with respect to my leaving England, must in a great measure depend on the state of affairs, both abroad and at home after Parliament rises, and more nearly to the period when the Sovereigns are about to assemble, I do not feel that I can prove myself deserving of your Highness' constant, and to me invaluable, confidence better than by now apprizing you of some of those circumstances, which may have an influence to facilitate the execution of a plan, which would be exceedingly gratifying to me, and which, though not exempt from difficulties as your Highness is well aware, might nevertheless, as we both think, materially tend to simplify and improve the political relations of the Alliance for a considerable period of time to come.

The first observation I have to make is, that, availing myself of your suggestion of dividing the business to be treated of into two distinct periods, and thus separating the affairs of Italy from those of a more general character, and further in weighing the alternatives of my joining you at Vienna, or in Italy, I have no hesitation in giving a decided preference to the former, as likely to answer all the purposes of my mission without exposing the Government and the Alliance to the degree of misconception, to which my repairing to Vienna might give birth. At Vienna everything, *including the affairs of Italy* might be discussed and understood without hazard of reviving the controversies of the former year, and as I conceive the matter now ripe for discussion in Italy must be small, and the

affairs of the East present the substance in fact, which is likely to occupy your attention, I cannot persuade myself that the general convenience would suffer from your making the Italian excursion the secondary, rather than the principal, arrangement of the Autumn.

But whilst I place before your Highness without reserve such thoughts as occur to myself upon the subject, don't let me be understood as wishing to embarrass, or derange any of *your* plans. My own are too uncertain to form a justifiable (?) motive for suffering, what the general convenience might suggest, to bend to that of a particular Government, but, as there will be full time for me to hear again from Your Highness before the close of the session, and as I do not conceive that the King can decide finally as to my motions, till the very eve of the rising of Parliament, and until his confidential servants can compare events passing in *the West*, as well as in *the East*, with our general position at home, I have to beg your Highness to send me confidentially the fullest tableau you can sketch, both of the business you contemplate as likely to present itself for discussion in the period of assembling, the time that you propose to assign to the examination at Vienna, and the latest period you could fix for your adjournment to Verona. You very prudently and very truly state, that your aim is not to provoke or multiply matters of discussion, but rather to study how uncalled-for questions may be avoided; but joining nevertheless with your aim the wisdom of this principle, the more you can anticipate the "carte de deliberation" the more you will place me in a situation, either to present myself at Vienna with adequate powers, or to supply by suitable instructions the inconveniences of my absence.

My brother proposes to set out the first days of the ensuing month to resume his functions. I shall endeavour by dispatches to Mr. Gordon early in the ensuing week to communicate the sentiments of this Court upon the actual state of the negotiation, on the greatly improved position of which I beg to offer your Highness my most cordial and sincere congratulations. In the meantime allow me, my dear Prince Metternich, to assure you of my unalterable friendship, and perfect consideration.

LONDONDERRY.

(v)

Baden, July 8, 1822.¹

[Has only just received Castlereagh's letter of June 26. Regrets the uncertainty of Castlereagh's visit and the determination of the King not to come to Vienna. In accordance with Castlereagh's

¹ Copy.

wishes has arranged that the first Conferences should take place at Vienna.]

Vous me demandez, Monsieur le Marquis, un budget des objets que nous regarderions comme plus particulièrement dignes d'être pris en considération par les Cabinets ? Je n'hésite pas à soumettre mon opinion sur cette importante question aux lumières de V. E. La tâche ne saurait même me sembler difficile ; il me suffira, pour la remplir, de jeter un coup d'œil sommaire sur la situation des choses en Europe.

Le *premier* objet qui devra nous occuper, ce sont les grands intérêts de l'Orient. Ces intérêts ne sauraient se trouver réglés définitivement d'ici à l'époque de la réunion. Si jusque là ils se présentent à nous sous un aspect favorable, il sera réservé aux Cabinets de mettre la dernière main à l'accommodement désiré à un degré égal par S. M. I. de toutes les Russies et par ses augustes Alliés, et non moins réclamé par les intérêts de l'humanité. Dans la supposition contraire, les besoins se pèsent d'eux-mêmes.

Le *second* objet serait le bienfait incalculable qui résulterait d'une entente franche entre les Cabinets au sujet de l'attitude que les Cours devraient prendre selon les conjonctures que peut malheureusement amener la déplorable complication dans la péninsule occidentale de l'Europe. Il n'est que trop permis de prévoir les chances, ou positivement funestes, ou pleines de risques pour la tranquillité de l'Europe et en particulier pour le repos de la France, auxquelles l'état actuel de l'Espagne peut donner lieu.

Le *troisième* sujet de délibération, c'est les affaires d'Italie proprement dites, qui seraient considérées à Vienne dans leurs traits principaux et sous un point de vue général. Ainsi préparées, les questions plus spéciales resteraient dans le domaine de la réunion en Italie.

Il est enfin un *quatrième* objet que je trouve, en mon particulier, plus facile à sentir qu'à définir. Cet objet viendrait à se régler de lui même par le seul fait de la réunion des Monarques et des Cabinets, à la suite des triomphes glorieux que l'Alliance a remportés dans le cours des dernières années sur les attaques dangereuses et les coupables tentatives qu'une faction en démenace n'a cessé de diriger contre l'édifice social de l'Europe. Serrée de toutes parts, il est naturel que cette faction criminelle se livre, dans l'intérêt de son propre salut, à des tentatives constamment renouvelées ; mais il suffira de mettre au grand jour l'existence de l'Alliance, pour restreindre ces efforts dans un cercle toujours plus étroit. Rien de ce qui sortirait des attributions naturelles des Cours ne saurait se présenter ici à notre pensée, mais il suffit le seul fait d'une attitude forte et imposante de l'Alliance, de cette Puissance qui, pour être immense, n'a besoin que de créer, dans une multitude livrée à toutes les influences malignes du radicalisme, le sentiment de

l'uniformité le moins problématique à l'égard des principes de conservation qui forment son essence. La réunion des Monarques et de leurs Cabinets, et le glorieux accord qui régnera parmi eux, constateront cette uniformité aux yeux de tous, et assureront le premier des intérêts moraux auxquels nous visons.

Telles sont mes idées, Mylord, et je me tiens assuré qu'elles seront les vôtres et celles de tous les Cabinets. Si je ne vous offre dans mon budget que les titres des chapitres, vous en trouverez le développement dans l'ensemble de l'expédition volumineuse que j'adresse aujourd'hui à l'Ambassadeur de S. M. I. à Londres, et je ne crois pas que vous puissiez y rencontrer un point de vue qui pourrait être récusé par vous. Permettez que, pour vous donner la plus entière connaissance de mes propres idées, je m'en rapporte également à mon expédition antérieure, à laquelle votre lettre servait de réponse.

Il serait superflu de parler à V. E. de la satisfaction personnelle que j'éprouverai à me trouver réuni à Elle : je me flatte qu'elle ne saurait en douter. Placé depuis si longtemps dans un tourbillon d'affaires, dont la moindre suffirait pour occuper la vie d'un homme, vous devez concevoir, mon cher Marquis, le sentiment que je dois éprouver en voyant approcher le moment de me retrouver en contact immédiat avec un collègue tel que vous. . . .

METTERNICH.

(vi)

Foreign Office, *July 29, 1822.*¹

(Private and confidential.)

MY DEAR PRINCE METTERNICH,

Your several communications of the 8th inst. reached us with great rapidity ; the messenger was only seven days in making the journey.

The King is highly sensible of the Emperor's attention, and has conveyed to His Imperial Majesty the expression of His great regret, that His Majesty cannot possibly leave England this year ; but His Majesty looks forward with confident hope to execute this long desired visit next year. In the meantime your Highness may rest assured, that His Majesty considers that nothing has been omitted, which could either be agreeable to His feelings, or which could encourage His Majesty to pay His respects at Vienna.

The King has fixed His departure for Scotland on the 9th of next month, and I have received His Majesty's commands (should no unforeseen event arise) to set out about the 15th for Vienna. I

¹ In Castlereagh's handwriting.

APPENDIX E

PRIVATE LETTERS FROM ESTERHAZY TO METTERNICH, 1819-1822 ¹

(i)

London, *August 7, 1819.*

[Received six days ago Metternich's letter from Carlsbad, with its accompanying dispatches to Vincent, and also the later dispatches to himself, which he had just time to read to Castlereagh before the latter went into the country.]

Il est enchanté de l'activité que vous déployez dans les affaires allemandes, et il reconnaît leur extrême importance. Il avait reçu à peu près la même [nouvelle] de M. Rose, de Berlin, et je lui dois rendre la justice qu'il a très bien présenté les dangers du moment. Aussi le Prince Régent ainsi que Castlereagh, y ajoutent-ils tous deux une grande importance. Le premier, qui est monarchique dans l'âme (et, comme il dit souvent, royaliste de métier) est anti-constitutionnel au plus haut degré, et ne demanderait pas mieux que de se débarrasser des entraves dont il est entouré ici; l'autre craint également l'augmentation de la force démocratique sur le Continent, dont ils éprouveraient le contre-temps ici. Wellington plus que tous deux sent l'importance et l'extrême difficulté de la besogne que vous avez sur les bras. Il s'est récrié sur l'extrême légèreté avec laquelle les gouvernements avaient pris des engagements dont ils ne comprennent ni l'étendue ni les inconvénients, et qui les placent dans des difficultés inextricables, soit en les remplissant, soit en les éludant. Quant à la Prusse, il croit qu'il lui sera impossible de ne pas faire quelque concession à l'opinion publique. Il croit que ce gouvernement devrait se borner à l'établissement d'assemblées provinciales, sur lesquelles le gouvernement conserve toujours plus d'influence, et qu'elle doit surtout travailler pour avoir une armée *féconde* plutôt que *nombreuse*.

¹ *Vienna St. A. Berichte.* Nearly all of these are in Esterhazy's handwriting. It is difficult sometimes to decide whether the French or the caligraphy is the worse, and the result in one or two places has been to defeat both my copyist and myself completely.

Il déplore cette manie qui s'est accaparée de l'esprit, à laquelle on a d'après lui trop cédé au commencement. Le système constitutionnel ne peut marcher qu'à l'appui d'une forte et puissante aristocratie qui se rattache à tous les grands propriétaires, comme cela se fait dans ce pays-ci, et ce qui forme la seule garantie de la conservation de la tranquillité publique. C'est cette *classe* qui a le *vouloir* et le *pouvoir* pour le maintien du repos. Nous en voyons ici les exemples journellement.

Dans les derniers troubles, quels étaient ceux qui ont le plus essentiellement contribué à rétablir l'ordre ? Les deux plus forts partisans du parti de l'opposition, Lord Fitzwilliam and Lord Derby. Or cette fonction, cette base indispensable ne se crée pas où elle n'a jamais existé, comme en *Prusse*. Elle ne se reproduit pas où elle a été détruite comme en *France*, et comme vous l'avez affirmé avec tant de justesse et de sagacité dans votre memorandum, *voilà* ce qui rend l'expérience de la France dans son système actuel vacillante et précaire. Il peut aller longtemps jouer la Royauté sans l'entamer, mais la première bourrasque peut aussi la renverser.

Le march *physique* de la France est indépendante de sa marche morale. La première peut-elle s'améliorer, peut-elle se consolider. Mais il restera toujours la déchéance organique et inhérente qui s'opposera à son développement sous le second rapport. Sur quelle force le Gouvernement peut-il se reposer avec confiance ?

Voilà les idées du Duc ; non seulement je les comprends très bien mais je les partage entièrement. . . .

(ii)

Windsor Cottage, *August* 11, 1820.

[Received Metternich's dispatches on the affairs of Naples while at this intimate royal party. It is really impossible to exaggerate the goodwill of the King. Esterhazy went to London to shew them to Castlereagh.]

Ce ministre se félicita de la concordance entre la manière de voir des deux Cabinets sur cette importante question, et de ce que le nôtre, tout en allant droit au fait et déployant la vigueur et la détermination indispensables, ne s'est pas éloigné de la ligne de prudence, ni des principes de l'Alliance, et a évité par là bien des écueils et des difficultés. Vous agissez, me dit-il, d'après vos principes, dont il me paraît impossible de nous départir, savoir : que *l'union* de principes et de morale doit toujours être *unanime* et *générale*, mais que la sphère d'activité doit, et ne peut souvent qu'être *isolée*. C'est d'après ce même principe que j'abonde entièrement dans le sens du Prince Metternich, en engageant le Roi de

Prusse à ne point prendre part à l'entrevue des deux Empereurs, et à éviter par là une réunion de trois Souverains. L'invitation de l'Empereur Alexandre était infiniment bien calculée, soit que S. M. s'y rende ou non dans le premier cas, il en résultera une facilité d'entente bien désirable, et dans l'un comme dans l'autre, ce Souverain ne pourra qu'y reconnaître une preuve de confiance et d'amitié de la part de l'Empereur François, ce qui doit produire l'effet le plus salulaire. Comme le Comte de Lieven,—continue ce ministre,—expédie un courrier droit à Varsovie, où, notre Ambassadeur ne s'y trouvant point, nous n'avons aucun moyen de communication avec Sa Majesté, j'ai cru qu'il serait d'une utilité commune de m'expliquer vis-à-vis de cet Ambassadeur pour lui marquer notre opinion sur le plus d'utilité d'abandonner la sphère d'activité plutôt à l'Autriche, en se mettant d'accord avec elle sur le principe, cette question touchant par mainte raison plus directement cette Puissance, de même que la Russie s'est crue dans le temps dans la position d'être plus particulièrement concernée dans les événements en Espagne. J'ai cru devoir aussi entrer vis-à-vis du Comte de Lieven dans des explications, pour le mettre à même de rendre compte à sa Cour de la grande différence que nous voyons dans les deux catastrophes d'une affinité apparente, mais bien différentes dans leur genre, et que les raisonnements contenus dans notre mémoire confidentielle¹ sur un de ces événements ne peuvent point dans toute leur étendue, s'appliquer au plus récent.

J'ai parlé dans le même sens à M. Decazes, me dit Lord Castlereagh, principalement sur ce que, d'après votre opinion bien prononcée, il est préférable d'appliquer à ce mal local les remèdes les plus *rapprochés* plutôt que d'en venir à un appel à l'Europe. La Russie et la France penchent également dans mainte occasion à mettre en mouvement la grande machine de l'Alliance, la première parceque c'est alors que ses rouages sont les plus forts, et l'autre parcequ'elle cherche à donner une direction différente de celle à laquelle l'Alliance doit sa naissance, qui, en dernière analyse a été formée contre la France—non la France sous les Bourbons, mais la France révolutionnaire ; il n'en est pas moins vrai que l'amour propre des Français est encore souvent blessé de cette arrière-pensée.

[Castlereagh had not time to go through all the papers.]

Il a beaucoup admiré la manière dont nous avons pris position dans cette affaire. Il nous reste à voir les nuances que ce gouvernement observera lorsqu'il s'agira de se prononcer ; il est évident qu'on en évitera le plus que possible les occasions ; il s'en présentera cependant qui seront inévitables ; par exemple, que répondra-t-on à une annonce officielle des changements opérés dans la forme du gouverne-

¹ The State Paper of May 5, 1820.

ment ? Quel accueil fera-t-on à un envoyé dans la catégorie du prince Cariati ?¹ Quelles instructions donnera-t-on au chevalier A'Court ?

La solution de ces différentes questions donnera quelque embarras au ministère, entre ses bonnes dispositions et ses principes, et sa crainte de se compromettre devant le Parlement ; et je crois que ses actes publics ne porteront point un caractère aussi prononcé que nous pourrions le désirer. . . .

(iii)

London, *September* 24, 1820.

Si je n'avais décidé l'expédition du présent courrier déjà par la simple raison qu'en ayant deux ici je voulais en mettre un à la disposition du Baron de Vincent, les doutes que Mylord Castlereagh m'a témoignés relativement à la dernière expédition russe m'auraient décidé à le faire partir. Je n'ai point vu Lieven qui est à la campagne. Castlereagh est également allé faire une [cure] pour huit jours. Wellington est absent depuis quelque temps déjà. Le bureau des affaires étrangères est dirigé de manière que je ne viendrai également point en ville pour huit jours. D'ici là, les doutes s'éclairciront, et j'espère pouvoir vous dire quelque chose de plus positif alors. Ce qui me fait croire que le *peur* a fait voir à Castlereagh dans la pièce russe un fantôme qui ne s'y trouve peut-être pas, ou, au moins, qui n'est pas si effrayant qu'il a paru à ses yeux, est la réflexion que *vous* ne l'y avez point *vu*. Il ne resterait donc que la supposition que Lieven ait reçu des pièces que vous n'avez point vues, ce dont je doute. Cet incident, au reste, montre, mon Prince, à quel point on est outrageux ici, et vous prouvera la difficulté que vous trouverez à ménager les intérêts de la *forme* pour la Russie sans faire tort aux intérêts du *fond* de la question ici. Il ne me reste point de doute qu'on ne saisisse l'échappatoire que je vous ai indiquée dans mes dépêches, si on les presse trop fortement ici ; tandis qu'il me paraît difficile qu'au point où vous avez su amener les choses avec la Russie, elle puisse nous échapper ou entraver notre marche.

Il est assez curieux d'observer que la seule Puissance dans l'Alliance, dont les intérêts dans cette question sont entièrement et complètement identifiés avec les nôtres, est non seulement celle qui par ses entraves de politique administrative, tient le langage le plus réservé, combat ou rejette une partie de nos propositions (uniquement dictées dans ce même intérêt) mais pourrait même par ces mêmes motifs momentanément rester en arrière et séparer sa marche de la nôtre. Quand je dis que l'Angleterre est la seule

¹ Sent to represent the new constitutional Government of Naples.

Puissance qui a le même intérêt que nous, je crois que cette vérité n'a pas besoin de preuves ; et, à mesure qu'elle est démontrée, les intérêts de la Russie et de la France se rapprochent et forment le contrepoids. Celui de la Prusse est nul dans la balance, quoique son influence *morale* se dirige dans notre sens. J'avoue que je crains dans cette question plus encore que dans d'autres, l'ascendant de l'*esprit Pozzo* sur l'*esprit Richelieu* : pour nous, faire tort au dernier m'apparaît comme le pot de fer contre le pot de terre.

Mais les véritables intérêts finiront par l'emporter. Ôtons le grand intérêt qui nous réunit tous jusqu'ici, vu le bon esprit des Souverains, celui de *notre existence*, et vous verrez chacun suivre la pente naturelle de la gravitation de sa politique, et il est *impossible* que celle-là ne mette dans cette question l'Autriche et l'Angleterre d'un côté, la France et la Russie de l'autre. Au reste celui-ci n'est point une question de politique autant que de morale et de ces principes qui sont antérieurs à toute politique.

Je n'ai de reste pas beaucoup à vous dire, mon cher prince ; l'effet du scandale Européen se fait sentir tous les jours davantage, et la moralité de ce pays-ci en a reçu une forte secousse. Le Roi pourra difficilement regagner le terrain perdu. . . .

(iv)

London, *January 2, 1821.*

[Congratulations.]

Vous voyez assez bien la carte morale du pays pour ne pas m'imputer la faute que les affaires n'y marchent point d'une manière plus satisfaisante. Mais si, d'un côté, je suis loin à vérifier la présomptueuse vanité de croire qu'un négociateur plus habile ne peut peut-être les présenter sous un jour plus avantageux et dérober de cette manière quelques nuances plus favorables à nos opinions, mais [*sic*] je dois dire que j'ai l'intime conviction que personne ne parviendrait à opérer un changement essentiel. Ce qu'il y a de fâcheux dans l'attitude et le langage du ministère britannique, n'est pas qu'il ne peut point convenir des véritables motifs de sa conduite qui se trouvent dans la déplorable faiblesse qu'il a mise à l'ordre du jour, mais qu'il doit avoir recours à d'autres arguments qui sont encore plus fâcheux.

Sa faiblesse doit certainement nous donner beaucoup *de regrets*, d'autres arguments nous font *du tort*—contre son intention, mais de fait. De tels arguments ne sont pas ceux du Gouvernement même ; mais ce sont ceux de l'Opposition mis en avant par le Gouvernement pour pouvoir dire dans le temps qu'on avait prévu ces objections.

Je me réserve de vous parler plus longuement sur l'impression que votre mémoire aura produit ici quand j'aurai parlé davantage

avec Lord Castlereagh, mais je n'hésiterai pas un instant à prendre sur moi la responsabilité de consigner d'avance toutes les idées que ce ministère entreprendra par la suite. Il part de la persuasion qu'il n'existe point un système de mesures préventives efficaces, et qu'en tout cas ce n'est pas dans la réaction *du dehors* qu'il doit être cherché. Il craint aussi que tout concert que les Cours pourraient prendre n'empêcheront point le mal d'éclater *là* où il est—comme on ne peut pas l'attendre,—et qu'il est inutile de parler *là* où on ne peut pas agir. La parole, dit-il, n'a de l'effet qu'autant qu'elle est le symbole et le précurseur de l'action. Les déclarations de l'Empereur Alexandre sur les affaires de l'Espagne n'ont fait d'effet ni à Madrid ni à Naples, et il en serait de même maintenant si ce n'était l'attitude imposante de l'Autriche que l'on craignait. Au reste, comme je vous ai déjà dit, mon Prince, ce que l'on craint ici par dessus tout (au moins d'après la crainte du Parlement), c'est l'extension de l'influence russe. Et malgré tout ce que je dis, et les preuves que je donne que nous n'avons jamais donné lieu à un pareil reproche, on craint que nous *légalisions* son interférence.

Le Comte Munster avec lequel je me suis entretenu à cet égard partage en grande partie cette opinion, et même il me témoigna quelque inquiétude à l'égard d'une difficulté, qui s'offre pour la confédération germanique, qui se trouve liée par des stipulations analogues à celles que l'on veut aujourd'hui rendre générales, mais auxquelles on ne pourra point donner les limitations salutaires fondées dans le pacte fédéral. Il écrit la dessus au Comte de Hardenberg¹ avec ordre de vous communiquer les dépêches, mon Prince.

Tout ce que vous me dites de Stewart ne m'étonne aucunement, et je crois seulement que de pareils inconvénients ne peuvent pas déjà reproduits [*sic*] plus souvent. Le ministère partage tout à fait cette opinion et il en a parlé dans ce sens au Roi. Il y a plus de trois semaines que je ne l'ai vu ; mais je crois que nous serons bientôt en cas de nous rendre à Brighton et je n'en serai point fâché, car il me tient à cœur de détruire des idées qu'il pourrait prendre relativement à notre rapprochement avec la Russie, que je sais lui donner personnellement de l'ombrage.

Je suis persuadé que Stewart ne restera point, et j'ignore qui pourrait être son successeur si ce n'était Henry Wellesley, de Madrid. Ce serait, je crois, un très bon choix. Au reste, ceci n'est tout à fait que conjecture de ma part.

Je ne vous parle point de la sortie de Canning—car on n'en parle pas beaucoup. Il est seulement fâcheux que Lord Castlereagh soit tout seul à la Chambre basse sans orateur.

¹ Representative of Hanover at Vienna.

(v)

London, *January* 10, 1821.

Enfin nous voyons clair, mon cher Prince, et je partage bien votre opinion qu'il vaut mieux avoir à combattre un mal peut-être plus grand que moindre, mais caché et compliqué. Telle est la position des affaires aujourd'hui.

Vous avez eu un peu d'humeur contre le noble Lord ici, et je le conçois. S'il est déjà fort désagréable de ne *pas* être compris, il l'était bien davantage d'être *mal* compris. Mais, de grâce, ne prenez pas tout à la lettre, et croyez que des moments de faiblesse extrême actuelle s'amourront et ne peuvent point rester un système. Laissez ce ministère à nouveau prendre haleine et se rassurer de leur existence, et bientôt vous les verrez enfin donner signe de vie. Ce que j'avoue n'a pas été le cas depuis quelque temps, puisque l'Angleterre était en quelque sorte politiquement morte. Un ministère qui n'est point populaire ne peut rien faire, la meilleure cause avorterait entre ses mains, et telle est sans contredit la position de celui-ci. Il ne pèchent point faute de vouloir, mais faute de pouvoir, et c'est un effet dont la cause monte bien plus haut.

Au reste quoique vous ayez eu certainement raison d'être mécontent des dernières productions qui vous sont arrivées d'ici, j'ai été bien soulagé en voyant le point de vue réellement grand sur lequel vous envisagez les choses, et je vous ai reconnu en cela. En me permettant de rester toujours dans une attitude cordiale et amicale avec Castlereagh vous me mettez à même de lui dire beaucoup plus de vérité que si vous m'en chargiez officiellement. Je ne lui ai point épargné plusieurs de celles que contient votre dépêche secrète, et je dois dire qu'il les a très bien prises. Et il y a des points qu'il a même défendus légèrement comme par exemple la manière dont Lord Liverpool a parlé sur les affaires de Naples à la Chambre Haute. Il se plaint cependant que vous vous plaisez à dépeindre le diable encore plus noir qu'il n'est (à ce qu'il dit) et vous envisagez l'Angleterre comme beaucoup plus éloignée de vous qu'elle ne l'est effectivement. Il sépare toujours dans son raisonnement l'affaire de Naples des affaires générales ; et il dit que dans la première l'Angleterre était aux avant-postes et qu'il aurait pu arriver, par les circonstances, que le canon anglais eût retenti devant Naples avant le canon autrichien. Au reste, comme les positions sont prises, il est inutile de recourir sur le passé.

Il ne me parle que vaguement et d'une manière interrompue sur votre mémoire. Cependant j'ai déjà rassemblé plusieurs fragments, et j'en formerai un ensemble que je vous prierai cependant de ne

considérer que comme un assemblage d'idées isolées et éparses sur lesquelles même il n'arrive pas beaucoup à s'expliquer. Il convient que vous avez raison en disant quelquepart, dans une de vos dépêches, que l'Angleterre est en quelque sorte révolutionnaire, pas en principe mais par les formes ; et il admet que les formes peuvent produire du mal dans le moment actuel, tout en disant qu'il est impossible de ne pas les ménager. L'Angleterre n'a fait autre chose, depuis vingt-cinq ans, que de combattre la *Revolution de fait* ; mais jamais même Mr. Pitt n'a avoué que c'était là le principal but de ses efforts, et toujours il a du chercher d'autres motifs, ou plutôt prétextes. Ce que Mr. Pitt n'a pas pu remporter de vive force *alors*, certainement Lord Castlereagh aurait de la peine même à l'essayer *maintenant*. Je ne veux point au reste troubler les nuances de ce grand homme par des comparaisons déplacées dans leurs applications. Mais je veux seulement dire que la lutte gigantesque qu'il a provoquée et dont l'issue glorieuse est le plus beau monument élevé à sa mémoire, cette lutte, dis-je, n'a pas commencé par un défi lancé contre les principes révolutionnaires, mais elle a été entamée par quelques considérations de violation de neutralité, ou d'autres considérations bien secondaires du danger alors presque chimérique en le comparant avec celui qu'effectivement déjà alors présentait [*sic*] les principes, dont ce grand homme d'état avait si bien jugé le développement et les effets. Je ne connais point de lecture plus intéressante et plus utile dans le moment actuel que la lecture des chefs-d'œuvre d'éloquence entre lui et son antagoniste. Je m'en fais une étude sérieuse, qui vient de beaucoup d'utilité dans mes conversations avec Lord Castlereagh. Je crois qu'à l'instant de surprise il a reculé à mesure que tous ses noirs pressentiments ne se réalisent point.

Tout ce que vous me dites de Stewart me fait de la peine sans me surprendre. La lettre à Gentz est un document unique dans son genre. Je suis sûr que le *Morning Chronicle* le paierait à poids d'or. Il faut que Lieven ait quelque chose à placer sur son compte : *das ist mir gut zufrieden*.

Je crois que la faveur de Decazes baisse : au moins la marche du gouvernement n'est pas tout à fait dans son sens. Pasquier lui écrit moins et sans détails, et ce que je vous mande par mes dépêches du jour, mon prince, le prouve en quelque sorte. Cependant je ne comprends rien à cette marche du Cabinet français pour sa politique extérieure. Celles pour son intérieure paraissent sages, si effectivement le pouvoir ne fait pas tourner la tête aux Ultras, mais, de toute manière, c'est déjà un bon état de choses quand le danger ne vient que de là. Cette nomination de Villèle, Corbière et Lainé lui est venue à l'improviste, et il ne s'y attendait pas. Je crois que l'activité raisonnable de son poste ne lui suffit point, et on voit qu'il en cherche de tous côtés. Nous n'avons pas

encore tiré au clair l'histoire des voleurs qui attaquent ses gens sur la route. On croit dans sa maison que ce sont des Français, et qu'on en veut à ses papiers plutôt qu'à son argent.

De grâce, mon cher Prince, donnez moi quelques commissions, ou au moins la permission pour aller à Paris à temps opportun. J'ai aucun d'œuvre [*sic*] et réellement les brouillards ici pour le moment sont insupportables . . .

Nous avons fait deux très jolis séjours chez le Jersey et Bedford, où nous nous sommes amusés à merveille, c'est à dire toujours un peu à l'Anglaise, avec quelques intervalles de roideur, mais l'ensemble était très bien. Le Duc d'York y était tout le temps, c'est un bien excellent mortel ; il sait une quantité d'histoires du Stewart, qui montre la bizarrerie de sa conduite. . . . J'ai toujours su qu'il était fou, mais je ne savais pas qu'il l'était à ce point. . . .

[Observations on the new journal *John Bull* and the trial.]

Nous allons demain passer quelques jours à la campagne chez Wellington avec les Lieven et les Castlereagh. Lundi ce dernier doit se lancer pour la première fois à la Chambre. Le pauvre homme aura quelques rudes journées.

Canning part incessamment pour Paris ; il s'était établi une liaison assez intime entre lui et Decazes, qui datait d'ailleurs déjà de plus loin. . . .

(vi)

London, *March* 30, 1821.

Comment vous exprimer tout ce que j'éprouve au moment du triomphe complet que vous remportez, moi qui depuis si longtemps m'associe à tous vos sentiments et à tout ce que vous éprouvez ? . . .

Si j'ai une satisfaction de plus, c'est de vous avoir compris et de ne pas avoir souffert la moindre incertitude sur le parti irrévocable que vous avez pris. La sagesse prépare les voies aux événements, et la Providence seule les dirige. Et celle-ci vous a secondé au delà même des plus chères espérances. Ce ne sont pas les événements seuls, mais la *manière* qui ne laisse absolument rien à désirer.

Il me serait difficile de vous rendre un compte exact de toutes les différentes impressions ; ce que je vous ai dit dernièrement de l'opinion du *publique* plutôt que *publique* [*sic*] est littéralement vrai. Mais je vous réponds que cela changera, et que non seulement vous avez sauvé le Continent, mais vous avez *essentielllement* contribué à sauver l'Angleterre, en dépit et même contre elle-même.

Le ministère et surtout Castlereagh sent cela, et je vous assure qu'il exprime un petit sentiment d'embarras vis-à-vis de moi, dont, comme de raison, je me garde bien d'avoir l'air de m'apercevoir, et en général j'ai cru dans toutes ces dernières circonstances mettre le calme le plus imperturbable à l'ordre du jour, vis-à-vis de tout

le monde. J'ajoute tout aussi peu d'importance aux basses flat-teries du moment qu'aux propos peu avenants des moments précédents qu'on a remarqués dans la société. Je vous assure que cela m'a satisfait assez bien personnellement : on m'a toujours montré les plus grands égards sous ce rapport. Castlereagh, au fond du cœur, est enchanté, je vous le réponds. Quant au Duc de Wellington, il est toujours excellent. Je dois cependant dire qu'il y a eu un moment où son *courage moral* avait baissé : c'est à dire, en causant des affaires du Piémont, il croyait bien que nous devions terminer avec vigueur notre affaire à Naples, mais nous [indéchiffrable] (c'est son expression) après, et ne pas laisser continuer à rester engagés des deux côtés.

Mr. Hill¹ va retourner, j'espère, incessamment à Turin, et je vous réponds, mon prince de ses sentiments. Je l'ai beaucoup vu ici. Dès le premier moment, il a envisagé comme vous l'affaire de Piémont.

Quant à la France, Castlereagh croit comme vous, mon prince, que *tout* dépend de son attitude future. Il craint que l'approche des Russes ne cause une grande sensation et ne rende la fonction du ministère, et surtout celle du duc de Richelieu, fort difficile . . .

. . . Le Roi a été parfait ici. Je vous assure, mon prince, qu'il a donné dans cette occasion preuve de plus de caractère qu'on ne lui en supposait, et il était notre plus vaillant défenseur dans le ministère. Il sera enchanté si nous arrêtons un des courriers de la Reine.

Le Duc de Wellington, qui a toujours fait grand cas de notre armée, m'a dit qu'il avait appris avec la plus vive satisfaction par un témoin oculaire, tout à fait capable d'en juger, qu'elle était dans le meilleur état possible. . . .

(vii)

London, *November 26, 1821.*

C'est avec le plus grand intérêt que j'ai lu la dépêche secrète² de l'expédition que V. A. m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser de Hanovre contenant les détails curieux de ses entretiens particuliers avec le roi et son ministre sur les relations de Sa Majesté avec son Cabinet. Il ne m'était resté aucun doute dans mon esprit que le Marquis de Londonderry tout en usant principalement au grand intérêt de politique générale attaché à votre réunion dans les conjonctures importantes du moment, comptait également utiliser l'ascendant qu'il vous connaît sur [blank] du Roi pour rétablir ses relations, tant personnelles que ministérielles, avec son maître. Heureusement que ce but plutôt particulier se trouve essentiellement d'accord

¹ British Minister to the Court of Sardinia.

² See above, Chapter VII., Section 2, p. 369.

avec le bien général que vous avez en vue en vous rendant à Hanovre. L'espèce d'incertitude dans laquelle il me laissa sur la possibilité de votre arrivée, et le silence complet qu'il observa quant à l'idée d'une invitation formelle, sont autant de preuves pour moi qu'il préférerait ne point avoir de tiers entre vous et lui sur ce point si délicat, quoiqu'il eût été, j'en ai la conviction, fort charmé que tel fût le cas sous tous les autres rapports. Non seulement que j'approuve entièrement sa délicatesse extrême à ne jamais aborder les relations intérieures fort compliquées de cette administration, mais je lui en sais le plus grand gré, puisqu'il m'évite bien des embarras dans mes relations avec le Roi. Faisant preuve devant lui de mon entière ignorance sur ses relations individuelles avec ses ministres, je puis ou garder le silence, ou, d'après les circonstances, même dire quelque chose en faveur des récusés, puisque je dois en convenir que c'est plutôt dans ce sens là que je l'ai entendu parler que dans un autre.

Si je n'ai pas entretenu V. A. plus souvent des ouvertures confidentielles que Sa Majesté me fait à ses différentes reprises, c'est d'abord vu la délicatesse extrême de l'objet et dans la persuasion que ces plaintes réitérées ne peuvent avoir de prix à vos yeux, mon Prince, qu'autant qu'elles pouvaient pronostiquer quelque *fait positif*. Aussi n'ai-je point manqué de vous soumettre mon opinion sur quelques changements au retour du roi d'Irlande. Aussi l'orage d'alors, qui menaçait d'éclater (vu les fautes à l'occasion du Convoi funèbre de la Reine) n'a été conjuré que par quelques habiles manœuvres, dont le renvoi de Sir Robert Wilson n'était pas la plus insignifiante. La brièveté du séjour du Roi à Londres, ses préparatifs pour le voyage, son penchant à la procrastination, toutes ces circonstances ont fait gagner du temps, et on a résolu de délibérer à Hanovre sur ce que l'on ferait au retour. C'est ce que voulaient les ministres, d'autant plus que, soit par l'effet du hasard ou de la persuasion, que je sais que le duc de Wellington a fait valoir, la personne dont l'influence est à la fois la plus positive et la moins favorable au ministère (à l'exception du Duc) ne s'est point rendue à Hanovre. Tout ceci était parfaitement au gré de Lord Londonderry, et pour se présenter plus en force sur le champ de bataille, il détacha de la route un courrier à son Allié le plus puissant pour réclamer son soutien. Les résultats à Hanovre vous sont plus connus qu'à moi, puisque c'est vous qui les avez amenés. Vous me dites qu'il serait difficile de mieux traiter un ministère que le Roi ne l'a fait vis-à-vis de Lord Londonderry. J'espère mieux que personne juge [*sic*] que ce n'était en grande partie qu'à votre présence qu'il devait cette distinction, car il serait difficile de la traiter avec plus de froideur qu'il ne l'avait été à Dublin. Il ne s'agit donc maintenant que de voir en combien ces succès obtenus se soutiendront sur un terrain plus contesté et sans le soutien de

son puissant Allié. Les auspices jusqu'ici me paraissent favorables. Quant à Lord Liverpool, la tension entre lui et le roi est telle que ses rapports de service jusqu'ici ne pouvaient durer. Je crois qu'on est occupé à les modifier, puisque le ministère craint de s'affaiblir, même si sa retraite avait l'air d'être entièrement volontaire ; on tâche donc de l'éviter si cela est possible.

Les torts principaux que le Roi impute à Lord Liverpool se trouvent surtout dans les formes, et dans son extrême véhémence et irascibilité, qui, à ce que m'a souvent dit Sa Majesté, lui fait dans la chaleur de la discussion oublier le profond respect dû au trône, dont la Constitution de ce pays a fait si sagement un devoir tout particulier et plus marqué que dans les monarchies les plus absolues. Il serait cependant difficile de trouver un ministre dont le caractère individuel soit plus pur et plus respecté, et qui, sous ce rapport, exerce une influence plus prononcée sur l'opinion publique et dans la Chambre. Son ministère doit donc à juste titre épuiser toutes les chances pour conserver un membre aussi important dans les rangs de son administration.

Un des motifs les plus futiles a engendré la froideur avec Lord Londonderry. Mylady a trouvé bon de boudier le Roi pour avoir rompu avec la Marquise de Hertford, et a affiché de ne faire aucune politesse à Lady Coyningham. Pour que les torts soient cependant réciproques, celle-ci ne s'est prêtée depuis à aucune espèce de raccomodement, et voilà en un mot les choses. Ces deux femmes ne se parlent jamais, l'une étant *toujours* dans la société intime du Roi, l'autre *jamais*, et par conséquent son mari presque jamais.

Jack [undecipherable] m'a dit : "C'était même dans peu de jours, avant le retour du Roi, que la manière de ton de Lady Londonderry place son mari dans une attitude qui lui fait du tort (quoique peut-être à tort) ; car sans cela, dans le cas de la retraite de Lord Liverpool, personne ne conviendrait mieux pour premier ministre."

Ces petits détails avec ceux que vous avez si amplement recueillis à Hanovre vous donneront, mon prince, [une idée] de la carte du pays ici pour le moment. J'aurai soin de vous indiquer toutes les variations qui parviennent à ma connaissance. J'ai longuement vu le Roi, et il n'a pas tari en éloges sur votre compte. Il est, comme vous dites, l'Autrichien le plus déterminé ; il trouve même l'Archiduc Ferdinand extrêmement *aimable* et *charmant*. Quant à son royaume de Hanovre, tout en rendant justice à ses habitants, il dit qu'il est en arrière de 300 ans, et que Münster y est le type du bon goût et de l'extrême *fashion*. Il parle de ses voyages pour l'année prochaine comme une chose entièrement arrêtée. J'ai trouvé sa santé dans le meilleur état, et il avait bu de très bonne humeur. . . .

APPENDIX F

DISPATCHES FROM LIEVEN TO NESSELRODE.¹

(i)

(No. 67) *May* 18, 1818.

[Conversation with Castlereagh concerning the approaching Conference.]

. . . " Le Prince Regent est aussi jaloux que Sa Majesté Impériale, dit le Secrétaire d'État, d'honorer les droits des autres Puissances, et d'écarter de la pensée de leurs Cabinets toute idée de suprématie quelconque de la part des grands États. Mais il pense que la réunion prochaine découlant exclusivement d'un traité auquel les quatre grandes Puissances seules ont pris part, exclut par là même toute prétention ou attente des autres Cours de s'y voir invitées. . . . L'intérêt générale le réclame et exige qu'on écarte tout ombrage ou interprétation erronée sur l'objet de l'entrevue. Il est essentiel de détruire à ce sujet toute idée vague ou incertaine. Il est essentiel encore que les occupations des Cabinets réunis à cette entrevue portent exclusivement sur l'objet qui les rassemble ; mais il pense qu'à côté de ce grand œuvre, on pourrait utiliser aussi cette occasion pour rapprocher les opinions des Grandes Puissances sur les autres questions politiques, qui quoique étrangères à l'objet immédiat de leur réunion, sont inhérentes à l'essence de la Grande Alliance, en tant qu'elles embrassent la question du repos universel dans le bien être et la paix des États. Ces mêmes questions forment déjà l'objet commun de leurs soins et de leur sollicitude. Pourquoi, dit le Vicomte de Castlereagh, négliger un moyen plus immédiat de se concerter et de s'entendre sur elles ; non point sous la forme de négociations, elles n'appartiennent point à la nature de cette entrevue mais comme aboutement fortuit, qui ne peut manquer d'exercer l'influence la plus salutaire dans l'intérêt de ces questions.

Le Secrétaire d'État s'étendit beaucoup à ce sujet sur l'importance et l'utilité majeure de semblables réunions pour l'avenir

¹ *Pet. Arch.*, all from London.

même, et ne peut qu'anticiper les résultats de ce contact répété entre les Souverains, qui, tout en resserrant les liens personnels qui les unissent, écartent à son avis ou détruisent l'influence souvent maligne des relations purement diplomatiques." . . .

(ii)

(No. 146) *September 4, 1818.*

[Interview with Castlereagh a few hours before his departure for Aix-la-Chapelle concerning the Spanish note on the South American Colonies and the British reply. Castlereagh desired the matter to be kept confidential.]

Il me dit qu'elles ne pouvaient que servir de justification complète du jugement que porte le gouvernement britannique de la conduite du Cabinet espagnol et des principes qui le guident. Si d'un côté nos exhortations et celles des autres cours l'ont déterminé, poursuit le Secrétaire d'Etat, à adopter des bases libérales dans les conditions qu'il offre à ses peuples transatlantiques ; de l'autre il s'explique de manière à ne plus laisser de doute sur son attente de voir les Puissances médiatrices s'armer en sa faveur. Or les objections que nous élevons contre un engagement de cette nature découlent autant de la forme de notre gouvernement que de l'esprit de la nation anglaise. Le gouvernement exécutif ne peut point entrer dans un lien quelconque qui le mette par la suite dans le cas d'employer la force pour faire adopter à un peuple étranger, qui jouit de son indépendance et n'aspire qu'à la maintenir, les lois d'un souverain despote.

Les mêmes obstacles se présentent à l'établissement de restrictions pour les relations commerciales des sujets anglais avec les rebelles. Comment pourrions nous poser des entraves à notre commerce, dont les conséquences seraient toutes à l'avantage de celui de notre rivale (les Etats-Unis). D'ailleurs le commerce de contrebande s'établirait incessamment, les délits et contraventions devraient être punis et la poursuite des coupables serait bientôt vengée par la dépopularisation du gouvernement et par conséquent son ébranlement. Enfin, ajouta Lord Castlereagh, si je pouvais être de cette opinion, jamais mes collègues ne la partageraient ; s'ils pouvaient l'avoir, jamais ils ne la feraient adopter au parlement ; et si enfin les deux chambres voulaient la soutenir, la nation entière désavouerait ses représentants.

Passant au contenu de la note, les menaces de l'Espagne, dit-il, ne pouvant se rapporter à une guerre, compliquent nécessairement quelque transaction qui affecterait les intérêts de l'Angleterre ; or nulle menace, quelques fâcheux que soient ses résultats, ne

pourra nous forcer à contracter un lien contraire aux principes et à l'essence de notre gouvernement et l'abandon que ferait l'Espagne des Florides, non plus que toute autre détermination semblable de sa part, n'ébranlerait pas la nôtre.

Loin d'être injustes envers l'Espagne, loin que nous ayons vu avec indifférence rien de ce qui l'intéresse, l'histoire des dix dernières années, les sacrifices immenses qu'à faits l'Angleterre pour elle, le sang anglais répandu à côté du sien, les liens de toute espèce qu'une longue communauté de privations, de peines, de triomphes ont établis entre nous, tout dépose de l'intérêt naturel qui nous liait à l'Espagne. Une nation sauvée par nous, conservait par la même des titres pressantes à notre sympathie, à notre amitié. Nos intérêts politiques s'y mêlaient aussi ; l'importance de ne point lui laisser reprendre ses liens de famille, si contraire à toute saine politique, la nature de ses possessions transatlantiques et l'avantage de voir la domination sur ces régions conservée à l'Espagne, plutôt que passer au pouvoir de gouvernements républicains, en un mot, tout nous unissait à l'Espagne et nous disposait à maintenir les liens intimes établis par les dernières années

L'Espagne a tout oublié, tout repoussé et nous a toujours soupçonné ; témoin le langage qu'elle emploie aujourd'hui ; il porte le type des principes qui dominent son Cabinet, et que je vous ai signalé depuis deux ans. L'Espagne laisse arriver ses relations au point d'un éclat ; elle exige alors qu'on l'assiste et qu'on la venge. Sa hauteur, ses maladresses lui font tout perdre. Son impuissance la force à rechercher l'appui des autres, et la politique vicieuse de son Cabinet dicte encore et exige des moyens violents. Car ajoutez-il, la grande majorité dans le conseil, dans l'armée et même dans la nation est tout pour subjuguier et vaincre les provinces rebelles et non pour les pacifier.

Considérons maintenant l'état actuel de ces provinces. Sur une population de quatorze millions le tiers se trouve émancipé ; la proportion de territoire est à l'avantage des insurgés. Le laps de temps qui s'est déjà écoulé depuis cette émancipation, les succès et les progrès de la rebellion, rendent très problématique la soumission de ces pays au sceptre espagnol ; la fermentation se manifeste dans ceux qui sont encore restés fidèles, des hordes de guerillas se maintiennent sur différents points. Si cependant aux offres libérales et généreuses qui propose l'Espagne, pourrait se joindre encore le poids de l'intervention européenne ; (si cette intervention s'établissait sur un système qui permit à l'Angleterre d'y prendre part) ou pourrait peut-être se flatter de l'ascendant favorable, que cette force morale exercerait sur l'esprit des peuples révoltés. Mais dans tous les cas, elle servirait au moins à maintenir et à consolider la tranquillité de ceux qui n'ont point encore pris de part ouverte

à la rébellion ; et l'exemple de leur prospérité sous un régime libérale et stable pourrait préparer un retour volontaire des autres vers le même gouvernement.

Il est plus douteux que les républiques organisées déjà s'y soumettent, et il reste à savoir le parti auquel l'Espagne se déciderait à leur égard, et si elle ne jugerait point avantageux de placer à leur tête un prince de sa famille pour diriger au moins dans un sens moins hostile à ses intérêts, l'indépendance à laquelle ces pays se sont élevés.

Lord Castlereagh me fit mention très confidentiellement à cette occasion d'une lettre qu'il avait reçue du général San Martin ; la même dont l'un de mes précédents rapports à Votre Excellence a signalé l'existence. Il trace au Secrétaire d'Etat le tableau de la situation de la république de Buenos-Ayres ; il représente l'émancipation de cet État comme établie sur les bases les plus solides et les libertés de la nation assurées. Mais il ajoute que pour affirmer et protéger sa prospérité et la calculer sur le degré de civilisation du peuple, il reconnaît la nécessité d'une monarchie représentative. San Martin fait entendre cependant que la choix d'un prince espagnol ne pourrait point être admis, sans compromettre la tranquillité du pays, puisqu'il serait naturel de redouter de sa part des récriminations et des persécutions incompatibles avec la sécurité et le bonheur de la nation. Lord Castlereagh me dit qu'il avait cru devoir faire connaître à l'Espagne cette démarche de San Martin.

(iii)

(No. 75) *May 16, 1820.*

[Interview with Castlereagh on the State Paper of May 5, 1820. He excused the delay by the importance of the subject. The Cabinet felt it necessary to review all its obligations.]

Le Secrétaire d'État s'est en conséquence trouvé chargé par les ministres ses collègues de leur présenter un exposé de l'état général de la politique européenne et de son opinion sur le système que l'Angleterre doit suivre dans les présentes circonstances. Le Duc de Wellington, que sa position particulière rend plus qu'aucun autre apte à juger sainement des affaires d'Espagne, s'est également vu invité à présenter son opinion au Conseil pour éclairer le jugement de ses collègues. Chacun en son particulier, et tous collectivement, ont voué à l'examen de cette question, la méditation la plus profonde ; ils se sont trouvés unanimes. . . . [Thus not a document meant to be communicated regularly to the Allies but a kind of general review of British policy.]

On ne saurait se déguiser, et mes entretiens confidentiels avec le Secrétaire d'État m'ont pleinement confirmé dans cette opinion,

que leurs embarras domestiques et les difficultés presque insurmontables de leurs finances ne soient de puissants motifs pour contraindre les ministres anglais à l'adoption de cette marche politique. Je sais aussi que la durée des délibérations du Cabinet a été occasionnée par le sentiment de répugnance très prononcée de quelques uns des membres qui composent ce conseil (et auxquels l'habitude d'une politique plus insulaire et l'éloignement du courant des rapports extérieurs de la Grande Bretagne, donnent une certaine étrangeté rude d'opinion) à prendre part à aucune nouvelle complication extérieure, dans un moment où l'intérieure offre tant de motifs d'apprehension et de difficulté. Il m'est connu que le Vicomte de Castlereagh et le Duc de Wellington ont eu l'un et l'autre à combattre vivement à cette occasion les préventions de leurs collègues.

[Public opinion in Britain against Spain and its King makes the situation more difficult.] Malgré cela on ne peut douter de l'intérêt que le Vicomte de Castlereagh et le Duc de Wellington apportent aux affaires espagnoles. Leur sentiment et celui du Roi lui-même est identique avec le nôtre dans cette question ; les premiers par les rapports personnels dans lesquels ils se sont trouvés avec les Cabinets du Continent, et l'habitude d'un échange constant d'opinions et d'idées avec eux ; le Roi par principe d'aversion immuable en lui de tout ce qui porte atteinte au respect dû aux trônes et à la légitimité.

(iv)

(No. 148) *July 21, 1820.*

[Interview with Castlereagh on the revelations of French intrigues with Buenos Ayres in 1819.]¹

Le Vicomte de Castlereagh me dit : ces informations nous sont tombées comme un coup de foudre, et cela dans un moment où nous pouvons à peine suffire à nos embarras domestiques. Telles que nos données nous représentent cette affaire, elle porte le caractère de la plus noire perfidie et forme assurément un exemple de duplicité et de mauvaise foi inouï dans la politique de nos jours. La France travaille à une négociation secrète six mois après qu'elle se trouve agrégée à la Grande Alliance dans le moment même où les cinq Puissances sont occupées d'une médiation qui a pour but l'intérêt même de la cour, que ces menées sourdes sacrifient, dans le moment où le plenipotentiaire français siège à Paris avec ses collègues et abonde dans un sens diametralement opposé à celui qui forme l'objet des trames de son Cabinet. La France met à

¹ See Chapter VIII., Section 2, p. 424.

profit l'époque même à laquelle le gouvernement anglais travaillait à obtenir de la législature des lois restrictives, qui le missent à même de renforcer sa neutralité dans le différend entre l'Espagne et ses anciennes colonies et d'entraver les moyens d'assistance que ces dernières tiraient de l'Angleterre—mesures qui devaient être regardées par les insurgés comme hostiles à leurs intérêts et qui étaient de nature par conséquent à les rendre plus accessibles à des projets ignorés de l'Angleterre. C'est sous tous ces auspices réunis que le gouvernement français négocie secrètement pour établir un nouvel ordre de choses dans le Continent méridional de l'Amérique et qu'il répond de l'aveu du Continent européen.

Sans doute on a agité la question de l'établissement d'une nouvelle monarchie dans l'Amérique du Sud. A Aix-la-Chapelle même M. de Richelieu a mis en avant ce projet ; on l'a discuté, mais jamais il n'a pu être entendu ou soupçonné que l'une des Puissances put travailler à l'insu des autres à un projet de cette nature, qu'elle alla fonder une nouvelle monarchie par la force des armes dans des vues exclusives et dans le but avoué de nuire aux intérêts de la Puissance même, dont toutes les autres voulaient protéger le bon droit et qui s'était déjà refusée à la demande de nommer un prince de la maison pour régner sur ses provinces d'outre mer.

Nous ne pouvons voir qu'avec un profond regret, poursuivit le Secrétaire d'État, la France trahir ainsi les devoirs d'union solennelle qu'elle avait contractés envers ses Alliés. Mais nous éprouvons surtout le sentiment de la plus vive peine de ce que ce soit sous le règne de Louis XVIII. que son Cabinet fournisse à l'Angleterre cet exemple de déloyauté. La conduite de M. Decazes n'a pas le droit de nous surprendre ; mais il nous reste la consolation de croire que le Duc de Richelieu est demeuré étranger à ces menées secrètes. Nous allons, ajouta-t-il, communiquer à nos Alliés toutes les informations qui nous sont parvenues sur ce sujet et leur offrir ainsi l'occasion de nous faire connaître le jugement qu'ils en portent.

[Lieven asked if he believed in all the documents and if France would have gone so far with an ephemeral government like that of Buenos Ayres. Perhaps Gomez had exaggerated his reports and instructions. The Cabinet of Buenos Ayres appeared to have received with some suspicion the five conditions which imposed no sacrifice on it.]

Le Secrétaire d'État tout en admettant la possibilité de ces hypothèses, observa toute fois, que d'un autre côté ce même conseil pour délibérer gravement sur des documents qui touchaient son existence politique, devait les croire authentiques, et qu'enfin le mémoire français en portait bien le type.

[Castlereagh then shewed Lieven Sir Charles Stuart's report of Pasquier's explanations : that the idea of a monarchy in South America was not a new one, that Richelieu and Decazes knew

nothing of it, while Dessolles was out of Paris but had, Pasquier was sure, no hand in it.]¹

Le Vicomte de Castlereagh me dit après m'avoir donné lecture de ce rapport qu'il me l'avait communiqué pour me faire juger combien était faible la défense du gouvernement français. D'ailleurs, ajouta-t-il, sur quel argument pourrait-il défendre l'envoi clandestin de vaisseaux chargés de troupes pour l'Amerique du Sud, et qui viennent de mettre à la voile des bouches de Tage ? Lorsque l'année dernière l'Angleterre envoya quelques bâtiments pour renforcer sa croisière dans la mer du Sud, elle donna avis à toutes les cours alliées des motifs et du but de cet envoi. La France arme, équipe, l'expédition met à la voile et ses Alliés l'apprennent par les gazettes.

[Portugese Government suspected of complicity, but Palmella on point of sailing from Portsmouth sent a letter of denial. Lieven took pains to dispel any similar suspicions as regards Russia. Great effect will be produced on Franco-British relations.]

(v)

(No. 261) December 8, 1820.

[Interview with Castlereagh concerning the *Protocole préliminaire*. He said that as his colleagues were absent he could only speak unofficially but would do so without reserve.]

Il ne pouvait, continua-t-il, me cacher la peine qu'il éprouvait à voir les trois Cours signer une pièce de l'importance de ce protocole à l'insu des représentants des deux autres Cabinets ; mais il ne peut surtout me déguiser ses vives appréhensions sur l'objet même de ce protocole. Il ne sait, ajouta-t-il, de quelle manière l'envisager. Doit-il être considéré comme la substance d'un traité à faire, et partant de là comme base d'une nouvelle alliance, ou bien est-il simplement l'exposé d'une entente confidentielle résultant du rapprochement des opinions des Cabinets sur les circonstances actuelles et de leurs vues sur de futurs contingents. Dans ce dernier cas on aurait simplement à appréhender l'inconvenient que le secret des cabinets ne veuille à être compromis. Mais le premier offrirait les plus légitimes motifs d'alarme parce que rien de plus grave et de plus déplorable ne pourrait accabler l'Europe dans la situation où elle se trouve.

Les trois Cours créeraient un nouveau système politique qui invaliderait tous les engagements existants : elles érigeraient une autorité qu'il serait impossible aux autres Puissances de reconnaître ; mais plus que cela elles donneraient naissance à un système opposé

¹ From Stuart, July 10, 1820 : *F.O. France*, 229.

que leur ferait trouver de la résistance là, où elles ne rencontrent aujourd'hui qu'une disposition sincère d'assistance et de concours.

[Lieven said he was yet without instructions but referred to those of Esterhazy.]

Le Vicomte de Castlereagh me répondit, que tous les développements des quels on pouvait accompagner ce sujet, ne changeraient en rien ses opinions puisqu'ils ne changeaient point le fonds de la question. Si l'on proclame les principes indiquées dans cette pièce, poursuivit-il, les lois fondamentales de notre monarchie nous obligeront non seulement à nous déclarer contre eux, mais à protester contre ses doctrines. Nous nous y verrions contraints, quelques convaincus que nous puissions être d'ailleurs de la droiture et de la pureté des vues qui les auraient dicté. Vous proclameriez à la face de l'univers que vous vous reconnaissez le privilège exclusif de vous ingérer dans les affaires intérieures d'États indépendants, d'États aux quels les transactions existantes assurent des droits que vous voulez enfreindre. Vous conviendrez même entre vous de l'emploi de moyens coercitifs.

[Lieven refused to admit this interpretation. They did not pretend to interfere in the internal affairs of other countries but only to exclude revolutionary States from their Alliance. Coercion would only be used when other means exhausted and when a neighbouring State threatened. Such generous and conservative principles could surely be proclaimed aloud.]

Je ne revoque point en doute, répondit le Secrétaire d'État, les intentions des monarques ; personne plus que moi ne rend justice au mobile généreux qui les guide ; mais je dois juger et condamner maintenant ce que sous peu nous serons forcés de juger et de condamner à la face de notre parlement. C'est ainsi qu'en répliquant à vos observations, je vous observerai à mon tour, que des maximes semblables reconnues et convenues entre trois Souverains autocrates, ouvrent de fait tous les pays à l'invasion de leurs armées. Ils s'attribueraient la faculté d'interpréter eux-mêmes la nécessité de leur intervention et de déterminer la convenance et le moment de l'emploi de leurs moyens de compulsion. Comment peut-on justifier en principe le droit des Puissances d'ériger de leur propre mouvement et volonté un tribunal aussi redoutable à l'indépendance des nations ?

Les nuances sur des points aussi essentiels sont si délicates, que de même qu'il leur serait impossible de définir et de prévoir tous les cas aux quels s'appliqueraient leurs principes, il deviendrait aisé aux ennemis de l'ordre de les interpréter dans tel sens étendu, qui conviendrait le mieux à leurs projets et d'induire ainsi dans une erreur dangereuse et les nations et les gouvernements et jusqu'aux auteurs mêmes d'un système généreux en principe. L'Angleterre même pourrait-elle se reconnaître à l'abri de ce système de

coercition? Qu'un changement quelconque vienne à s'opérer dans ce pays, que l'état présent de l'agitation publique vous semble rentrer dans la catégorie des cas qui requièrent notre intervention, qu'un monarque anglais demande votre secours, toutes ces circonstances hypothétiques autoriseraient donc l'Alliance à connaître des affaires intérieures de la Grande Bretagne? Quel est, je vous demande, le ministère qui pourrait sanctionner des principes susceptibles d'inductions semblables? et, pourrait-il soutenir sur un seul jour, s'il ne s'y déclarait ouvertement hostile?

Quels sont donc au surplus les avantages si grands que présente ce système pour les mettre en balance avec les conséquences funestes desquelles il menace?

[Lieven answered that advantages were to prevent a repetition of the disasters and combine forces of order against attack. How could they look supinely on, while a Sovereign was deprived in a moment of his authority?]

Ce n'est point, je vous l'ai répété plus d'une fois, me dit le Vicomte de Castlereagh, contre le but et l'intention des monarques que je me prononce, mais contre les formes et les moyens qu'ils veulent adopter. Un même but peut être atteint par des voies plus naturelles, plus conformes à l'esprit de nos temps. Au lieu d'unir les esprits par la manifestation de principes sévères et hostiles à l'indépendance des nations, votre action envers Naples fera mieux que toute autre chose, connaître vos opinions et votre résolution. Le fait imposera plus que les paroles et ne livrera pas comme celles-ci des armes dangereuses aux factieux.

Que l'Autriche au moment d'agir (si toute fois la sagesse commande ce parti) fasse ostensiblement connaître à ses Alliées les raisons qui la guident; elle en a de légales; les preuves qu'elle possède des trames des Carbonari sont à elles seules un motif suffisant pour légitimer l'adoption de mesures énergiques afin de se préserver de leur influence. Les autres Puissances, en répondant à la déclaration de la Cour de Vienne, pourront émettre leurs opinions sur le fait qui aura provoqué cette déclaration, et elles auront dans cette forme le moyens de les exprimer avec bien plus d'énergie et d'effet, puisque chacun parlera le langage propre à sa situation particulière, qu'elles ne sauraient le faire dans une proclamation collective, dans laquelle les ménagements respectifs doivent nécessairement affaiblir et gêner la force de la pensée et de l'expression.

L'esprit de faction sait dans notre siècle tourner tout au profit de ses dangereuses doctrines. Ici les monarques lui livreraient gratuitement des armes qu'il serait aisé de tourner contre eux. De nos jours l'action vaut mieux que les systèmes et des lois pratiques que des lois écrites. Vos principes proclamés ainsi établiraient une nouvelle loi de nation à nation. Une déclaration

collective dans laquelle trois Souverains absolus se reconnaissent le droit de condamner un peuple libre et de faire suivre leur anathème de la marche d'une armée, appelée européenne, destinée à porter la guerre sur le territoire napolitain, donneraient aux factieux et même à ceux qui ne le sont pas, les moyens les plus faciles de vous représenter sous un jour odieux et arbitraire et réveilleraient dans la nation napolitaine un esprit de résistance et un enthousiasme dont il est difficile de calculer les suites. Qu'on se rappelle l'effet de la proclamation du Duc de Brunswick au commencement de la Révolution ; il est notoire que c'est ce document imprudent qui a donné le premier élan à l'esprit guerrier et conquérant des Français. Agissez donc là où il faut agir, mais point de déclarations qui généralisent vos principes ; elles ne feraient que nuire au but que vous vous proposez.

Nous ne sommes assurément point en principe un gouvernement révolutionnaire ; nous ne pouvons pas conséquent avoir d'autres vœux que les vôtres ; mais la marche que vous adoptez peut en dépit de notre volonté nous forcer jusqu'à devenir le centre et le point de ralliement des révolutionnaires. Vous ériges deux étendards là où il n'en faut qu'un seul pour le salut de l'Europe. Je le répète, agissez, mais ne dictez pas les lois. Vous nous trouverez toujours disposés et intéressés à vous seconder dans le moment où notre secours deviendra nécessaire, et nous saurons trouver dans chaque circonstance particulière des motifs fondés pour notre concours. Mais ne nous placez point dans l'arène pour vous combattre, ne nous contraignez pas à vous nuire et par là à nous perdre tout.

Tout ce que je viens de vous dire pour la part de l'Angleterre doit s'appliquer également à la France avec la différence qu'elle a de plus que nous à observer les considérations dues à la situation du Roi vis-à-vis de sa nation—situation qu'une scission dans la politique européenne exposerait aux plus grands périls. Il deviendrait aisé de signaler cette ligue des Souverains à la haine et à la méfiance des Français et d'interpréter toute mesure du gouvernement, qui ne conviendrait point aux intérêts des factieux et qui poserait des entraves à leurs projets, comme basée sur la confiance que le Roi mettrait dans l'appui et le secours de cette ligue. De nouveaux germes de discorde seraient ainsi disséminés dans ce pays, foyer et moteur du vertige révolutionnaire, qui désole tous les autres, et il se verrait livré à de nouveaux bouleversements tandis que les engagements spécifiques qui garantissaient le maintien de son repos, seraient invalidés et détruits.

On ne peut se dissimuler que déjà l'Espagne offre une preuve palpable de la crainte et de la méfiance qu'inspirent aux peuples cette réunion des Souverains. Nos derniers rapports de Madrid, que j'ai aussitôt transmis à Lord Stewart, nous apprennent les

inquiétudes qu'ont conçues les ministres du Roi ; que ce monarque ne se trouve déjà influencé par l'espoir d'une assistance étrangère. Et quelques résolus qu'ils semblassent être de soutenir les droits de la monarchie il paraît maintenant qu'appréhensifs aux-mêmes des résultats de la réunion de Troppau, ils inclinent bien plus qu'ils n'en avaient l'air jusqu'ici à s'entourer de nouvelles garanties contre les empiètements de l'autorité royale sur les libertés de la nation.

La position et les forces imposantes des trois Puissances et plus que cela encore le caractère vertueux de leurs monarques offrent à l'Europe des avantages précieux. Plus à même que les autres grandes Cours d'agir avec célérité, lorsque l'occasion de la faire l'exige, elles assurent par là même le maintien de l'ordre et de la paix de l'Europe ; mais plus leur moyens sont grands, moins il faut qu'elles en abusent. Le moment présent est décisif pour les gouvernements ; ils ne feront point impunément des fautes. Voyez l'état de l'esprit public dans tous les pays—plus on y réfléchit et plus on doit se sentir effrayé du mal immense qui résulterait d'une seule fausse démarche.

Je n'ai jamais autant regretté qu'à présent de ne point me trouver auprès de l'Empereur et de ne pas pouvoir Lui soumettre mes pensées. Ma conviction de tout ce que je viens de vous dire est telle que je ne forme aucun doute, qu'accessible comme est l'Empereur au langage franc de la vérité, je ne fasse partager à Sa Majesté Impériale des opinions qui ne peuvent que frapper de conviction un jugement aussi éclairé que le sien. L'Empereur a répété en toute occasion son principe immuable de ne point contracter de nouveaux engagements, de ne point former de nouveaux liens à côté de ceux qui existent et de ne point chercher de nouvelles garanties hors de l'Alliance générale. Cette détermination est en effet l'ancre de salut de l'Europe ; pourquoi y porter atteinte ? "

Votre Excellence concevra sans que je les répète ici les arguments desquels j'ai pu me servir pour chercher à détruire dans l'esprit du Vicomte de Castlereagh les impressions fâcheuses et exagérées qui lui étaient restées sur les transactions de Troppau. Il lui sera également aisé de se former une idée par le récit fidèle et presque littéral que j'ai cru devoir lui faire de cet entretien du degré de chaleur et de vivacité, qui animaient [*sic*] le secrétaire d'État dans ce sujet. Son langage portait l'accent de la plus intime conviction ; il parlait avec la force qui donne la vérité et il m'en est resté la plus complète persuasion qu'un intérêt général et commun à tous les gouvernements dirigeaient seuls sa pensée et ses discours.

Je l'ai vu à cette occasion, comme à toutes les autres pénétré de la pureté et de la noblesse des intentions qui guident les Souverains ; aussi n'élève-t-il aucune objection sur les fonds de leurs déterminations ; toute son opposition porte sur des formes et il se prononce

contre elles avec la plus grande force, parce qu'il croit voir dans cette cause secondaire les entraves les plus inférieures au concours de l'Angleterre et peut-être même l'obligation forcée de suivre une marche opposée à celle que nous adopterions.

(vi)

(No. 264) *December 21, 1820.*

[Interview with Castlereagh as to the British note and the dispatch to Stewart of December 16 sent in reply to the *Protocole préliminaire* of November 19, 1820. Castlereagh said that this was necessary to avoid misconception but that it had been made as little controversial as possible and would be kept confidential but used if necessary to justify the Government. Lieven regards this as a natural development of attitude revealed in last dispatch.¹ He expressed his pain to Castlereagh at its tenure.]

Le Secrétaire d'État me dit qu'il pouvait attester que le coeur lui avait saigné en traçant cet écrit ; que son Cabinet, étant l'un de ceux qui avaient à s'honorer le plus d'avoir participé à la création du beau lien qui unit les Grandes Puissances entre elles, de ce lien le plus glorieux qu'offrent les annales de la politique du monde, ce n'était pas sans le plus vif chagrin qu'il se voyait contraint pour la première fois de se servir d'un langage qui impliquait une dissidence d'opinions avec ces mêmes Puissances, auxquelles l'union la plus solennelle attache l'Angleterre et dont les pensées ni les intérêts ne diffèrent pour le fonds en rien des siennes. Si nous nous montrons opposés au système que nos Alliées veulent établir, ce n'est point, ajouta le Vicomte de Castlereagh, que le moindre sentiment de méfiance ou de jalousie nous y porte ; nous ne saurions concevoir l'une ni de leurs principes ni de leurs intentions ; l'autre n'approche pas de notre pensée, et loin que les mesures qu'ils pourraient prendre à l'exclusion de la Grande Bretagne déplussent à notre Cabinet c'est nous au contraire qui avons soutenu dès le premier moment que la marche la plus sage qu'il convenait à l'Autriche de suivre après les événements qui ont changé la face du gouvernement napolitain, était de s'assurer de l'aveu et des dispositions de la Russie et d'agir en conséquence de ce seul entendement.

Le Secrétaire d'État me rappela ici combien souvent il avait signalé l'urgence de mettre un frein à cette contagion révolutionnaire qui menace de subversion tous les trônes. Il entre dans des explications très étendues, tendante à me prouver que l'Angleterre n'était pas moins intéressée que tout autre État, à dompter cet

¹ See No. v. above.

esprit et combien elle envisage avec inquiétude les conséquences de la révolution de Naples sur le reste d'Italie et la chance de voir cette partie de l'Europe démocratisée.

Il me fit observer que le gouvernement anglais avait énoncé son jugement sur ces bouleversements politiques dans toutes les pièces sorties de son cabinet, qui avaient eu trait à ce sujet particulier, et qu'il avait réprouvé et condamné, comme ils devaient l'être, les principes révolutionnaires qui avaient amené ces commotions, ainsi que les formes sous lesquelles elles s'étaient opérées ; qui ce n'était donc ni contre les intentions ni contre l'action de ses Alliées, que l'Angleterre proteste, mais que voyant consignés dans un document officiel des principes que l'essence de son gouvernement ne lui permet point à admettre, le gouvernement britannique se trouvait contraint d'émettre un jugement sévère tandis que tous ses vœux sont à l'unison de la pensée de ses Alliés.

Peut-être, ajouta-t-il, les trois Puissances se trouvent elles déjà engagées trop avant pour pouvoir revenir sur les dernières résolutions ; peut-être se croiront-elles dans l'obligation de leur donner de la publicité ; dans ce cas si l'énoncé actuel ne faisait foi du jugement qu'en porte le ministère anglais, il succomberait infailliblement à la force de l'opinion nationale, qui doit se lever toute entière contre des doctrines semblables, et les Alliés perdraient avec la présente administration cette disposition, qu'ils trouveront toujours en elle de se rattacher à leur politique et d'agir dans un sens identique avec leurs intérêts du moment que les circonstances pourront lui permettre.

Je repousse cependant cette hypothèse et j'espère encore, poursuit le Vicomte de Castlereagh, que les Cabinets Alliés parviendront au moyen de mesures sages à l'égard de Naples à ramener dans cet État le règne de l'ordre et de la paix et à exercer par cet exemple seul, une influence bien plus tutélaire et plus sévère en Europe que ne pourrait leur valoir toute publication ou manifestation collective de leurs principes.

Il sera aisé à Votre Excellence de reconnaître la pensée qui a dominé le Cabinet britannique dans la rédaction de la pièce dont je jouis ici la traduction. Son but est évidemment de se ménager une arme défensive contre les attaques qui seraient dirigées contre lui, si l'entrée de l'armée autrichienne dans le Royaume de Naples était accompagnée d'un manifeste portant les déclarations que consacre le protocole préliminaire. Le Secrétaire d'État s'est particulièrement attaché à me convaincre que tel était l'objet unique de la présente communication, et qu'elle resterait à jamais ensévelie dans les archives, si une nécessité positive n'obligeait le gouvernement anglais à en faire usage. Je n'ai pas pu méconnaître dans les instances par lesquelles il cherchait à me persuader, combien est vive son apprehension qu'on ne donne une fausse interprétation

à cette démarche. Une égale crainte me semble dominer son esprit à l'égard de toutes les ouvertures du gouvernement britannique dans les derniers temps, et il déduit de la possibilité d'une méprise semblable des Cabinets sur les principes et la position de celui-ci les plus déplorables conséquences, non seulement pour les relations des grandes puissances entre elles, mais encore pour le repos de l'Europe en général.

[Wellington spoke in the same sense as Castlereagh. Lieven is convinced of the sincerity of the British Cabinet.]

(vii)

(No. 27) *December 9, 1821.*

...Votre Excellence sait qu'à l'époque où le Roi a quitté Hanovre il était dans la résolution la plus positive de faire sortir Lord Liverpool du Cabinet. Il me reste à instruire Votre Excellence des causes plus particulières qui avaient motivé cette détermination.

L'office de Grand Chambellan était occupé depuis nombre d'années par le Marquis de Hertford, époux de l'ancienne favorite du Roi. Sa Majesté voulant l'obliger à se démettre de cette charge imagina de lui imposer les fonctions les plus pénibles pour la cérémonie du couronnement. La conséquence en fut que ne se sentant point en état, ou son grand âge de supporter les fatigues de cette journée, et jugeant du motif qui pouvait avoir guidé le Roi, il se démit volontairement de sa charge, mais *la veille seulement* du jour du couronnement.

Sa Majesté demanda de suite à ses ministres de disposer de cette place en faveur du Marquis de Conyngham. Lord Liverpool déclara qu'il ne pouvait sans compromettre la dignité du ministère et porter atteinte à l'intérêt de l'administration, remplir à cet égard la volonté de son Maître. C'est sur ce point que se fixa la résistance du Roi et de son ministre lequel était soutenu de l'aveu de tous ses collègues.

Le Marquis de Londonderry, ayant précédé de deux jours le retour du Roi en Angleterre, s'aboucha immédiatement avec le premier ministre. Il paraît qu'il répondit de quelques concessions de la part de Sa Majesté, si de son côté Lord Liverpool était disposé à en faire, et à l'arrivée Roi on lui offrit la nomination à une place de cour de moindre importance pour le Marquis de Conyngham. Sa Majesté ne balança point à accepter ce moyen de conciliation. Elle n'avait en effet d'autre parti à prendre, attendu qu'en supposant même qu'Elle se déterminât à changer de ministère par ce motif seulement sa Majesté ne pouvait se flatter d'en former un qui aurait dû acheter cet honneur au prix d'une bassesse.

Il fut donc décidé que le Marquis de Conyngham aurait la place de Grand-Maréchal de la Cour, occupée jusqu'ici par le Marquis de Cholmondeley, et qu'il serait offert à celui-ci des avantages équivalents en compensation de sa démission volontaire. Une reconciliation sincère et complète entre le Roi et son premier ministre fut le résultat de cet arrangement. Les explications qui l'ont amenée ont été, selon ce que m'en a dit Lord Londonderry lui-même, qui m'a donné spontanément connaissance de ces faits, des plus utiles et des plus satisfaisantes pour les rapports futurs du Roi avec ses ministres.

Il considère la crise qui vient d'avoir lieu comme également utile à l'expérience du Souverain et à celle de son premier ministre ; en ce qu'elle modérera les caprices de l'un et l'aspérité de l'autre. Et son opinion, de même que celle du Duc de Wellington, est que la permanence du présent ministère n'a jamais été plus solidement garantie que par les explications qui viennent d'avoir lieu.

Tout leur mérite de ce rapprochement est dû au Marquis de Londonderry, qui a su habilement ménager les intérêts et l'amour propre des deux partis. Il reconnaît au reste qu'il a trouvé les voies préparées dans l'esprit du Roi, et que le voyage de Sa Majesté sur le Continent avait contribué à un haut degré à éclairer ses opinions et ses idées.

Je dois remarquer encore ici que l'entrevue du Roi avec le Prince de Metternich doit avoir eu une grande influence en faveur des ministres et disposé Sa Majesté au rapprochement favorable qui vient de s'opérer entre Elle et eux.

Ayant nommé le Prince de Metternich sous le rapport de son influence sur la personne du Roi, je ne dois point omettre à cette occasion de mentionner celle qu'il se trouve plus que jamais en mesure d'exercer sur le ministère.

Le séjour d'Hanovre a fortifié et accrue sensiblement l'intimité qui avait existé jusque là entre lui et le Marquis de Londonderry. Ce ministre s'est exprimé envers moi sur le compte du Chancelier d'Autriche dans les termes de la plus grande estime. Il reconnaît qu'un grand changement s'était opéré en lui depuis leur dernière entrevue ; que son esprit et ses opinions avaient acquis un degré de solidité et de justesse qui pouvait lui avoir manqué ci-devant.

Il attribue en grande partie ce changement au rapprochement heureux dans lequel il s'est trouvé de l'Empereur notre auguste Maître à Laybach, et aux occasions qu'il y a eues de s'éclairer du jugement de Sa Majesté Impériale. Cette époque en général est regardée par le ministère britannique comme une ère des plus imposantes dans la politique européenne par les rapports d'intimité que s'y sont établis entre les deux Cours impériales, condition que le Cabinet de St James considère comme essentielle à un entendement franc et sincère entre tous les Cabinets.

(viii)

(No. 118) *June 10, 1822.*

[Lieven was summoned by Castlereagh to a conference a few days before on the Spanish Colonies. Castlereagh reviewed at length the history of the negotiations from 1812 onwards shewing the deference paid by the British Government to Spain's rights. Action could now no longer be deferred on the question of the admission of the vessels of the Colonies to British ports and the alteration in the Navigation Acts was explained.¹]

Par cette mesure et par le forme dont elle sera revêtue le ministère préviendra toutes les réclamations de sujets britanniques et d'ailleurs il n'aura porté aucun préjudice aux anciens droits de la monarchie espagnole, car il déclarera en même temps à la cour de Madrid que, dès qu'elle parviendrait à rétablir en Amérique l'empire de son autorité légitime, l'Angleterre reconnaîtrait que dès lors ses dispositions temporaires cesseraient d'être en vigueur et que le gouvernement espagnol se trouverait libre de replacer ses relations commerciales sur le pied qu'il jugeait convenable. D'une autre part, continua le Marquis de Londonderry, la Grande Bretagne a pensé qu'elle ne devait pas laisser ignorer aux provinces de l'Amérique méridionale le jugement qu'elle porte sur leur situation. C'est pourquoi j'ai devoir me ménager avec M^r Campbell ² une entrevue qui a eu lieu il y a trois jours.

Nous n'avons pas jugé à propos de répondre par écrit à la note de M. Zea, d'abord parce qu'elle est conçue dans un langage inconvenient et qu'elle faut entendre un ton menaçant qui ne plait pas aux oreilles du ministère anglais. En outre ne se trouvant pas en rapport avec les contrées dont M. Zea se dit représentant, l'Angleterre ne pouvait non plus reconnaître son caractère officiel ni entrer par conséquent avec lui en relation diplomatique.

En effet le gouvernement ne possède pas une connaissance suffisante de la situation véritable de ces vaste contrées pour être à même de décider sur leur sort politique. Sa Majesté le Roi par un juste ménagement du à son ancien Allié le Roi d'Espagne devait se défendre d'ailleurs de prendre l'initiative sur une affaire dans laquelle S. M. Catholique est seule l'arbitre légitime. Il falloit donc abandonner à la consideration sérieuse des provinces américaines de reconnaître, que les efforts par lesquels elles tendent vers leur liberté politique devaient s'adresser en premier lieu à l'Espagne et non à des Puissances tierces, car quelles que puissent être les

¹ See Chapter VIII., Section 1, p. 429.

² Zea's secretary, who had preceded him to London, Clancarty, however, calls him Mr. Williams.

déterminations de ces dernières elles ne pourraient point servir de garantie réelle à la stabilité de leurs institutions. Enfin, autant pour la paix du monde que pour leur propre prospérité, l'Angleterre préférerait de les voir attendre leur but par des voies d'accommodement avec la mère-patrie. Quant à elle même, l'Angleterre loin de prétendre à aucune prééminence, à aucun privilège exclusif reconnaîtrait avec empressement les avantages qui pourraient être assurés à l'Espagne, en retour des sacrifices qu'elle aurait faits à la pacification du nouveau monde. J'ai remarqué avec satisfaction, ajouta le Secrétaire d'État, que cette manière de voir a été justement appréciée l'Agent américain.

Comme le gouvernement anglais a des notions trop imparfaites sur l'état des choses dans l'Amérique méridionale pour connaître ses besoins véritables, il est intentionné d'envoyer des agents dans ces contrées. A la demande que je lui fis sur la qualité de ces fonctionnaires, Lord Londonderry me répondit que ce seraient simplement des agents de commerce et non diplomatiques, et que leur mission n'aurait d'autre objet que celui de recueillir sur les lieux des renseignements nécessaires sur la situation du pays par lequel ils étaient destinés. Le Secrétaire d'État poursuit en ces termes : J'ai fait à M. d'Onis une communication entièrement conçue dans le même sens que celle dont je viens de vous faire part. Je l'ai invité à instruire sa Cour de notre situation. Je lui ai exprimé, dans les mêmes paroles dans lesquelles je vous ai parlé, les vœux que nous formons à l'égard du parti que le gouvernement espagnol aurait à prendre dans ces complications, ainsi que la nécessité qui a porté l'Angleterre à adresser ces ouvertures à S. M. Catholique.

M. d'Onis qui semble être duement entré dans la situation de l'Angleterre, m'a assuré par anticipation sur les réponses de sa Cour qu'elle me méconnaîtrait point la conduite de notre Cabinet, et que même elle se trouvait actuellement en rapport avec ses colonies pour en venir à un accommodement. Cependant, poursuivit Lord Londonderry, la situation diverse des colonies, des vues qui elles ont conçues sur leur sort futur et l'inflexibilité habituelle de la métropole ne donnent que peu d'espoir d'une reconciliation prochaine.

La France, continua-t-il, étant d'entre toutes les Puissances celle que sa position et ses institutions placent le plus dans la même situation délicate que l'Angleterre, j'ai cru en second lieu devoir une ouverture entière à ce sujet à l'ambassadeur de S. M. Très Chrétienne, car il est essentiel que ces deux gouvernements s'entendent complètement sur la marche qu'ils trouvent convenable de suivre dans ce grand intérêt.

C'est à vous que je me suis adressé immédiatement après pour vous prier de transmettre à votre Cour les communications que je

viens de vous faire au nom de mon Cabinet. L'Autriche et la Prusse étant intéressés dans ces questions d'une manière moins directe c'est plutôt pour maintenir l'harmonie qui préside en général aux relations des Puissances alliées, que je me réserve de porter ces vues, également à leur connaissance.

Après m'avoir ainsi mis au fait des différentes démarches auxquelles le gouvernement anglais a dû se déterminer dans l'intérêt de ses relations commerciales avec l'Amérique, le Secrétaire d'État entra vis-à-vis de moi dans des explications plus confidentielles sur le même objet, dans la vue de me faire connaître au juste la position difficile où le Cabinet de Londres se trouve placé à cet égard. Le ministre, me dit-il, ne se dissimule pas qu'il s'agit de décider ici d'une question qui peut dans ses dernières conséquences produire un effet moral des plus graves—attendu qu'elles consolideraient l'existence d'un grand nombre de gouvernements divers, pour la plupart démocratiques et qui pourraient facilement créer dans la suite si non des dangers, du moins des embarras, pour tous les états monarchiques. Ces considérations devaient donc nécessairement rendre plus difficile encore le choix d'un système propre à combiner deux éléments divers, qui pouvaient d'un côté toucher de près à l'essence même du gouvernement, et de l'autre exciter contre lui les clameurs de la classe commerçante de ses sujets et par là le forcer à devier de cette ligne de conduite mesurée, qu'il aimerait à suivre dans cette conjoncture comme dans tout autre. Par conséquent tout ce que le gouvernement anglais désirerait ce serait de pourvoir, ménager autant que possible ces deux grandes considérations.

Afin de se maintenir sur cette ligne intermédiaire l'Angleterre ne cessera de former des vœux pour que la conduite de l'Espagne ne vienne y mettre obstacle, et pour que l'unité de vues et de principe qui caractérise l'Alliance générale facilite de son côté l'attitude pleine de modération et de justice, que l'intérêt bien entendu des Puissances européennes leur fait un devoir d'opposer aux dissensions du nouveau monde.

Il suffirait pour cela de bien connaître et d'apprécier la situation de l'Angleterre, et, en se dépouillant des préventions qui ont trop souvent influé sur le jugement qui a été porté sur la politique anglaise dans les affaires coloniales, se convaincre de la pureté des intentions du Cabinet britannique et de la sincérité des ouvertures confidentielles qu'il adresse aujourd'hui aux Cours alliées.

Tels ont été, M. le Comte, les explications du Marquis de Londonderry. Les ayant fidèlement rendues dans tous leurs détails je me bornerai à y ajouter quelques peu de remarques.

Il me paraît évident que le gouvernement anglais pressé par l'exemple des Etats-Unis et plus directement encore par l'ouverture catégorique de M. de Zea (motif dont il n'était pas de la dignité

du ministère britannique de convenir vis-à-vis de moi) a été forcé de recourir à une mesure propre à protéger son commerce. Les relations suivies dans lesquelles l'agent américain, ainsi que tous ceux de sa catégorie, se trouvent avec l'Opposition auraient infailliblement mis cette matière en discussion devant le parlement et de même que dans toute question délicate de cette nature, l'issue en aurait été douteuse.

Mais en se déterminant à prendre une résolution sur ce sujet il a tâché de la dépouiller de toute apparence de mesure politique et l'a pour cet effet englobée dans une série nombreuse d'autres arrêtés sur le commerce dont la clause la plus importante n'a l'air de former qu'une partie subalterne. Par ce moyen il a mis à couvert les intérêts de son commerce sans toucher le côté moral de la question. Comme cependant il ne saurait se dissimuler que cette demi-mesure ne peut avoir qu'une action absolument temporaire, il a le plus profond désir que l'Espagne, en prenant l'initiative, épargne à l'Angleterre l'obligation forcée de se prononcer plus tard sur la plus délicate matière qui puisse s'offrir à ce gouvernement.

Le soin particulier, que le Secrétaire d'État a apporté à me faire entendre la situation difficile du gouvernement, partagé, pour ainsi dire, entre les prétensions de la classe commerçante et le danger des conséquences morales qu'entraîneraient cette vaste question, si une fois elle était mise en avant,—ce soin et les explications ultérieures, qui en sont découlées, m'ont fait conjecturer que le ministère anglais se bornerait probablement à de simples communications verbales, et qu'il ne transmettrait point par écrit aux Cours alliées les ouvertures confidentielles, qu'il leur adresse aujourd'hui par la voie de leurs représentants.

APPENDIX G

PRIVATE CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN JOSEPH PLANTA AND STRATFORD-CANNING, 1821-1822

(i)

Hastings, *January 9, 1821.*¹

(*Private.*)

[Pressure of Business.] My demi-colleague, Clanwilliam, has taken a two months' start on his private affairs to Vienna and has left me with everything at the most critical moment..

[Retirement of Canning.] I was determined you should have full particulars from himself on this subject, and to judge by the size of his packet, I shall have but little to add.² He good-naturedly communicated his position fully to me—and I fairly confess that, as he is determined not to act upon any *moral* conviction as to the Queen, and as the Government are determined *so* to act, having lost all *legal* conviction, I do not see how it was possible for him and the Government to go on together; and, however much in a general point of view and on the great questions of policy his loss will certainly weaken the Government, yet if he abstain from opposing them (which I believe is now his intention) on the Queen's business,—in that affair so critical to them,—I am convinced his absence will not be detrimental to them. Had he stayed in, with his present feelings he would have done them more harm than good. Everything said publicly about him is flattering, but privately of course this is shewn up as another act of versatility, and a proof one cannot depend [*sic*] but this is quite *entre nous*. Lord Castlereagh and Canning have parted on the best possible terms and with mutual recorded expressions of sorrow and regret.

After his withdrawal Peel was sounded but held off, chiefly he said from *family* considerations (he has married a young wife), partly from not feeling so strongly as the Government do about the

¹ *F.O. Stratford-Canning Papers*, 8.

² These add nothing to evidence already published.

Liturgy—but not at all on account of the office offered to him. . . . Upon the whole he did not wish to take office *at present*. This we consider somewhat shabby, but it has led to the determination, which I think is a good one, of leaving the office unfilled until the Parliament has decided (by putting at rest the Liturgy and Palace questions) whether this Government is to remain the Government of the country or not. On this therefore everything hangs, and, from the assurances of support which we have received, we believe that the victory will be on our side. When it shall be gained the Ministers will then look to filling up the situation in the Cabinet. . . .

(ii)

August 8, 1821.¹

(Private.)

You will see by the date of this letter that [I] have been fortunate enough to realise the gay projects of my last letter: and, though I could not escape a short fit of severe illness before I left London, yet I have now escaped I trust from *both*. I held out until the very moment when Hamilton arrived to relieve me. He came to town Saturday week. Sunday I completed the business of all the coronation Embassies and Missions, and on Monday Hamilton took up the reins again fresh and without finding arrears. Monday I was laid on my back and narrowly escaped a bilious fever . . .

We have had great doings since I last wrote you and most successfully have they gone off. The Coronation was got up and gone through admirably, and has been productive of the best effects. I can assure [you] that the sight—and I saw the whole of it—was very imposing and magnificent. I went rather with the idea that I should consider it mummery and childishness, but everything was so well managed, the dresses and preparations were so superb, the *Local* so venerable, and the assemblage so distinguished and august that one felt nothing but respect and awe. The King bore the fatiguing ceremony upon the whole much better than was expected, and was quite radiant from the thunders of applause with which he was received. On the whole this ceremony has elicited an expression of loyalty much greater than was expected, and has therefore done good. The Queen by her conduct on the occasion ruined herself and her cause for ever. I say no more of her because you will probably hear by this mail of her death: at least the last account I have from London is that she is not expected to live half-an-hour. Certainly her being withdrawn from amongst us would appear to be the most salutary circumstance that could

¹ *F.O. Stratford-Canning Papers*, 7.

happen at present. It will remove from us the great handle for disaffection and wickedness of every description. How fortunate circumstances turn out for this Government !

Abroad we have no subject of interest but the Greeks, the Turks and the Russians : and the war which everybody fears between Russia and the Porte. The Emperor's promises are strongly pacific ; but still he seems to support Stroganov, who is so intemperate that, at any moment, he may plunge his Master into a war ; and with the known disposition of one of his Ministers and of the whole of his people, I hardly know how the Emperor is to avoid war in the end. Austria would temporize and prevent if possible. We would do everything we possibly could to prevent the rupture—and have written so to Strangford—but we have not a very cautious tool in him, *as we had in 1812*, and he has already been complained of for separating himself from the Russians and endeavouring to gain separate influence—' *la veille diplomatique*.' This is the charge against him which probably goes further than the truth. As to the struggle between the Greeks and the Turks, the most serious part of it is in Greece itself, in the Morea, and in the adjacent Islands. In Albania, the insurgents are so strong (and the Turks daily weakening) that they will probably soon set Ali Pasha free from his fortress on the Lake of Janina ; and when he once gets loose he will put himself at the head of the whole insurrection and the Turkish power in every part of Greece will be annihilated.

Then say your politicians : What will be the end of all this ? I think that, though the question of Greece may be soon decided, the Turks will hold the Russians a long tug [*sic*] before the latter get to Constantinople. It will not be done in one campaign. If, however, the Emperor is in the end successful, he and his Brother of Austria will no doubt divide those provinces and Greece will be started as an independent kingdom, under the formation of [*sic*] Capo d'Istria—and the guarantee, I suppose, of all the Powers of Europe. In this case we shall have to throw in the Ionian Islands as part of the new kingdom—which I trust we shall do instantly and *de bonne grace*. Otherwise we are determined to keep out of whatever happens and not to allow ourselves to be drawn into war in any manner. I am not at all sure, though I do not shut my eyes to the great increase of power on the part of Russia, whether it will not be better that she should be employing herself for the next fifty years in squabbling and beating the Turks and settling affairs in that quarter, rather than in turning her attention to Europe. This will give us capital breathing time—to refit.

I am sure I have given you enough of this. Abroad, as I said when I began, there is no other subject of interest, Bonaparte's death is a good thing for France, otherwise the event has been very little regarded. The saving to us is most important, and the

further reduction now of the Queen's allowance will altogether produce much diminution in our expenditure. You will see also we are going to retrench—Army and Offices . . .

(iii)

New Burlington Street, May 11, 1822.¹

(*Private.*)

This mail must go with very little from me, for an attack of bile and overwork has shut me up at home just on the day of its departure; and the discipline resulting therefrom has left me so little power of exertion that I feel unequal to write to you at any length. The anxiety and work at the Foreign Office has been very severe during this session, and, burdened as I am with the *shafts* of the waggon, has been almost too much for me. I now feel quite oppressed, but I trust that a few days quiet will restore me.

I had thought that Lord Londonderry would have said something to you by this mail on the subject of the Independence of the South American Provinces; but he says not. You have sent us very valuable information on the subject, and have kept us continually informed by every channel in your power of the progress of things. The proceedings in Parliament and what you will see in the papers will put you pretty well in possession of what our line will at present be. The note of M. de Zea has brought us pretty *short up* upon it, coupled as that note is with the recognition of the United States. If I were to describe our line, I should say it would be one of as little *overt act* as possible, but one securing to our subjects all the commercial advantages enjoyed by any other nation with the South American Provinces. For this object we shall insert a clause in one of our acts of Parliament, I believe the Navigation Act, to permit and protect this trade, and thus in fact to acknowledge the *de facto* existence of these States; but we shall make as little fuss about it as we can, and reason and defend the matter with Spain as absolutely required from us under the circumstances. I say this to you *confidentially*, thinking it may be important for you to know what I believe will be our line; but it is not yet matured. . . .

¹ *F.O. Stratford-Canning Papers*, 8.

INDEX

- Aberdeen, Lord, 379 *n*.
- Abisbal, d', 227, 228.
- A'Court, Sir William, 41, 65, 66, 71, 95, 108-112, 182-185, 260, 261, 270, 282, 296, 303, 310, 313, 319, 327, 332-337, 342 *n*, 344, 516, 520, 553.
- Adams, John, 440
- Adams, John Quincy, 45, 415-418, 422, 423, 426, 427, 436, 439-441, 443, 446-452, 465, 495
- Aix-la-Chapelle, Conference of, 19, 86, 94, 117, 121, 127-175, 177, 178, 180, 182, 186, 196, 199, 200, 205, 208, 209, 214, 226, 230, 231, 236, 240, 241, 269, 272, 274, 284-286, 288, 293, 295, 300, 351, 352, 360, 406, 415, 417, 418, 420-423, 425, 444, 445, 458, 462-464, 477, 493, 499, 501, 513, 514, 516, 567.
- Alexander I. :
- character, 58, 89-91, 97, 103, 104, 143, 275, 282, 283, 523, 534.
- at Aix-la-Chapelle, 122, 126, 132, 139, 142-144, 148, 149, 152, 153, 155-158, 162-164, 169-171, 351, 352, 418-420.
- and the Alliance, 53, 55-58, 96, 126, 127, 136, 142, 148-150, 156-158, 162-164, 178, 179, 243, 288, 302, 309, 338, 351, 358, 359, 375, 381, 385, 392, 472, 498, 500, 501, 572.
- and Arakscheiev, 89-91.
- and the Barbary Powers, 462-464.
- and Beauharnais (Eugène de), 95, 170.
- and Capo d'Istria, 91, 92, 126, 132, 164, 229, 265, 286, 308, 314, 389, 398, 526.
- and the Carbonari, 95, 340.
- and the Carlsbad Decrees, 193.
- and Castlereagh, 90-92, 97-100, 102-104, 118, 130, 142, 143, 148, 149, 155-158, 243, 282, 283, 302, 324, 343, 352, 360, 361, 363, 373-379, 394, 418-420, 435, 473, 498, 572.
- and Disarmament, 97-99, 103
- and the Eastern Question, 96, 142, 337, 338, 343, 345, 349, 353, 358, 359, 373, 383-385, 388, 389, 397, 472, 476, 542, 547, 583.
- and France, 75, 78, 80, 84, 85, 92, 93, 128, 143, 144, 152, 153, 156, 158, 179, 199, 200, 203, 210, 265, 280, 289, 307, 330, 340, 341, 358, 388, 424, 462, 476, 480, 522, 531, 532, 542.
- and George IV., 7, 8, 43, 92, 101.
- and Germany, 95, 96, 117, 178, 187, 188, 191-194.
- and Holland (Lord), 267, 325.
- and the Holy Alliance, 58, 59, 89, 96, 97, 229, 288.
- and Intervention, 73, 149, 156, 157, 228, 309, 338, 339, 340, 472.
- and Italy, 181-183, 344.
- and the Jewish Question, 169.
- and Krudener (Madame de), 58.
- at Laibach, 317, 324, 329-331, 342, 353, 354, 389, 528, 540, 576.

Alexander I.:

- and Metternich, 90, 102, 143, 178, 205, 210, 243, 265, 266, 274, 285, 288, 291, 294, 298, 308, 309, 315, 342, 344, 364, 385, 392, 472, 473, 476, 480, 534, 535, 540, 576.
- and Naples, 95, 273, 288, 289, 307-309, 314, 317, 340, 528.
- and Nesselrode, 91, 286.
- and the Opposition, 92, 101, 289.
- and Owen (Robert), 131.
- and the Papal See, 308, 314.
- and the Patriarch Photinus, 90.
- and Piedmont, 329-331.
- and Poland, 264, 288.
- and Pozzo di Borgo, 93, 126, 128, 265.
- and Reichstadt (the Duke of), 114, 115.
- and Richelieu, 280, 287, 340.
- and the Slave Trade, 456, 462, 463.
- and Spain, 94, 168, 179, 226, 228, 229, 243, 264, 273, 308, 309, 338-343, 388, 398, 410-412, 419, 421, 472, 476, 555.
- and the Spanish Colonies, 418-421, 424.
- and Stourdzia, 183, 187.
- and Sweden, 171.
- and Tatishchev, 94, 128, 179, 226, 388, 411, 412.
- at Troppau, 265, 266, 269, 271, 273, 276, 286-289, 291, 294, 307-309, 340-341.
- and the United States, 445.
- and the Verona Conference, 328, 435.
- and Way (Louis), 169.
- and Wellington, 75, 85, 92, 143.
- Ali Pasha of Janina, 351-353, 391, 583.
- Alison, Sir Archibald, 491.
- Alliance, Treaty of, 54-59, 66, 67, 69, 124, 126, 127, 136-138, 145-147, 149, 150, 152, 156, 157, 159-161, 175, 496, 509.
- Alopeus, 133 n, 231, 363, 380.
- Ambrister, Robert Christie, 449.
- Ancillon, Johann, 231, 363, 364, 380.
- Anstett, Baron, 116.
- Antioche, Comte d', viii.
- Antwerp, 51.
- Arakscheiev, Alexis, 89, 90, 97.
- Arbuthnot, Alexander, 449.
- Arbuthnot, Charles, 26, 27, 205 n.
- Arcos, 250, 252.
- Army of Occupation, 16, 53, 55, 63, 69, 70, 72-83, 86, 87, 118, 123, 131, 134, 135, 145, 153, 165, 199, 419.
- Artois, Comte d', 86, 129, 201, 206, 209, 470, 475.
- Baden, Grand Duke of, 117, 178.
- Bagot, Sir Charles, 40, 41, 280 n, 358, 373, 374, 375, 380, 381, 383, 386, 387, 389, 391, 393, 417, 418 n, 422, 442, 443, 447, 448, 473 n, 487.
- Bankhead, Dr., 485, 486.
- Barbary Powers, the, 68, 139, 140, 168, 362, 462-464.
- Bardaxi, 426, 432, 469.
- Baring, Alexander, 50, 81, 84-86, 131, 145.
- Barnard, Sir Andrew, 368 n.
- Bathurst, Bragge, 16.
- Bathurst, Earl of, 15, 35, 86, 144 n, 147, 148, 152, 153, 160, 261, 283, 367.
- Beauharnais, Eugène de, 95, 117, 170, 211.
- Belgrano, Manuel, 424 n.
- Bentinck, Lord William, 21, 41, 108, 109, 264, 336.
- Beresford, Marshal, 248-250, 254 n.
- Bergami, 219.
- Berlin, 39, 40, 42 n, 169.
- Bernadotte (Charles XIV. of Sweden), 4, 170, 171, 250.
- Berne, 39, 42 n.
- Bernstorff, Count, 133, 231, 280, 286, 363, 364, 374, 380.
- Berri, Duc de, 212, 213.
- Blacas, Comte de, 182, 312, 315-317, 327, 330, 336, 337, 535, 536.

- Carlsbad Decrees, the, 177, 191, 193, 194, 196, 499.
 Caroline, Queen, 5, 8, 11, 217-225, 245, 334, 367, 501, 560.
 Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount:
 character and career, 29-35, 371, 490-505.
 illness and death, 482-486.
 and A'Court, 66, 110, 112, 282, 313, 336.
 and Adams (John Quincy), 415-417, 423, 427, 439, 447, 448.
 at Aix-la-Chapelle, 130-172, 236, 286, 288, 295, 352, 415, 418-421, 477.
 and Alexander I., 90-92, 97-100, 102-104, 118, 130, 142, 143, 148, 149, 155-158, 243, 282, 283, 302, 324, 343, 352, 360, 361, 363, 373-379, 394, 418-420, 435, 473, 498, 572.
 and Ali Pasha, 352.
 and the Alliance, 3, 50-58, 66-69, 71-73, 102, 106, 123-125, 127, 136-139, 146, 149-153, 157, 159, 160, 162, 163, 165, 177, 208, 214, 238-241, 249, 255, 256, 280, 284, 299, 300, 303-305, 321-323, 344, 361, 395, 509-511.
 and the Army of Occupation, 80, 134-137.
 and the Austrian Loan, 401, 402.
 and the Barbary Powers, 139, 140, 362, 463.
 and Baring, 84, 131.
 and Bathurst, 147, 152, 160, 170.
 and Beauharnais (Eugène de), 117.
 and Brougham, 487.
 and the Cabinet, 14-16, 19, 72, 80, 130, 134, 138-141, 143-148, 150, 152-155, 158-160, 163, 164, 166, 243, 371, 394, 445, 447.
 and Canning, 13, 18, 19, 31.
 and Capo d'Istria, 194, 195, 363, 376, 379, 418, 420, 421.
 and Cathcart, 68.
 and Chateaubriand, 429, 430, 476-478, 483, 488.
 and Clancarty, 40, 117, 169, 179.
 Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount:
 and Clanwilliam, 37, 131, 484, 487.
 and Consalvi, 112, 113.
 and Conyngham (Marchioness of), 220.
 and Cooke, 37, 130.
 and Croker, 371.
 and Disarmament, 98, 99.
 and the Eastern Question, 102, 349, 350, 359-365, 372, 374-378, 380, 384, 386, 387, 391, 393-400.
 and Esterhazy, 43, 71, 103, 106, 107, 115, 242, 262, 263, 267, 268, 271, 272, 277-279, 284, 299, 301, 302, 319, 326, 327, 360, 361, 363, 365, 395, 550-561.
 and Fernan-Núñez, 410, 411.
 and France, 52, 75, 76, 92, 102, 134-139, 149, 150, 152, 158, 164, 165, 201-204, 206-209, 211-214, 243, 244, 280, 281, 335, 380, 424, 425, 429-431, 476-478.
 and Gentz, 149.
 and George IV., 9, 11, 14, 217, 219, 221, 222, 225, 362, 365, 367-371, 374, 479, 483, 485, 489.
 and Germany, 116, 117, 171, 178, 179, 186, 190, 192, 194, 195, 197, 198.
 and Hamilton, 37.
 and the Hanover Interview, 225, 332, 365, 369, 372, 380, 381, 383, 396.
 and Hardenberg, 195, 231.
 and the Holy Alliance, 58, 250, 252.
 and the Jewish Question, 169.
 and the Laibach Conference, 302, 303, 344.
 and Lieven, 68, 72, 94, 193, 194, 203, 204, 223, 242, 243, 271, 277-279, 282, 283, 299-302, 305, 319, 326, 384, 393, 395, 415, 416, 423, 431, 473, 562-580.
 and Liverpool, 14, 141, 153-155, 160, 161, 217, 277, 369, 370, 485, 487.

Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount:

and Metternich, 43, 71, 99-107, 111, 112, 114, 116, 129, 130, 132, 134, 144, 161, 162, 177, 178, 180, 181, 186, 189, 191, 195-198, 206, 211, 220, 225, 245, 255, 263-265, 267, 269, 270, 272-276, 281, 297, 301, 332, 337, 353, 359-361, 364-366, 369-372, 374, 379, 381, 394, 395, 398, 401, 402, 428, 476, 480, 481, 488, 537-549.

and Naples, 95, 109-112, 261-263, 268, 270, 271, 282, 299, 300, 319, 321, 322, 325, 330, 336.

and Nesselrode, 206, 420, 421.

and Neumann, 181, 190, 192, 193, 195, 211, 483.

and Owen, 132.

and Palmella, 251, 252, 459.

and the Papal See, 112, 113

at Paris, 25, 92, 100, 122, 141, 147, 150.

and Parish, 37.

and Parliament, 19-24, 29, 31, 32, 110-112, 204, 224, 325, 334.

and Pasquier, 212.

and Persia, 353.

and Piedmont, 114, 330-332.

and Planta, 36, 37, 131, 484, 487.

and Portugal, 70, 248-255, 414.

and Pozzo di Borgo, 170, 207, 211.

and Reparations, 84, 135.

and Richelieu, 76, 142, 214, 418.

and Rose, 67.

and Rush, 33, 417, 422, 439, 441, 444-446, 450.

and San Martin, 423.

and Seymour, 484.

and the Slave Trade, 139, 140, 455-466.

and Spain, 93, 94, 167, 233-235, 237, 238, 242, 244, 248, 254, 255, 298, 408-435, 469, 476, 477.

and the Spanish Colonies, 70, 102, 139, 140, 241, 242, 399, 406-435, 453.

Castlereagh, Robert Stewart, Viscount:

and the State Paper of May 5, 1820, 245, 246.

and Stewart, 36, 39, 40, 103, 108, 111, 117, 131, 198, 221, 261-263, 268, 271, 272, 274, 275, 283, 284, 299, 300, 305, 515-536.

and Strangford, 361, 372, 380.

and Stratford-Canning, 439.

and Stuart, 40, 71, 72, 75, 76, 201, 202, 243, 263, 413, 431.

and Sweden, 140, 170, 171.

and Talleyrand, 25.

and Tatishchev, 94, 180.

and Thornton, 252, 254.

and the Troppau Conference, 251, 259, 271, 272, 276-279, 292, 298-300.

and the United States, 415-417, 422, 437-441, 444-503.

and Vaughan, 65.

at Vienna, 23, 24, 51, 52, 68, 69, 92, 96, 100, 140, 162, 195, 286, 349, 458, 459.

and Ward (E. M.), 251, 254.

and Wellesley, 410.

and Wellington, 16-18, 64, 75, 131, 141, 142, 159, 204, 207, 470, 485.

and Wilberforce, 455, 459, 463, 466.

and Zea, 425, 430, 431.

Castlereagh, Lady, 10, 33, 34, 132, 220, 367, 368 n, 480, 481, 486, 549, 561.

Catharine, Grand Duchess, 8, 11, 95.

Cathcart, Earl of, 40, 68, 90, 94, 99, 115, 126.

Cayla, Madame du, 212, 470.

Cevallos, Pedro, 409, 410.

Charles Albert, Prince of Carignan, 328-332.

Charles Felix, King of Piedmont, 329-332.

Charlotte, Princess, 10, 11, 224.

Charlotte, Queen, 10, 45.

- Chateaubriand, Vicomte de, 7, 44,
 400, 429-431, 475, 476, 478,
 480, 483, 488.
 Chaumont, Treaty of, 53-55, 57, 510
 Cimitelli, Prince, 299.
 Clancarty, Earl of, 40, 114, 116, 117,
 164 *n*, 169, 179, 244 *n*, 245, 461.
 Clanwilliam, Lord, 37, 131, 368 *n*,
 484, 486, 487, 498 *n*
 Clarence, Duke of, 10, 11.
 Clarkson, Thomas, 131, 456, 463.
 Clay, Henry, 416, 426.
 Cobbett, William, 27, 102, 225, 488.
 Cochrane, Lord, 406, 423.
 Consalvi, Cardinal, 112, 113, 314.
 Constantinople, 38-40, 42 *n*, 89, 225,
 355, 357, 385, 391, 399.
 Conyngham, Lord, 368, 370, 575,
 576.
 Conyngham, Lord Francis, 368 *n*,
 481 *n*.
 Conyngham, Marchioness of, 220,
 221, 268, 365, 367, 368, 479,
 480, 482, 561.
 Cooke, Edward, 37, 113, 130, 169.
 Copenhagen, 39, 40, 42 *n*.
 Corbière, Comte de, 308, 380, 557.
 Corfu, 182.
Courier, the, 26.
 Cresson, W. P., 419 *n*.
 Croker, John Wilson, 26, 27, 205 *n*,
 370 *n*, 371.
 Cuba, 438, 448.
 Cumberland, Duchess of, 10, 45.
 Cumberland, Duke of, 10, 11.
 Cuxhaven, 38.

 Davis, H. W. C., ix, 368 *n*.
 Decazes, Duc, 27, 44, 190, 199, 200,
 203-205, 211, 214, 223, 244,
 267, 280, 281, 425, 531, 552,
 557, 558, 567.
 Denman, Lord, 221.
 Derby, Lord, 218, 551.
 Dessoles, Marquis, 198, 200, 424,
 425, 568.
 Devonshire, Duke of, 368.
 Dover, 221, 444.

 Dresden, 39, 41 *n*, 42 *n*.
 Dublin, 5, 560.
 Dusseldorf, 123 *n*.

 Edinburgh, 5, 487.
Edinburgh Review, the, 27.
 Eldon, Lord, 15, 221.
 Ellenborough, Lord, 335.
 Esterhazy, Prince, vii., 7, 8, 14, 22,
 43, 45, 71, 94, 101, 103, 105-
 107, 109, 110, 115, 128, 181,
 182, 188, 190, 204, 206, 207,
 213, 218, 219, 221, 223, 232,
 242, 261-263, 265, 267, 268,
 271, 272, 274, 276-279, 283,
 284, 291, 297, 299, 301, 302,
 316, 319, 320, 326, 327, 334,
 336, 344, 359-363, 365, 371,
 385, 395, 401, 473, 479-481,
 517, 531 *n*, 532, 537, 538, 542,
 544, 549, 550-561, 569.

 Fagel, Baron, 45.
 Ferdinand I. (IV.), King of the Two
 Sicilies, 109-111, 261, 282, 290,
 295, 298, 299, 302, 306, 307,
 309, 310-315, 317, 319, 327,
 333, 337, 472, 473, 527, 535,
 536.
 Ferdinand VII., King of Spain, 21,
 94, 128, 134, 227-239, 242 *n*,
 244, 298, 299, 308, 338-342,
 408-412, 421, 426, 432, 469-
 472, 474.
 Fernan-Núñez, Count, 44, 410-412,
 414.
 Ferrara, 182.
 Fitzwilliam, Lord, 208, 551.
 Florence, 39, 41, 42 *n*, 71, 113, 314,
 324, 342, 381, 480.
 Floridas, the, 227, 410, 416, 422,
 426, 438, 447, 448, 451, 564.
 Fontainebleau, Treaty of, 115.
 Francis I., Emperor of Austria, 59,
 81, 122, 132, 142, 161, 178, 179,
 182, 183, 189, 193, 200, 219,
 275, 327, 363-365, 369, 473,
 480, 528, 544, 552.
 Frankfort, 40-42 *n*, 68, 69, 84, 131,
 140, 179.

- Frederick, King of Wurttemberg, 186, 192, 193.
- Frederick William III., King of Prussia, 59, 122, 123 *n*, 132, 133, 142, 153, 186, 188, 189, 265, 267, 274, 280, 286, 545.
- Frere, John Hookham, 350.
- Frias, Duc de, 45.
- Fuller, H. B., 449 *n*.
- Fyffe, C. A., 492.
- Gallatin, Albert, 440, 443-445.
- Gallo, Duc di, 310, 314, 317, 318, 333.
- Genoa, 4, 108, 110, 114.
- Gentz, Friedrich von, 87, 100 *n*, 123 *n*, 131-133, 149, 153, 154, 168, 169, 179, 188, 285, 287, 289, 290, 297, 306, 310, 313-315, 525, 526, 557.
- George III., 4, 217, 218, 440.
- George IV., 4-12, 14, 32, 43, 44, 67, 92, 94, 98, 101, 103, 111, 115, 122, 132, 182, 190, 193, 197, 207, 213, 217-225, 237, 239, 242 *n*, 267, 268, 269, 278, 279, 283, 299, 302, 304, 326, 334, 336, 362, 365, 368-371, 374, 381, 409, 413, 414, 478-480, 482, 483, 487, 489, 501, 544-546, 548, 550, 559-561.
- Ghent, Treaty of, 438, 440, 443, 445, 451.
- Gloucester, Duke of, 10.
- Goderich (*see* Robinson).
- Golitzin, Prince, 169.
- Golovkin, Count, 181, 201, 203, 205, 286, 473.
- Goltz, Count, 70.
- Gomez, Valentine, 424, 567.
- Gordon, Sir Robert, 128, 129, 131, 178-184, 188, 205, 287, 292, 297, 298, 313, 315, 316, 324, 329, 334, 337, 341, 343, 344, 366, 395-398, 472, 473, 476, 488, 536-538, 546.
- Goulburn, Henry, 444.
- Gouvion St. Cyr., Marshal, 199, 203.
- Green, J. G. S., 478 *n*.
- Grey, Earl, 21, 43, 222, 325, 368.
- Hague, the, 39, 40, 42 *n*.
- Halet Effendi, 351, 397.
- Hamburg, 39, 42 *n*.
- Hamilton, William, 37, 42.
- Hanover Interview, the, 332, 365, 366, 369, 372, 374, 375, 379-381, 383, 395, 396, 401, 501, 537, 541, 559-561, 576.
- Hardenberg, Prince von, 64, 84, 133, 162, 168, 186, 189, 195, 231, 232, 235, 286, 290, 514, 555.
- Hardy, Sir Thomas, 226.
- Harrowby, Lord, 15, 261.
- Hastings, Lord, 371.
- Hertford, Lord, 10.
- Hertford, Marchioness of, 9, 10, 220, 561.
- Hertslet, Lewis, 38.
- Hervey, 342, 469-471, 474.
- Hesse, Elector of, 171.
- Hessen-Homburg, 125.
- Hetavia Philhke*, the, 353.
- Hill, the Hon. William, 41, 329 *n*, 331, 332, 559.
- Holland, Lord, 21, 267, 335, 532.
- Holy Alliance, the, 58, 59, 89, 96, 97, 228, 229, 231, 250, 252, 255, 288, 325, 351, 373, 439, 464, 497.
- Hope, the financial house of, 86, 145.
- Horner, Francis, 20.
- Hudelist, Josef von, 132.
- Hulot d'Osery, General, 424.
- Humboldt, Baron von, 45, 64, 127, 133, 188.
- Hume, Joseph, 13.
- Hunt, Henry, 191.
- Huskisson, William, 13, 16, 371, 429, 444.
- Hutchinson, Lord, 221.
- Hyde de Neuville, Baron, 443.
- Hypselantes, Prince Alexander, 337, 353.
- Internuncio, the (*see* Lützow).
- Ionian Islands, the, 207 *n*, 352.
- Ismail Effendi, 373.
- Iturbide, Augustin, 426.

- Jackson, Andrew, 448-450.
 Jacobi-Kloest, Baron, 45.
 Janina, 391.
 John, Regent and King of Portugal,
 247-254, 459
 Jordan, 133.

 Kent, Duke of, 10, 11.
 Kiel, Treaty of, 68, 139, 140, 170.
 Knessebeck, Field-Marshal von dem,
 164.
 Knighton, Sir William, 220, 368 n,
 479, 480
 Kniphausen, 171
 Kotzebue, August von, 182, 183,
 187, 188, 213
 Krudener, Madame de, 58.
 Krusemarck, 286

 Labouchère, P. C., 131.
 La Feronnays, M. de, 282, 287, 292,
 296, 306, 327, 330, 340, 363 n,
 522.
 La Garde, Comte de, 471, 474,
 475.
 La Harpe, Frédéric de, 183.
 Laibach, Conference of, 100, 102,
 249, 252, 295, 302, 303, 307,
 310-345, 353, 354, 361, 374,
 380, 389, 395, 396, 398, 401,
 469, 493, 499, 501, 528, 535,
 536, 540.
 Lamb, Frederick, 41, 116, 325.
 Landsdowne, Lord, 21.
 La Tour du Pin, 71, 230, 231, 233,
 235, 244, 330.
 Latour-Maubourg, Marquis de, 44,
 204, 211, 390.
 Laval, Duc de, 332, 339, 341.
 Lawrence, Sir Thomas, 132.
 Leach, Sir John, 219.
 Lebzeltern, Count, 43, 125, 132, 193,
 195, 201, 243, 264, 275, 313,
 364, 384, 385, 387, 388, 473,
 476, 520, 535.
 Leghorn, 313.
 Leopold of Saxe-Coburg, Prince,
 11.
 Lieven, Count, viii, 24, 43, 68, 72,
 94, 101, 133, 180, 193-196, 203,
 204, 221, 223, 236, 242, 243,
 246, 267, 271, 272, 277-279,
 282, 283, 299-302, 305, 319,
 326, 336, 370, 374-375, 379,
 384-386, 389, 393, 395, 414,
 416, 423, 431, 463, 472, 473,
 476, 480, 518, 530, 531, 552,
 553, 557, 562-580.
 Lieven, Countess, 11, 43, 92, 133,
 207 n, 220.
 Lima, De Oliveira, 406.
 Lisbon, 42, 249-254
 Liston, Sir Robert, 40, 350, 352,
 354
 Litta, Cardinal, 113 n.
 Liverpool, Lord :
 character of, 13-15.
 and the Alliance, 153-155, 160,
 161.
 and the Army of Occupation, 86.
 and the Cabinet, 13-15, 370, 487,
 and Canning, 14, 18, 224, 368,
 370.
 and Castlereagh, 14, 141, 153-155,
 160, 161, 217, 277, 369, 370,
 485, 487.
 and George IV., 217, 221, 224,
 225, 367-370, 561, 575.
 and Lieven, 277, 280, 326.
 and Metternich, 206, 369.
 and Naples, 276, 277, 325, 556.
 and the Press, 25, 26.
 and the Slave Trade, 454.
 and the Troppau Conference, 278.
 Esterhazy on, 561.
 Lieven on, 575.
 Wellington on, 14.
 London, 43, 139, 170, 172, 203, 205,
 209, 221, 244, 351 n.
 Louis XVIII., 6, 8, 53, 58, 66, 76,
 77, 79, 88, 138, 153, 199, 201,
 204, 206, 208, 209, 211, 212,
 229, 230, 244, 265, 306, 455,
 462, 470, 471, 475.
 Louvel, Louis-Pierre, 218.
 Lowe, Sir Hudson, 170.
 Lozano de Torres, 227.
 Lucca, 182.

Lutzow, Count, 350 *n*, 355, 359, 364,
380, 384, 389.

Mackintosh, Sir James, 21, 325.

Madison, James, 446.

Madrid, 39-42, 93, 226, 228, 230,
231, 233, 260, 325, 422, 474,
475.

Mahmoud II., 350, 351, 354-356,
358, 359, 372, 373, 375, 380,
390, 391, 393, 394.

Maitland, Sir Thomas, 207 *n*.

Malta, 49.

Mannheim, 123 *n*.

Marie-Louise, Duchess of Parma,
114-116.

Martens, F., viii, 415 *n*

Martinez de la Rosa, 432, 470, 471.

Maxwell, Sir Herbert, 486 *n*.

Medici, Ludovico, Duke of Sarto,
260

Melville, Lord, 15

Metternich, Prince:

and A'Court, 71, 110, 183, 185,
311, 344.

at Aix-la-Chapelle, 132, 133, 143,
144, 149, 162, 164, 186, 196,
205.

and Alexander I., 90, 102, 143,
178, 205, 210, 243, 265, 266,
274, 285, 288, 291, 294, 298,
308, 309, 315, 342, 344, 364,
385, 392, 472, 473, 476, 480,
534, 535, 540, 576.

and the Alliance, 70-73, 123, 125,
126, 129, 149, 179, 205, 210,
243, 275, 324, 392, 500, 516,
517, 542, 547.

and the Ambassadorial Conference,
70, 71, 123, 127, 129, 201, 205

and Artois (Duc d'), 129, 201, 206.

and the Austrian Loan, 401, 402.

and Blacas, 315, 316.

and Bonaparte (Louis), 170.

and Canning, 101.

and Capo d'Istria, 91, 128, 129,
164, 176, 193, 196, 265, 273,
275, 285-294, 297, 298, 301,
315, 353, 379, 388, 396, 520,
524, 525.

w.c.

Metternich, Prince:

and Caraman, 212, 282, 287, 307,
474.

and the Carlsbad Decrees, 177,
184, 189-191.

and Castlereagh, 43, 71, 99-107,
111, 112, 114, 116, 129, 130,
132, 134, 144, 161, 162, 177,
178, 180, 181, 186, 189, 191,
195-198, 206, 211, 220, 225,
245, 255, 263-265, 267, 269,
270, 272-276, 281, 297, 301,
332, 337, 353, 359-361, 364-
366, 369-372, 374, 379, 381,
394, 395, 398, 401, 402, 428,
476, 480, 481, 488.

and Castlereagh (Lady), 132.

and Decazes, 190, 203.

and the Eastern Question, 255,
343, 345, 359, 364, 365, 372,
374, 379, 385, 390, 392, 395-
397, 481, 539-542, 547

and Esterhazy, 22, 43, 103, 105,
109, 128, 181, 188, 190, 205,
221, 232, 242, 267, 268, 272,
274, 278, 291, 297, 301, 316,
327, 343, 359, 365, 385, 481,
517, 542, 550-561.

and France, 129, 177, 201, 203,
206, 209-212, 329.

and Francis I., 132, 182, 276, 311.

and Frederick William III., 186,
189, 286.

and Gentz, 133, 179, 188, 286,
313.

and George IV., 8, 101, 190, 193,
213, 219-221, 223, 268, 365,
369, 371, 381, 480, 576.

and Germany, 108, 117, 118, 162,
176, 177, 186-191, 193, 196,
198.

and Golovkin, 201, 203, 205.

and Gordon, 178-181, 184, 188,
189, 205, 329, 344, 366, 472,
473, 488.

and the Hanover Interview, 225,
332, 365, 366, 369, 372, 374,
379, 391, 401, 541, 576.

and Hardenberg, 162, 189, 232.

and Humboldt, 188.

and Italy, 108, 118, 178, 179, 181-
183, 260, 265, 290, 515, 539,
547.

- Metternich, Prince
 and the Jewish Question, 168.
 and Kotzebue, 183
 and La Ferronnays, 287, 292, 327.
 and La Harpe, 183
 at Laibach, 312-318, 324, 329,
 343, 374, 535, 536.
 and Lebzeltern, 132, 243, 264,
 275, 313, 364, 385, 473, 476,
 520.
 and Lieven (Countess), 43, 133,
 220.
 and Liverpool, 206, 369.
 and Lützow, 359, 364, 380.
 and the *Morning Chronicle*, 27,
 28, 191.
 and Munster, 189.
 and Naples, 102, 109-111, 183,
 259, 263, 265, 270, 288-290,
 306, 308-315, 327, 329, 332,
 333, 337, 338, 527, 539
 and Nesselrode, 91, 190, 195, 359,
 525.
 and Neumann, 43, 128, 130, 181,
 191, 210.
 at Paris, 100.
 and Piedmont, 114, 290, 329, 338,
 539.
 and Pozzo di Borgo, 127, 133, 206,
 211, 265, 307, 312, 314, 542.
 and Reichstadt (Duke of), 115.
 and Reparations, 84.
 and the Rothschilds, 168.
 and Ruffo, 109.
 and St. Marsan, 312.
 and Spain, 178, 228, 232, 243,
 288, 311, 338, 343, 472, 473,
 476, 481, 547.
 and Stewart, 39, 103, 105, 115,
 129, 130, 178, 191, 193, 196,
 209, 223, 232, 264, 267, 271,
 273-276, 287, 290-294, 296-298,
 308, 309, 311, 312, 315, 316,
 324, 338, 344, 365, 480, 515-
 525, 527-536.
 and Strangford, 359, 541.
 and Tatishchev, 94, 382, 391-393,
 397, 398.
 at Troppau, 285-298, 306-311,
 524, 525, 527-534.
- Metternich, Prince :
 at Vienna, 100, 196.
 and Vincent, 126, 232, 313, 476.
 and Wellington, 75
 and Zichy, 364.
 Miguel, Prince of Portugal, 247.
 Mikhailowitch, the Grand Duke
 Nicholas, 8 n, 88 n.
 Milan, 328.
 Miller, General, 406.
 Miltitz, 390
 Milton, Lord, 192, 198.
 Minorca, 94, 411.
 Missolonghi, 400.
 Mocenigo, Russian Ambassador, 95,
 118, 182, 329 n.
 Modena, 182, 329.
 Monaco, Prince of, 171.
 Monroe, James, 45, 427, 440 n, 441,
 442, 446, 447.
 Monroe Doctrine, the, 436
 Montmorenci, Duc de, 429, 430 470-
 472, 475, 476, 488.
 Morier, J. P., 41 n.
Morning Chronicle, the, 26-28, 191,
 320 n, 424, 557.
 Mounier, Baron, 133.
 "Mountain," the, 21, 222, 334.
 Muffling, General, 164.
 Mulgrave, Lord, 15, 16
 Munich, 39, 42 n, 178, 179.
 Münster, Count, 7, 136, 189, 221,
 223, 555, 561.
 Murat, Joachim, 24, 108, 260.
 Naples, 39, 41, 42 n, 183, 244, 245,
 249, 259-261, 270, 282, 283,
 288, 291, 297, 300, 307, 309-
 311, 314, 319, 325, 327, 333,
 334.
 Navigation Acts, 22, 429, 434, 444,
 577.
 Nesselrode, Count von, 91, 93, 132,
 190, 193, 195, 206, 286, 312,
 343, 359, 374, 382, 384, 389,
 420, 421, 525.
 Neumann, Baron, 43, 128, 130, 180,
 181, 190, 191-194, 196, 197,
 210, 211, 480, 483.

- Newfoundland, 438, 445.
 New Orleans, 449
New Times, the, 26, 27.
 Nicholas I., 90.
 Nicolai, Baron, 44, 363
 Northumberland, Duke of, 177.
 Nugent, General, 260.

 Odessa, 353, 355.
 Oliveira, Portuguese minister, 253.
 Olivenza, 248, 410.
 Oncken, Wilhelm von, 492
 Onis, Luis de, 45, 422, 432, 433,
 449 n, 578.
 Oporto, 249.
 Orange, Prince of, 11, 211
 Orleans, Duc d', 424
 Osmond, Marquis d', 44, 128, 423.
 Owen, Robert, 131.

 Pacca, Cardinal, 113.
 Palmella, Marquis de, 44, 248, 251,
 252, 459.
 Palmerston, Lord, 13
 Papal See, the, 112, 113, 308, 314.
 Parga, 352.
 Paris, 39, 42 n, 63, 68, 69, 70, 72, 86,
 114, 122, 127, 129, 133, 139,
 146, 150, 153, 179, 183, 202,
 203, 206, 207, 209, 244, 263,
 351 n.
 Paris, First Peace of, 50, 53, 54.
 Paris, Second Peace of, 3, 50, 52-54,
 92, 101, 127, 146, 409, 462.
 Parish, David, 131
 Parish, Woodbine, 37.
 Pasquier, Duc, 133, 211-213, 229,
 230, 244, 266, 267, 280-282,
 287, 307, 313, 330, 335, 340,
 341, 380, 424, 557, 567.
 Pedro, Prince Royal of Portugal,
 247, 250, 252, 253, 255.
 Peel, Sir Robert, 13, 368, 371, 487,
 581, 582.
 Pepe, General, 261, 310, 333.
 Percy, 329.
 Perkins, Dexter, 95 n, 419 n

 Perry, James, 27, 132
 Petersburg, vii n, 38-42 n, 68, 94,
 206, 169, 228, 242, 243, 274,
 282, 294, 309, 351 n, 358.
 Phillips, Alison, viii, 284 n, 294 n.
 Photinus, the Patriarch, 90.
 Pilat, Austrian publicist, 100 n,
 286
 Pinheiro, Portuguese minister, 254,
 255
 Pizarro, Francisco, 410.
 Planta, Joseph, 36, 37, 131, 134,
 335, 359, 387, 398, 443, 452,
 482, 484, 487, 581-584.
 Plunket, William Conyngham, 371.
 Pole, Wellesley, 16.
Political Register, the, 27.
 Ponsonby, George, 20.
 Pozzo di Borgo, Count
 at Aix-la-Chapelle, 133, 170, 205,
 415.
 and Alexander I., 93, 126, 128,
 265.
 and the Alliance, 122, 126, 205,
 414
 and the Ambassadorial Confer-
 ence, 69-71, 81, 92, 123, 201,
 207, 263, 412
 and Ancillon, 231.
 and Blacas, 312.
 and Capo d'Istria, 126, 133, 274,
 307, 312, 340.
 and Castlereagh, 170, 207, 211.
 and Decazes, 200.
 at Laibach, 312, 317, 318.
 and France, 75, 76, 85, 183, 200-
 204, 206, 214, 280, 281, 307,
 380, 421, 474, 542.
 and Metternich, 127, 133, 206,
 211, 265, 307, 312, 314, 542.
 and Naples, 263, 265, 266, 314,
 317, 337.
 and Nesselrode, 312.
 and Richelieu, 128, 340, 554.
 and Spain, 126, 230, 244, 340,
 410, 415, 472
 and the Spanish Colonies, 70, 412,
 414, 415.
 and Stewart, 318, 522.

- Pozzo di Borgo, Count :
 and Stuart, 70, 75, 77, 96, 200-
 202, 207, 263, 280 n, 413
 at Troppau, 286, 307, 312.
 and Vincent, 70
 and Wellington, 69, 77, 79-82, 85,
 94, 204, 513
 Pradt, Abbé de, 23.
 Pribram, A. F., 401 n
 Pueyrredon, Juan Martin, 424.
- Quarterly Review*, the, 27.
 Quiroga, Antonio, 227
- Ramadan, M., 45
 Rayneval, Comte de, 133, 229, 230,
 424
 Reichstadt, Duke of (Napoleon II.),
 114, 115, 211.
 Reparations, 52, 74, 80-87, 123, 135,
 145, 165.
 Richeheu, Duc de, 71, 75, 76, 79-86,
 93, 128, 133, 135, 142, 143, 145,
 155, 159, 199, 213, 214, 229,
 230, 233, 243, 244, 266, 273,
 274, 280, 281, 287, 307, 308,
 330, 340, 376 n, 380, 413, 418,
 462, 470, 497, 510, 522, 554,
 559, 567,
 Riego, Rafael del, 227.
 Rieti, 333.
 Rio de Janeiro, 39, 42 n, 242 n, 247,
 249, 252, 460.
 Rio Plata, 226, 248.
 Ripon, Earl of (*see* Robinson).
 Robinson, Frederick John (after-
 wards Viscount Goderich and
 Earl of Ripon), 16, 56, 444.
 Romilly, Sir Samuel, 20, 486.
 Rose, George, 40, 67, 231, 509 n,
 550.
 Rothschild, the house of, 50, 168,
 169 n.
 Ruffo, Prince, 109, 111, 314, 318,
 327, 536.
 Rush, Richard, 33, 45, 417, 422, 427,
 439, 441, 444, 446, 447, 450.
 Russell, Lord John, 21, 267.
- Saadeik Effendi, 384
 St Helena, 169, 170
 St Marsan, 312.
 "Saints," the, 22, 440, 466
 Saldhana, Count, 298, 308, 339, 440,
 533, 534
 Salisbury, Lord, 108, 491, 503.
 Salzburg, 69.
 San Carlos, Duke of, 44
 Sand, Karl, 187, 218.
 San Domingo, 462.
 San Martin, José de, 406, 423, 424 n,
 565.
 Scholer, 384.
 Scio, 398
 Scott, Sir Walter, 490.
 Semyonovski Regiment, the, 294.
 Serrurier, 419 n
 Seymour, Hamilton, 484
 Sidmouth, Viscount, 15, 32, 371
 Sierra Leone, 458, 461, 465.
 Slavery and the Slave Trade, 22, 23,
 45, 68, 131, 139, 140, 168, 205,
 248, 410, 413, 414, 445, 454-
 466, 497.
 Smith, Sir Sydney, 23
 Spa, 142.
 Spina, Cardinal, 312.
 Stackelberg, 310.
 Stadion, Count von, 401.
 Stahremburg, Prince, 114.
 Stapleton, A. G., 245, 492
 Stewart, Lord, 36, 39, 40, 42 n, 95,
 103, 105, 106, 107, 109, 111,
 112, 114 n, 115, 117, 129, 131,
 178, 191, 193, 196, 197, 198,
 209, 210, 221-223, 232, 243,
 261-264, 268-279, 283, 290-303,
 305-309, 311-319, 324, 326, 338,
 340, 344, 365, 479, 480, 484,
 490, 491, 498 n, 549, 555, 557,
 558, 571.
 Stockholm, 39, 41, 42 n, 171, 354.
 Stourdza, Alexander, 183, 187.
 Strachey, Lytton, 11 n.
 Strangford, Lord, 40, 41, 354-359,
 361, 362, 372, 380, 381, 384,
 385, 389-392, 396, 398, 399,
 538, 541.

- Stratford-Canning, 41, 427, 439,
443, 444, 451, 452, 465.
- Stroganov, Baron, 96, 351, 354-358,
362, 363, 583
- Stuart, Sir Charles, 37, 40, 41, 70-72,
75-80, 83, 96, 127, 128, 200-202,
204, 207, 211, 213, 214, 230,
232, 233, 243, 263, 266, 267,
280 n, 335, 413, 424, 431, 471,
475, 567,
- Sturmer, 170.
- Stuttgart, 39, 42 n
- Sussex, Duke of, 10, 11.
- Talleyrand, Prince, 25, 296.
- Tatishchev, Dmitri Pavlovitch, 91-
95 n, 118, 128, 179, 180, 226,
382, 388, 391-393, 397, 398,
410-412, 414, 419-422, 471, 539.
- Tavistock, Lord, 483 n.
- Teheran, 385
- Temperley, H. W. V., ix, 236, 246,
399 n, 478 n
- Tepitz, 189.
- Thistlewood, Arthur, 32, 218.
- Thornton, Sir Edward, 41, 249, 252-
254.
- Thugutt, 401.
- Tierney, George, 20, 204, 223, 325,
334, 531, 532.
- Times*, the, 25-27, 132, 191, 205
- Trevelyan, G. M., 437 n, 466 n.
- Troppau, Conference of, 100, 112,
102, 223, 249, 251, 252, 259,
265, 267, 269, 271, 273-277,
279-283, 285-313, 315, 316, 319,
338, 342, 361, 380, 472, 493,
501, 524-534, 572.
- Turin, 39, 41, 42 n, 114, 325, 328,
329.
- Turner, the Rev. S., 490, 491.
- Vansittart, Nicholas, 16, 24, 32.
- Vaughan, 65, 93, 409, 411
- Venice, 4, 108.
- Verona, Conference of, 338, 435,
480, 484, 488, 499
- Victor Emanuel I., 328-332.
- Victoria, Queen, 11.
- Vienna, 38, 39, 42 n, 68, 109, 164,
178, 179, 180, 189, 190, 193,
195, 197, 200, 205, 206, 209,
212, 219, 220, 263, 266, 269,
270, 273, 274, 282, 286, 287,
292, 296, 297, 307, 351 n, 365,
368, 373, 391, 393, 397-399,
433, 478, 499.
- Vienna, Congress of, 8, 16, 20, 23,
27, 40, 45, 51-53, 57, 68, 69, 92,
95, 96, 100, 117, 121, 124, 131-
134, 136, 140, 162, 168, 171,
186, 192, 195, 196, 201, 285,
286, 292, 298, 349, 409, 438,
457-459, 465, 501, 528.
- Villanueva, Joaquin, 250
- Villèle, Comte de, 308, 380, 470, 471,
475, 478, 488, 557.
- Vincent, Baron, 70, 71, 125, 200,
202, 313, 317, 337, 476, 553.
- Vladimirescu, Tudor, 353.
- Wallace, Thomas, 378, 429, 444
- Walpole, Sir Spencer, 429 n.
- Ward, E. M., 251-255.
- Warsaw, 125, 192, 272
- Washington, 38-42 n, 422, 442, 443.
- Way, Louis, 131, 169.
- Weimar, Grand Duke of, 188.
- Wellesley, Lord, 371.
- Wellesley, Sir Henry, 40, 65, 226-
228, 230, 233, 234, 237, 242 n,
244 n, 298, 338, 339, 342 n, 410,
419, 421, 451, 555
- Wellington, Duke of:
at Aix-la-Chapelle, 140-145, 152,
159, 153, 154, 168, 419, 420.
and Alexander I., 75, 85, 92, 143.
and the Ambassadorial Confer-
ence, 71, 77, 81.
and the Army of Occupation, 16,
53, 75, 76, 78-82, 86, 87, 134,
135.
and Artois (Duc d'), 86, 201.
and Bagot, 442
and Baring, 84, 145.
and Bathurst, 86.
and the Cabinet, 12, 13, 15-18, 35,
134, 135, 140, 141, 234, 277.
and Canada, 446.

Wellington, Duke of :

- and Castlereagh, 16-18, 64, 75, 131, 141, 142, 159, 204, 207, 470, 485.
- and Esterhazy, 326, 553, 558-560.
- and France, 52, 76, 79, 86, 135, 201, 470.
- and George IV., 370
- and Lieven, 277, 278, 566, 576.
- and Liverpool, 14.
- and Louis XVIII, 79.
- and Metternich, 75.
- and Naples, 326, 559
- and Palmella, 44.
- and Pozzo di Borgo, 69, 77, 79-82, 85, 94, 204, 513.
- and Reparations, 82, 84, 85, 145.
- and Richelieu, 79-81, 85, 233, 470.
- and Spain, 233-235, 237, 419, 420, 422, 425, 513, 514, 566
- and Stewart, 39.
- and Stuart, 40, 413.

Wellington, Duke of :

- at Verona, 488.
- and William, King of the Netherlands, 71.
- Werther, Baron von, 45.
- Westmoreland, Lord, 15, 16
- Whitbread, Samuel, 20, 486.
- Wilberforce, William, 22, 221, 440, 455, 456, 459, 463, 465, 466,
- William I, King of the Netherlands, 71, 136, 163, 244 n, 460
- Wilson, Sir Robert, 21, 108, 288, 335, 336, 368, 560.
- Wittgenstein, Prince, 133, 287.
- Wynn, Charles, 370.
- York, Duke of, 10, 558.
- Zea, Francisco Antonio, 425, 430, 431, 433, 577, 579, 584
- Zichy, Count, 132, 286, 364

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